American Footprints » Iraqi politics

Patronage and Iraqi Politics

Brian Ulrich — Tue, 16 Aug 2011 00:51:25 +0000

Maria Fantappie looks at the relationship between Nouri al-Maliki and the Sadr movement in Iraq:

“In 2007, Maliki’s forces drove the Sadrists’ Mehdi army out of Basra. Although allied in the central government, Maliki and the Sadrists are once again competing, but this time through political rather than military means…

“The Sadrists rely on a fluid chain of decision-making that issues policies at the top levels of government and implements projects through local committees in the provinces they run. In just a few months, their ministries have begun to build housing complexes in Maysan, implement infrastructure projects in Muthanna, improve the provision of electricity in Dhi-Qar, and improve access to water in Najaf. Starting with Maysan, Maliki has spared no time in disrupting this flow by limiting government funding, delaying approval for implementation, and hampering foreign investments.

“The rush to outperform each other is most evident in the provinces of Basra and Baghdad. Maliki has hastened the allocation of funds and approved projects, but often the Sadrists have capitalized on Maliki’s efforts by taking credit for implementing projects through local committees and the ministries they run. In Baghdad, when the government began providing free fuel to supply electric generators, Sadrist committees organized distribution to each home in Sadr City and Shula. As the Shatt al-Arab irrigation project began in Basra, Maliki was compelled to create the National Council for Water under his chairmanship, undermining the Ministry of Water in the process.

“If Maliki governs Iraq as its patron –– through a pyramidal hierarchy of command emanating from Baghdad –– the Sadrists deploy a strongly connected network between their representatives in parliament, the Al Ahrar Bloc, and their political bureaus in the provinces. While the prime minister receives local officials in his office in Baghdad, Sadrist members of parliament travel to all of the southern provinces to listen to constituent demands and congratulate local bureaus on their achievements. Competition is high over tribal support. While the Maliki-sponsored ‘Tribal Support Councils’ have co-opted several southern sheiks over the past years, the Sadrists are winning them over by proposing irrigation projects and improving services in the areas they control.”

The context for this is that Maliki can access the highest levers of power in Baghdad, but relies on the Sadr movement to penetrate Iraqi society, which is necessary to maintain power. The conduct of politics as described by Fantassie shows the persistence of patronage networks and informal ties in Iraqi politics. In this type of political economy, the Sadrists can do what other Islamist organizations have done in different Arab countries and fill public service gaps. At the same time, they seem to be serving as a mediator between state and society in a way they did with regional Ba’ath governors during the 1990′s. Whether they can actually parlay that into a greater share of power at the top remains to be seen.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Kirkuk and Kurdish Politics

Brian Ulrich — Tue, 05 Apr 2011 15:59:06 +0000

Denise Natali reports on Kurdish politics in Iraq:

“The protests, which are still ongoing, have not only unleashed populations’ pent-up frustrations with the KRG-party apparatus but also have reinforced fractures in Kurdish politics and society. While most Kurdish populations seek political reform, only those in Sulaimani have had the opportunity and interest to openly challenge KRG and Barzani family power. Political polarization between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was made evident after the PUK refused the deployment of KDP militia into Sulaimani, which attempted to quell a situation that its KRG partner has proven unable to manage.

“New fissures also have emerged between the KRG and its challengers — Kurdish populations it now refers to as ‘Those Who Do Not Love Kurdistan’. In fact, the entire opposition movement and protests have become highly politicized as old party feuds over leadership and control are intertwined with demands for real political reform. While the KDP and PUK accuse the opposition group, Goran, and demonstrators for being disloyal to Kurdish nationalism, Islamic parties that have joined the protestors in Sulaimani have permitted their mullahs to give sermons referring to the demonstrations as ‘a jihad against the KRG’. These political tensions have widened the Badinani-Soran rift, or the geographical polarizations between regions, that has evolved alongside the aggrandizement of Barzani-family power and weakening of the PUK since 2006, making the possibility of a truly unified Kurdish government unlikely.”

