“U.S. and Tajik officials have marked the start of construction of a military training center near Dushanbe that is being funded by Washington, RFE/RL’s Tajik Service reports.

“U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan Ken Gross and Tajik National Guard Commander General Rajabali Rahmonali laid the [...]]]> The U.S. is building a military training center in Tajikistan’s capital:

“U.S. and Tajik officials have marked the start of construction of a military training center near Dushanbe that is being funded by Washington, RFE/RL’s Tajik Service reports.

“U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan Ken Gross and Tajik National Guard Commander General Rajabali Rahmonali laid the cornerstone of the live-fire training building at Tajikistan’s National Training Center at Qaratogh, about 50 kilometers west of the Tajik capital.

“The $3.1 million project is being paid for by the U.S. Central Command (Centcom) and is scheduled to be completed later this year…

“The U.S. has previously sponsored projects to support Tajikistan’s counternarcotics and border-security efforts — including the modernization of border crossings along the Tajik-Afghan border and providing radios, vehicles, and training for border guards, police, and customs officials.”

Related posts:

1. What the US Could Learn about Afghanistan from Tajikistan: “You Can’t Always Get What You Want”
2. But I’ve Been Unfaithful, I’ve Been Traveling Abroad
3. End of a Century…It’s Nothing Special

Suppose the U.S. succeeded beyond all its wildest expectations, and turned Afghanistan into Nirvana on Earth, an orderly, high GDP nirvana with universal health care and a robust wireless network (and even suppose that it did this without the expense depriving Americans of the same things).  So what? [...]]]> Marc Lynch makes a very good point:

Suppose the U.S. succeeded beyond all its wildest expectations, and turned Afghanistan into Nirvana on Earth, an orderly, high GDP nirvana with universal health care and a robust wireless network (and even suppose that it did this without the expense depriving Americans of the same things).  So what? Al-Qaeda (or what we call al-Qaeda) could easily migrate to Somalia, to Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasas, into Africa — into a near infinite potential pool of ungoverned or semi-governed spaces with potentially supportive environments.  Are we to commit the United States to bringing effective governance and free wireless to the entire world?  On whose budget?  To his credit, McChrystal adviser Steve Biddle raises all of these questions in his excellent American Interest article from last month — but in my view goes wrong by limiting the policy options to either full withdrawal or full commitment to COIN.

Right.  It’s not like al-Qaeda is confined to this little sliver of land in South Asia such that, once that narrow stretch of land is magically pacified and completely reordered, al-Qaeda will cease to exist.  Thus, as Lynch points out, the game of nation build-a-mole will have to continue in a new setting.  And at a couple trillion dollars a pop, we don’t have the money.  Further, al-Qaeda (and its viral ideology) has penetrated Western Europe and other regions not in need of nation building.  So even if at the end of a century and $50 trillion dollars or so, we managed to purge the globe of potential havens, the problem would persist.

This, for my money (taxpayers too), is the right approach:

Another option which used to be on the table, as I understood it, was a much more narrowly focused policy of keeping the pressure on al-Qaeda while letting Afghan politics sort itself out.  But from my distance, at least, it seems that this approach is being overwhelmed by those arguing for a much more expansive mission (as Michael Cohen has been documenting for a while under the category title “Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch”). And that worries me.   I see why keeping al-Qaeda on the ropes matters.  But I just don’t really see why trying to build an Afghan state is a significant American national interest, or that it can be done at a price commensurate to its significance.   

I fear that the escalation of the war in Afghanistan is following a dangerous path of least resistance.  Given the assignment to win the war in Afghanistan, of course a military which has been reshaped by its experience in Iraq will turn to COIN doctrine.  Once the decision is made to apply a COIN approach, of course the military is going to ask for more troops there, and a long commitment, since it’s always been obvious that really doing COIN in Afghanistan would require vastly more troops than are currently deployed.  And then, at each step of the way, there will be a strong tactical argument for expansion and a very difficult sell for any attempt to argue for restraint. Once that iron logic has been accepted, all else follows — and it becomes extremely difficult to reverse course. 

