Related posts:

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2. Guests, Like Fish, Begin to Smell after Three Days
3. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance

Whatever the motivations, the prospect for a national referendum greatly strengthened Maliki’s hand in the SOFA negotiations, as the parties understood that forcing terms that were overly favorable to the United States would likely provoke spirited opposition and defeat come July.  Thus, Maliki – and his close ally and frequent patron, Iran – got most everything that they wanted: a firm timetable for withdrawal, the right to unilaterally demand an accelerated timetable, strict restrictions on US troop activities (with extensive input from Maliki’s government) and an express prohibition on using Iraqi soil to launch attacks on other nations (read: Iran).  In fact, according to senior US military leaders in Iraq, the Maliki government has been rather deliberate in terms of exerting its control, pushing its prerogatives to the very limits of the SOFA and beyond.

However, July came and went without a referendum (the referendum provision was part of a non-binding piece of legislation, and Maliki let the date come and go without holding a vote).  The reasons for this are unclear, but most likely, Maliki and his allies were satisfied with the terms of the SOFA and the outcomes generated thereby, and they didn’t want to risk its undoing…just yet.

Now, however, Maliki is calling for the referendum in conjunction with national elections to be held on January 16, 2010.  If the SOFA is defeated in that referendum (which seems likely), the net effect would be to pushthe withdrawal date of all US forces up about 11 months, from December 2011 to January 2011.  That is, unless a new agreement can be reached in the interim to replace the defeated SOFA that satisfies the various political and religious groups (ie, getting Sistani’s sign-off).

So the question arises, why is Maliki pushing for the referendum now?  My co-blogger Joel Wing sees political considerations behind the decision:

Now Maliki is on the campaign trail, and is portraying himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. Maliki for example, called the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities a national holiday and a great victory…Maliki needs to balance the continued need for U.S. support with his desire for a nationalist image. He appears to be going for the route that will assure him the most votes.

Juan Cole offers a guess as to Iran’s role:

I am just speculating, but I wonder if this measure was pushed by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which is close to the ayatollahs in Tehran, who in turn may want to speed up the US withdrawal because they have become afraid of a ‘color revolution’ in Iran promoted by the US. Staging such things from neighboring Iraq would be easier than doing it from a greater distance.

I would add that Maliki himself is close with Tehran, and was careful to protect Iran’s interests via the SOFA negotiations.  So this push could have Iranian backing without the Supreme Council being the primary, or sole, vehicle.  Despite the ludicrous claims by neoconservatives seeking to patch up tattered reputations, it should be clear that Iran has come out a winner for our Iraq misadventure, and their interests and goals will have receptive ears and frequent supporters in any foreseeable Shiite/Kurd dominated Iraqi government.

There is one other possibility to consider.  Maliki could be raising the specter of a referendum to, again, compel US cooperation in terms of adhering to the SOFA provisions.  As Juan Cole notes, General Odierno has repeatedly stated his desire (and expectation) that US troops should remain in Iraq well past the SOFA deadline.  Odierno is also pushing for new deployments of forces near cities in Iraq’s north, around the Kurdish flash points.

By invoking the threat of a referendum, Maliki can wield a potent stick to garner US good behavior, coupled with the carrot that if the US behaves, Maliki will once again scuttle the referendum.  Or, he could hold it as planned and then negotiate a new SOFA with terms tilted even farther in favor of the Iraqis (or better yet, in favor of his government).  Because it is not just compliance with the SOFA that Maliki is after, it’s his ability to continue to use the US military to weaken his rivals and consolidate his power.

I’ve got a better idea though: let’s push for an accelerated timetable for withdrawal ourselves.

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
2. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
3. Stay on Target… Stay on Target

Now Maliki is on the campaign trail, and is portraying himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. Maliki for example, called the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities a national holiday and a great victory. If the Iraqi public votes the SOFA down in January, which American officials seem to believe will happen, the U.S. will have one year to withdraw its forces. As the policy now stands, the Obama administration plans to accomplish that by December 31, 2011. In pushing for the referendum, Maliki needs to balance the continued need for U.S. support with his desire for a nationalist image. He appears to be going for the route that will assure him the most votes.

Related posts:

1. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
2. Stay on Target… Stay on Target
3. The SOFA Stick

The tar baby conundrum goes something like this: If things in Iraq are chaotic and violent, well, we just can’t leave can we – I mean, what about the oil…? On the other hand, if things in Iraq are quieting down, we can’t leave lest we disturb the peace. Especially because once we leave, the various factions will have at it. Even Petraeus said so.