This, I suspect, is a critical context for the KRG’s aggressive moves around Kirkuk:

“On February 25, Arabs and Turkomans planned to protest in Kirkuk against corruption and unemployment. The Kurds believed that these protests would lead to attacks against them and sought to preempt the protests. Therefore, two days earlier, Dr. Najmaldin O. Karim, until recently a prominent spokesman for the Kurds in the United States and now a member of Iraqi parliament from the Kirkuk region, told a press conference in Baghdad that ‘[Arab] chauvinists were planning to destabilize Kirkuk during the protests’ (Kurd Net, March 3). Khalid Shwani, another Kurdish MP from Kirkuk, claimed that the Arab Political Council planned to attack numerous Kurdish administrative and security offices. The following day 8500 to 12,000 heavily-armed peshmerga, including crack units of the Zeravani (paramilitary police), were deployed just west of Kirkuk. The Arab Political Council and Turkoman Front denounced the Kurdish move and demanded its immediate withdrawal. A call for a ‘day of wrath’ to protest the peshmerga presence was only averted by a police-enforced curfew.

“On March 3, Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki demanded through a spokesman that the KRG withdraw its troops: ‘These troops were deployed without the permission of the central government and the Prime Minister has asked them to draw down immediately’ (Kurd Net, March 4). However, Shaykh Ja’afar Mustafa, the Minister of Peshmerga Affairs, announced that the Kurdish forces would not withdraw until the situation normalized (Kurd Net, March 9). He claimed that the Kurds had to protect Kirkuk from al-Qaeda, Arab groups, and Ba’athists and were acting on the basis of intelligence reports that indicated that these groups had been planning to take over the city during the protests (Kurd Net, March 9). Mustafa also asserted that the Kurds were coordinating their actions with the Iraqi army units in the region (Kurd Net, March 2).”

These events in Iraq outside Baghdad have not gotten the attention they deserve, as the type of protests seen across the Middle East are, in Iraq’s north, increasing the volatility of an already situation. On one level, there is the KRG’s stated fear for their interests in Kirkuk. On the other, there is the fact that it is easy for the challenged authorities in Iraq, in this case the KRG, to try and answer protests by standing up for the interests of the community they represent against those of other communities, and portray the opposition as traitors.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Today’s Iraq Protests

Brian Ulrich — Sat, 26 Feb 2011 02:28:59 +0000

Today saw protests throughout Iraq, and six protestors were killed by government security forces. As with other recent protests in Iraq, these are connected to the broader wave of protests in the Arab world these past two months, but Reidar Visser usefully highlights their specific Iraqi context:

“Indeed, the striking aspect of today’s demonstrations was their national character. For one thing, we have seen Kurds rise up against the dominant Kurdish parties, Shiites challenging the hegemony of Maliki’s own ‘all-Shiite’ alliance, and Sunnis complaining against their Sunni local politicians. The cries for better services and employment conform to a universal pattern that has been in emergence over the past few weeks. But more importantly, in terms of slogans and demands, there are signs of a true synthesis of genuine nationwide opposition to the supposed ‘government of national partnership’ that was formed, tentatively at least, in December 2010…

“In Dhi Qar, demonstrators demanded better services, an end to corruption, and, importantly, criticised the system of ethno-sectarian quota-sharing that forms the basis for all of Iraq’s post-2003 government and that is supported by the United States and Iran alike. In Baghdad, protestors are trying to destroy the concrete blast walls put up by the United States since 2007 in its own attempt to engineer ‘sectarian’ reconciliation, American-style, and are calling for a unified Sunni–Shiite political project, with echoes from the uprising against the British in 1920. Again, this seems to indicate a desire for more profound reforms and system change. Some of the activists are highlighting the absence of properly elected local councils at the sub-governorate level across Iraq as one very immediate grievance.”

