American Footprints » al Qaeda

Al-Qaeda and Syria’s Uprising

Brian Ulrich — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 02:48:12 +0000

Nicholas Blanford examines the question of whether al-Qaeda is involved in Syria’s uprising:

“The Assad regime insists that the opposition protests that have rocked the country since March are being driven by ‘armed terrorist groups’ and ‘Islamic militants.’ It has blamed Al Qaeda for three suicide bomb attacks over the past month against security offices in Damascus, which left 70 people dead.

“Analysts say there is little proof – at least for now – that suggests that Al Qaeda, or its militant affiliates, are seeking to play an active role in the Syrian uprising…

“(However,) as the violence has steadily worsened, some commentators on jihadist websites are openly calling for waging a jihad against the Assad regime. In November, Osama al-Shehabi, the leader of Al Qaeda-inspired Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, called for an armed struggle in Syria.

“‘The regime’s brutal oppression of the Syrian people proves that it is time to change direction and use real weapons against the regime,’ he wrote in an article that was published by the Shumoukh al-Islam online forum. ‘The revolution is a jihad; it is a war; prepare for jihad for God; scrutinize your intentions and take up arms, for they are your obligation.’

“Last month the jihadist website Minbar al-Tawhid Wa al-Jihad posted a fatwa, or religious edict, by an influential Salafist cleric, in which he sanctioned the use of violence against the Assad regime.

“‘Why do you insist on confining yourselves to peaceful protests?’ wrote Sheikh Abu Mundhir al-Shinqiti. ‘Is it a disgrace to kill those who kill us?… It has come to a stage where nothing will avail except taking up arms.’”

The answer to the question probably depends on the meaning of “al-Qaeda.” The intelligence coup from the Bin Laden raid revealed that al-Qaeda central did have a larger coordinating role over al-Qaeda branded groups than most scholars had previously suspected. However, all these local groups still had their own levels of affiliation, as well as favored local causes. The Libyan Islamic Fighters Group was always primarily interested in their struggle against Qadhafi, and now that he’s gone, there’s been no evidence of their attacking other topics. It sounds like Lebanon’s Fatah al-Islam has an interest in the Syrian cause, as well. Even then, however, if Syria did rank high on the agenda of the al-Qaeda movement as a whole, I’d expect to see more happening in Aleppo, which as I recall had an underground jihadist community which supported foreign fighters en route to Iraq.

(Crossposted to my blog)

The Importance of Training Camps

Brian Ulrich — Fri, 09 Sep 2011 23:19:10 +0000

Over the past couple of years, I’ve noticed a trend of people pointing to terrorist plots hatched in, for example, Europe as evidence that “safe havens” for terrorist groups do not matter. In his monograph Jihad in Saudi Arabia, Thomas Hegghammer comes to a different conclusion:

“The arguably most important lesson from the history of al-Qaida is that unhampered access to territory can dramatically increase a terrorist group’s military capability. For a start, the safe haven allowed al-Qaida to quietly plan operations on its own schedule with virtually no outside interference. Moreover, it allowed Bin Laden to build a core organisation with a relatively high degree of bureaucratisation and functional task division, which in turn improved organisational efficiency. Most important of all, territorial access enabled Bin Laden to set up an elaborate military educational system, the like of which has never been seen in the hands of a transnational terrorist organisation with such a radical agenda. This infrastructure – or “University of Global Jihadism” – greatly improved al-Qaida’s ability to operationalise recruits. The training camps are also key to understanding the characteristic organisational unity of al-Qaida, namely the simultaneous existence of a hierarchical and bureaucratic core and a much larger and looser network of camp alumni.

“Beyond increasing the recruits’ paramilitary expertise, the camps constituted an arena for social processes that improved al-Qaida’s operational capability. Many of these processes imitated those cultivated by professional military organisations. Instructors first of all sought to desensitise the recruits through intensive weapons practice and through the promotion of an ultra-masculine and weapons-fixated camp culture. Moreover, the hardship of camp life made recruits forge strong personal relationships, thus building the deep internal loyalty and trust needed for long-winded operations such as the 9/11 attacks. Finally the ‘graduates’ of these camps were imbued with self-confidence and a sense of being part of a vanguard, which turned many into leading or entrepreneurial figures in the militant communities in their home countries. In addition to these social processes came the ideological indoctrination into global jihadism. Recruits were exposed to lectures and writings of global jihadi ideologues. Instructors also encouraged anti-American statements within the camps, leading recruits to try to rhetorically outdo one another. On the whole, the alumni from these training camps were more brutal, more bound together and more anti-Western than most of their peers.”

Some context for the second paragraph is provided by Hegghammer’s prosopographical study of 197 al-Qaida recruits from Saudi Arabia. Almost all of them travelled to Afghanistan intending to fight in prominent limited conflicts such as that in Chechnya and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only in the training camps in Afghanistan did some start becoming committed to the al-Qaida vision of a global campaign against the United States or socially recruited into other agendas. The fact that deception about al-Qaida’s actual agenda was involved, not only in fundraising, but recruitment, leads me to hate al-Qaida even more now than I did this morning.

I suspect suspicion about the “safe haven” idea results from skepticism about American policy into Afghanistan bleeding over into one of the primary rationales for our involvement there. I do not, however, draw from the work of Hegghammer and others whom I have read any especially militant conclusions. Specifically, it seems clear that al-Qaida and the Taliban themselves had different agendas, and that many within the Taliban were not keen on harboring Bin Laden’s state within a state. This is, in fact, why he ordered the assassination of the Taliban’s arch-rival Ahmad Shah Massoud ten years ago today. In addition, while it seems common sense that trained terrorists are more capable of inflicting harm than untrained ones, the point about drawing recruits into Bin Ladenism seems irrelevant now that everyone can clearly see what it is. I haven’t closely followed the war in Afghanistan for several years, but given my sense of the situation on the ground, I would not be averse to a withdrawal that involved some elements of the Taliban gaining some measure of political power in the country, along with a sufficient intelligence presence to be aware of and a willingness to act against any new “training camps” that were sufficiently threatening to U.S.’s national interests.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Al-Qaeda and the Arab Spring

Brian Ulrich — Tue, 16 Aug 2011 23:26:24 +0000

Mariann Ormholt looks at al-Qaeda and the Arab Spring:

“A study on al-Qaeda in the Arab Spring by Juan Zarate and David Gordon of Washington’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, suggests a number of other reasons why al-Qaeda has been sidelined in the uprisings…

“Nonetheless, al-Qaeda leaders have quickly sought to try and position their movement as having a role to play in the revolutions.

“Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading al-Qaeda figure, even linked the rebellions with its efforts to challenge the United States. He said this had inspired the Arab world to demand change.

“Other prominent al-Qaeda figures such as current head Ayman al-Zawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American cleric, have also attempted to claim credit for the revolutions…

“At the same time, Benotman said that it was difficult for al-Qaeda to find a role in the revolutions. While the militants blame western powers for the hardships faced by Muslims, the popular protests addressed ineffective governance and local grievances, such as unemployment and corruption.

“In addition, while the protesters are mostly driven by temporal concerns, al-Qaeda continues to be driven by religious imperatives.”

I’m dubious of the distinction between temporal and religious concerns in that last paragraph, as al-Qaeda has always articulated temporal concerns through a religious lens. This, however, does not detract from the fact that al-Qaeda has become even more marginal to Arab political developments than they were before. At the same time, I think we should take seriously the concern that their brand of transnational salafi jihadism could attract more of a following if the Arab world reverts to the status quo of 2010, much as it has gained supporters in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip and in some Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Osama bin Laden’s Death

Brian Ulrich — Mon, 02 May 2011 22:48:34 +0000

The death of Osama bin Laden has been a worthy objective for those like me that believe the United States should take all reasonable means to punish who attack it. The fact it took so long has been a propaganda coup for bin Laden and his fellow travelers in the salafi jihadist movement and the font of numerous unhealthy conspiracy theories both domestically and around the world.

