American Footprints » Egypt

Onward, Egyptian Democracy

Brian Ulrich — Thu, 01 Dec 2011 16:06:30 +0000

The first round of voting in Egypt’s three-stage elections indicates that the new parliament will be dominated by Islamist parties. The areas that voted this week were more liberal than Egypt as a whole, and yet the Muslim Brotherhood appears to have upwards of 40% of the seats, or about what they were expected to do nationwide. More surprisingly, Salafis strongly overperformed expectations to win about 25% of the vote. As the New York Times reports:

“If the majority proves durable, the longer-term implications are hard to predict. The Brotherhood has pledged to respect basic individual freedoms while using the influence of the state to nudge the culture in a more traditional direction. But the Salafis often talk openly of laws mandating a shift to Islamic banking, restricting the sale of alcohol, providing special curriculums for boys and girls in public schools, and censoring the content of the arts and entertainment.

“Their leaders have sometimes proposed that a special council of religious scholars advise Parliament or the top courts on legislation’s compliance with Islamic law. Egyptian election laws required the Salafi parties to put at least one woman on their electoral roster for each district, but they put the women last on their lists to ensure they would not be elected, and some appear with pictures of flowers in place of their faces on campaign posters.”

Egypt’s liberals are despondent, and there is concern for the future of civil liberties in Egypt if the Muslim Brotherhood decides to move in a more conservative direction to co-opt the salafis. My belief, however, is that the path forward is to establish a stable democratic system in which free elections become the norm. This means, in fact, supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in its efforts to speed the transition to civilian rule. Muslim Brotherhood leader Hassan al-Banna himself cited elections as something to admire about Western civilization, as it allows people to hold their leaders accountable, force those leaders to take into account the popular will and the condition of the country as a whole instead of just themselves and their own patronage networks.

Although Western political commentators assert as a given that all Islamist commitments to democratic principles is deceptive window dressing and that their true agenda is “one person, one vote, one time,” evidence for that is scanty. After the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini installed an “Islamic Republic” which still has lots of democratic features, and which even with its undemocratic elements happens to be what he stood for before the 1979 revolution. In Turkey and so far Tunisia, Islamist parties have maintained their democratic commitments. In Algeria and the Palestinian Territories, Islamist election victories were followed by chaos, but in both of those case the ruling powers acted undemocratically against the election results, cancelling them in Algeria and sharply curtailing their ability to do anything in the PNA. In other words, there’s no real precedent for Islamists suddenly acting on a hidden agenda, and plenty for fear of Islamists leading to rash, undemocratic actions damaging to the polities involved.

Given this history, the liberal parties, who are losing badly because they are simply badly underdeveloped and without a long history of arguing their message in society, should consider their common ground with the Muslim Brotherhood and the prospects for forming a coalition with them rather than leave the salafis are their only willing partners. The MB, for its part, has expressed an openness to this, denied rumors they are tacitly allied with the salafis, and even advertised their willingness to put Christians in high-profile positions. The way forward for those disappointed today is not to become political insurgents in league with the SCAF, but to accepts the results of 2011 so as to make sure they have a chance to do better in future elections.

(Crossposted to my blog)

The Next Phase

Brian Ulrich — Tue, 22 Nov 2011 00:11:08 +0000

My weekend was dominated by pre-Thanksgiving binge grading, and so I’m only now getting my mind around the details of the tumult taking place, not just in Cairo, but Alexandria, the Suez Canal cities, and elsewhere around Egypt. The direct chain of events leading to the current clashes came when Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Silmi of the SCAF’s transitional government proposed a set of “supra-constitutional principles” which he asked Egypt’s political parties to sign on to in advance of the first round of parliamentary elections November 28. These included two controversial articles putting the military beyond the control and oversight of any elected civilian government. All of the Islamist groups and some of the leftist opposition refused these conditions, and on Friday staged a major protest in Cairo’s Tahrir Square to pressure the SCAF into accepting a civilian-controlled government as quickly as possible. Marc Lynch explains what happened next:

“The Islamists and most other participants in the demonstration left Tahrir at the end of the rally. A few hundred people, mostly (it seems) families of the martyrs of the January 25 revolution and veterans of past Tahrir occupations, decided to launch a new sit-in. This does not seem to have been coordinated with the political strategy of the day’s demonstration. The move risked going down the same path as the July 8 demonstration, an originally successful rally which squandered its gains with a wildly unpopular occupation of Tahrir.

“But then Egyptian security forces, acting on authority which remains murky, moved in with extreme force to drive out the small group attempting to occupy Tahrir. Their over the top violence, including massive tear gas and highly abusive police behavior, seems to have then attracted the attention of the core of Egyptian activists who came running to join the fight. Instead of rapidly clearing the square, the security forces found themselves locked in an epic running battle with thousands of protestors. The momentum shifted repeatedly, with protestors holding the square and then being driven out and then returning. The security forces used massive amounts of tear gas, brute force, and weapons. That battle rages on.”

Today, on the third day of protests, the crowds have become large enough and the demonstrations geographically widespread enough to recall the days of the revolution last winter. They are demanding an end of SCAF rule, and lethal fighting continues at the entrance to the street leading to the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior. The latter point suggests that the SCAF regime’s frequent resort to violence in the face of any street opposition is the major sore point, and that a critical mass of Egyptians see the failure to rebuild the government’s internal security apparatus as an important piece of unfinished revolution business.

Aside from the SCAF, the Muslim Brotherhood is the institutional political actor drawing the most scrutiny. MB leaders show a sensitivity to any slight against their potential influence, and seem to have, perhaps with some justification, interpreted the supra-constitutional principles as something akin to the Turkish tradition where the military stands on guard against Islamists. There is also muttering that this entire crisis might have been provoked deliberately to postpone the elections, in which their Freedom and Justice Party is expected to win upwards of 40% of the seats. Because of this, they are insistent that the elections go forward as scheduled, arguing that they represent the best way to bring a civilian government into power. The leftist opposition, however, seems to favor postponing the vote on the grounds the situation is too chaotic and the SCAF cannot be trusted to fairly administer it. The MB has been ambivalent towards the protests, expressing sympathy with the demonstrators grievances, refusing to participate as an organization, and yet highlighting the participation of individual MB members, especially medical personnel.