But I remain far from convinced that COIN is the right approach, especially when compared not to total U.S. withdrawal but to a more minimalist strategy.  The attraction of COIN seems to derive from learning only partial lessons from Iraq — conveniently forgetting that the “surge” and COIN were only one of a number of factors contributing to the changing conditions there, along with the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda which long predated the “surge” and the near-completion of sectarian cleansing in many urban areas, and that its long-term success in Iraq is far from guaranteed. And Afghanistan, as should be obvious, is very different from Iraq.   Its advocates argue that this simply means that the approach needs to be adapted to the local conditions and the mission adequately resourced.  I’m not at all convinced. 

No, neither am I.  This is something to think about given a couple other pertinent news items of the day.  First, Anthony Cordesman (who is acting as one of McChrystal’s advisors) is recommending a substantial escalation:

Anthony Cordesman, an influential American academic who is a member of a team that has been advising General Stanley McChrystal, now in charge of Nato forces in Afghanistan, also said that to deal with the threat from the Taleban the size of the Afghan National Army might have to increase to 240,000.

If Mr Cordesman’s recommendation reflects the view of General McChrystal, who recently presented the findings of a 60-day review of Afghanistan strategy to Washington, it would mean sending another nine combat brigades, comprising 45,000 American troops, in addition to the 21,000 already approved by President Obama. This would bring the total American military presence in Afghanistan to about 100,000, considerably closer to the force that was deployed for the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq.

Here’s Steve Hynd on another:

Forty more years of occupation – that’s what the next head of the British Army, General Sir David Richards, is predicting. And he also predicts that US and British troops will be actively fighting there for “the medium term”, i.e. about 15-20 years…

Before American readers dismiss Richards’ prediction as “not invented here”, I’ll remind them that back in 2004 everyone in the U.S. was talking about a possible pullout from Iraq after elections in 2005 – but that the British Army said it was planning to be there until at least late 2008. They turned out to be more honest about prospects then than any American politician, pundit or general. The British Army finally left Iraq in mid-2009.

I expect the same on current timelines for Afghanistan, where American officials have been notoriously averse to estimates of how long the “long war” will actually take. Even now, they’re hedging their bets – but the estimate of David Kilcullen…that the U.S. will be enmired for at least a decade at a cost that will eventually eclipse even the trillion-plus spent on Iraq has become one they cannot ignore.

Imagine how much more incredibly costly in both blood and treasure FORTY years will be. And for what?

And then imagine what it will cost when we have to do it all over again in Somalia, Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasas, other parts of Africa, etc.  This is not an efficient or effective way to fight terrorism.  But it is what Osama bin Laden had in mind when he set out a strategy to bleed America dry and induce our decline.  Maybe we should consider an alternative to Osama’s playbook?

Related posts:

1. Start Another Fire and Watch It Slowly Die
2. We Chiseled and We Switched
3. In Tatters, Shattered

Former President Bill Clinton crawled (well, flew in a Hollywood bigwig’s jet) to Pyongyang to stroke the world’s nuttiest dictator to free two journalists on ex-VP Al Gore’s payroll.

Glad the gals are back [...]]]> It’s Ralph Peters, so there’s plenty wrong with this column, but this part in particular stuck out to me:

Former President Bill Clinton crawled (well, flew in a Hollywood bigwig’s jet) to Pyongyang to stroke the world’s nuttiest dictator to free two journalists on ex-VP Al Gore’s payroll.

Glad the gals are back in the Land of the Big PX. But the message we sent was that you can grab gringos and instantly become a Friend of Bill. Wonder what Iran will want for hostages? Will the Taliban demand face-time with Tina Fey in exchange for the soldier it holds?

Really?  We should be concerned that hostage takers in the future will…demand face time with Bill Clinton or Tina Fey?  Is that really such an exorbitant ransom to pay in order to spare two American women from an unthinkably brutal prison system, wherein prisoners are so deprived of food that they sometimes resort to cannibalism when the opportunity arises (that is, when they aren’t lucky enough to catch a rat and eat it raw on the spot)? 

Or would a Tina Fey photo op be too high a price for the life of a soldier held by the Taliban? Wait, maybe I’m asking the wrong question - Ralph Peters would rather see the soldier executed regardless.

For comparisons sake, consider that in the past Republican presidents have traded arms for hostages, but now Peters thinks a photo op is too steep a price?  Sounds like a bargain to me.  Obviously, hostage taking is a sordid business, and we don’t want to encourage it, but is there really a risk that a spike in hostage taking will occur now that the hostage takers know they might get a visit from Bill Clinton?  I mean, he’s charming and charismatic but he ain’t all that.  I would think the prospect of securing high end US weapons would do more to stoke a trend.