The actual impact of his death will be minimal among the generic al-Qaeda movement he has been so instrumental in creating. Even within al-Qaeda central, his functional role was always less than that of Ayman al-Zawahiri. His greatest significance was as a symbol and rallying point, and given the significance of martyrdom in those circles, he can be that almost as effectively dead as alive. I suspect, however, that the White House is playing up the apparent use of his wife as a human shield in an attempt to tarnish his image even among that set.

There is, however, some impact on al-Qaeda’s ability to present itself as an alternative within, for example, the Arab political universe. On this point, Marc Lynch is far more insightful than I could ever be, but the point is that bin Laden had a charismatic biography and sense of authenticity that gave his agenda at least some credibility in the Arab public sphere, many of whom engaged in conspiracy theories to deny his worst atrocities while lauding him as a symbol of resistance to the United States and its policies in the region. That resistance card, however, is the only one al-Qaeda ever played successfully in the court of public opinion. As Lynch says:

“Al-Qaeda was never able to attract significant support for its salafi-jihadist ideology, and thrived with mass Arab audiences only when it was able to pose as an avatar of resistance to the West. Al-Qaeda thrived on the ‘clash of civilizations’ and ‘war of ideas’ rhetoric which dominated the first five years of the Bush administration, since this vindicated its claim to speak on behalf of Islam against the West. But the Bush administration’s switch in its final two years towards a more nuanced approach focused on highlighting Al-Qaeda’s extremism and marginality proved more effective. The Obama administration continued this approach, and built on it by explicitly reducing its rhetorical focus on al-Qaeda and pushing back against all attempts to reignite a ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative…

“The message that al-Qaeda killed innocent Muslims, reinforced and amplified by American strategic communications and by sympathetic Arab governments and media, took a serious toll. So did al-Qaeda’s repeated picking of losing fights with more popular Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah. In short, while it was able to appeal to and recruit from the small, extreme sub-cultures which developed around jihadist ideology, al-Qaeda has long since lost its attractiveness to mainstream Arabs.”

The driving ideology in the Arab world right now is not the need to attack the “Far Enemy” so as to have the freedom to implement a puritanical vision of shari’a at home, but rather support for the idea of peaceful popular uprisings against corrupt dictatorships and social transformation through persuasion, regardless of what transformation particular movements are seeking. This is why a number of reports have indicated that the past few months have posed problems for al-Qaeda and company, as crowds in Tunisia and Egypt most prominently have undone the pillar of their distinctive ideology.

The death of Osama bin Laden is thus a good thing, but only one highly visible aspect of al-Qaeda’s more general decline. In that sense, bin Laden’s death may have just as much symbolism as the myths which surrounded his life, though not in the way he hoped.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Reacting Against al-Qaeda

Brian Ulrich — Fri, 05 Nov 2010 19:36:04 +0000

Muslims in Egypt from all shades of the theological spectrum are speaking out against al-Qaeda in Iraq’s anti-Christian declaration:

“But instead of turning against Christians, calls to protect them echoed from throughout Egypt’s Islamic community.

“‘This is something to be rejected and strongly denounced, and it serves none but those who want to spark discord and target national unity,’ the head of Al-Azhar University, Ahmed al-Tayeb, said.

“Pope Schnouda III, the head of Egypt’s Coptic Orthodox Church, used his weekly address in Cairo on Wednesday to praise Al-Azhar and the ‘sympathy’ Christians have received from Egyptian newspapers, intellectuals and the ministry of interior, which has posted extra security outside churches.

“Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, an outlawed Islamist group that represents the strongest opposition to Egypt’s ruling political party, also strongly condemned the ISI and its statements.

“‘The Muslim Brotherhood is stressing to all, and primarily Muslims, that the protection of holy places of all monotheistic religions is the mission of the majority of Muslims,’ the group said.”

(Crossposted to my blog)

Iraqi al-Qaeda and Christians

Brian Ulrich — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 01:31:20 +0000

The fact an important Iraqi group acting under the al-Qaeda label has declared war on all Christians is disturbing:

“An al Qa’eda group in Iraq has declared Christians ‘legitimate targets’ as a deadline expired for Egypt’s Coptic church to free women allegedly held after converting to Islam, SITE monitors said today.

“The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) said in an internet statement that its threat was justified by the church’s refusal to indicate the status of the women it said were being held captive in monasteries, the US-based monitoring group said…

“The group, which claimed the attack on Christians in a Baghdad church that ended on Sunday with the killing of 46 worshippers as security forces attempted to free them, had said that the attack was to seek the release of the alleged converts in Egypt.

“‘Let these idolaters, and at their forefront, the hallucinating tyrant of the Vatican, know that the killing sword will not be lifted from the necks of their followers until they declare their innocence from what the dog of the Egyptian Church is doing,’ the ISI said in its latest statement.

This is qualitatively different from the original al-Qaeda’s rhetoric against “Crusaders,” and more like the tone many Islamist militants have adopted toward Jews. If this willingness to push open communal warfare spreads, it will have important consequences for the large Christian communities found throughout the Middle East. Although not the most important aspect of the story, it’s also worth noting the conflation of different Christian groups, as the states motives involve a delicate communal affair among Egypt’s Copts and the Qur’an-burning threat by a Florida pastor, but the massacre was carried out at a Chaldean Catholic church and the statement clearly references the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Bab al-Mandab

Brian Ulrich — Tue, 23 Feb 2010 20:13:16 +0000

Normally al-Qaeda affiliates just make threats they can only carry out in their dreams, but in this case I’m not sure sure:

“Al-Qaeda has never attempted to seize and hold strategic territory, but this may be about to change, according to an audiotape message from the deputy leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In the 12-minute statement, Sa’id al-Shihri (a.k.a. Sufyan al-Azidi) outlined a new strategy that would involve Islamist fighters from Somalia working in coordination with AQAP fighters in Yemen to secure both sides of the vital strait (al-Malahim Establishment for Media Production, February 8)…

“‘Following the offer of Somalia’s al-Shabaab Islamist movement to send fighters to join AQAP in Yemen, al-Shihri praises his ‘great brothers in Somalia’ and says they will operate on two fronts in the upcoming battle with the United States. ‘You and we are standing on the two banks of the Bab al-Mandab… We shall expel our enemies. We should complete each other in our war against our enemies, until God grants us victory or martyrdom, God willing.’”

“Elements of the Arab press quickly pointed out that al-Qaeda’s ambition may be beyond its reach. ‘Control of the Bab al-Mandab might not be easy, especially as it does not possess heavy weapons and modern boats that can be used for this purpose, but this does not mean it does not possess the logistical capabilities that can disrupt navigation in this vital international passageway’ (al-Quds al-Arabi, February 9). Nevertheless, Yemeni government officials said all such threats were taken seriously (al-Hayat, February 9; 26Sep.net [Yemen Defense Ministry], February 10).”

Irreconcilable Differences?

Eric Martin — Thu, 29 Oct 2009 20:00:33 +0000

One justification for continuing (and possibly escalating) our military/non-military commitment in Afghanistan centers around the potential for al-Qaeda to establish safe havens in that country from which to coordinate attacks on US targets. This al-Qaeda-based rationale rests on several assumptions that include, but perhaps are not limited to:

1. If we withdraw or significantly reduce our military presence, the Taliban will retake Afghanistan (presumably that means the Taliban will exert more control than the permanent presence it currently maintains in more than 80% of that nation’s territory).

2. If the Taliban retakes Afghanistan, they will invite al-Qaeda back in that country, allowing al-Qaeda a free range of motion akin to what existed pre-9/11 (this, despite the fact that the Taliban currently controls vast swaths of Afghan territory and most US military and intelligence leaders – including Petraeus and McChrystal – maintain that there is no serious al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan at this time).