One again, it needs to be emphasized that Iraq’s sectarian divisions are not timeless enmities, which of course never actually exist, nor are they that comparable to the ethnic nationalism of post-communist eastern Europe. Alongside them there is an ideal of Iraqi nationalism among Arabs, which is why we see factions competing for the apparatus of the central state with regional autonomy as simply an occasional fallback position. Grassroots counter-sectarian activism is plausible, quite possibly sustainable, and welcome, and if the Kurds want to join in, then so much the better.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Syria-Iraq Dispute Could Be Ending

motown67 — Sat, 12 Sep 2009 05:17:04 +0000

On August 19, 2009 twin bombings occurred at Iraq’s Foreign and Finance Ministries. Three days later, the Baghdad Operations Command announced that it had arrested a suspect, and his taped confession was later played on television. He said he was a Baathist and former policeman who put together one of the truck bombs in the Muqdadiya district of Diyala under orders from two Baathist officials in Syria. On August 25, Iraq demanded that Syria turn over the two alleged masterminds, and withdrew its ambassador, with Damascus following suit. That was the beginning of a war of words between the two countries. Baghdad demanded that Syria turn over or expel all terrorists in the country, it showed another confession on television of an Al Qaeda member who said that he was trained and financed by Syrian intelligence, called for the United Nations to conduct a criminal investigation into the bombings, and sent troops and police to patrol the Syrian border. On September 9, however, at a meeting of the Arab League, it was announced that the Syrian and Iraqi Foreign Ministers had come to an agreement to ease tensions, stop the recriminations, return the ambassadors, and form a joint security committee.

This dramatic escalation of tensions between Iraq and Syria covered over the fact that Baghdad issued two contradictory stories about the bombings. On August 29, the Interior Ministry reported that it had arrested 14 Al Qaeda members in Baghdad who it said was responsible for the August 19 attack. Al Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq also claimed they carried out the bombing four days earlier on a website. The government has never reconciled these two versions of events.

The Arab and Iraqi press however, were full of ideas about why Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chose to confront Syria. What seems most likely is that Maliki wanted to defer blame for the bombings on a believable target, Baathists in Syria. First, the Baath Party and insurgents openly operate in Syria. For example, in 2008 Baath members and insurgent groups held a televised conference in Damascus, and in July 2009, militants held a summit in Syria. That made Damascus an easy target for Maliki. The Prime Minister is also running on law and order again for the 2010 elections, so he needed to blame someone other than himself for the attack. Another possible reason is that Maliki has been upset that the United States has held off and on negotiations with Baathists in Syria. It was reported that Baghdad demanded that Syria deport over 200 Baath members, which would’ve disrupted any deals with Washington as well as gotten rid of some of the most militant opponents of the Iraqi government.

If the Arab League announcement is followed through with, then this whole episode may be wrapping up. Maliki will have achieved his goal of distracting public attention away from his rule and the Iraqi security forces, to Syria and the Baathists. With all the fury and announcements, people will also probably forget that the government came out with two contradictory stories of who was responsible for the August 19 bombings. Maliki will then be able to return to the campaign trail claiming that he stood up for Iraq against the terrorists, even if he probably accused the wrong ones.

The Passing of Torches

Eric Martin — Wed, 26 Aug 2009 15:21:49 +0000

Just as the death of Edward Kennedy marks the passing of one of the most prominent politicians in the American political firmament, today the Iraqi political scene lost one of its key figures as well. Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of one of Iraq’s main Shiite political parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), succumbed to a long bout with cancer. al-Hakim, who was once feted by President Bush at the White House, passed away in a hospital in Tehran - a location of some significance given that it was his one time home during his years spent in exile from Saddam’s Iraq.

Reidar Visser, as usual, provides a detailed backstory:

More than anything, through his political career, Hakim became a symbol of the chaos, the contradictions and the opportunism that have characterised Iraq in the post-2003 period. Having abandoned religious studies at an early level, Hakim made a professional career in the 1980s as a political-military operator in what was then called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a Khomeinist outfit created by Iran in 1982 in order to maximise its control of the Iraqi opposition during the Iran–Iraq War. He returned to Iraq from Iran after the start of the Iraq War in 2003, and in August that year, after the death of his brother Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in a terrorist attack in Najaf, was propelled to the top leadership position in SCIRI.

