Rosen tries to explain how Iraq has come to this new situation. The major reason to him was that the Shiites won the sectarian war. The Mahdi Army, with the implicit and sometimes explicit support of the Iraqi government and security forces were successful in driving large numbers of Sunnis out of central and southern Iraq. Sunni insurgents were also fighting with Al Qaeda in Iraq. By the time the U.S. began the Surge in 2007, many Sunnis were willing to switch sides and work with the Americans for money in the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program to expel the Islamists. U.S. erected blast walls also formalized the new segregation of Iraqi neighborhoods. The success of the Shiites, also led them to turn on each other. The Mahdi Army for example, devolved into several factions, some of which were no better than gangs that preyed on their own communities. In early 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took advantage of this situation by striking against the Sadrists in Basra and Baghdad, resting control of the streets from them. This helped transform him from a sectarian into a nationalist leader at the front of a newly invigorated Iraqi state.

All of this is generally agreed upon by Iraq observers. What’s new is that Rosen is finally writing about it. This has been a slow transformation. In 2008 for example, he wrote about the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program in an article entitled “The Myth of the Surge” in Rolling Stone that emphasized that the Sons of Iraq were insurgents with blood on their hands, and only a stop-gap measure that was actually increasing violence, and putting off the next battle between Sunnis and Shiites. By April 2009 in “The big sleep” for The National, however, he noted that the Sunnis had actually lost the war, and were done for as a military force. He revealed that back in 2006 Sunni insurgent leaders in Jordan and Syria had told him that they were done for now that the sectarian war had started because they could not beat the numerically superior Shiite militias and Shiite controlled government. Maliki’s arrest of an SOI leader in Fadhil that led to two days of fighting, but no further repercussions also showed that the insurgents were not unified enough to resist the power of the government. In fact, the entire SOI program meant that the former insurgents were publicly known, and denied them the anonymity that would allow them to melt back into the public and return to the insurgency.

Another major change in tone could be seen in Rosen’s opinion of the Mahdi Army. In “Songs for the Mahdi Army” for Mother Jones in December 2008 he wrote about how the Sadrists were a state within a state with their militia and social services. They were a force that could not be ignored, and that they were here to stay, even after the government’s crackdown. By the time of “The Ugly Peace” Rosen was talking about their shortcomings. Whereas before he said that the Mahdi Army attacked Sunnis who were Baathists and militants, now he wrote that the Sadrists were responsible for ethnic cleansing of entire Sunni communities. Sadr had also lost control of parts of his movement, some of which had devolved into gangs. This was a far change from previous reports that gave the impression that Sadrists were everywhere in Shiite communities, the security forces, and the government, and all were loyal followers.

Rosen also seems to have come to the conclusion that Iraq is entering a stage of some type of stability. Back in April 2009 he wrote in “The gathering storm” that while there was no more random violence in Baghdad, that shops were open and customers were out on the streets, that Iraq was rebuilding, and that some displaced and refugees were returning he felt a sense of foreboding of things falling apart once the U.S. withdrew. In “An Ugly Peace” he appears to be arguing that the Iraqis can handle security, and that the Iraqi government is strong enough to stand on its own.

The major problem he sees remaining in Iraq is latent sectarianism. That no longer takes the form of fighting out on the streets, but rather in an emerging Shiite culture in the security forces, and government offices. He found that in almost every Iraqi institution and ministry he went to there were posters of Shiite religious figures hanging from the walls, and Shiite music could be heard. He also mentions the continuing refugee and displaced crisis, corruption and Maliki’s move towards authoritarianism as other issues.

This is what Rosen means by his title. There is an ugly peace in Iraq with the Sadrists having lost their standing, the sectarian war is over, but sectarianism remains, and the Sunnis are thoroughly defeated and divided. The Iraqi state and Prime Minister Maliki are asserting their authority, and face no real challengers. These are all major changes in Rosen’s writing who before emphasized that renewed fighting and conflict were always just around the corner. The major problem is that he knew about many of these changes years ago, but didn’t really write about them until now. Having Sunni insurgent leaders saying that they knew they were going to eventually lose back in 2006 was not reported until 2009. The same is true for the Sadrists. Rosen must have known about their fracturing and loss of standing, but chose not to mention it until the end of this year. The real question is what took him so long to change his tune? Was it that he was so caught up in the moment that he didn’t realize the larger transformations occurring, or did his opposition to the U.S. invasion make him emphasize the resistance and chaos in Iraq to make the Americans look bad?

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
2. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
3. Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
2. Guests, Like Fish, Begin to Smell after Three Days
3. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance

This dramatic escalation of tensions between Iraq and Syria covered over the fact that Baghdad issued two contradictory stories about the bombings. On August 29, the Interior Ministry reported that it had arrested 14 Al Qaeda members in Baghdad who it said was responsible for the August 19 attack. Al Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq also claimed they carried out the bombing four days earlier on a website. The government has never reconciled these two versions of events.