Here is Crowley on why Obama should reconsider his plans for pulling US forces out of Iraq:

Moreover, the strategic calculus has changed since Obama unveiled his withdrawal plan in October 2007. Back then, American troops were dying as they policed a civil war that looked nearly impossible to resolve peacefully. Today, however, there’s reason to think that it’s U.S. troops who are the only thing holding Iraq together.

Of course, Crowley was amongst the chorus of voices issuing warnings back in 2007 that withdrawal in the midst of such heightened civil war violence was too risky.  Only now, according to Crowley, we can’t leave because of the relative peace.  Either way, we stay.

Crowley’s assertion that US forces are the “only thing holding Iraq together” is also highly dubious, if convenient.  For 6+ years, Iraq has been a violent, roiling mess of insurgencies (plural) and civil wars (plural).  During that period, US forces have been unable to put a halt to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis (actually, US forces were one faction that was adding to the body count), nor have our soldiers been able to prevent the internal and external displacement of 4 million Iraqis (over 15% of Iraq’s population), amongst other horrific events.  Despite this prior impotence, now our forces have become all powerful in determining outcomes?

Due to a series of developments associated with the Surge – though not dependent on US forces necessarily or entirely (ie the Awakenings shift, the walling off of cities, the effects of ethnic/sectarian cleansing, Sadr ceasefire, etc) - violence has been reduced considerably (though not eliminated).  But despite this confluence of events that work to keep violence at relatively low levels, Crowley would have us believe that our troops are the “only” thing keeping Iraq together.  More likely, Iraqis will or will not perpetuate these conflicts according to their own prerogatives and objectives, as they have done during the prior 6+ years of US occupation.  And as many continue to do to this day.

Next Crowley offers a puzzling bit of analysis steeped heavily in the narrative of Petraeus as savior of Iraq - but that narrative is juxtaposed with a series of hypothetical events that belies Petraeus’ reputation, not that Crowley notices:

If Iraq does seem to be headed back towards chaos as U.S. troops withdraw, what will Obama do? It’s hard to say for sure. During the campaign, he was tonally emphatic about ending America’s commitment there. But he has always allowed for revisions based on the judgment of his commanders. It’s awfully hard to imagine that surge architect David Petraeus would be willing to watch his gains there disappear in a maelstrom of car bombs and sectarian assassinations. If Petraeus says we need to maintain a substantial troop committment, will Obama defy him?

Crowley is arguing that Petraeus, whose popularity and esteem is based largely on his ostensible success with the Surge, is someone whose wisdom even the President should heed.  However, if the Surge (Petraeus’ claim to fame) turns out to be the failure its critics have claimed and no political reconciliation materializes and Iraq’s warring factions resume their suspended (not abandoned) conflicts, Crowley asks if Obama will “defy” a general who is deemed so wise…because of his Surge-related success that turns out to be a chimera!?!?

That logical doozy leaves aside the upside-down view Crowley sketcheswith respect to the relationship between civilian and military leaders.  Crowley suggests that Petraeus might not be “willing to watch his gains disappear.”  Then asks, “will Obama defy him?”  But that’s completely backwards – and indicative of a dangerous trend in American political life whereby military leaders are deified and granted an undue presumption of wisdom in terms of policy making.

First of all, Obama is the Commander in Chief.  He gives the orders, and Petraeus follows them.  By definition, Obama could never “defy” Petraeus – although the inverse is certainly possible.  Military leaders deserve respect and deference within a certain range of military policy discussions/battlefield planning, but they are not best suited to make larger strategic and/or policy decisions.  Decisions such as whether and when to withdraw troops from a war zone (though certainly their input is invaluable with respect to the logistics of that process).

There are several very good reasons to preserve this civilian-military dynamic.  For one, Petraeus might favor preserving “his” gains because that is “his” goal based on military objectives that are, by nature, narrowly construed.   Petraeus does not need to consider the astronomical costs involved.  He does not have to worry about budgets, deficits, taxes, revenues and debt.  He does not concern himself with domestic policy issues that require funding, nor does he bother with environmental crises that require attention.  He does not answer to the American people via the ballot box.

Yet because of the importance of those issues, factors that don’t enter a general’s calculus under most circumstances, and in order to preserve civilian dominance over military personnel necessary to safeguard liberal democracy, it is vital that the chain of command – and presumption – favors the Commander in Chief.  So, no, Obama should not hesitate to defy Petraeus if doing so is in the best interest of the American people, even if such a decision comes at the expense of a general’s ego.