It was during 2005 in particular that Hakim would make his mark on the post-2003 politics of Iraq, through a series of remarkable policy initiatives. Ever since the first pre-war opposition conferences in 2002, SCIRI had managed to wrestle itself to the unlikely position as the preferred partner of the United States in “dealing with the Shiite community of Iraq” (a strategy that in itself was predicated on a belief in Washington that the complexities of Iraqi politics would be best approached through sectarian lenses), and it consolidated this position between 2003 to 2005 by appealing to sectarian identity as a basis for political power. Then, in August 2005, Hakim dramatically launched a bid to create a federal region that would comprise the nine Shiite-majority governorates south of Baghdad – an overt projection of sectarian identity onto Iraq’s administrative map that had hitherto been the preserve of Israelis, Kuwaitis and pro-Kurdish American senators, and a scenario so radical and divisive that its sheer presence on the political agenda added a major obstacle to Iraq’s process of national reconciliation. [...]

Throughout the post-war period, Hakim masterfully managed to balance US and Iranian pressures and was successful in creating the impression in Washington that SCIRI was on course to liberate itself from Iranian overlordship. This involved theatrics such as a name change in May 2007, where SCIRI became ISCI (without the “revolution”) and where the rumour was circulated (but never officially confirmed) that ISCI would henceforth take its orders from the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf in Iraq, instead of from Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Simultaneously, Hakim, who himself was never an Islamic scholar of repute, managed to create the impression of religious authority among Americans by focusing on his status as the son of a Shiite luminary (the Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim) and as a sayyid (descendant of the Prophet), thereby prompting many international journalists to describe him as a “leading cleric” and one of the most “powerful” politicians of Iraq. It was only gradually since 2008 – and more pronouncedly since the local elections in January 2009 – that the idea of ISCI as a loyal ally of Iran returned to US policy-making circles in earnest. [...]

Hakim’s health began to deteriorate several years ago, but he remained a vital policy-maker until his death. Since May 2009, from his convalescent home in Tehran, he presided over a series of meetings with Iraqi politicians that prepared the ground for the revamping of the Shiite political alliance (UIA or the United Iraqi Alliance) that he had been instrumental in crafting back in 2004. Responding to experiences from the local elections, the newly formed Iraqi National Alliance (INA) now accords greater rhetorical emphasis to the idea of Iraqi national unity, but its programme still remains remorseless towards former Baathists (who are to be “cleansed” from the Iraqi state), and ISCI still keeps focusing on an ideology of radical decentralisation which many Iraqis believe contradict the idea of national unity.

Hakim chose to be treated for cancer in Iran and it is remarkable that the United States was unable to correctly interpret his physical movements as the most revealing indicator of his true political loyalties. Since 2003 and until today, Hakim, SCIRI/ISCI and members of the Badr brigades have travelled in and out of Iran without any restriction. It was Iranian territory that was used to orchestrate the new INA. It is inconceivable that the authorities in Tehran would have allowed these processes to go on within their own borders had they not felt that right until his death Hakim was pursuing a policy that was in Iran’s best interests. Instead, however, until recently Washington clung to a rosy scenario in which ISCI was seen as a potential convert to the American cause; ultimately it was the contradictions in this policy that would create the space for Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s peculiar political career.

For anyone interested in reading up on the new Iraqi National Alliance political party that, in a bit of cats and dogs sleeping together peculiarity, features the unlikely partnership of ISCI with its longtime rivals, the Sadrists, Visser has more. As does Raed Jarrar.

As this site warned many months ago, the full court press on the Sadrists (traditionally quite nationalistic and anti-Iranian), including forcing Moqtada al-Sadr to seek refuge in Iran, would end up strengthening Iran’s ties to, and influence over, the Sadrists. Each of the Iraqi political factions needs foreign patronage in order to garner the resources necessary to carve out and hold on to political power (at least, as long as some factions are receiving support from abroad, the others will need support in kind in order to compete).

The Sadrists, however, lack an obvious patron - while they received some minimal support from Iran, it was a pittance compared to what ISCI and Dawa received, given the latter two factions’ closer ties and alliance with Iran. Further, ISCI and Dawa were also the parties most favored by the US government, so they were taking with both hands. Meanwhile, not only were the Sadrists left to deal with only lesser levels of support from Iran, and none from the US, but they were being actively targeted by US/government of Iraq forces.