The Arab and Iraqi press however, were full of ideas about why Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chose to confront Syria. What seems most likely is that Maliki wanted to defer blame for the bombings on a believable target, Baathists in Syria. First, the Baath Party and insurgents openly operate in Syria. For example, in 2008 Baath members and insurgent groups held a televised conference in Damascus, and in July 2009, militants held a summit in Syria. That made Damascus an easy target for Maliki. The Prime Minister is also running on law and order again for the 2010 elections, so he needed to blame someone other than himself for the attack. Another possible reason is that Maliki has been upset that the United States has held off and on negotiations with Baathists in Syria. It was reported that Baghdad demanded that Syria deport over 200 Baath members, which would’ve disrupted any deals with Washington as well as gotten rid of some of the most militant opponents of the Iraqi government.

If the Arab League announcement is followed through with, then this whole episode may be wrapping up. Maliki will have achieved his goal of distracting public attention away from his rule and the Iraqi security forces, to Syria and the Baathists. With all the fury and announcements, people will also probably forget that the government came out with two contradictory stories of who was responsible for the August 19 bombings. Maliki will then be able to return to the campaign trail claiming that he stood up for Iraq against the terrorists, even if he probably accused the wrong ones.

Related posts:

1. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
2. Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010
3. The SOFA Stick

With respect to Iraq’s COIN-borne “success,” violence in that country has not ceased, although it has declined considerably (hundreds of Iraqis are still dying each month, down from thousands).  But a large portion of those gains is attributable to several unrelated developments: the coopting of the majority of the Sunni insurgency (Awakenings), the Sadrists decision to lay low, walling off of entire neighborhoods and the fact that many neighborhoods had already been cleansed along sectarian lines, thus removing potential combatants from close proximity.  

Further, even the heretofore reduced levels of violence have begun to increase again, highlighting The Surge’s most glaring failure: it was supposed to be a vehicle for delivering lasting political reconciliation, compromise and accommodation such that warring factions would be content to pursue their objectives via elections rather than violence.  This broad-based accord has not materialized, and the Sunni groups that had held fire for a time are beginning to return to violent resistance, clashes along the borders of the disputed Kurdish regions are heating up, civilian bombings in various areas are occurring with a familiar regularity and a new Shiite coalition with maximalist sectarian underpinnings has emerged to challenge Maliki. 

Given the fact that The Surge/COIN doctrine has only delivered a qualified and possibly fleeting success in Iraq, and given the confluence of extenuating factors needed to bring about even that modicum of progress, it is highly doubtful that this doctrine will succeed in Afghanistan - a considerably harder nut to crack.  In fact, even the Afghanistan optimists – the COIN doctrine gurus that believe the mission should be pursued and can be achieved – believe that if all goes incredibly well, we will still need to maintain a robust troop presence in Afghanistan for the next 10-15 years at a price tag of a couple trillion dollars.  Oh, and even then, we will only succeed if we can also stabilize the situation in Pakistan and clear out all potential Taliban redoubts in the border regions.

So it is with a skeptical eye that the situation in Afghanistan should be viewed.  Afghanistan will need a skillful application of COIN doctrine as well as its own extenuating factors/good luck helping the cause, and even then, if Iraq is any indication, these efforts will only result in partial achievements. 

At the very least, success hinges on building up a government that is legitimate in the eyes of a vast majority of the people, efficient in delivering vital services and effective in terms of providing security.  Hearts and minds must be won in droves (and kept secure), or the whole edifice will collapse. 

This has been a constant struggle in Afghanistan given the corruption rampant throughout all levels of the Karzai government – provoking some elements of the population to pine for the return of the Taliban which, for all its innumerable flaws, had the virtue of imposing order and cutting down on graft.  Not to mention the taint associated with Karzai by virtue of his being propped up by a Western occupying power whose military causes hundreds of innocent civilian casualties with some regularity.

Considering these long odds, and the delicacy of the mission, the blatant electoral fraud in Afghanistan’s recent election may prove to be a fatal blow.  The perception that the elections were rigged has only served to emphasize the illegitimacy of a government that was already unpopular with large swathes of the population.  And the fraud was blatant:

Afghans loyal to President Hamid Karzai set up hundreds of fictitious polling sites where no one voted but where hundreds of thousands of ballots were still recorded toward the president’s re-election, according to senior Western and Afghan officials here.

The fake sites, as many as 800, existed only on paper, said a senior Western diplomat in Afghanistan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the political delicacy of the vote. Local workers reported that hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of votes for Mr. Karzai in the election last month came from each of those places. That pattern was confirmed by another Western official based in Afghanistan.