3. A safe haven in Afghanistan is necessary for al-Qaeda to coordinate attacks against the United States (the current safe haven in Pakistan is, according to this reasoning, significantly less ideal, and the myriad small scale safe havens and potential new safe havens in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere are also substantially inferior to the potential and coveted Afghan safe haven).

4. Despite the vastly increased focus - and allocation of resources – dedicated to counterterrorism efforts on the part of the US law enforcement community, intelligence community, political leadership and military establishment, a safe haven in Afghanistan would significantly increase al-Qaeda’s ability to carry off successful attacks on US interests (the current safe haven in Pakistan, according to this reasoning, does not similarly increase al-Qaeda’s efficacy, and the myriad small scale safe havens and potential new safe havens in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere would also not augment efficacy in the same manner as the potential and coveted Afghan safe haven).

5. Even if items 1-4 are correct, the United States could not successfully disrupt Afghan safe havens from afar using air power and other targeted military strikes (with much looser rules of engagement governing air strikes, more focus and a higher priority placed on anti-terrorist operations, our posture with respect to air strikes varies greatly from the days leading up to 9/11, and such strikes have been used to great success in places like Somalia and Yemen where we maintain very light to non-existent boots-on-the-ground presence).

Without addressing items 1-5 in their entirety, there are some recent developments that call into question the likelihood of item #2 – that the Taliban would welcome al-Qaeda back and provide them with free range of motion in terms of operations, should the Taliban exert greater control over Afghan territory. Via Marc Lynch, Vahid Brown of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has been picking up chatter on key jihadi websites regarding a growing rift between the Taliban and al-Qaeda:

Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders have been issuing some very mixed messages of late, and the online jihadi community is in an uproar, with some calling these developments “the beginning of the end of relations” between the two movements. Beginning with a statement from Mullah Omar in September, the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta-based leadership has been emphasizing the “nationalist” character of their movement, and has sent several communications to Afghanistan’s neighbors expressing an intent to establish positive international relations.

In what are increasingly being viewed by the forums as direct rejoinders to these sentiments, recent messages from al-Qa’ida have pointedly rejected the “national” model of revolutionary Islamism and reiterated calls for jihad against Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan and China. However interpreted, these conflicting signals raise serious questions about the notion of an al-Qa’ida-Taliban merger. [...]

[O]ne thing is clear: the recent shift in the Quetta Shura’s strategic communications is not to al-Qa’ida’s liking, and it is raising serious concerns among the broader Salafi jihadi movement about the religio-political legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership.

Like Marc Lynch, I would caution against interpreting these online trends as a definitive indicator of an underlying schism, but this rhetoric is not to be dismissed either. According to Lynch:

…Brown’s post reminds me of the online furor over the Islamic State of Iraq which foreshadowed the dramatic split in the Iraqi insurgency in which key insurgency factions flipped to the U.S. side and formed the backbone of the Awakenings/ Sons of Iraq. Back then, in the fall of 2006 through early 2007 we saw growing discord on the forums between al-Qaeda in Iraq’s umbrella group the Islamic State of Iraq and key insurgency factions. Some of the discord focused on local complaints (ISI attacks on moderate imams), but a lot focused on this tension between the nationalist goals of the Iraqi insurgency factions (which mainly wanted to drive American forces out of Iraq) and the universalist goals of AQI (which mainly wanted to use Iraq as the base for global jihad).

Those tensions on the forums proved to be a crucial leading indicator of real splits on the ground which energized the “Awakenings” movement.

The prospect for such a rift developing would not be outlandish either, considering the fundamental differences in outlook and orientation of the two parties involved. While there is some religious and ideological affinity, Afghans (including Taliban) have tended to bristle at the tendency of the foreign al-Qaeda contingent to disregard the concerns, and authority, of the locals. The Taliban’s overriding goal is to take power in Afghanistan, and maintain that power. al-Qaeda, on the other hand, is more interested in an international religious struggle – with its primary adversary, in the near term, being the United States.

Recall, al-Qaeda’s past strikes on the US are responsible for the Taliban losing power and suffering much hardship in the process. The provocation of the United States, and the aftermath, angered many Taliban, and their experience facing the onslaught of the US military left an impression, to say the least. In portions of this intriguing piece by Sami Yousafzai (which collected first hand reports by Taliban fighters), some of that animosity comes through quite clearly:

HAQQANI: Two days before the September 11 attacks on America, we were all celebrating the death of [Northern Alliance commanderAhmed Shah] Masood, [who was assassinated by Qaeda agents posing as television reporters]. His forces were already on the verge of defeat, so his death all but assured us of total victory in Afghanistan. But the September 11 attacks turned our cheer into deep concern. We gave those camels [a derogatory Afghan term for Arabs] free run of our country, and they brought us face to face with disaster. We knew the Americans would attack us in revenge.

Realizing the danger, I immediately sent my wife and children to Pakistan. The entire government started to fall apart. I never thought the Taliban would collapse so quickly and cruelly under U.S. bombs.

AKHUNDZADA: When the bombing started, I was commanding some 400 fighters on the front lines near Mazar-e Sharif. The bombs cut down our men like a reaper harvesting wheat. Bodies were dismembered. Dazed fighters were bleeding from the ears and nose from the bombs’ concussions. We couldn’t bury the dead. Our reinforcements died in their trenches. [...]

YOUNAS: …The Islamic Emirate’s collapse was like a nightmare.

I watched as wounded, disabled, and defeated Taliban fighters straggled into Wana and the surrounding villages, along with Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks. Every morning as I went to school I could see them wandering around town, almost like homeless beggars. Little by little, the tribal people started helping them, giving them food. Some people even took them into their houses; at first these once proud jihadis survived, thanks to the people’s charity.

The Arabs were disappointed the Taliban hadn’t stood and fought. They told me they had wanted to fight to the death. They were clearly not as distressed as the Afghans. That was understandable. The Arabs felt they had lost a battle. But the Afghans were much more devastated—they had lost their country. [...]

HAQQANI: I admit Taliban commanders are being captured and killed, but that hasn’t stopped us, and it won’t. Our jihad is more solid and deep than individual commanders and fighters—and we are not dependent on foreigners, on the ISI [Pakistan's intelligence agency], or Al Qaeda. Personally I think all this talk about Al Qaeda being strong is U.S. propaganda. As far as I know, Al Qaeda is weak, and they are few in numbers. Now that we control large amounts of territory, we should have a strict code of conduct for any foreigners working with us. We can no longer allow these camels to roam freely without bridles and control.

Again, this is not to say that the Taliban would expel al-Qaeda en masseshould it consolidate its position in Afghanistan. But it is a definite possibility considering the goals of each party, and the stakes should the Taliban continue to allow al-Qaeda to provoke retaliation from the US from Afghan soil.

Well, One Out of Three Ain’t Bad

Eric Martin — Thu, 17 Sep 2009 14:59:01 +0000

At long last, the Obama administration has provided a draft of its objectives with respect to the ongoing military occupation of Afghanistan, as well as a series of metrics for gauging the success in terms of meeting those aims. Unfortunately, the enunciated objectives are themselves typical of the muddled and contradictory goals, tactics and strategies associated with a mission that has lost both its mooring and rudder. From Josh Rogin’s summary:

The draft document focuses on three main objectives: disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan, working to stabilize Pakistan, and working to achieve a host of political and civic goals in Afghanistan. Each objective has a list of metrics beneath it, although many of these are more goals than concrete milestones that could be measured in any factual way. [emph. added]

The metrics span just about every conceivable issue, including progress towards Pakistan’s civilian government and judicial system becoming stable, to support for human rights, to public perceptions of security, to volume and value of narcotics.