Under the circumstances, the Sadrists have nowhere else to turn, and Tehran is more than happy to play savior, patron and alliance builder. Now, the INA alliance might not be able to stay together given the historical animosity and conflicting ideologies/agendas between its constituent parties, but as Visser and Jarrar point out, it’s viability does not bode well for the future of Iraq given that it will likely pursue further ethnic/sectarian cleansing/harsh treatment of Sunni groups, and further decentralization of power with partition looming, as always, in the background. At least as long as Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s party remains a political force. Which is a question, now, for his successors to answer.

The SOFA Stick

Eric Martin — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 15:36:17 +0000

While President Bush was still in office and his administration was trying to come to an agreement with the Iraqi government on terms governing the continued troop presence in Iraq (what is referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, or “SOFA”), Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani made a public statement demanding that any such agreement enjoy broad support from the Iraqi populace. In response to this, as well as to pressure from Sunni factions, Maliki agreed to subject the SOFA to a referendum in July 2009.

Whatever the motivations, the prospect for a national referendum greatly strengthened Maliki’s hand in the SOFA negotiations, as the parties understood that forcing terms that were overly favorable to the United States would likely provoke spirited opposition and defeat come July. Thus, Maliki – and his close ally and frequent patron, Iran – got most everything that they wanted: a firm timetable for withdrawal, the right to unilaterally demand an accelerated timetable, strict restrictions on US troop activities (with extensive input from Maliki’s government) and an express prohibition on using Iraqi soil to launch attacks on other nations (read: Iran). In fact, according to senior US military leaders in Iraq, the Maliki government has been rather deliberate in terms of exerting its control, pushing its prerogatives to the very limits of the SOFA and beyond.

However, July came and went without a referendum (the referendum provision was part of a non-binding piece of legislation, and Maliki let the date come and go without holding a vote). The reasons for this are unclear, but most likely, Maliki and his allies were satisfied with the terms of the SOFA and the outcomes generated thereby, and they didn’t want to risk its undoing…just yet.

Now, however, Maliki is calling for the referendum in conjunction with national elections to be held on January 16, 2010. If the SOFA is defeated in that referendum (which seems likely), the net effect would be to pushthe withdrawal date of all US forces up about 11 months, from December 2011 to January 2011. That is, unless a new agreement can be reached in the interim to replace the defeated SOFA that satisfies the various political and religious groups (ie, getting Sistani’s sign-off).

So the question arises, why is Maliki pushing for the referendum now? My co-blogger Joel Wing sees political considerations behind the decision:

Now Maliki is on the campaign trail, and is portraying himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. Maliki for example, called the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities a national holiday and a great victory…Maliki needs to balance the continued need for U.S. support with his desire for a nationalist image. He appears to be going for the route that will assure him the most votes.

Juan Cole offers a guess as to Iran’s role:

I am just speculating, but I wonder if this measure was pushed by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which is close to the ayatollahs in Tehran, who in turn may want to speed up the US withdrawal because they have become afraid of a ‘color revolution’ in Iran promoted by the US. Staging such things from neighboring Iraq would be easier than doing it from a greater distance.

I would add that Maliki himself is close with Tehran, and was careful to protect Iran’s interests via the SOFA negotiations. So this push could have Iranian backing without the Supreme Council being the primary, or sole, vehicle. Despite the ludicrous claims by neoconservatives seeking to patch up tattered reputations, it should be clear that Iran has come out a winner for our Iraq misadventure, and their interests and goals will have receptive ears and frequent supporters in any foreseeable Shiite/Kurd dominated Iraqi government.

There is one other possibility to consider. Maliki could be raising the specter of a referendum to, again, compel US cooperation in terms of adhering to the SOFA provisions. As Juan Cole notes, General Odierno has repeatedly stated his desire (and expectation) that US troops should remain in Iraq well past the SOFA deadline. Odierno is also pushing for new deployments of forces near cities in Iraq’s north, around the Kurdish flash points.