Crowley ends his piece with another head scratcher:

Ultimately what this means is that Obama may be faced with an excruciating choice: Will he use limited American military resources to stabilize Afghanistan?–or to maintain stability in Iraq? It is, ultimately, not unlike the choice faced by George W. Bush, who neglected Afghanistan not out of stupidity, but because he believed that anarchy in Iraq posed the greater threat to American security. Obama has suggested he believes the opposite to be true. If Iraq starts teetering on the brink of collapse, we’ll see how firmly he believes it.

But that analysis of Bush’s motives – and wisdom – is plausible only if you look at history from late March 2003 on, ignoring the events that created the predicament.  One could argue that after Bush decided to invade Iraq and unleash breathtaking chaos in that country while Afghanistan was itself an unsettled question, he was faced with a difficult choice in terms of allocating limited resources between two needy theaters of war.

But that would ignore the recklessness and, yes, the sheer stupidity of deciding to invade Iraq while troops were fighting a bitter battle in Afghanistan with the outcome uncertain, and the situation so desperately in need of more resources and attention.  Whatever credit Crowley wants to bend over backwards to give Bush for his attempts to pick the less destructive path while prioritizing two wars should be wiped away completely by reminder of the fact that Bush would have had only one war to focus on if Bush hadn’t willingly, and foolishly, rushed to open a second front with the first still active.  For no good reason.

Which is, at the absolute very least, a remarkably stupid thing to do. But really, it’s far more tragic than that.

Related posts:

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3. By Invitation Only

The latter link is from a Barbara Walter column in the Los Angeles Times which argues that the risks of a civil war re-erupting in Iraq should compel us to maintain a troop presence in Iraq for "an additional five to 10 years" beyond the 2011 deadline imposed by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) previously agreed to by the governments of Iraq and the United States.

In making her case, Walter undermines the narrative of the successful Surge.  Recall, the Surge was supposed to create space for the various warring factions to forge a lasting political reconciliation.  Its critics, however, have claimed that the Surge has only managed to freeze conflicts in place, conflicts which would be thawed out and revisited at a later date (and even then, the Surge was only able to achieve this with the help of extenuating circumstances):  

A country that has experienced one civil war is much more likely to experience a second and third civil war.

That’s partly because violence tends to exacerbate the political, economic and social problems that caused war to break out in the first place. But it is also because the first civil war often ends with no clear victor and no enforceable peace settlement. As soon as the combatants have rested and resupplied, strong incentives exist to try to recapture the state. [...]

Combatants who end their civil war in a compromise settlement — such as the agreement to share power in Iraq — almost always return to war unless a third party is there to help them enforce the terms.

While she may have a point about the likelihood of various civil wars reigniting, it’s less clear that there has ever been even a compromise agreement to "share power in Iraq."  That power sharing agreement, the elusive ‘political reconciliation’ that was, again, the primary goal of the Surge, has yet to emerge.  The current governing pact has never really had widespread buy-in from various insurgent and insurgent-friendly groups – hence the need to expand beyond the four corners of the current political set-up, amend the constitution and reach accords on various other key issues such as federalism/centralism, control of oil, incorporation of Sunnis into the security forces, etc.

Perhaps that only bolsters her point regarding the risks for the resumption of violence.  Where she is on decidedly shakier ground, however, is in her estimation of the ability of US soldiers to prevent that eventuality.

American soldiers have kept a lid on internecine fighting. But the recent increase in violence in some of Iraq’s cities reveals that different groups began jockeying for position as U.S. troops left the cities in the hands of Iraqi security forces in June and in anticipation of complete U.S. withdrawal.

Right now, U.S. forces serve two important purposes. First, they signal to Maliki and the dominant Shiite population that a decisive victory over the Sunnis and Kurds will not be possible. They also signal to the less-numerous Sunni and Kurdish populations that both of these groups will be protected from Shiite exploitation over time. Remove U.S. forces and U.S. involvement in Iraq and you simultaneously embolden the Shiites while telling the weaker groups they must fend for themselves.

On the other hand, the presence of US forces in Iraq – and their concomitant support for the ruling government (Maliki’s government) - has also made it easier for Maliki to ignore the need to offer real political concessions to aggrieved factions.  After all, he’s been insulated from the effects of taking a maximalist position by the presence of US forces which have acted as his government’s de facto guardian. 

Along these lines, the US military has actively supported Maliki’s campaigns to weaken rivals such as the Sadrists, and stood passively by as Maliki has balked at paying the salaries of the Sunni Awakenings/Sons of Iraq militias that had ceased insurgent activities in exchange for an alliance with US forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq and, supposedly, a place in Iraq’s nascent security forces and a paycheck from the Iraqi government.  The latter two inducements have not been forthcoming.