A partial list of the cross purposes is as follows: A continued military operation in Afghanistan that (even if inadvertently) weakens Pakistan vis-a-vis India is not going to stabilize the situation in Pakistan (nor garner the full support of the Pakistani government). Along those lines, operations against Pakistani Taliban elements in pursuit of eliminating supply lines and redoubts for Afghan Talibs is not going to stabilize Pakistan either. Quite the contrary, such activities are creating a sizable anti-US, anti-Pakistani government backlash – pushing moderates and religious extremists together in common cause – and provoking Pakistani Taliban to attack the Pakistani government.

In general terms, this radicalization and escalation are only logical: large foreign military occupations pursuing narrow, self-serving interests and in the process bending local powers to its purposes rarely bring about stability, peace and regional harmony. Absent an unrestrained brutality that we will not and should not unleash.

As for the metric of achieving “progress towards Pakistan’s civilian government and judicial system becoming stable,” again, this aim is undercut by the underlying policy of military occupation of Afghanistan. Consider the actual metrics:

Progress towards Pakistan’s civilian government and judicial system becoming stable and free of military involvement
Pakistan’s actions to take necessary steps to ensure economic and financial stability, job creation, and growth
Support for human rights
Development of an enduring, strategic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan
Pakistani public opinion of government performance
Demonstrable action by government against corruption, resulting in increased trust and confidence of the Pakistani public

Our policy is wildly unpopular in Pakistan. We are viewed by large swathes of the population as, alternatively, an imperial power and a Western crusader intent on weakening a powerful Muslim nation (and seizing its nukes). The government in power is viewed as a quisling regime installed and/or controlled by us.

How is a continuation of the policy that gives rise to such sentiment going to aid the “[d]evelopment of an enduring, strategic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan”? Further, in an environment like the one stoked by such policies, how can the US simultaneously support democracy and seek to ensure a compliant Pakistani government? After all, it is at least likely that any government that emerges from a fair democratic process, if representative of public sentiment, would reject these particular US policies in the region.

Even Hamid Karzai had to engage in massive fraud to achieve his “free and fair” electoral victory – a testament to the complications elections and democracy can bring about. A similar outcome (or perceived outcome) in Pakistan in order to preserve the opportunity to pursue an unpopular policy would directly undermine each and every one of the enumerated metrics above.

Legitimacy is not won that way. And if legitimacy is a prerequisite for success in counterinsurgency operations, well then, we’re doing it wrong.

You Probably Think this War is About You

Eric Martin — Wed, 09 Sep 2009 18:37:27 +0000

Despite President Bush’s post-9/11, manichean-tinged attempt to categorize other nations as either “with us or against us” with respect to those terrorist groups that the US government considers problematic, and despite an understandable impulse on the part of the US government to put US interests ahead of those of other states (a tendency that spans administrations from both parties), governments in foreign capitals haven’t necessarily been all that cooperative or obedient. This should come as no surprise, and yet our policies are often crafted with the expectation that our dictates will meet little resistance because we, the indispensable nation, have issued them.

Along these lines, much of our strategic class suffers from a persistent form of solipsism with respect to international affairs, a myopia that obscures the obvious truth that, just as we must pursue our interests first and foremost, other governments are, likewise, compelled to put their own respective interests first. Often times, this overriding motivation means that they will refuse to line-up along demarcations established, somewhat arbitrarily in their eyes, by the United States. It’s nothing personal.

The most pertinent recent example of this incongruity between US expectations and demands, and a foreign nation’s uncooperative and hesitant response, centers around our dealings with Pakistan and our policy agenda in Afghanistan.

After the attacks of 9/11, from the US perspective, the Taliban was an extremist religious faction that had seized power in Afghanistan, hosted a terrorist organization that had repeatedly attacked the US and US interests, and thus, a group that had to be deposed and shut out from power. That policy agenda is certainly reasonable enough, especially for an American, but there is another side to the story.

Whereas the United States is, quite understandably, concerned with the threat posed by al-Qaeda, and thus views the Taliban as a hostile element given its past support (and current cooperation) with al-Qaeda, Pakistan is not similarly disposed. For Pakistan, the foreign policy universe revolves around its regional adversary, frequent military opponent, and former co-inhabitant of a vast territory that each, in common, once called home: India. Everything from relations with China and Russia, to relations with the United States, are ordered on the principle of how to best counter India. In fact, this pervasive paranoia and monomaniacal focus has even warped Pakistan’s domestic political life, exacerbating a militarized culture, complete with a powerful and semi-autonomous intelligence apparatus (the ISI), with frequent military coups and a general disregard for civilian rule.

While Pakistan views its alliance with the US as valuable, it is not because it necessarily sees eye to eye with the US on most matters. Quite the contrary: Pakistani elites, as well as the general population, have long had a suspicious view of the United States and its motives, opposing key aspects of its international policies (these attitudes have worsened dramatically in recent years). This alliance, like most others for Pakistan, passes through the India-lens; Pakistan values the military and economic aid it can obtain via cordial relations with the US in order to counter India, and it has an interest in preventing too close an alliance forming between the US and India (which could tilt the balance of power too heavily in India’s direction). But the US alliance is – at best – of a second order importance, and subsumed by the India imperatives.

With respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan has long sought to cultivate a proxy and ally in that territory in order to achieve several objectives: expand its regional reach, influence and alliances in order to better balance India’s larger territorial space and population, and create a strategic redoubt in case of conflict. In fact, the US facilitated this process somewhat with the funneling of massive amounts of financial and military aid destined for anti-Soviet Afghan mujaheddin through Peshawar and other Pakistani hubs, leaving it to the Pakistanis (mostly the ISI) to determine the recipients of this largess (a valuable perch from which to cultivate influence, as well as enrich itself). Peshawar, it turns out, was also where Osama bin Laden set up his operations, and the point from which he coordinated aid from Gulf donors to his favored groups of foreign fighters.

After the withdrawal of the Soviets, and the eventual fall of the regime that it had backed, the US withdrew its presence from Afghanistan. But Pakistan, obviously, continued its involvement with its neighbor. As the dust settled after years of post-Soviet conflict, Pakistan made sure that the eventual victor – the Taliban – was the horse that it had backed with money, arms and other forms of support. Pakistan, at last, had what it deemed vital in terms of countering India, its most serious threat.

Fast forward to the events of 9/11 and George Bush’s invasion of Afghanistan. The leader of Pakistan at the time, by dint of a prior military coup in 1999, was Pervez Musharraf and he was faced with a significant strategic setback for Pakistan: it’s proxy and ally had been replaced by a government that was establishing friendly ties (and accepting millions in aid from)…India. While the US was focused on neutralizing al-Qaeda and the Taliban (notwithstanding the massive diversion of resources away from this effort and to the unrelated theater in Iraq), Pakistan was trying to contain the fallout from the loss of its valuable regional ally.

Musharraf did his best, as any Pakistani leader would, to juggle the various imperatives: placate the United States by saying what they wanted to hear and making a show of cooperation, extract massive amounts of aid under the pretense of fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban (aid that was converted into conventional arms better suited for conflict with India, and rushed to that front), surreptitiously support (or, at least, keep alive) its Taliban allies, and destabilize the India-friendly Karzai regime. All in preparation for the day when the United States, again, withdraws and Pakistan can, again, fill the void.

But the tightrope walking has had its perils. In the process of, at least partially, complying with the war on terror as envisioned by the United States, the Pakistani government has had to support the anti-Taliban mission in Afghanistan which has, at times, involved cross border incursions and air strikes on Pakistani territory along the border regions. This support and acquiescence to infringements on its sovereign territory has, in turn, greatly stoked anti-Americanism as well as anti-government sentiment within Pakistan.

Pakistani Taliban elements have been radicalized, choosing in recent months to launch attacks against government forces. During the years that the Afghan Taliban were in power, the Pakistani government had little problem with its indigenous Taliban elements. The heightened tensions are a recent phenomenon, and are directly related to the Pakistan government’s complicity in the US war on terror, and they are a symptom of a pernicious underlying unrest.