By invoking the threat of a referendum, Maliki can wield a potent stick to garner US good behavior, coupled with the carrot that if the US behaves, Maliki will once again scuttle the referendum. Or, he could hold it as planned and then negotiate a new SOFA with terms tilted even farther in favor of the Iraqis (or better yet, in favor of his government). Because it is not just compliance with the SOFA that Maliki is after, it’s his ability to continue to use the US military to weaken his rivals and consolidate his power.

I’ve got a better idea though: let’s push for an accelerated timetable for withdrawal ourselves.

Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010

motown67 — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 02:29:27 +0000

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s cabinet submitted a draft law to parliament calling for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the January 2010 parliamentary election. The SOFA was originally passed in November 2008 by the Iraqi parliament. Alongside it was a second law, the Political Reform Document, which also called for power sharing in the government and security forces, and a referendum on the SOFA by July 2009. The Reform Document was pushed by the Iraqi Accordance Front, and was the only concession they were able to get from the negotiations over the SOFA. It was not binding however, which was why the referendum was not held on time, and there has been no change in the administration or army and police. There was also no one advocating for the referendum from within the parliament, Maliki’s cabinet, or the United States.

Now Maliki is on the campaign trail, and is portraying himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. Maliki for example, called the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities a national holiday and a great victory. If the Iraqi public votes the SOFA down in January, which American officials seem to believe will happen, the U.S. will have one year to withdraw its forces. As the policy now stands, the Obama administration plans to accomplish that by December 31, 2011. In pushing for the referendum, Maliki needs to balance the continued need for U.S. support with his desire for a nationalist image. He appears to be going for the route that will assure him the most votes.

Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance

motown67 — Thu, 23 Jul 2009 19:17:05 +0000

On July 16, 2009 Al-Hayat newspaper reported that Moqtada al-Sadr visited Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in his Tehran hospital. Sadr said he was interested in rejoining the United Iraqi Alliance, which the Sadrists left in September 2007. The new alliance is due to be announced later this month according to a Supreme Council member. In February 2009 Sadr issued a statement saying that he would come back to the Alliance as long as it was renamed, the SIIC was no longer leading it, and that it was non-sectarian. Those talks fell apart in May when the Sadrists said they would run independently in the January 2010 parliamentary vote. The change in the Sadrists’ position could be due to the influence of Iran, which is applying strong pressure upon the leading Shiite parties to re-unite and run together in the next round of balloting in Iraq.

One of the main goals of Tehran is to ensure friendly Shiite rule in Iraq so that it never becomes a rival again. Following this Iran wants the main Shiite parties to be united during elections, so they stay in power. In 2005 Iran helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, and gave them printing presses, advisors, broadcast equipment, and stuffed ballot boxes. Since the January 2009 provincial elections, Iran has been pushing for the Alliance to be revived. In January, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ran his own State of Law List, which trumped the Supreme Council in most of southern Iraq. Iran was afraid of further fracturing by the Shiites, and began pressuring them to run together in 2010.

Iranian officials began traveling to Iran shortly after the provincial vote. On February 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki came to Baghdad to mediate between the estranged Dawa Party and SIIC. On March 2 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council came to Iraq for five days. He was followed by the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani who came at the end of that month.

Domestic Iraqi politics also played into this Iranian policy. In early 2009 the Supreme Council and their allies in parliament were threatening a no confidence vote against Maliki. The Prime Minister was forced to reach out to them to stop this from happening. Their price was for Maliki to rejoin the United Alliance. This appealed to Maliki, because if he was given the leadership position in the list it could help his chances of maintaining his office. The SIIC was also hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power after their loses in the provincial councils. There is still a lot of mistrust between the two, but mutual ambition appears to be bringing them back together with ample pressure from Tehran.

May 2009 saw a renewed drive by Tehran and SIIC leader Hakim to get the Shiite parties back together. On May 13, Hakim publicly announced that he wanted the United Alliance reformed. The chairman of the SIIC Humam Hammudi was given responsibility for re-organizing the List, while Ahmad Chalabi was tasked with bringing back the old members of the Alliance.

