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Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s cabinet submitted a draft law to parliament calling for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the January 2010 parliamentary election. The SOFA was originally passed in November 2008 by the Iraqi parliament. Alongside it was a second law, the Political Reform Document, which also [...]
It’s Ralph Peters, so there’s plenty wrong with this column, but this part in particular stuck out to me:
Former President Bill Clinton crawled (well, flew in a Hollywood bigwig’s jet) to Pyongyang to stroke the world’s nuttiest dictator to free two journalists on ex-VP Al Gore’s payroll.
Glad the gals are back in the Land of the Big PX. But the message we sent was that you can grab gringos and instantly become a Friend of Bill. Wonder what Iran will want for hostages? Will the Taliban demand face-time with Tina Fey in exchange for the soldier it holds?
Really? We should be concerned that hostage takers in the future will…demand face time with Bill Clinton or Tina Fey? Is that really such an exorbitant ransom to pay in order to spare two American women from an unthinkably brutal prison system, wherein prisoners are so deprived of food that they sometimes resort to cannibalism when the opportunity arises (that is, when they aren’t lucky enough to catch a rat and eat it raw on the spot)?
Or would a Tina Fey photo op be too high a price for the life of a soldier held by the Taliban? Wait, maybe I’m asking the wrong question - Ralph Peters would rather see the soldier executed regardless.
In another example of the pushback against Colonel Reese’s call for a slightly accelerated timetable for withdrawal from Iraq, The New Republic’sMichael Crowley makes an appeal to the "tar baby conundrum," as I termed it back in March 2008:
The tar baby conundrum goes something like this: If things in Iraq are chaotic and violent, well, we just can’t leave can we – I mean, what about the oil…? On the other hand, if things in Iraq are quieting down, we can’t leave lest we disturb the peace. Especially because once we leave, the various factions will have at it. Even Petraeus said so.
Here is Crowley on why Obama should reconsider his plans for pulling US forces out of Iraq:
Moreover, the strategic calculus has changed since Obama unveiled his withdrawal plan in October 2007. Back then, American troops were dying as they policed a civil war that looked nearly impossible to resolve peacefully. Today, however, there’s reason to think that it’s U.S. troops who are the only thing holding Iraq together.
Of course, Crowley was amongst the chorus of voices issuing warnings back in 2007 that withdrawal in the midst of such heightened civil war violence was too risky. Only now, according to Crowley, we can’t leave because of the relative peace. Either way, we stay.
As is customary with the ebb and flow of the Iraq withdrawal debate, Col. Timothy Reese’s widely disseminated memo calling for a slightly accelerated timeline for removing troops from Iraq has provoked responses from those that warn against deviating from the original timeline (at least in terms of getting out ahead of schedule), and those that advocate pushing the ultimate withdrawal date back a decade, or longer (as necessary).
The latter link is from a Barbara Walter column in the Los Angeles Times which argues that the risks of a civil war re-erupting in Iraq should compel us to maintain a troop presence in Iraq for "an additional five to 10 years" beyond the 2011 deadline imposed by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) previously agreed to by the governments of Iraq and the United States.
In making her case, Walter undermines the narrative of the successful Surge. Recall, the Surge was supposed to create space for the various warring factions to forge a lasting political reconciliation. Its critics, however, have claimed that the Surge has only managed to freeze conflicts in place, conflicts which would be thawed out and revisited at a later date (and even then, the Surge was only able to achieve this with the help of extenuating circumstances):
A country that has experienced one civil war is much more likely to experience a second and third civil war.
That’s partly because violence tends to exacerbate the political, economic and social problems that caused war to break out in the first place. But it is also because the first civil war often ends with no clear victor and no enforceable peace settlement. As soon as the combatants have rested and resupplied, strong incentives exist to try to recapture the state. [...]
Combatants who end their civil war in a compromise settlement — such as the agreement to share power in Iraq — almost always return to war unless a third party is there to help them enforce the terms.
While she may have a point about the likelihood of various civil wars reigniting, it’s less clear that there has ever been even a compromise agreement to "share power in Iraq." That power sharing agreement, the elusive ‘political reconciliation’ that was, again, the primary goal of the Surge, has yet to emerge. The current governing pact has never really had widespread buy-in from various insurgent and insurgent-friendly groups – hence the need to expand beyond the four corners of the current political set-up, amend the constitution and reach accords on various other key issues such as federalism/centralism, control of oil, incorporation of Sunnis into the security forces, etc.
A senior U.S. military official and adviser to the Iraqi military’s Baghdad command, Col. Timothy R. Reese, wrote a rather blunt memo that has recently found the light of day (copy here). In the memo, Reese argues that the U.S. should accelerate its withdrawal from Iraq based on the following factors: we have already accomplished what was possible for us to achieve militarily, the way forward involves Iraqi issues best-suited for Iraqi solutions (or not) and, further, that our continued presence is actually increasing tension, resistance, risk to our troops and the potential for a serious rift in relations.
Reese argues that we have lost leverage over the Iraqi government, and the ability to influence the political/military landscape. Political reconciliation – the endgame that the Surge was supposed to secure – is backsliding, as corruption and self-dealing have settled in as the norm:
The United States took an important step yesterday toward leaving Iraq by moving combat troops out of Iraqi population centers in anticipation of the June 30 deadline specified in the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
This redeployment has focused attention on Iraq’s current security situation [...]