By pushing Pakistan even further, by forcing US prerogatives on the Pakistani government (interests that run counter to Pakistan’s in many respects), the US is actually destabilizing Pakistan and forcing disparate groups of religious zealots and secular elites, extremists and moderates, together in common cause in opposition to the current government and its pro-US tilt - ironic, considering that one of the arguments for ongoing US military operations in the region is the supposed stabilizing effect those military operations will have on Pakistan, crucial to safeguarding that country from potential hostile coup. From a McClatchy article (via Kevin Drum):

For weeks now, the Pakistani media have portrayed America, its military and defense contractors in the darkest of lights, all part of an apparent campaign of anti-American vilification that is sweeping the country and, according to some, is putting American lives at risk.

Pakistanis are reacting to what many here see as an “imperial” American presence, echoing Iraq and Afghanistan, with Washington dictating to the Pakistani military and the government. Polls show that Pakistanis regard the U.S., formally a close ally and the country’s biggest donor, as a hostile power. [...]

The lively Pakistani media has been filled with stories of under-cover American agents operating in the country, tales of a huge contingent of U.S. Marines planned to be stationed at the embassy, and reports of Blackwater private security personnel running amuck. Armed Americans have supposedly harassed and terrified residents and police officers in Islamabad and Peshawar, according to local press reports.

Much of the hysteria was based on a near $1 billion plan, revealed by McClatchy in May and confirmed by U.S. officials, to massively increase the size of the American embassy in Islamabad, which brought home to Pakistanis that the United States plans an extensive and long-term presence in the country. [...]

A survey last month for international broadcaster al Jazeera by Gallup Pakistan found that 59 percent of Pakistanis felt the greatest threat to the country was the United States. A separate survey in August by the Pew Research Center, an independent pollster based in Washington, recorded that 64 percent of the Pakistani public regards the U.S. “as an enemy” and only 9 percent believe it to be a partner.

“The Ugly American of the sixties is back in Pakistan and this time with a vengeance,” said Mazari, the defense analyst whose newspaper column was the subject of the American complaint. “It’s an alliance (U.S.-Pakistan) that’s been forced on the country by its corrupt leadership. It’s delivering chaos. We should distance ourselves. You can’t just hand over the country.”

While the anti-US sentiment appears genuine, it is uncertain whether the current storm, and the particular stories that it thrived on, was orchestrated by a pressure group or even an arm of the state. In the past, Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency, part of the military, has very effectively used the press to push its agenda. [...]

A widely believed conspiracy contends that America is deliberately destabilizing Pakistan, to bring down a “strong Muslim country”, and ultimately seize its nuclear weapons. Pakistanis, especially its military establishment, also are distrustful of U.S. motives in Afghanistan, seeing it as part of a strategy for regional domination. Further Pakistanis are appalled that the regime of Hamid Karzai in Kabul is close to archenemy India. [...]

Many also blame the U.S. for “imposing” a president on the country, Zardari, who is deeply disliked and who last year succeeded an unpopular U.S.-backed military dictator. So democrats resent American interference in Pakistani politics, while conservatives distrust American aims in Afghanistan.

“You used to find this anti-Americanism among supporters of religious groups and Right-wing groups,” said Ahmed Quraishi, a newspaper columnist and the leading anti-American blogger. “But over the past two to three years, young, educated Pakistanis, people you’d normally expect to be pro-American modernists, and middle class people, are increasingly inclined to anti-Americanism. That’s the new phenomenon.”

There are two main takeaways from this McClatchy piece, and the background laid out above: First, Pakistan will, ultimately, look out for Pakistan’s interests and address threats to Pakistan which involve, above all else, India. Our efforts in Afghanistan run directly counter to Pakistan’s regional/India-related concerns. Thus, Pakistan will only provide half-hearted cooperation, while key elements of its security establishment work at cross-purposes. The recent anti-American media blitz is either the result of grass roots sentiment, or an ISI funded campaign, but neither alternative should prove comforting.

With a population so suspicious of our motives, and with a military/elite/intelligence apparatus in vehement opposition to an agenda that is weakening Pakistan vis-a-vis India, forcing our mandate on Pakistan will serve to destabilize a country that is far more important to the US than Afghanistan. In that sense, it should be possible to line-up US interests and Pakistani interests: ultimately, destabilizing a nuclear armed nation such as Pakistan is riskier than withdrawing from Afghanistan and disrupting al-Qaeda from afar. And by doing the latter, we reduce the risk of the former. Perhaps if the Obama administration took full measure of Pakistan’s position and interests, it could further seek to craft a compromise acceptable for all.

A Precedent that will Reach to Himself

Eric Martin — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 16:06:14 +0000

Andrew Sullivan is right:

The document reads, like so much else from the Cheney years, like a document from a South American dictatorship in the 1970s or 1980s. If someone had told me a few years ago that it had popped up in the Soviet archives, I would have believed him. Read the whole thing if you can. It is a distressing document. Here’s what the “CIA pros” did to prisoners (the non-CIA pros improvised the president’s directive to torture and abuse prisoners in very similar ways): stress positions, nudity, hooding, sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, long time standing, beatings, hypothermia, and walling. They key thing, according to the CIA, is to enhance “the potential dread a high-value detainee might have of US custody”. Notice the shift from the standards of the past. In the past, the US was known for being a country whose soldiers would never mistreat prisoners; now, the US wants the world to know that US custody is something to be dreaded. That’s what Cheney did to America. He’s proud of it. If you are ever captured by a US soldier, and suspected of terrorism, you know that torture will be coming soon. The values of Washington and Eisenhower and Reagan are inverted. The reputation of the US as a defender of human rights is reversed. The point is that America must be feared for its willingness to abandon all human rights.

This is what the neocon right believe in, even as they prattle on about extending human rights as an American value. They say they believe in democracy. What they also believe in is what we saw done to innocent human beings at Abu Ghraib:

Nudity. The HVD’s clothes are taken from him and he remains nude until the interrogators provide clothes to him.

Sleep deprivation. The HVD is placed in the vertical shackling position to begin sleep deprivation. Other shackling procedures may be used during interrogations. The detainee is diapered for sanitary purposes, although the diaper is not used at all times.

The diapers are necessary because when you shackle someone in the same position for hours and hours on end and feed him Ensure, he will shit himself. All torturing regimes deal with shitting torture victims. The US followed other regimes in both diapering prisoners or, better still, forcing them to lie in their own excrement, as was discovered by horrified FBI agents at Gitmo. Other torture regimes capture piss and shit in bowls beneath the torture victims. Various forms of nude shackling, sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation (all barred under Geneva and the UN Convention) are then supplemented by constant bombardment with light, loud noise, water-dousing and walling. These techniques can be used in combination. [emphasis added]

Don’t it make you proud? Don’t you wonder why the Obama administration would want to politicize criminal conduct by actually investigating torture and holding those that tortured accountable under the law?

As for the techniques, maybe we took diapering tips from the North Koreans, one of our new sources of emulation. And for those that don’t consider the use of sleep deprivation and stress positions (let alone waterboarding) torture, here are some passages from Kim Yong’s horrific tale of torture at the hands of the North Korean regime, some of whose torture methods Dick Cheney and George Bush adopted for the US government:

I was completely sleep deprived and could not react any longer. I had lost track of how many hours or days had passed. But I knew that if I told them what they wanted to hear, there would be no other punishment but a death sentence waiting for me. At moments, the sleep deprivation became so severe that I simply wanted to surrender, but I bit my lips to remain silent. As time went by, the interrogators became more and more furious.