As a historian, I find it unsurprising that a revolution would traverse multiple phases, as that is simply what often happens. This is especially true when there is no ready made united opposition to assume the helm. Even in Tunisia, there were protests several weeks after Ben Ali fled to oust his prime minister, Muhammad Ghannoushi. In the Egyptian case, almost everyone seemed to put the regime’s flaws primarily on Mubarak, and so were content to leave the transition to the military. Even then, I’ve seen a steady stream of stories in which a large number of groups fight for different types of influences and changes in local communities, businesses, and other institutions. It would not surprise me if Egypt’s politics develop something like Kyrgyzstan did after the Tulip Revolution, with a steady ebb and flow of protest as groups with conflicting agendas that trust neither each other nor the system vie for influence.

(Crossposted to my blog)

The Maspero Massacre

Brian Ulrich — Sun, 09 Oct 2011 20:59:51 +0000

Today, Egypt’s military government killed at least 19 Coptic demonstrators in Cairo:

“Nineteen people were killed in Cairo Sunday when Christians, some carrying crosses and pictures of Jesus, clashed with military police, medical and security sources said, in the latest sectarian flare-up in a country in political turmoil.

“Christians protesting against an attack on a church threw rocks and petrol bombs and set cars on fire, as thick smoke wafted through the streets in some of the most violent scenes since an uprising ousted ex-President Hosni Mubarak in February.

“Hundreds from both sides fought with sticks on a Cairo bridge. Protests later spread to the central Tahrir Square, the focal point of the February uprising. Witnesses said the army had moved into the area…

“‘We were marching peacefully,’ Talaat Youssef, 23-year old Christian trader told Reuters at the scene.

“‘When we got to the state television building, the army started firing live ammunition,’ he said, adding army vehicles ran over protesters, killing five. His account could not be immediately confirmed.”

My attention was drawn to this my Twitter feed, where people like al-Jazeera English journalist Nadia Abu al-Magd state unequivocally that security forces responded with lethal force to a peaceful demonstration, despite what is on official state media. Hossam el-Hamalawy, one of the organizers of Egypt’s leftist opposition, is blunt, and includes video clips:

“The army and police committed a horrible massacre against peaceful protesters today in Maspero, Cairo. Army vehicles ran over protesters. Live ammunition was used. Extensive rounds of tear gas were fired, and showers of beatings from the military police and the central security forces. At least 19 people have been killed, and more than 150 injured. The toll keeps increasing.

“The Army also stormed Al-Hurra TV station and 25 January TV stations, and took them off air. The Egyptian state run TV is inciting the public against the ‘Coptic protesters’ and even called on the citizens to take to the streets to ‘protect the army’!! SCAF is trying to instigate a sectarian civil war.”

Despite the lazy sectarian framing of the Reuters excerpt above, this is not sectarian violence, but violence of the regime against its citizens and an ongoing quest to use the threat of instability to preserve its own power. What’s more, it has a lesson for those who argue that current regimes are good for religious minorities: Dictators make fickle friends.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Egypt’s Ongoing Revolution

Brian Ulrich — Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:57:24 +0000

Undemocratic regimes don’t consist of just one powerful person. They exist with the support of certain elements in society that profit from their continuation. Because of this revolutions aren’t just protests which depose rulers, but broader social movements by which different social groups try to improve their position, whether economically, politically, or even culturally. Egypt is clearly following this trajectory, as protests since Mubarak’s resignation continue to reshape the country.

The past few days have seen two high-profile developments in the departure of interim prime minister Ahmed Shafiq and the unveiling of Egypt’s security apparatus following the storming of State Security offices.

Perhaps the most significant development for the future of Egyptian society, however, is that noted by Ursula Lindsey

“One of the most interesting (and hard to follow) phenomena of the moment in Egypt is the proliferation of demands for reform at the level of institutions and workplaces. At all sort of different organizations, workers are demanding the resignation of top officials and the institutions of more equitable pay scales.

“I just did a piece looking at this for the radio show The World. One of the people I spoke is my old friend Sabah Hamamou, who is one of the leaders of an effort to reform state newspapers. She and 300 other journalists wrote a letter of apology to readers for Al Ahram’s coverage of the protests. The editors refused to print it so they called a press conferences and read it out loud.”

Joel Beinin has also commented:

“Workers were critical in bringing the reluctant generals to the decision to ask Mubarak to step aside (or force him out, it’s unclear). They also continue to play a role by engaging in strikes since Mubarak’s departure…

“Certain kinds of anti-corruption demands also have a specific working-class component. For example, workers demanded the dismissal of the CEO of the public sector Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla al-Kubra, the largest textile enterprise in Egypt, on the grounds of corruption. And they won this demand after a three-day strike…

“The business cronies of Gamal Mubarak, the son of the former Egyptian president, people like the steel magnate Ahmad Ezz, have been dealt a strong blow. But they will not disappear so easily, and it is very possible to imagine that once ‘stability’ has been re-established they, or others like them, will return.”

Flipping through al-Masry al-Youm is instructive. There are stories of protests by miners and postal workers, university students, bank employees, auto workers, and those with housing concerns, the disabled,the journalists noted by Lindsey, high school students, imams and mosque functionaries, pharmaceutical plant workers, and those are just in March.