“We think that about 15 percent of the polling sites never opened on Election Day,” the senior Western diplomat said. “But they still managed to report thousands of ballots for Karzai.”

Besides creating the fake sites, Mr. Karzai’s supporters also took over approximately 800 legitimate polling centers and used them to fraudulently report tens of thousands of additional ballots for Mr. Karzai, the officials said.

The result, the officials said, is that in some provinces, the pro-Karzai ballots may exceed the people who actually voted by a factor of 10. “We are talking about orders of magnitude,” the senior Western diplomat said.

The widening accounts of fraud pose a stark problem for the Obama administration, which has 68,000 American troops deployed here to help reverse gains by Taliban insurgents. American officials hoped that the election would help turn Afghans away from the Taliban by giving them a greater voice in government. Instead, the Obama administration now faces the prospect of having to defend an Afghan administration for the next five years that is widely seen as illegitimate.

“This was fraud en masse,” the Western diplomat said.

Andrew Exum, the blogosphere’s preeminent COIN practitioner (and supporter of ongoing military operations in Afghanistan), minces no words:

Before the Afghan elections, every assessment you could read and every opinion you could solicit from policy-makers was the same: the worst outcome of the Afghan elections would be one that, in either the first or second round of voting, delivered the election to Hamid Karzai with a narrow margin of victory amidst wide-spread allegations of corruption and ballot box-stuffing. The overwhelming fear was of “another Iran” — only with our fingerprints all over it.

The worst-case scenario now appears to have been realized.

In a more immediate sense, the election results threaten to touch off a mounting conflict between various Tajik factions and the Karzai government. 

Due to the complexity and tenacity of the multi-layered, multi-faceted conflict that we are seeking to address as an outside presence with limited resources and staying power, we are forced to bank on a miraculous combination of luck, good fortune and skill in order to pull off an outcome that, if all goes well, might come to fruition some 15 years and a couple trillion dollars down the road (with many thousands of NATO soldiers lost in the interim).  But all is not going well, far from it.  One of the most crucial political watersheds has played out in worst-case scenario terms.  COIN will not fix this.  It’s well past time we abandoned what George Kennan called the “stubborn pursuit of extravagant and unpromising objectives.”

Related posts:

1. I’m Creepin’ and I’m Creepin’
2. Engaging the Muslim World: Pakistan and Afghanistan
3. You Understand Less As the Pages Turn

The middle portion of this chapter shifts into an exploration of how the U.S. got involved in the war in the first place. Here Cole delves into the geopolitics of world oil supplies. I suspect one reason people have difficulty believing this is that the war-for-oil slogan is often used to call up simple war for corporate profit. Cole notes effectively that for many, economic strength is a vital component of national strength, which is perfectly in tune with aspects of the PNAC writings from the 1990′s.

As a regular Informed Comment reader, I was most interested in Cole’s speculations as to why Cheney and Bush, who as oil men had warm relations with the Arab world, would launch an Iraq invasion. It was before blogs, but I remember in 2000 thinking that the Bush administration was oversee a warming of our relations with Iran because of Exxon-Mobil’s oil interests, which that was also the calculation of the Iranian government during the late Clinton years. Cole tracks Cheney’s views of Middle Eastern policy through the 1990′s, when, contra AIPAC, he was a chronic opponent of sanctions on oil-rich countries in the Middle East, though he may have been content with Halliburton’s involvement with the oil-for-food program in Iraq’s case. Here’s the nut of it:

“My conjecture is that Cheney and other petroleum company executives had despaired of ever besting AIPAC on the sanctions issue. Therefore, they believed that they would be locked out of Iraq and Iran and their enormous oil and gas reserves while France, Russia, and China positioned themselves to benefit from developing those fields. Cheney had spent most of the 1990′s fighting the Israel lobbies and consorting with Saudi princes and Muslim presidents and prime ministers. Yet when he set up as vice president in 2001, he created a rump national security council of his own that he staffed with figures such as Irv Lewis Libby, John Hannahm, and later on David Wurmser – all prominent neoconservatives who were ideologically close to Israel’s Likud Party. This about-face is so stark that it should make our necks snap. Big Oil, with its strong ties to the Arab hydrocarbon monarchies, was cohabiting in the vice presidential mansion with AIPAC and the Project for the New American Century.

“The simplest explanation would be that Cheney made a conceptual breakthrough. He may have seen that if he pushed for regime change in Iraq and Iran, he could turn AIPAC and the Israel lobbies into allies of the oil majors’ plans for investment in Iraq and Iran. If he committed to removing the governments that threatened Israel and replacing them with pro-Western regimes, then Congress would lift those implacable boycotts and allow Houston and Dallas finally to play in Mesopotamia and Khuzistan. Such a development could well be crucial to maintaining the position of the United States as a superpower into the twenty-first century.”