Kim Yong was subjected to certain forms of physical torture that even Cheney didn’t push for, such as bamboo under the fingernails and electric shocks. And yet, according to Yong, stress positions were amongst the most grueling:

One of the worst tortures I endured was to have my body, waist down, submerged in water in a tiny cell that prohibited me from moving. The cell was so tiny that I had to bend slightly in order to fit my body in…[Later] they put me in solitary confinement in a tiny cell about two feet wide and five feet long and ordered me not to move an inch. When I couldn’t bear the pain any longer, they brought me blank paper and made me write confessions.

Ironically, the Republican Party, which has come to stand for full throated support of torture for various categories of detainees (inevitably, and in practice, the innocent and guilty), is prone to flag lapel pin demagoguery and other ostentatious displays of ostensible patriotism. And yet, Party members seem entirely unaware of just how contrary their support of torture is to the vision of the revered, if only in the abstract, founding fathers (let alone the more recent object of adulation, Ronald Reagan).

Consider that George Washington, then facing a truly existential crisis, refused to allow prisoners to be tortured – even as the fledgling republic teetered on a precipice in the midst of an improbable military campaign against the British. Thomas Paine, too, offers no equivocation (via Glenn Greenwald):

An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws. He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself. [...]

The executive is not invested with the power of deliberating whether it shall act or not; it has no discretionary authority in the case; for it can act no other thing than what the laws decree, and it is obliged to act conformably thereto…

And yet the torture cheerleaders attack the patriotism of those that would uphold the values of Washington, Paine, Jefferson, Madison and, even, Reagan - as opposed to the policies and values of Dick Cheney, George Bush, John Yoo, Jay Bybee and David Addington.

Tell me again which group is truly defending America and the ideals we aspire to?

Engaging the Muslim World: The Wahhabi Myth

Brian Ulrich — Fri, 21 Aug 2009 03:02:07 +0000

In reading the third and shortest chapter of Juan Cole’s Engaging the Muslim World, “The Wahhabi Myth: From Riyadh to Doha,” I was struck by something that wasn’t there. The point of this chapter is that Wahhabism does not cause terrorism, nor is Saudi Arabia the main exporter of anti-American violence in the region. He does say that Saudi Arabia has a deeply flawed human rights record and puritan domestic moral policy that the United States and its allies could address through diplomatic pressure, but detaches that from Wahhabism as well by describing the different conditions in Qatar. Given his emphasis on terminology in the last chapter, however, I’m surprised he didn’t go into the ways in which “Wahhabi” itself is usually used as a slur in intra-Muslim polemics, and is not used by Wahhabis themselves, who prefer to be called “Muwahidun,” which refers to God’s unity and is sometimes translated as “unitarians.” As for Wahhabi itself, I’m reminded of something one of my professors once said about “Fascism” – that today, it’s meaning has been largely reduced to, “this position is to my right, and I disagree with it.” Similarly, my understanding is that “Wahhabi” serves much the same function in Islamic theological debates, and has since it was coined centuries ago. This has two implications. One is that, when you read about “Wahhabis” somewhere causing problems, they may not be actual followers of the doctrines of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab – a lot depends on your source. Another is that it is used as a slur precisely because Saudi Arabia, far from being a society to which most Muslims aspire, is seen as a somewhat crazy, doctrinaire place by many.

Also in reading this chapter, I found I like “fundamentalist vigilante” more one its own terms than as something produced as a deliberate alternative to “Salafi Jihadi.” (I actually think Salafi, given the contemporary capture of that term by the theological conservatives, works well for the purposes for which “Wahhabi” is often employed.) In any case, Cole’s decoupling of the Wahhabism and militancy is similar to that argued for by David Commins in The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, though he seems not to have read Commins’s work, which would have buttressed his mention that the forms of extremism causing international concern owe more to the Sahwa tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood than they do to Wahhabism per se. To all this, Cole adds another point that Saudi Arabia has actually been a close ally of the United States, and has even taken the lead in trying to lead the Arab world to peace with Israel. This is a necessary corrective to the view that the kingdom is somehow our mortal enemy, though an informed reader might wonder about the differences within both the Saudi royal family and the country’s religious establishment.

Cole also describes Qatar in this chapter, and spends several pages on al-Jazeera that serve to make their own points about that station which are similar to those Abu Aardvarkian readers of this blog are probably already familiar with. (Marc Lynch’s work is actually cited in the endnotes here.) If memory serves, Sharjah, one of the components of the UAE, is also Wahhabi. It’s not relevant to the point of this chapter, but as a scholar, it might be interesting to explore the relationship of those dynasties with the Wahhabi ulama, as well as that of the Rashidis of Ha’il during the 1800′s, in attempting to understand the differences among Wahhabi states.

The takeaways from this chapter are that Saudi Arabia is not a geopolitical enemy of the United States, and conservatism does not equal militancy. Both points are well argued.

I’m Creepin’ and I’m Creepin’

Eric Martin — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 18:47:05 +0000

Marc Lynch makes a very good point:

Suppose the U.S. succeeded beyond all its wildest expectations, and turned Afghanistan into Nirvana on Earth, an orderly, high GDP nirvana with universal health care and a robust wireless network (and even suppose that it did this without the expense depriving Americans of the same things). So what? Al-Qaeda (or what we call al-Qaeda) could easily migrate to Somalia, to Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasas, into Africa — into a near infinite potential pool of ungoverned or semi-governed spaces with potentially supportive environments. Are we to commit the United States to bringing effective governance and free wireless to the entire world? On whose budget? To his credit, McChrystal adviser Steve Biddle raises all of these questions in his excellent American Interest article from last month — but in my view goes wrong by limiting the policy options to either full withdrawal or full commitment to COIN.

Right. It’s not like al-Qaeda is confined to this little sliver of land in South Asia such that, once that narrow stretch of land is magically pacified and completely reordered, al-Qaeda will cease to exist. Thus, as Lynch points out, the game of nation build-a-mole will have to continue in a new setting. And at a couple trillion dollars a pop, we don’t have the money. Further, al-Qaeda (and its viral ideology) has penetrated Western Europe and other regions not in need of nation building. So even if at the end of a century and $50 trillion dollars or so, we managed to purge the globe of potential havens, the problem would persist.

This, for my money (taxpayers too), is the right approach:

Another option which used to be on the table, as I understood it, was a much more narrowly focused policy of keeping the pressure on al-Qaeda while letting Afghan politics sort itself out. But from my distance, at least, it seems that this approach is being overwhelmed by those arguing for a much more expansive mission (as Michael Cohen has been documenting for a while under the category title “Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch”). And that worries me. I see why keeping al-Qaeda on the ropes matters. But I just don’t really see why trying to build an Afghan state is a significant American national interest, or that it can be done at a price commensurate to its significance.

I fear that the escalation of the war in Afghanistan is following a dangerous path of least resistance. Given the assignment to win the war in Afghanistan, of course a military which has been reshaped by its experience in Iraq will turn to COIN doctrine. Once the decision is made to apply a COIN approach, of course the military is going to ask for more troops there, and a long commitment, since it’s always been obvious that really doing COIN in Afghanistan would require vastly more troops than are currently deployed. And then, at each step of the way, there will be a strong tactical argument for expansion and a very difficult sell for any attempt to argue for restraint. Once that iron logic has been accepted, all else follows — and it becomes extremely difficult to reverse course.

But I remain far from convinced that COIN is the right approach, especially when compared not to total U.S. withdrawal but to a more minimalist strategy. The attraction of COIN seems to derive from learning only partial lessons from Iraq — conveniently forgetting that the “surge” and COIN were only one of a number of factors contributing to the changing conditions there, along with the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda which long predated the “surge” and the near-completion of sectarian cleansing in many urban areas, and that its long-term success in Iraq is far from guaranteed. And Afghanistan, as should be obvious, is very different from Iraq. Its advocates argue that this simply means that the approach needs to be adapted to the local conditions and the mission adequately resourced. I’m not at all convinced.