At the same time, a counter-revolution is under way:

“A look at the most prominent discourse making the newspapers and airwaves during the last week indicates that the army (or parts of it) and elements of the old regime will resist attempts at meaningful democratic reforms. While paying lip service to the youth, the revolution, and the martyrs, the ubiquitous appeal in all the local media has been to urge Egyptians to get back to work in order to get the economy back on track – as if the economy was ever on track in the first place…

“In the Egyptian context, the counter-revolutionary ‘who’ is not too difficult to identify: It certainly includes those officers of the despised state security services who fear being eventually brought to trial (however unlikely that scenario is) for their participation in the systematic torture of Egyptians, as well as people in the intelligence service who are loyal to Omar Suleiman. It includes corrupt businessmen who fear future prosecution and forfeiture of their wealth, and high- and mid-level operators of the now-defunct National Democratic Party for whom it would be almost impossible to do a facelift in a new era. It also includes those media executives, editors-in-chief, journalists and pundits who “spun” the most for the Mubarak regime and who are anxious about their own ouster…

“In this counter-revolutionary discourse, Mubarak’s name is being invoked in nostalgic terms, whereas Wael Ghoneim, who emerged as one of the most prominent figures of the revolution, is being written and talked about as a foreign stooge, a member of the Free Masons, and even as a yes-man for the security services…

“The counter- or contra-revolutionary media blitz has been in full swing over the last week. Mona Shazly, whose program 10 pm has a large following, deserves to become an honorary member of the High Army Council for her recent performance when she interviewed three of its generals and only one young activist. She helped paint the military in the best possible light by allowing the generals to repeat the same vapid media catchphrases: ‘forgive and forget,’ ‘we are all one,’ and ‘Egypt is above all.’ It was a tour de force, which suggests that this police state might be able to get away with the same crimes that it has been committing for the last 30 years if public opinion is persuaded to embrace this discourse of forgiveness and the parallel discrediting of continuing revolutionary ‘chaos.’”

Implicit in this is the assumption that the Egyptian military concluded that Mubarak was lost, but that his ruling structure as a whole, one from which they benefited, could still be preserved. Recent weeks have seen the army attack protestors. More dramatic, if away from the cameras, was the attack on Coptic desert monasteries which had built walls for their protection in the unstable revolutionary security situation. At issue seems to be the fact they did not seek government permission for this construction, but in practice it looks like the continuation of the Mubarak regime’s policies which forbid construction on Christian religious buildings without explicit government permission. A deeper issue is the level of force used, which was clearly excessive and designed to send some sort of message.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Qaradawi in Egypt

Brian Ulrich — Sun, 20 Feb 2011 03:16:03 +0000

As I’ve commented before, Yusuf al-Qaradawi matters, as a conservative Sunni Islamist who appeals to massive youth audiences through television even as the older generations remember his connection to Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna. On Friday, he gave a sermon in Midan Tahrir. I can’t find a complete English text, but here is some of what he said:

“On Friday, he struck themes of democracy and pluralism, long hallmarks of his writing and preaching. He began his sermon by saying that he was discarding the customary opening ‘Oh Muslims,’ in favor of ‘Oh Muslims and Copts,’ referring to Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. He praised Muslims and Christians for standing together in Egypt’s revolution and even lauded the Coptic Christian ‘martyrs’ who once fought the Romans and Byzantines. ‘I invite you to bow down in prayer together,’ he said.

“He urged the military officers governing Egypt to deliver on their promises of turning over power to ‘a civil government’ founded on principles of pluralism, democracy and freedom. And he called on the army to immediately release all political prisoners and rid the cabinet of its dominance by officials of the old Mubarak government.

“‘We demand from the Egyptian Army to free us from the government that was appointed by Mubarak,’ Sheik Qaradawi declared. ‘We want a new government without any of these faces whom people can no longer stand.’ And he urged the young people who led the uprising to continue their revolution. ‘Protect it,’ he said. ‘Don’t you dare let anyone steal it from you.’”

Another source mentioned this:

“Qaradawi, a spiritual leader to the Muslim Brotherhood here, sought to reassure Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority saying ‘in this square sectarianism died’ and praised Copts for linking hands to symbolically protect Muslims while they prayed during the uprising.

“‘The regime planted sectarianism here … in Tahrir Muslims and Christians joined hands for a better Egypt,’ said the theologian, who has lived in semi-exile in Qatar for decades.”

In my post from a week ago, I commented that the illiberal opinions of many Egyptians was a greater problem for developing a pluralistic society than the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, and that there is no reason to suspect the latter of secretly planning a theocratic dictatorship. While I still expect to see an increase in, for example, blasphemy trials, there is an optimistic scenario in which strong comments by respected leaders such as Qaradawi mute popular attitudes towards, say, conversion much like American popular Islamophobia remained somewhat muted when President Bush repeatedly worked against it.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Egyptian Revolution and Islamic Revival

Brian Ulrich — Sun, 13 Feb 2011 04:13:49 +0000

With the fall of long-time Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, many fear that Egypt will evolve into a theocracy under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. In that light, this statement is significant:

“Preserving the people’s freedom is more important than setting up a system of Sharia (Islamic law), even though freedom remains part and parcel of Sharia, said Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi on Friday evening in an interview with Al Jazeera television network. Al-Qaradawi, who is an influential Islamic thinker and president of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, is closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest opposition group.

“Recently, some members of the Brotherhood have tried to alleviate concerns that they want to establish an Islamic state by asserting that the Brotherhood does not seek to the rule the country or establish an Islamist government in Egypt.”

I don’t know on what show this interview was conducted, but prior to his retirement he was central to the highly rated al-Jazeera show Shari’a and Life. He was also an early follower of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, though he has resisted involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership. Although despised by al-Qaeda types, he is one of the undisputed leaders of conservative Islam in the world today, and his views are significant.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s support for democracy is not a momentary tactic, but has roots in its theological foundations. The group draws on the traditional of Islamic reformism associated with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the 19th century, which taught that instead of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, Muslims should rely on contemporary interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith. These modern interpretations can be harsh and puritanical, as well as liberal, and the Muslim Brotherhood has interpreted criminal law, for example, fairly literally. Politically, however, a key principle is “shura,” or consultation, which at least since the Young Ottomans opposed to the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-1800′s has for many carried connotations of democracy. Richard Mitchell, whose 1969 book on the Muslim Brotherhood remains a standard, explained it thus:

“‘The nation,’ ‘the people,’ in fact, are the source of all the ruler’s authority: ‘The nation alone is the source of power; bowing to its will is a religious obligation.’ The ruler has no legal existence and deserves no loyalty except as ‘he reflects the spirit of the society and is in harmony with its goals.’ Banna described the relationship of ruler and ruled as a ‘social contract’ in which the ruler is defined as a ‘trustee’ and ‘agent’…Since the ruler is the ‘agent contracted for’ by the nation, he is ‘elected’ by it.”