From there the chapter moves into an account of Iraq’s post-invasion problems, which need no elaboration here. Cole finally makes the case for U.S. withdrawal from the country, noting at the end that it, “would reduce America Anxiety in the Muslim world and would eliminate a prime cause of Islam Anxiety for the American public, perhaps making possible movement toward real understanding.” Again, there’s not much new in this chapter for regular Cole readers, but there’s a lot to be said for having an overview of the situation concisely in one highly readable place.

Related posts:

1. Engaging the Muslim World: The Struggle for Islamic Oil
2. Engaging the Muslim World: Muslim Activism, Muslim Radicalism
3. Engaging the Muslim World: The Wahhabi Myth

Reidar Visser, as usual, provides a detailed backstory:

More than anything, through his political career, Hakim became a symbol of the chaos, the contradictions and the opportunism that have characterised Iraq in the post-2003 period. Having abandoned religious studies at an early level, Hakim made a professional career in the 1980s as a political-military operator in what was then called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a Khomeinist outfit created by Iran in 1982 in order to maximise its control of the Iraqi opposition during the Iran–Iraq War. He returned to Iraq from Iran after the start of the Iraq War in 2003, and in August that year, after the death of his brother Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in a terrorist attack in Najaf, was propelled to the top leadership position in SCIRI.

It was during 2005 in particular that Hakim would make his mark on the post-2003 politics of Iraq, through a series of remarkable policy initiatives. Ever since the first pre-war opposition conferences in 2002, SCIRI had managed to wrestle itself to the unlikely position as the preferred partner of the United States in “dealing with the Shiite community of Iraq” (a strategy that in itself was predicated on a belief in Washington that the complexities of Iraqi politics would be best approached through sectarian lenses), and it consolidated this position between 2003 to 2005 by appealing to sectarian identity as a basis for political power. Then, in August 2005, Hakim dramatically launched a bid to create a federal region that would comprise the nine Shiite-majority governorates south of Baghdad – an overt projection of sectarian identity onto Iraq’s administrative map that had hitherto been the preserve of Israelis, Kuwaitis and pro-Kurdish American senators, and a scenario so radical and divisive that its sheer presence on the political agenda added a major obstacle to Iraq’s process of national reconciliation.  [...]

Throughout the post-war period, Hakim masterfully managed to balance US and Iranian pressures and was successful in creating the impression in Washington that SCIRI was on course to liberate itself from Iranian overlordship. This involved theatrics such as a name change in May 2007, where SCIRI became ISCI (without the “revolution”) and where the rumour was circulated (but never officially confirmed) that ISCI would henceforth take its orders from the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf in Iraq, instead of from Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Simultaneously, Hakim, who himself was never an Islamic scholar of repute, managed to create the impression of religious authority among Americans by focusing on his status as the son of a Shiite luminary (the Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim) and as a sayyid (descendant of the Prophet), thereby prompting many international journalists to describe him as a “leading cleric” and one of the most “powerful” politicians of Iraq. It was only gradually since 2008 – and more pronouncedly since the local elections in January 2009 – that the idea of ISCI as a loyal ally of Iran returned to US policy-making circles in earnest. [...]

Hakim’s health began to deteriorate several years ago, but he remained a vital policy-maker until his death. Since May 2009, from his convalescent home in Tehran, he presided over a series of meetings with Iraqi politicians that prepared the ground for the revamping of the Shiite political alliance (UIA or the United Iraqi Alliance) that he had been instrumental in crafting back in 2004. Responding to experiences from the local elections, the newly formed Iraqi National Alliance (INA) now accords greater rhetorical emphasis to the idea of Iraqi national unity, but its programme still remains remorseless towards former Baathists (who are to be “cleansed” from the Iraqi state), and ISCI still keeps focusing on an ideology of radical decentralisation which many Iraqis believe contradict the idea of national unity.

Hakim chose to be treated for cancer in Iran and it is remarkable that the United States was unable to correctly interpret his physical movements as the most revealing indicator of his true political loyalties. Since 2003 and until today, Hakim, SCIRI/ISCI and members of the Badr brigades have travelled in and out of Iran without any restriction. It was Iranian territory that was used to orchestrate the new INA. It is inconceivable that the authorities in Tehran would have allowed these processes to go on within their own borders had they not felt that right until his death Hakim was pursuing a policy that was in Iran’s best interests. Instead, however, until recently Washington clung to a rosy scenario in which ISCI was seen as a potential convert to the American cause; ultimately it was the contradictions in this policy that would create the space for Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s peculiar political career.