Most of the negotiations for the revival of the Alliance occurred in Hakim’s Tehran hospital where he is undergoing cancer treatment. On May 14 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Hakim. Six days later Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the National Reform Trend and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari came to Hakim’s hospital. Hakim also met with Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization. At the end of the month Maliki flew to Tehran to consul with Hakim. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki was present. Maliki then met with Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei who also pressured him on the United Alliance.

These moves have apparently paid off for Iran for now. On June 19, al-Hayat reported that Maliki and the SIIC had agreed to revive the United Iraqi Alliance. It would now be called the Coalition of the State of Law, and the Prime Minister would be its leader. Sadr’s meeting with Hakim this month, almost completes the original line-up of the Alliance. If these parties do run together it would be a big victory for Iran’s policy, and a step backwards for Iraq. In the 2009 vote, Iraqi nationalism made a revival. The re-birth of the United Alliance would be a return to the sectarian politics of the past. Early reports that the new election law will also maintain the 2005 closed list system where voters only get to vote for lists and not individual candidates is another sign that the major parties are more interested in maintaining their positions rather than advancing the country’s interests. The leading Shiite parties also do not seem to have any problems with playing along with Iran, as long as it helps them win.

Stay on Target… Stay on Target

Eric Martin — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 21:59:28 +0000

Mike Hanna is on point, as usual:

The United States took an important step yesterday toward leaving Iraq by moving combat troops out of Iraqi population centers in anticipation of the June 30 deadline specified in the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

This redeployment has focused attention on Iraq’s current security situation and triggered stepped-up efforts by insurgents to undermine the symbolic importance of the transition, by launching attacks generally aimed at Shiite civilians. It has also provided fodder for those in the United States who wish to delay withdrawal.

However, looking at Iraq solely through the prism of short-term security trends clouds thinking about how the United States can best prepare for its exit from the country. It also obscures the enduring and fundamental disputes that undermine long-term prospects for stability. The United States should instead continue the transition toward diplomacy with modest goals and a focus on facilitating dialogue and negotiations on the most intractable issues facing Iraqis: governance, territory, and resources.

Make no mistake, Iraq is not on a self-correcting path to tranquility. It is likely to see a near-term increase in baseline levels of violence, and varying levels of violence for years to come.

But the logical case for withdrawal remains unchanged, starting with the binding obligation to withdraw on a fixed timetable as part of the SOFA negotiated by the Bush administration. More broadly, our expanding commitments in Afghanistan and the impact of the current economic downturn have added urgency to the need to rebalance the U.S. military posture.

Delaying withdrawals because of recent bombings would have given insurgents veto power over U.S. actions. More perilously, it would have conceded a key strategic goal of the ongoing insurgency by undercutting the legitimacy of the Iraqi government as sovereign over Iraqi territory. It would also have undermined U.S. credibility in the region at a time when the Obama administration is seeking buy-in and support for its ambitious regional agenda from partners in the Arab world.

Iraq’s security gains remain fragile and reversible. But although withdrawal entails risks, there is no credible alternative. As President Obama clearly stated when announcing his timeline for troop withdrawals, "The most important decisions that have to be made about Iraq’s future must now be made by Iraqis." Unfortunately, the improved security and accompanying degree of normalcy that has returned to many areas of the country has allowed complacency and overconfidence to set in among Iraqi political actors, frustrating significant political progress.

As Hanna noted, the case for withdrawal remains unchanged. An uptick in violence is, sadly, almost certainly inevitable (and in the present case, that uptick preceded the actual troop withdrawal, which should tell us something). In some sense, warring factions are waiting out the American presence (and some keep fighting with us there). On the other hand, it would be pointless to bankrupt ourselves (and break our army, and hamstring our posture, etc.) in pursuit of that interminable standoff.

More importantly, the only actors that can bring lasting peace post-US bulwark are the various Iraqi factions with grievances and competing interests, and sooner or later, those parties will have to resolve their conflicts, whether or not we stay another five to ten years in the middle. Oh, and the Iraqi people want us out sooner regardless, which is kind of important (even if there is eventually some accommodation for military support via a much smaller residual force down the road).