Not all or even most of the specific systems of government proposed under this framework could be called “democratic,” as many involve religious tests for office, limited electorates, and clerical councils with important powers, but the point I make is that for the Brotherhood, there is no break between advocating democracy and core political theory.

In the present context, I’m not even convinced that the Muslim Brotherhood wants to exercise power. It has pledged not to run a candidate for president, which is probably about reassuring those fearful of its influence, but may also cover uncertainty about the effects of actually having responsibility for things on its image and overall message. A further point is that there are several strains of thought within the MB, and I am not certain they will hold together in a common organization without the unifying concern for strength and unity in the face of military government.

If there is a related concern going forward in Egypt, it does not involve the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, but rather the generally illiberal impulses of Egyptian society. The specific form of Islamic Revivalism involving puritanical intolerant religious ideas has been growing steadily in Egypt for many years. I know its broader context from anthropological studies by Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood, and there is a decent journalistic account by Geneive Abdo. One factor seems to be returning guest workers from Wahhabi Saudi Arabia. Migration from conservative rural areas to the cities is also spreading that conservatism through urban society. Physical manifestations of the movement are seen widely attended unlicensed, often open-air mosques led by independent preachers and the circulation of salafi cassette sermons. Legally, there is a steady drumbeat of court cases involving alleged blasphemy. I expect all these trends to make themselves felt more publicly in a freer political environment.

At the same time, however, it may be that the salafi wave has crested. I suspect it is too soon to proclaim a post-Islamist Middle East, but several factors may gradually reduce its attractions. For one thing, a less corrupt government that spent more on economic and human development could reduce the incentive to become a guest worker in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the moderate clerics favored by Mubarak may no longer suffer from government associations in the court of public opinion.

Most important, however, is the sudden upsurge of new, competing ideologies and paths to dignity and meaning in life. I don’t have the materials at hand to provide concrete examples, but I was struck by the way in which the reasons many protesters gave for wanting to participate in the uprising paralleled those of people attending conservative shari’a classes at their local mosque. This passage by Mohammed Bamyeh is kind of what I mean:

“Third, remarkable was the virtual replacement of religious references by civic ethics that were presumed to be universal and self-evident. This development appears more surprising than in the case of Tunisia, since in Egypt the religious opposition had always been strong and reached virtually all sectors of life. The Muslim Brotherhood itself joined after the beginning of the protests, and like all other organized political forces in the country seemed taken aback by the developments and unable to direct them, as much as the government (along with its regional allies) sought to magnify its role.

“This, I think, is substantially connected to the two elements mentioned previously, spontaneity and marginality. Both of those processes entailed the politicization of otherwise unengaged segments, and also corresponded to broad demands that required no religious language in particular. In fact, religion appeared as an obstacle, especially in light of the recent sectarian tensions in Egypt, and it contradicted the emergent character of the Revolution as being above all dividing lines in society, including one’s religion or religiosity. Many people prayed in public, of course, but I never saw anyone being pressured or even asked to join them, in spite of the high spiritual overtones of an atmosphere saturated with high emotions and constantly supplied by stories of martyrdom, injustice, and violence.

“Like in the Tunisian Revolution, in Egypt the rebellion erupted as a sort of a collective moral earthquake—where the central demands were very basic, and clustered around the respect for the citizen, dignity, and the natural right to participate in the making of the system that ruled over the person. If those same principles had been expressed in religious language before, now they were expressed as is and without any mystification or need for divine authority to justify them. I saw the significance of this transformation when even Muslim Brotherhood participants chanted at some point with everyone else for a ‘civic’ (madaniyya) state—explicitly distinguished from two other possible alternatives: religious (diniyya) or military (askariyya) state.”

I remember G’Kar from Babylon 5:

“There is a greater darkness than the one we fight. It is the darkness of the soul that has lost it’s way. The war we fight is not against powers and principalities. It is against chaos and despair. Greater than the death of flesh is the death of hopes, the death of dreams. Against this peril we can never surrender. The future is all around us, waiting, in moments of transition, to be born in moments of revelation. No one knows the shape of that future or where it will take us. We know only that it is always born in pain.”

President Obama also spoke of the power of human dignity in his speech yesterday afternoon. If that is right, then the future is on the right track.

(Crossposted to my blog)

The Fall of Husni Mubarak

Brian Ulrich — Sat, 12 Feb 2011 02:53:06 +0000

What happened today in Egypt is a landmark, not only in Egyptian history, but that of the entire Arab world. Its relative wealth and high level of human development mean that Tunisia could be dismissed as an outlier. Its lesson, however, that the power of determined activists can undermine repressive regimes and even oust their top authorities, has now been confirmed in the Arab world’s most populous nation and frequent cultural leader. The people of Egypt, long derided for political apathy and easy co-option, sent a signal that sends chills down the spine of autocrats the world over.

The story of this uprising is still gradually coming to light, and that process could easily take years. In the Wall Street Journal, Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker chronicle the origins of the January 25 protest that worked and got the ball rolling, a story of cooperation, skilled planning, and undoubtedly a little luck that is worth reading. Mohammed Bamyeh suggests that January 28 is January 28 is the day the regime really fell:

“Though the regime struggled for two more weeks, practically little government existed during that period. All ministries and government offices have been closed, and almost all police headquarters were burned down on January 28. Except for the army, all security personnel disappeared, and a week after the uprising, only few police officers ventured out again. Popular committees have since taken over security in the neighborhoods. I saw patriotism expressed everywhere as collective pride in the realization that people who did not know each other could act together, intentionally and with a purpose. During the ensuing week and a half, millions converged on the streets almost everywhere in Egypt, and one could empirically see how noble ethics—community and solidarity, care for others, respect for the dignity of all, feeling of personal responsibility for everyone–emerge precisely out of the disappearance of government.”