No, neither am I. This is something to think about given a couple other pertinent news items of the day. First, Anthony Cordesman (who is acting as one of McChrystal’s advisors) is recommending a substantial escalation:

Anthony Cordesman, an influential American academic who is a member of a team that has been advising General Stanley McChrystal, now in charge of Nato forces in Afghanistan, also said that to deal with the threat from the Taleban the size of the Afghan National Army might have to increase to 240,000.

If Mr Cordesman’s recommendation reflects the view of General McChrystal, who recently presented the findings of a 60-day review of Afghanistan strategy to Washington, it would mean sending another nine combat brigades, comprising 45,000 American troops, in addition to the 21,000 already approved by President Obama. This would bring the total American military presence in Afghanistan to about 100,000, considerably closer to the force that was deployed for the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq.

Here’s Steve Hynd on another:

Forty more years of occupation – that’s what the next head of the British Army, General Sir David Richards, is predicting. And he also predicts that US and British troops will be actively fighting there for “the medium term”, i.e. about 15-20 years…

Before American readers dismiss Richards’ prediction as “not invented here”, I’ll remind them that back in 2004 everyone in the U.S. was talking about a possible pullout from Iraq after elections in 2005 – but that the British Army said it was planning to be there until at least late 2008. They turned out to be more honest about prospects then than any American politician, pundit or general. The British Army finally left Iraq in mid-2009.

I expect the same on current timelines for Afghanistan, where American officials have been notoriously averse to estimates of how long the “long war” will actually take. Even now, they’re hedging their bets – but the estimate of David Kilcullen…that the U.S. will be enmired for at least a decade at a cost that will eventually eclipse even the trillion-plus spent on Iraq has become one they cannot ignore.

Imagine how much more incredibly costly in both blood and treasure FORTY years will be. And for what?

And then imagine what it will cost when we have to do it all over again in Somalia, Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasas, other parts of Africa, etc. This is not an efficient or effective way to fight terrorism. But it is what Osama bin Laden had in mind when he set out a strategy to bleed America dry and induce our decline. Maybe we should consider an alternative to Osama’s playbook?

Our Midas Guns

Eric Martin — Thu, 23 Jul 2009 20:24:32 +0000

Stephen Biddle’s recent piece on Afghanistan seeks to probe the question asked in the title, Is It Worth It? Biddle’s answer is a tepid, tentative "yes." In his words, our ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan represents "a war effort that is costly, risky and worth waging—but only barely so."

As suggested, Biddle is certainly no optimist about our prospects for "victory" in Afghanistan – although, to his credit, he narrows down the criteria to two modest goals when compared to some of the other more grandiose designs associated with the mission since its inception.

The United States has two primary national interests in this conflict: that Afghanistan never again become a haven for terrorism against the United States, and that chaos in Afghanistan not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan. Neither interest can be dismissed, but both have limits as casus belli.

Biddle quickly abandons the first rationale, however, describing it as the "weakest" reason to wage a war considering the fact that: (a) there is no guarantee that the Taliban would welcome al-Qaeda back if the US departs and the Taliban dominates; (b) we can disrupt so-called safe-havens by taking measures far short of all out war; and (c) there are more attractive safe havens available in several other settings, and waging war to shut them down as they crop up is unrealistic in the extreme (also: a key part of Osama Bin Laden’s strategy of bleeding our resources by goading us into costly campaigns across the globe) – arguments that this site has been making with some frequency.

Which leaves us with the second rationale alone, about which Biddle has this to say:

Pakistani state collapse, moreover, is a danger over which the United States has only limited influence. We have uneven and historically fraught relations with the Pakistani military and intelligence services, and our ties with the civilian government of the moment can be no more efficacious than that government’s own sway over the country. The United States is too unpopular with the Pakistani public to have any meaningful prospect of deploying major ground forces there to assist the government in counterinsurgency. U.S. air strikes can harass insurgents and terrorists within Pakistan, but the inevitable collateral damage arouses harsh public opposition that could itself threaten the weak government’s stability. U.S. aid is easily (and routinely) diverted to purposes other than countering Islamist insurgents, such as the maintenance of military counterweights to India, graft and patronage, or even support for Islamist groups seen by Pakistani authorities as potential allies against India. U.S. assistance to Pakistan can—and should—be made conditional on progress in countering insurgents, but if these conditions are too harsh, Pakistan might reject the terms, thus removing our leverage in the process. Demanding conditions that the Pakistani government ultimately accepts but cannot reasonably fulfill only sets the stage for recrimination and misunderstanding.

If we cannot reliably influence Pakistan for the better, we should at least heed the Hippocratic Oath: Do no harm. With so little actual leverage, we cannot afford to make the problem any worse than it already is.

That is a very accurate, objective analysis of the situation: our influence in Pakistan is limited; we are extremely unpopular; the use of our military assets engenders resistance and radicalization; Pakistan is more pre-occupied with India; and the Pakistani government is not fully committed to combating those Taliban elements and radicals that it has used, and continues to use, as anti-Indian proxies in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Given those factors, one could easily see that, since our primary mission should be to "do no harm" in terms of destabilizing Pakistan, we should cease our US-centric (which runs counter to Pakistan’s focus), heavy-handed, military interference in the region. After all, our influence is limited, and due to our lack of popularity, and the radicalizing effects of our presence and military campaign, we aren’t furthering our goals but undermining them. Biddle, however, comes to the opposite conclusion:

If the Taliban regained control of the Afghan state, their ability to use the state’s resources to destabilize the secular government in Pakistan would increase the risk of state collapse there. Analysts have made much of the threat that Pakistani Taliban base camps pose to the stability of the government in Kabul, but the danger works both ways: Instability in Afghanistan also poses a serious threat to the secular civilian government in Pakistan. This is the single greatest U.S. interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear-armed sanctuary there.

But Biddle overstates the quality of the threat posed by Afghan Talibs in terms of destabilizing the Pakistani state. The Taliban have long been on the receiving end of Pakistani government largess. They have been cultivated as a proxy and ally useful in terms of creating a strategic redoubt in case of conflict with India, and in further establishing an anti-Indian front in the region. In fact, much of their tenacity and success in Afghanistan today (and previously) is attributable to the ongoing support of their Pakistani patrons.

That is the nature of the Afghan Taliban: a local phenomenon benefiting from the generosity of foreign benefactors. As such, the Afghan Taliban enjoys limited reach and power – especially if it were to actually turn on those same foreign benefactors. Along those lines, what exactly are the Afghan "state’s resources" that are supposed to threaten Pakistan (whose military and security forces are far more numerous, vastly better equipped, well trained, etc)? The Afghan state (and various militant factions) have limited economic and military resources – and much of what they have comes from…Pakistan.

This tail is just not capable of wagging the dog, and the Pakistani government knows it. That is why that government continues to support those same Afghan Taliban factions that we are, according to Biddle, supposed to be protecting Pakistan from. Maybe they know something we don’t?

Further, Biddle takes it as a given that our ongoing military operations in Afghanistan serve to stabilize the situation in Pakistan without even acknowledging – let alone discussing – the obvious counterpoint: what if our seven+ year military campaign in neighboring Afghanistan (targeting Pakistan’s longtime ally), with US forces frequently striking Pakistani territory itself, was actually "aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems."

What if, in asking the Pakistanis to cooperate in the neutralizing of their proxies and in the empowerment of a new regime friendly to India, we were "[d]emanding conditions that the Pakistani government ultimately accepts but cannot reasonably fulfill only set[ting] the stage for recrimination and misunderstanding." Is there any chance that bending the Pakistani government to our agenda – which cuts against its own interests – could cause political problems for that same government?

Shouldn’t we at least acknowledge the possibility that wars and occupations often have a radicalizing, destabilizing effect with myriad unintended consequences throughout the war zones? The Pakistani government is certainly sounding the alarm: [more after the jump]

Pakistan is objecting to expanded American combat operations in neighboring Afghanistan, creating new fissures in the alliance with Washington at a critical juncture when thousands of new American forces are arriving in the region.