For anyone interested in reading up on the new Iraqi National Alliance political party that, in a bit of cats and dogs sleeping together peculiarity, features the unlikely partnership of ISCI with its longtime rivals, the Sadrists, Visser has more.  As does Raed Jarrar.

As this site warned many months ago, the full court press on the Sadrists (traditionally quite nationalistic and anti-Iranian), including forcing Moqtada al-Sadr to seek refuge in Iran, would end up strengthening Iran’s ties to, and influence over, the Sadrists. Each of the Iraqi political factions needs foreign patronage in order to garner the resources necessary to carve out and hold on to political power (at least, as long as some factions are receiving support from abroad, the others will need support in kind in order to compete).

The Sadrists, however, lack an obvious patron - while they received some minimal support from Iran, it was a pittance compared to what ISCI and Dawa received, given the latter two factions’ closer ties and alliance with Iran.  Further, ISCI and Dawa were also the parties most favored by the US government, so they were taking with both hands.  Meanwhile, not only were the Sadrists left to deal with only lesser levels of support from Iran, and none from the US, but they were being actively targeted by US/government of Iraq forces.

Under the circumstances, the Sadrists have nowhere else to turn, and Tehran is more than happy to play savior, patron and alliance builder.  Now, the INA alliance might not be able to stay together given the historical animosity and conflicting ideologies/agendas between its constituent parties, but as Visser and Jarrar point out, it’s viability does not bode well for the future of Iraq given that it will likely pursue further ethnic/sectarian cleansing/harsh treatment of Sunni groups, and further decentralization of power with partition looming, as always, in the background.  At least as long as Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s party remains a political force.  Which is a question, now, for his successors to answer.

Related posts:

1. Defining Ransom Down
2. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
3. The SOFA Stick

Whatever the motivations, the prospect for a national referendum greatly strengthened Maliki’s hand in the SOFA negotiations, as the parties understood that forcing terms that were overly favorable to the United States would likely provoke spirited opposition and defeat come July.  Thus, Maliki – and his close ally and frequent patron, Iran – got most everything that they wanted: a firm timetable for withdrawal, the right to unilaterally demand an accelerated timetable, strict restrictions on US troop activities (with extensive input from Maliki’s government) and an express prohibition on using Iraqi soil to launch attacks on other nations (read: Iran).  In fact, according to senior US military leaders in Iraq, the Maliki government has been rather deliberate in terms of exerting its control, pushing its prerogatives to the very limits of the SOFA and beyond.

However, July came and went without a referendum (the referendum provision was part of a non-binding piece of legislation, and Maliki let the date come and go without holding a vote).  The reasons for this are unclear, but most likely, Maliki and his allies were satisfied with the terms of the SOFA and the outcomes generated thereby, and they didn’t want to risk its undoing…just yet.

Now, however, Maliki is calling for the referendum in conjunction with national elections to be held on January 16, 2010.  If the SOFA is defeated in that referendum (which seems likely), the net effect would be to pushthe withdrawal date of all US forces up about 11 months, from December 2011 to January 2011.  That is, unless a new agreement can be reached in the interim to replace the defeated SOFA that satisfies the various political and religious groups (ie, getting Sistani’s sign-off).

So the question arises, why is Maliki pushing for the referendum now?  My co-blogger Joel Wing sees political considerations behind the decision:

Now Maliki is on the campaign trail, and is portraying himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. Maliki for example, called the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities a national holiday and a great victory…Maliki needs to balance the continued need for U.S. support with his desire for a nationalist image. He appears to be going for the route that will assure him the most votes.

Juan Cole offers a guess as to Iran’s role:

I am just speculating, but I wonder if this measure was pushed by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which is close to the ayatollahs in Tehran, who in turn may want to speed up the US withdrawal because they have become afraid of a ‘color revolution’ in Iran promoted by the US. Staging such things from neighboring Iraq would be easier than doing it from a greater distance.

I would add that Maliki himself is close with Tehran, and was careful to protect Iran’s interests via the SOFA negotiations.  So this push could have Iranian backing without the Supreme Council being the primary, or sole, vehicle.  Despite the ludicrous claims by neoconservatives seeking to patch up tattered reputations, it should be clear that Iran has come out a winner for our Iraq misadventure, and their interests and goals will have receptive ears and frequent supporters in any foreseeable Shiite/Kurd dominated Iraqi government.

There is one other possibility to consider.  Maliki could be raising the specter of a referendum to, again, compel US cooperation in terms of adhering to the SOFA provisions.  As Juan Cole notes, General Odierno has repeatedly stated his desire (and expectation) that US troops should remain in Iraq well past the SOFA deadline.  Odierno is also pushing for new deployments of forces near cities in Iraq’s north, around the Kurdish flash points.