Perhaps, but I still remember watching on February 2 and 3 as youth protesters held Midan Tahrir against the brutal onslaught of Mubarak’s thuggish mercenaries. I won’t made definitive statements questioning those on the scene, but I suspect that will go down as the critical moment which secured the ground on which, last weekend, protesters held both Muslim Friday prayers and Christian Sunday prayer service that no one could touch. Also critical, however, are the neighborhood committees, which thus far are mentioned for security and local organization, but could easily evolve into something like the anjumans which were an ongoing source of public participation and pressure during Iran’s Constitutional Revolution over 100 years ago.

Bamyeh eloquently continues:

“Undoubtedly this revolution, which is continuing to unfold, will be the formative event in the lives of the millions of youth who spearheaded it in Egypt, and perhaps also the many more millions of youth who followed it throughout the Arab world. It is clear that it is providing a new generation with a grand spectacle of the type that had shaped the political consciousness of every generation before them in modern Arab history. All those common formative experiences of past generations were also grand national moments: whether catastrophic defeats or triumphs against colonial powers or allies.

“This revolution, too, will leave traces deep in the social fabric and psyche for a long time, but in ways that go beyond the youth. While the youth were the driving force in the earlier days, the revolution quickly became national in every sense; over the days I saw an increasing demographic mix in demonstrations, where people from all age groups, social classes, men and women, Muslims and Christians, urban people and peasants—virtually all sectors of society, acting in large numbers and with a determination rarely seen before.

“Everyone I talked to echoed similar transformative themes: they highlighted a sense of wonder at how they discovered their neighbor again, how they never knew that they lived in ‘society’ or the meaning of the word, until this event, and how everyone who yesterday had appeared so distant is now so close. I saw peasant women giving protestors onions to help them recover from teargas attacks; young men dissuading others from acts of vandalism; the National Museum being protected by protestors’ human shield from looting and fire; protestors protecting captured baltagiyya who had been attacking them from being harmed by other protestors; and countless other incidents of generous civility amidst the prevailing destruction and chaos.”

The future is unknown, and I’m still not convinced true democracy is the most likely outcome. The bargain among those with influence will now be renegotiated, a process that sometimes takes years after this kind of earthquake. With continued popular pressure, however, and probably with ongoing American back-channel pressure and cooperation with the Egyptian military, I see at least a reasonable chance for a system that is democratic aside from military-enforced red lines, much like Turkey was for decades. Compared to Egypt’s recent past, that would be no small victory.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Alaa Explains Next Choices for Egypt Revolution

nadezhda — Thu, 10 Feb 2011 08:00:03 +0000

Sharif Abdel Kouddous, senior producer for Democracy Now interviews the youth activist and blogger, Alaa Abd El Fattah, in Tahrir Square on where the revolution stands now (Day 15, Feb 9). Alaa describes the contributions of the various groups driving the revolution, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and the challenges of making decisions among a disparate collection of protesting groups. He explains the complex options for pushing the revolution forward, such as whether to try to begin to replace regime structures from the ground up, and the entrance of the labor movement as a new factor. Especially noteworthy is that he treats seriously the pros-and-cons of both a go-slow approach to amending the constitution and the more radical option of rejecting the current constitution as illegitimate.

I highly recommend this ten-minute interview. Both optimistic and realistic, the interview shows how tricky the coming steps will be, seen both from Tahrir Square and from the White House or Foggy Bottom.

Even if the Egyptian government’s response to the expanding protests becomes more conciliatory, the central issue is that those supporting the protests cannot trust the regime leaders’ promises to reform themselves. Hence the significance of the readout of Biden’s phone call with Suleiman: the notion of “irreversible” as part of what constitutes “meaningful” change. Echoing Obama’s earlier statement that Egypt “can’t go back”, this was a critical step in the White House’s evolving public position. At least for the moment, this puts Obama on the same page as the protesters in assessing whether Suleiman’s actions reach the test Gibbs defined in Wednesday’s briefing: that the govenment meet a “minimum threshold” of change acceptable to the Egyptian public.

Transcript of the interview is at the Democracy Now site.

A Worried Regime

Brian Ulrich — Fri, 04 Feb 2011 02:46:04 +0000

As the Battle of Midan Tahrir continues, there are signs the regime is still worried:

“The developments come as the New York Times reports, quoting US officials and Arab diplomats, that the US administration is discussing with Egyptian officials a proposal for Mubarak to resign immediately, turning over power to a transitional government headed by Omar Suleiman, the newly appointed vice-president, with the support of the Egyptian military.

“The Egyptian president, for his part, says he has had enough and is ready to go but fears chaos if he resigns now…

“Ahmed Shafiq, Egypt’s new prime minister, said the interior minister should not obstruct Friday’s peaceful marches. The interior ministry has denied it ordered its agents or officers to attack pro-democracy demonstrators…

“In a move to try to calm the situation, Suleiman, the vice-president, said on Thursday the Muslim Brotherhood had been invited to meet the new government as part of a national dialogue with all parties.

“An offer to talk to the banned but tolerated group would have been unthinkable before protests erupted on January 25, indicating the gains made by the pro-democracy movement since then.”

Shafiq’s comments, Mubarak’s comments, the possibility of U.S. brokerage, and the attempt to peel the Muslim Brotherhood out of the opposition all show that the regime does not feel it has the situation under control. This is entirely due to the heroism of those in Midan Tahrir:

“Protesters in Tahrir Square, dominated now by a youthful hard core including secular middle-class graduates and mostly poorer Muslim Brotherhood activists, barely listened, saying the concessions were too little and too late…

“Doctors in makeshift hospitals at the scene said at least 10 people were dead and 800 wounded after armed men and stick-wielding Mubarak supporters attacked protesters on the streets. The UN estimates that number to be much higher.