While worrying about potential Clinton-related Iranian ransom demands, Peters ignores the fact that we take hostages too, like these five Iranians. And then there are the "detainees" locked up without trial, or worse.  I’m sure many of those prisoners wish there was a photo-op-out-of-jail option available to them too.

As an aside, the Iranian prisoner story is really rich with irony.  U.S. forces seized five Iranians that were in Iraq on the invitation of the Iran-friendly Iraqi government – the same government that our soldiers are fighting (and dying) to defend.   At the time of the arrest, and throughout their 2 1/2 year captivity, the Iraqi government has petitioned for their release, to no avail (sovereignty has its limits).

According to US officials, the men were detained because they were "associated with" Iran’s Quds force, a unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and were giving aid to Shiite militias.  But here’s the thing, one of the main political parties in Iraq, ISCI (whose leader was feted by President Bush at the White House), was formed in Iran in close consultation with, and its militia was trained and equipped by…Iran’s Quds force!  In fact, many ISCI members still receive pension payments from the Quds force.  They might as well arrest the whole damn political party. 

Round and round we go.

Related posts:

1. The Passing of Torches
2. Whither Rafsanjani?
3. End of a Century…It’s Nothing Special

The United States took an important step yesterday toward leaving Iraq by moving combat troops out of Iraqi population centers in anticipation of the June 30 deadline specified in the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

This redeployment has focused attention on Iraq’s current security situation [...]]]> Mike Hanna is on point, as usual:

The United States took an important step yesterday toward leaving Iraq by moving combat troops out of Iraqi population centers in anticipation of the June 30 deadline specified in the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

This redeployment has focused attention on Iraq’s current security situation and triggered stepped-up efforts by insurgents to undermine the symbolic importance of the transition, by launching attacks generally aimed at Shiite civilians. It has also provided fodder for those in the United States who wish to delay withdrawal.

However, looking at Iraq solely through the prism of short-term security trends clouds thinking about how the United States can best prepare for its exit from the country. It also obscures the enduring and fundamental disputes that undermine long-term prospects for stability. The United States should instead continue the transition toward diplomacy with modest goals and a focus on facilitating dialogue and negotiations on the most intractable issues facing Iraqis: governance, territory, and resources.

Make no mistake, Iraq is not on a self-correcting path to tranquility. It is likely to see a near-term increase in baseline levels of violence, and varying levels of violence for years to come.

But the logical case for withdrawal remains unchanged, starting with the binding obligation to withdraw on a fixed timetable as part of the SOFA negotiated by the Bush administration. More broadly, our expanding commitments in Afghanistan and the impact of the current economic downturn have added urgency to the need to rebalance the U.S. military posture.

Delaying withdrawals because of recent bombings would have given insurgents veto power over U.S. actions. More perilously, it would have conceded a key strategic goal of the ongoing insurgency by undercutting the legitimacy of the Iraqi government as sovereign over Iraqi territory. It would also have undermined U.S. credibility in the region at a time when the Obama administration is seeking buy-in and support for its ambitious regional agenda from partners in the Arab world.

Iraq’s security gains remain fragile and reversible. But although withdrawal entails risks, there is no credible alternative. As President Obama clearly stated when announcing his timeline for troop withdrawals, "The most important decisions that have to be made about Iraq’s future must now be made by Iraqis." Unfortunately, the improved security and accompanying degree of normalcy that has returned to many areas of the country has allowed complacency and overconfidence to set in among Iraqi political actors, frustrating significant political progress.

As Hanna noted, the case for withdrawal remains unchanged. An uptick in violence is, sadly, almost certainly inevitable (and in the present case, that uptick preceded the actual troop withdrawal, which should tell us something). In some sense, warring factions are waiting out the American presence (and some keep fighting with us there). On the other hand, it would be pointless to bankrupt ourselves (and break our army, and hamstring our posture, etc.) in pursuit of that interminable standoff.

More importantly, the only actors that can bring lasting peace post-US bulwark are the various Iraqi factions with grievances and competing interests, and sooner or later, those parties will have to resolve their conflicts, whether or not we stay another five to ten years in the middle. Oh, and the Iraqi people want us out sooner regardless, which is kind of important (even if there is eventually some accommodation for military support via a much smaller residual force down the road).

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
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3. Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010