By invoking the threat of a referendum, Maliki can wield a potent stick to garner US good behavior, coupled with the carrot that if the US behaves, Maliki will once again scuttle the referendum.  Or, he could hold it as planned and then negotiate a new SOFA with terms tilted even farther in favor of the Iraqis (or better yet, in favor of his government).  Because it is not just compliance with the SOFA that Maliki is after, it’s his ability to continue to use the US military to weaken his rivals and consolidate his power.

I’ve got a better idea though: let’s push for an accelerated timetable for withdrawal ourselves.

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
2. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
3. Stay on Target… Stay on Target

Now Maliki is on the campaign trail, and is portraying himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. Maliki for example, called the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities a national holiday and a great victory. If the Iraqi public votes the SOFA down in January, which American officials seem to believe will happen, the U.S. will have one year to withdraw its forces. As the policy now stands, the Obama administration plans to accomplish that by December 31, 2011. In pushing for the referendum, Maliki needs to balance the continued need for U.S. support with his desire for a nationalist image. He appears to be going for the route that will assure him the most votes.

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
2. Iran’s Role In The Revival Of The United Iraqi Alliance
3. Stay on Target… Stay on Target

The tar baby conundrum goes something like this: If things in Iraq are chaotic and violent, well, we just can’t leave can we – I mean, what about the oil…? On the other hand, if things in Iraq are quieting down, we can’t leave lest we disturb the peace. Especially because once we leave, the various factions will have at it. Even Petraeus said so.

Here is Crowley on why Obama should reconsider his plans for pulling US forces out of Iraq:

Moreover, the strategic calculus has changed since Obama unveiled his withdrawal plan in October 2007. Back then, American troops were dying as they policed a civil war that looked nearly impossible to resolve peacefully. Today, however, there’s reason to think that it’s U.S. troops who are the only thing holding Iraq together.

Of course, Crowley was amongst the chorus of voices issuing warnings back in 2007 that withdrawal in the midst of such heightened civil war violence was too risky.  Only now, according to Crowley, we can’t leave because of the relative peace.  Either way, we stay.

Crowley’s assertion that US forces are the “only thing holding Iraq together” is also highly dubious, if convenient.  For 6+ years, Iraq has been a violent, roiling mess of insurgencies (plural) and civil wars (plural).  During that period, US forces have been unable to put a halt to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis (actually, US forces were one faction that was adding to the body count), nor have our soldiers been able to prevent the internal and external displacement of 4 million Iraqis (over 15% of Iraq’s population), amongst other horrific events.  Despite this prior impotence, now our forces have become all powerful in determining outcomes?

Due to a series of developments associated with the Surge – though not dependent on US forces necessarily or entirely (ie the Awakenings shift, the walling off of cities, the effects of ethnic/sectarian cleansing, Sadr ceasefire, etc) - violence has been reduced considerably (though not eliminated).  But despite this confluence of events that work to keep violence at relatively low levels, Crowley would have us believe that our troops are the “only” thing keeping Iraq together.  More likely, Iraqis will or will not perpetuate these conflicts according to their own prerogatives and objectives, as they have done during the prior 6+ years of US occupation.  And as many continue to do to this day.

Next Crowley offers a puzzling bit of analysis steeped heavily in the narrative of Petraeus as savior of Iraq - but that narrative is juxtaposed with a series of hypothetical events that belies Petraeus’ reputation, not that Crowley notices:

If Iraq does seem to be headed back towards chaos as U.S. troops withdraw, what will Obama do? It’s hard to say for sure. During the campaign, he was tonally emphatic about ending America’s commitment there. But he has always allowed for revisions based on the judgment of his commanders. It’s awfully hard to imagine that surge architect David Petraeus would be willing to watch his gains there disappear in a maelstrom of car bombs and sectarian assassinations. If Petraeus says we need to maintain a substantial troop committment, will Obama defy him?

Crowley is arguing that Petraeus, whose popularity and esteem is based largely on his ostensible success with the Surge, is someone whose wisdom even the President should heed.  However, if the Surge (Petraeus’ claim to fame) turns out to be the failure its critics have claimed and no political reconciliation materializes and Iraq’s warring factions resume their suspended (not abandoned) conflicts, Crowley asks if Obama will “defy” a general who is deemed so wise…because of his Surge-related success that turns out to be a chimera!?!?

That logical doozy leaves aside the upside-down view Crowley sketcheswith respect to the relationship between civilian and military leaders.  Crowley suggests that Petraeus might not be “willing to watch his gains disappear.”  Then asks, “will Obama defy him?”  But that’s completely backwards – and indicative of a dangerous trend in American political life whereby military leaders are deified and granted an undue presumption of wisdom in terms of policy making.