“Close to the Egyptian Museum, home to 7,000 years of civilisation, men fought with rocks, clubs and makeshift shields, as US-built tanks from the Egyptian army made intermittent efforts to intervene.

“There were sporadic clashes throughout Thursday as the army fanned out to separate the two sides and allowed thousands more protesters to enter their camp in the square.

“An Al Jazeera online producer in Cairo said: ‘The battle for downtown Cairo took on an almost medieval quality, with protesters erecting makeshift barricades and building homemade catapults to launch rocks at each other.’

“He described the contrast between both sides’ tactics as striking. ‘The pro-democracy protesters organised themselves, building walls and seizing strategic locations; the pro-Mubarak crowd mostly advanced in a mob, hurling rocks and then retreating under return fire,’ he said.”

(Crossposted to my blog)

Battle of Midan Tahrir

Brian Ulrich — Thu, 03 Feb 2011 02:32:43 +0000

Today, Egypt’s peaceful pro-democracy protestors were set upon by a mob wielding knives, bricks, and Molotov cocktails:

“Witnesses said the military allowed thousands of pro-Mubarak supporters, armed with sticks and knives, to enter the square. Opposition groups said Mubarak had sent in thugs to suppress anti-government protests.

“One of our correspondents said the army seemed to be standing by and facilitating the clashes.

“Though initially put on the backfoot by the sudden attack, determined anti-government protesters looked to be winning the battle against Mubarak supporters.

“Witnesses also said that pro-Mubarak supporters were dragging away protesters they had managed to grab and handing them over to security forces…

“Aisha Hussein, a nurse, said dozens of people were being treated at a makeshift clinic in a mosque near the square…

“Meanwhile, another Al Jazeera correspondent said men on horseback and camels ploughed into the crowds as army personnel stood by.

“At least six riders were dragged from their beasts, beaten with sticks by the protesters and taken away with blood streaming down their faces.”

The battle began mid-afternoon and raged into the evening. The Associated Press put the numbers involved at about 10,000 anti-Mubarak demonstrators and 3000 regime supporters. Evidence suggests that the pro-Mubarak faction was conjured up from the police and hired thugs, as is common in Egypt.

The regime restored internet and cell phone service shortly before the attack, probably hoping word would spread and intimidate potential activists. At the same time, the international seem to have been targets of regime violence, presumably in an attempt to keep the affair off television screens. The army ceased guarding the square entrances and let the protesters get attacked, suggesting it has no intention of acting decisively against the Mubarak government, which is probably at this point more like Umar Suleiman’s government anyway. It looks to all appearances that my theory the military was seizing the chance to install Suleiman was annoyingly correct.

As I write, while today the demonstrators survived and cleared the square of regime forces, those pro-Mubarak thugs have barricaded them inside and any potential reinforcements outside, leading to fears of what tomorrow will bring. According to substantial Twitter traffic, in at least one nearby square, someone is firing rubber bullets at anti-Mubarak demonstrators.

I don’t see this as over today any more than I did a few days ago, though it looks bad for the protestors, who were able to remain united and organized even on this terrible day. They could still hold out for a little while, but I’m not sure they’ll get much help in the coming days without a massive organizational call for such help which I’m not seeing anywhere. Mubarak’s hand-off to Suleiman seems to have resolved the internal tensions within the security apparatus.

UPDATE: AJE is now (9:56 p.m.) reporting that anti-Mubarak demonstrators may have taken control of the Sixth of October Bridge over the Nile.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Generals and Protestors

Brian Ulrich — Tue, 01 Feb 2011 00:58:16 +0000

Steven Cook comes to some similar thoughts to those I posted yesterday about what is going on with Egypt’s regime and the military. He attributes the military’s declaration today that they would not fire on protestors in part to concerns at the elite levels that junior officers would not follow orders to do so. This is an important additional perspective to Matthew Axelrod’s interpretation of the military, in which they see themselves as guardians of the nation rather than the regime, but also look out for their own interests:

“Senior military officers are believed to benefit handsomely from the revenues generated by military-owned corporations, private contracts with foreign companies, and post-retirement postings in the private and public sectors. General Ahmed Mohamed Shafik, former head of Civil Aviation and now Egypt’s new Prime Minister, is the most prominent example. During my research in Cairo, foreign diplomats told me that Egyptian military officers regularly supplemented their incomes by receiving cash for routine military services, including Suez Canal passage. Some of those funds are believed to be held in Switzerland, where General Magdy Galal Sharawi, head of Egypt’s Air Force from 2002-2008, currently serves as Ambassador…

“There is a tension between the military’s interests — maintaining its credibility by siding with the people on the one hand, and maintaining its vast economic apparatus on the other. Maintaining stability is a given, but that stability will shake if the military is seen by the protesters as siding with Mubarak’s attempts to retain power. A middle solution is conceivable, where the military would not stand in the way of a transition government should it receive assurances that its affairs will remain untouched from reform. Mohamad El Baradei has said he will reach out to the Army, and such a discussion is not hard to imagine. For the Egyptian military it will be a huge, existential break from a symbiotic relationship with President Mubarak, but that break is looking to be inevitable.”

As I commented yesterday, the military leadership can get what they want even with greater political openness.

Cook also describes what I think is the strategy:

“To contain and control the protests for as long as possible and play for time. From the perspective of Mubarak, Vice President Omar Soleiman, the chief-of-staff General Sami Annan and the others now clinging to power every day provides an opportunity to try to weaken the opposition and peel the less committed from the demonstrations. Is it any wonder that Soleiman started talking about constitutional change today? The senior command believes they can save the regime. Delusional? Perhaps, but not surprising given their deep links to the regime.”

The regime, whatever that term means in this fluid situation, has clearly not given up. Al-Jazeera English just interviewed a woman who reported that police were attacking demonstrators in Luxor, away from journalistic attention. In addition, cell phone and train service will reportedly be disrupted tomorrow in an attempt to limit the size of what demonstrators hope will be a crowd of millions marching through Cairo.