Further, contra Walter, while US troops have been in Iraq for well over 6 years, it’s not entirely clear to what extent they’ve been able to "keep a lid on internecine fighting."  Even in the supposedly Post-Surge Victorious Iraq, hundreds of Iraqis are dying each month due to political violence.  That represents an improvement over the civil war period, but that figure remains ghastly enough.

However, a large number of US troops were present during that excessively bloody chapter which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, led to the displacement of roughly 4 million more and caused severe demographic shifts in key cities and towns (from heterogeneous ethnic/sectarian blends to homogeneous enclaves).  But if such an episode was possible with 150,000 troops present, why is Walter so certain that the 50,000 troops she envisions remaining behind will be able to prevent a sequel?

The U.S. needs to decide what outcome it is willing to live with in Iraq. It’s likely that if the U.S. withdraws all of its troops on schedule, the strategic balance will dramatically shift in favor of the Shiites, and they will press for full control over the state. This, in turn, will probably goad the Sunnis and Kurds back to war, likely ending in a brutal Shiite victory and the establishment of an authoritarian state.

The hope is that Shiite leaders (and their constituents) would rather avoid such a massive conflict, and in pursuit of that objective, would offer real political concessions and other inducements (and the aggrieved factions would show similar willingness and forbearance).  But if Shiite leaders are not so inclined now, there is little reason to think they will be differently disposed in 5-10 years.  If exerting full control is a goal worth fighting and dying for, what difference does a decade make – especially when the roughly 9 years leading up to the 2011 deadline had thus far not altered the calculus? 

This is especially true when the Shiite-dominated government in power has two things going for it – two things that will stay with it during the extension of the withdrawal deadline proposed by Walter.  The Shiite-dominated government can continue to consolidate power while US troops remain in Iraq playing a helpful role, and as soon as US forces outlive their utility, the Shiite-dominated government can demand that US forces leave according to the timeline in the SOFA or according to the terms of a subsequent agreement. 

We do not have any credible leverage anymore, and it is unclear to what extent we ever had as much influence as our pundits/politicians liked to pretend (see, ie, Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s ability to dictate events).  Put another way, if political reconciliation was such an important goal to the US throughout the past 6+ years, why haven’t we been able to impose our will to bring it about?  If the answer is that we lacked the ability to impose such a decision on the Iraqi population, why would that ability be greater now?

Walter’s arguments are at their weakest when she ignores the reality of the timeline imposed by the SOFA, when she talks past the lack of leverage and when she tries to formulate an actual plan for reconciliation:

If the U.S. wants to avert this scenario, it will need to create real incentives for Maliki and the Shiites to offer a fair deal that transfers real political power to the Sunnis and Kurds by the 2011 deadline, and then it needs to help them enforce it over time. This would require that those 50,000 "support troops" remain in Iraq until the new political institutions are firmly established, something most experts believe will take an additional five to 10 years.

"Real incentives"?  What, exactly, are those?  Where have they been hiding for the past 6+ years?  Walter doesn’t say.  Also left unmentioned is the means by which the US would unilaterally void an agreement between two sovereign governments and simply opt to stay in Iraq against the will of the Maliki government. 

Or is it that we will offer Maliki such an overwhelmingly compelling set of "real incentives" that he will be happy to cede power to his rivals and acquiesce to a prolonged US troop presence?  Again, what is this irresistible package of incentives?  Shouldn’t we try to come up with that silver bullet before showing up with guns in hand?  Then again, maybe if we stay another decade, we’ll find that pony after all.

Related posts:

1. Guests, Like Fish, Begin to Smell after Three Days
2. Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010
3. No SOFA Referendum?

Reese argues that we have lost leverage over the Iraqi government, and the ability to influence the political/military landscape. Political reconciliation – the endgame that the Surge was supposed to secure – is backsliding, as corruption and self-dealing have settled in as the norm:

The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI [ed note: Government of Iraq] Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF [ed note: Iraqi Security Forces] and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

Iraq’s security forces, with new-found confidence and long-simmering resentment, are pressing their prerogatives with increasing assertiveness (as should be expected of any people that underwent such a prolonged occupation):

It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

Importantly, Reese contends that Iraqi Security Forces are at the point where they can stand on their own, while our soldiers are becoming convenient targets to several factions:

Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.

The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq.There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups.

Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.

The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the “goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances. [emphasis added]

His conclusion is eminently sensible:

The massive partnering efforts of U.S. combat forces with I.S.F. isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. We should declare our intentions to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing U.S. plans by some 15 months.

That sounds like a plan.

(Spencer Ackerman has more)

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
2. Stay on Target… Stay on Target
3. Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010