First of all, Obama is the Commander in Chief.  He gives the orders, and Petraeus follows them.  By definition, Obama could never “defy” Petraeus – although the inverse is certainly possible.  Military leaders deserve respect and deference within a certain range of military policy discussions/battlefield planning, but they are not best suited to make larger strategic and/or policy decisions.  Decisions such as whether and when to withdraw troops from a war zone (though certainly their input is invaluable with respect to the logistics of that process).

There are several very good reasons to preserve this civilian-military dynamic.  For one, Petraeus might favor preserving “his” gains because that is “his” goal based on military objectives that are, by nature, narrowly construed.   Petraeus does not need to consider the astronomical costs involved.  He does not have to worry about budgets, deficits, taxes, revenues and debt.  He does not concern himself with domestic policy issues that require funding, nor does he bother with environmental crises that require attention.  He does not answer to the American people via the ballot box.

Yet because of the importance of those issues, factors that don’t enter a general’s calculus under most circumstances, and in order to preserve civilian dominance over military personnel necessary to safeguard liberal democracy, it is vital that the chain of command – and presumption – favors the Commander in Chief.  So, no, Obama should not hesitate to defy Petraeus if doing so is in the best interest of the American people, even if such a decision comes at the expense of a general’s ego.

Crowley ends his piece with another head scratcher:

Ultimately what this means is that Obama may be faced with an excruciating choice: Will he use limited American military resources to stabilize Afghanistan?–or to maintain stability in Iraq? It is, ultimately, not unlike the choice faced by George W. Bush, who neglected Afghanistan not out of stupidity, but because he believed that anarchy in Iraq posed the greater threat to American security. Obama has suggested he believes the opposite to be true. If Iraq starts teetering on the brink of collapse, we’ll see how firmly he believes it.

But that analysis of Bush’s motives – and wisdom – is plausible only if you look at history from late March 2003 on, ignoring the events that created the predicament.  One could argue that after Bush decided to invade Iraq and unleash breathtaking chaos in that country while Afghanistan was itself an unsettled question, he was faced with a difficult choice in terms of allocating limited resources between two needy theaters of war.

But that would ignore the recklessness and, yes, the sheer stupidity of deciding to invade Iraq while troops were fighting a bitter battle in Afghanistan with the outcome uncertain, and the situation so desperately in need of more resources and attention.  Whatever credit Crowley wants to bend over backwards to give Bush for his attempts to pick the less destructive path while prioritizing two wars should be wiped away completely by reminder of the fact that Bush would have had only one war to focus on if Bush hadn’t willingly, and foolishly, rushed to open a second front with the first still active.  For no good reason.

Which is, at the absolute very least, a remarkably stupid thing to do. But really, it’s far more tragic than that.

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
2. No SOFA Referendum?
3. This One’s Optimistic

The latter link is from a Barbara Walter column in the Los Angeles Times which argues that the risks of a civil war re-erupting in Iraq should compel us to maintain a troop presence in Iraq for "an additional five to 10 years" beyond the 2011 deadline imposed by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) previously agreed to by the governments of Iraq and the United States.

In making her case, Walter undermines the narrative of the successful Surge.  Recall, the Surge was supposed to create space for the various warring factions to forge a lasting political reconciliation.  Its critics, however, have claimed that the Surge has only managed to freeze conflicts in place, conflicts which would be thawed out and revisited at a later date (and even then, the Surge was only able to achieve this with the help of extenuating circumstances):  

A country that has experienced one civil war is much more likely to experience a second and third civil war.

That’s partly because violence tends to exacerbate the political, economic and social problems that caused war to break out in the first place. But it is also because the first civil war often ends with no clear victor and no enforceable peace settlement. As soon as the combatants have rested and resupplied, strong incentives exist to try to recapture the state. [...]

Combatants who end their civil war in a compromise settlement — such as the agreement to share power in Iraq — almost always return to war unless a third party is there to help them enforce the terms.

While she may have a point about the likelihood of various civil wars reigniting, it’s less clear that there has ever been even a compromise agreement to "share power in Iraq."  That power sharing agreement, the elusive ‘political reconciliation’ that was, again, the primary goal of the Surge, has yet to emerge.  The current governing pact has never really had widespread buy-in from various insurgent and insurgent-friendly groups – hence the need to expand beyond the four corners of the current political set-up, amend the constitution and reach accords on various other key issues such as federalism/centralism, control of oil, incorporation of Sunnis into the security forces, etc.

Perhaps that only bolsters her point regarding the risks for the resumption of violence.  Where she is on decidedly shakier ground, however, is in her estimation of the ability of US soldiers to prevent that eventuality.

American soldiers have kept a lid on internecine fighting. But the recent increase in violence in some of Iraq’s cities reveals that different groups began jockeying for position as U.S. troops left the cities in the hands of Iraqi security forces in June and in anticipation of complete U.S. withdrawal.