If millions do march, however, it will be hard for regime elements to think they have a chance.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Military Opportunity

Brian Ulrich — Mon, 31 Jan 2011 02:28:01 +0000

Just as a follow-up to what’s below, the more I think about this, the more I suspect the military leadership is seizing the opportunity to install Omar Suleiman now and forestall the possibility of a Gamal Mubarak presidency. It definitely will not be that easy. Many of the protest leaders have drawn lines that won’t walk away from easily, but even if Suleiman can win temporary acceptance as a transitional leader, remaining regime elements can manipulate the system as they go. The two key pillars are economic corruption and foreign aid rent, and neither is incompatible with a period of greater political openness.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Egyptian Uncertainties

Brian Ulrich — Sun, 30 Jan 2011 23:33:05 +0000

Today, Husni Mubarak met with the military:

“President Hosni Mubarak, clinging to power despite unprecedented demands for an end to his 30-year rule, met on Sunday with the powerful military which is widely seen as holding the key to Egypt’s future.

“Mubarak held talks with Vice President Omar Suleiman, whose appointment on Saturday has possibly set the scene for a transition in power, Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Chief of Staff Sami al-Anan and other senior commanders…

“In surreal scenes, soldiers from Mubarak’s army stood by tanks covered in anti-Mubarak graffiti: ‘Down with Mubarak. Down with the despot. Down with the traitor. Pharaoh out of Egypt.’

“Asked how they could let protesters scrawl anti-Mubarak slogans on their vehicles, one soldier said: ‘These are written by the people, it’s the views of the people.’

“Egypt’s sprawling armed forces — the world’s 10th biggest and more than 468,000-strong — have been at the heart of power since army officers staged the 1952 overthrow of the king. It benefits from about $1.3 billion a year in U.S. military aid.”

Opposition leaders led by Muhammad el-Baradei have also expressed a desire to negotiate with the military. What is happening within it? Publicly they have sided with the demonstrators, using force mainly to try and bring order by rounding up looters, as just reported a few seconds ago by al-Jazeera English from Alexandria. They may be hoping that if their credibility increases, they can work a transition to the military-friendly Omar Suleiman rather than risk the unknowns of a non-NDP government following a successful revolution.

At the same time, regime moves bear scrutiny. The curfew, widely ignored, has been extended, and police are expected to return to the streets. I believe that the withdrawal of the police was part of a broader plan to defuse the protests through generalized instability, a plan which failed. It also seems like the police are still supporting the NDP, especially away from the Cairo/Alexandria/Suez trio that has dominated television coverage. Will the police crack down again, as the cameras fade away with the press crackdown?

I don’t think we are out of the woods yet on possible repression. One possible scenario is an attempt by various security services to manage some sort of transition to Suleiman. The overwhelming majority of protesters will not accept this. On the other hand, maybe the military is trying to maintain its command structure by not risking a revolt of foot soldiers and the lower officer corps if they give protest suppression orders which are not followed. An assumption could also be that they could be a power in any new regime that is formed, simply by threatening a coup.

This is far from over.

(Crossposted to my blog)

A Short Primer on Egypt Now

Brian Ulrich — Sat, 29 Jan 2011 21:41:50 +0000

The following is a guest post by Noor Khan

Basic Egypt facts

Egypt has about 80 million people and is the most populated Arab country. It is the 2nd most populated African country. The per capita income is about $5500, but the income gap is very large, with the vast majority of people living on about $5/day. It is a net exporter of petroleum, but not a major one. Many Egyptians work in the Petro-states or the West and send money back for their families. The three largest sources of hard currency in Egypt are tourism, the Suez Canal, and remittances from abroad. The literacy rate is between 60% and 70%, pretty good for Africa. About 85-87% of Egyptians are Sunni Muslim and 10-12% are Coptic Christian. Egypt gets 1.3 billion in military aid from the USA.

Egypt has NEVER experienced a real democracy. Despite being technically independent since 1922, it was under British colonial control until the Free Officers “Revolution” in 1952. Since Nasser and the Free Officers were pretty popular, the time is often looked back on nostalgically, especially by the lower classes, but it was a military government. Since Nasser’s death in 1970, Egypt was ruled by Anwar Sadat until he was assassinated in 1981 and M. Hosni Mubarak since then. Upon coming to power, Mubarak instated an Emergency Law which suspends many constitutional protections and basically gives the state complete jurisdiction for anything falling under the category “security.” There is no guaranteed right to privacy, free speech, assembly, press, or even a trial. Although there are a number of members of the judiciary who have tried to maintain its independence from the state, they are regularly thwarted and often removed or worse.

The political party which controls the country is the National Democratic Party. Other parties are allowed, but kept weak; the Muslim Brotherhood is technically banned but still the biggest party in opposition. When the elections are relatively free, they carry about 20% of the votes. There are periodic “elections” for a parliament that has no real power, and Mubarak is “re-elected” regularly with more than 90% of the vote. Recently, it has been clear that he expects his son Gamal to be “elected” after him (he’s 82), although there has always been a chance that another military strongman will take over, since Gamal is not from the military. Among the major contenders are Omar Suleiman, who was just named vice president, Ahmed Shafiq, who has just been made prime minister, and Sami Annan the Army Chief of Staff (who was in the USA on Wednesday).

Why are Egyptians in the streets protesting?

First of all, they want a real democracy. No one is fooled by the “elections” that just play musical chairs with the people already in power. They want real choices. Yes, many want the choice to vote for the Muslim Brotherhood. But that has NOT been the major theme in these protests, and in fact has been less important than anyone expected. The real issue is that the people want fair and free elections with all choices on the table. They want what most Americans want here.

(Note: The Brotherhood has condemned political violence, recognizes the Constitution and is NOT a terrorist organization. It is also not out to destroy Israel, although it certainly is not interested in putting Israel or America’s desires above those of Egyptians.)

Another issue is the use of torture by the police, who are protected by the Emergency Law. It has become endemic to the point that no one expects NOT to be tortured if arrested. And the reasons for arresting you can be as simple as not moving out of the way of a police officer fast enough. People disappear and die in police custody on a regular basis, and if the “arrest” is supposedly for “political crime,” there is very little the family or even lawyers can do. It is estimated that there are close to 10,000 political prisoners in Egypt at any given time. (See “We are all Khaled Said” on Facebook for more on the issue of torture in Egypt.)

The third is corruption. It is almost impossible to get anything done in Egypt without knowing someone or bribing someone. This is at every level of society. You need to bribe government officials to run a business, get a permit for anything, avoid a trumped up fine, get or keep a public sector job, or even get a driver’s license in fewer than five visits. Education is supposedly free, but government schools are so bad that only the most desperate will send their children there. For example, the average class size of a 7th grade Arabic language class in a public school in Cairo (from my sister-in-law, who is a teacher) is about 70 students. Health care is about the same. You literally have to budget about 25% of hospital costs for an operation for “tips” so that nurses and doctors will help you. Private care is better, but no less corrupt. You want to install a new pipe? Plan on having to pay at least three different people bribes to get the paperwork to do it “legally.” Buildings literally fall down in Egypt all the time, as quality codes can’t be enforced because of corruption. The list goes on.

Connected to the corruption is the bureaucratic inefficiency. It takes hours just to pay your electric or phone bill. Getting a copy of your birth certificate will require a full day off work, trekking to multiple offices, plus the bribes. And it’s not like you can avoid the bureaucracy either, because EVERYTHING needs government pieces of paper. For my Egyptian driver’s license I needed to go to the Interior Ministry to get a stamped copy of my marriage certificate to prove I was Egyptian (because I am married to the Egyptian whose name is on my Egyptian passport, which I had) and then the Foreign Affairs Ministry to get them to translate it and then another office to get it stamped. Then I had to bribe someone to say I had driven a stick shift for the test, because my own car was an automatic. Then I was told I couldn’t put my degree on the license (occupation is listed on these things) because it was from the USA. Despite having a Fulbright to Cairo University and all the documentation from the Bi-National Commission, I was supposed to take my degree to the Ministry of Education to get it endorsed and then do another set of acrobatics. I decided it was easier to be listed as “uneducated” on the license. My sister-in-law was born on February 4, but the certificate of passing high school has a mark on it so it looks like February 14. After weeks of going between different government offices to get this fixed so that her college degree would be registered correctly, we finally gave up. We made a mark in front of the 4 on her birth certificate and enrollment paper. So now her birthdate is the 14th. It’s easier to forge than to correct a government mistake. Imagine this kind of rigmarole every time you needed to do paperwork of any kind.

The last problem is the poverty. Prices have risen over 12% in the past few months, but food has risen the fastest. Meat has gone up 23%, sugar about 30% and tomatoes even more. In a country where most of the population spends about 50% of its income on food, this has been devastating. People can’t put food on their family, as W would say. Yes, things are tough everywhere, but they are very bad in Egypt, and the government is spending billions on weapons and the security apparatus which protects them from the people more than it protects Egypt from any external threat. Plus, the fat cats in government and their “private sector” cronies are very visibly flaunting their ill-gotten gains. The gap between the rich and the overwhelming majority of poor is huge, but now the middle class is shrinking quickly – sliding down, not going up. There are thousands of luxury housing units going up all over Cairo, while the majority of the people are packed like sardines in tiny apartments with deteriorating infrastructure. “Let them eat cake” is the government’s attitude.

So who do the Egyptians want in charge?

Good question – why don’t we let them vote on it? Realistically, it will take at least a few months to arrange for free elections. Until then, Egyptians will accept a transitional government they trust to turn over power to a new elected civilian government. They might even trust the military to do it, but I don’t think so. The two most trusted people by the masses are probably Mohamad al-Baradei, the former head of the IAEA, and Amr Moussa, the head of the Arab League. Maybe another will appear. Opposition leaders such as Ayman Nour and Noman Goma’a would probably not want the job, as they would want to run for Parliament. Could elections be held fairly? I don’t know. Egypt does have some reliable figures in the judiciary, but I personally would prefer international observers. Would the Egyptian masses? Again, I don’t know. Most Egyptians I know distrust international organizations and are very leery of threats to their country’s sovereignty, perhaps for good reason.

What should the US and other governments do?

Support democracy. The people are actually quite clear. It is time for us to stop supporting dictators who we think are more reliable than a free people. And it is time we stopped thinking our foreign policy and economic concerns should be more important to other countries than their own. There is much more I could say here, but I’ll stop now.

Noor Khan is an assistant professor of history at Colgate University, with a specialty in modern Egypt.

Mubarak’s Survival Efforts

Brian Ulrich — Sat, 29 Jan 2011 19:31:57 +0000

Husni Mubarak has tried to defuse some of the protests by redoing his government:

“Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has appointed the country’s head of intelligence to the post of vice-president, in a move said to be a reaction to days of anti-government protests in cities across the country.

“Omar Soliman was sworn in on Saturday, the first time Mubarak appointed a vice-president during his 30-year rule. Ahmad Shafiq, a former chief of air staff, was also appointed prime minister.

“But Al Jazeera’s correspondents in Egypt have said that many of those on taking to the streets have demanded a total change of guard, as opposed to a reshuffling of figures in the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).

“Tens of thousands of people in the capital Cairo gathered on Saturday, demanding an end to Hosni Mubarak’s presidency.

By appointing Omar Suleiman as vice president, Mubarak is giving him important advantages for an eventual succession, perhaps reassuring some whose main concern is having the presidency handed to his son Gamal Mubarak. This has not, however, had much impact on the streets, where protestors are demanding Mubarak’s resignation and a complete end to his regime.

I’m watching al-Jazeera English, and military leaders are trying to clear the streets without shooting by playing the looting card. I suspect their hope is that, with the communications crackdown, it will be difficult to reconstitute the protests if they dissipate, and forces are able to crack down on what remains under the banner of combating thuggery. I’m certain those hopes are in vain.

(Crossposted to my blog)