Right now, U.S. forces serve two important purposes. First, they signal to Maliki and the dominant Shiite population that a decisive victory over the Sunnis and Kurds will not be possible. They also signal to the less-numerous Sunni and Kurdish populations that both of these groups will be protected from Shiite exploitation over time. Remove U.S. forces and U.S. involvement in Iraq and you simultaneously embolden the Shiites while telling the weaker groups they must fend for themselves.

On the other hand, the presence of US forces in Iraq – and their concomitant support for the ruling government (Maliki’s government) - has also made it easier for Maliki to ignore the need to offer real political concessions to aggrieved factions.  After all, he’s been insulated from the effects of taking a maximalist position by the presence of US forces which have acted as his government’s de facto guardian. 

Along these lines, the US military has actively supported Maliki’s campaigns to weaken rivals such as the Sadrists, and stood passively by as Maliki has balked at paying the salaries of the Sunni Awakenings/Sons of Iraq militias that had ceased insurgent activities in exchange for an alliance with US forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq and, supposedly, a place in Iraq’s nascent security forces and a paycheck from the Iraqi government.  The latter two inducements have not been forthcoming.

Further, contra Walter, while US troops have been in Iraq for well over 6 years, it’s not entirely clear to what extent they’ve been able to "keep a lid on internecine fighting."  Even in the supposedly Post-Surge Victorious Iraq, hundreds of Iraqis are dying each month due to political violence.  That represents an improvement over the civil war period, but that figure remains ghastly enough.

However, a large number of US troops were present during that excessively bloody chapter which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, led to the displacement of roughly 4 million more and caused severe demographic shifts in key cities and towns (from heterogeneous ethnic/sectarian blends to homogeneous enclaves).  But if such an episode was possible with 150,000 troops present, why is Walter so certain that the 50,000 troops she envisions remaining behind will be able to prevent a sequel?

The U.S. needs to decide what outcome it is willing to live with in Iraq. It’s likely that if the U.S. withdraws all of its troops on schedule, the strategic balance will dramatically shift in favor of the Shiites, and they will press for full control over the state. This, in turn, will probably goad the Sunnis and Kurds back to war, likely ending in a brutal Shiite victory and the establishment of an authoritarian state.

The hope is that Shiite leaders (and their constituents) would rather avoid such a massive conflict, and in pursuit of that objective, would offer real political concessions and other inducements (and the aggrieved factions would show similar willingness and forbearance).  But if Shiite leaders are not so inclined now, there is little reason to think they will be differently disposed in 5-10 years.  If exerting full control is a goal worth fighting and dying for, what difference does a decade make – especially when the roughly 9 years leading up to the 2011 deadline had thus far not altered the calculus? 

This is especially true when the Shiite-dominated government in power has two things going for it – two things that will stay with it during the extension of the withdrawal deadline proposed by Walter.  The Shiite-dominated government can continue to consolidate power while US troops remain in Iraq playing a helpful role, and as soon as US forces outlive their utility, the Shiite-dominated government can demand that US forces leave according to the timeline in the SOFA or according to the terms of a subsequent agreement. 

We do not have any credible leverage anymore, and it is unclear to what extent we ever had as much influence as our pundits/politicians liked to pretend (see, ie, Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s ability to dictate events).  Put another way, if political reconciliation was such an important goal to the US throughout the past 6+ years, why haven’t we been able to impose our will to bring it about?  If the answer is that we lacked the ability to impose such a decision on the Iraqi population, why would that ability be greater now?

Walter’s arguments are at their weakest when she ignores the reality of the timeline imposed by the SOFA, when she talks past the lack of leverage and when she tries to formulate an actual plan for reconciliation:

If the U.S. wants to avert this scenario, it will need to create real incentives for Maliki and the Shiites to offer a fair deal that transfers real political power to the Sunnis and Kurds by the 2011 deadline, and then it needs to help them enforce it over time. This would require that those 50,000 "support troops" remain in Iraq until the new political institutions are firmly established, something most experts believe will take an additional five to 10 years.

"Real incentives"?  What, exactly, are those?  Where have they been hiding for the past 6+ years?  Walter doesn’t say.  Also left unmentioned is the means by which the US would unilaterally void an agreement between two sovereign governments and simply opt to stay in Iraq against the will of the Maliki government. 

Or is it that we will offer Maliki such an overwhelmingly compelling set of "real incentives" that he will be happy to cede power to his rivals and acquiesce to a prolonged US troop presence?  Again, what is this irresistible package of incentives?  Shouldn’t we try to come up with that silver bullet before showing up with guns in hand?  Then again, maybe if we stay another decade, we’ll find that pony after all.

Related posts:

1. Guests, Like Fish, Begin to Smell after Three Days
2. Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010
3. The SOFA Stick