Pakistani officials have told the Obama administration that the Marines fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan will force militants across the border into Pakistan, with the potential to further inflame the troubled province of Baluchistan, according to Pakistani intelligence officials. [...]

The country’s perspective was given in a nearly two-hour briefing on Friday for The New York Times by senior analysts and officials of Pakistan’s main spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence…The main themes of the briefing were echoed in conversations with several military officers over the past few days.

One of the first briefing slides read, in part: “The surge in Afghanistan will further reinforce the perception of a foreign occupation of Afghanistan. It will result in more civilian casualties; further alienate local population. Thus more local resistance to foreign troops.”

One obvious rebuttal is that the Pakistani government is exaggerating these threats because it is trying to cut short US operations against the Pakistan-friendly Afghan Taliban, and it is wary of an India-friendly Karzai government consolidating power in Kabul. But the implications of that possibility should offer no comfort: it would mean that the Pakistani government is more intent on protecting the Taliban, and preserving its influence via the Taliban in Afghanistan, than it is in advancing US interests (which are diametrically opposed). If that’s the case (and it seems likely), and our success in terms of stabilizing Afghanistan is dependent on the Pakistani government’s cooperation with our agenda instead, then we are pursuing a lost cause.

The Pakistani account made clear that even as the United States recommits troops and other resources to take on a growing Taliban threat, Pakistani officials still consider India their top priority and the Taliban militants a problem that can be negotiated. In the long term, the Taliban in Afghanistan may even remain potential allies for Pakistan, as they were in the past, once the United States leaves.

The Pakistani officials gave views starkly different from those of American officials regarding the threat presented by top Taliban commanders, some of whom the Americans say have long taken refuge on the Pakistani side of the border.

Recent Pakistani military operations against Taliban in the Swat Valley and parts of the tribal areas have done little to close the gap in perceptions.

Even as Obama administration officials praise the operations, they express frustration that Pakistan is failing to act against the full array of Islamic militants using the country as a base.

Instead, they say, Pakistani authorities have chosen to fight Pakistani Taliban who threaten their government, while ignoring Taliban and other militants fighting Americans in Afghanistan or terrorizing India.

Right. And that’s not going to change any time in the near future, or thereafter.

We Chiseled and We Switched

Eric Martin — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 21:01:58 +0000

I don’t envy President Obama’s predicament in Afghanistan. It’s hard to think of a region that has been less hospitable to foreign interlopers throughout ancient and modern history (earning itself the moniker "Graveyard of Empires"). And yet despite this foreboding track record, it is unclear that President Obama is willing to deviate from that familiar, if tragic, path traveled most recently by Britain and the USSR. Not that Obama’s options are all that attractive. Bush left him with a mismanaged and directionless occupation to unwind (or not). The exact nature of the hoped-for success via a continued military occupation is hard enough to define, let alone achieve, yet withdrawal has its downsides as well – including the potential for an intense civil war and the return of repressive elements such as the Taliban.

While entirely too much has been made of the importance of Afghan safe havens in terms of conducting successful terrorist attacks (just as too little has been made of the ability to replicate similar safe havens elsewhere and our ability to disrupt any such haven from afar now that we are making such interdiction a priority), there is little doubt that Obama would pay a steep political price if he were to withdraw and an attack occurred that had some traceable connection to Afghanistan. While an attack emanating from hubs in, say, Europe or Yemen may be just as (or more) likely, those connections would not prove as damaging despite the underlying reality of the terrorist threat.

So it is that Obama seems to be trading Bush’s muddled vision of Afghanistan for his own, with a vague yet grandiose (if often contradictory) recitation of implausible goals and exaggerated fears, all buttressed by a refusal to acknowledge the costs of continuing our occupation. As if they were trivial (think trillions of dollars – less than the costs of health care that has Washington in a tizzy, but then wars never seem to count as spending). As Rory Stewart suggests, it’s almost impossible to decipher an actual policy direction from the pomp and flourish:

When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. ‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.

It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. [...]

Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban to build a state and you need to build a state to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don’t have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, ‘If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists.’

These connections are global: in Obama’s words, ‘our security and prosperity depend on the security and prosperity of others.’ Or, as a British foreign minister recently rephrased it, ‘our security depends on their development.’ Indeed, at times it seems that all these activities – building a state, defeating the Taliban, defeating al-Qaida and eliminating poverty – are the same activity. The new US army and marine corps counter-insurgency doctrine sounds like a World Bank policy document, replete with commitments to the rule of law, economic development, governance, state-building and human rights. In Obama’s words, ‘security and humanitarian concerns are all part of one project.’

This policy rests on misleading ideas about moral obligation, our capacity, the strength of our adversaries, the threat posed by Afghanistan, the relations between our different objectives, and the value of a state. Even if the invasion was justified, that does not justify all our subsequent actions. If 9/11 had been planned in training camps in Iraq, we might have felt the war in Iraq was more justified, but our actions would have been no less of a disaster for Iraqis or for ourselves. The power of the US and its allies, and our commitment, knowledge and will, are limited. It is unlikely that we will be able to defeat the Taliban. The ingredients of successful counter-insurgency campaigns in places like Malaya – control of the borders, large numbers of troops in relation to the population, strong support from the majority ethnic groups, a long-term commitment and a credible local government – are lacking in Afghanistan.

He continues, highlighting some points that I have been making regarding the mythic importance of "safe havens":

Even if – as seems most unlikely – the Taliban were to take the capital, it is not clear how much of a threat this would pose to US or European national security. Would they repeat their error of providing a safe haven to al-Qaida? And how safe would this safe haven be? They could give al-Qaida land for a camp but how would they defend it against predators or US special forces? And does al-Qaida still require large terrorist training camps to organise attacks? Could they not plan in Hamburg and train at flight schools in Florida; or meet in Bradford and build morale on an adventure training course in Wales?

Furthermore, there are no self-evident connections between the key objectives of counter-terrorism, development, democracy/ state-building and counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy). Nor is there any necessary connection between state-formation and terrorism. Our confusions are well illustrated by the debates about whether Iraq was a rogue state harbouring terrorists (as Bush claimed) or an authoritarian state which excluded terrorists (as was in fact the case).

It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. Is a centralised state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values? And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives? Afghanistan is starting from a very low base: 30 years of investment might allow its army, police, civil service and economy to approach the levels of Pakistan. But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.

Yet the current state-building project, at the heart of our policy, is justified in the most instrumental terms – not as an end in itself but as a means towards counter-terrorism.

With so convoluted a policy, with its mosaic of cross-purpose justifications and strategies, it is no surprise that Obama’s choice of McChrystal (a noted counter-terrorism practitioner – aka, a "killer") was curious given the underlying rhetoric and nod in the direction of counterinsurgency ("COIN", noted for its population centric concern and restraint in terms of the use of force). As Judah Grunstein suggests to explain this apparent contradiction:

…[It seems that] the COIN rhetoric is simply a scaffolding that’s been slapped over a strategy that has neither the resources, the political will, nor the local support necessary to succeed.

Those limitations are real. Even the Afghan optimists (the COIN experts that think that we must "succeed," and that we have a shot at succeeding) think that our only hope is to commit tens of thousands more troops for at least the next decade at a price tag (when combined with non-military outlays) in the neighborhood of several trillions of dollars. Oh, and even then we’ll only succeed if we also eradicate the poppy crop and reorder Pakistan’s society while we’re creating a stable Afghanistan.

As unrealistic an allocation of resources (and set of goals) as that may seem, it actually gets worse. Back to Stewart:

In pursuit of this objective, Obama has so far committed to building ‘an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000’, and adds that ‘increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed.’ US generals have spoken openly about wanting a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000 soldiers (in a country with a population half the size of Britain’s). Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget.

Some policymakers have been quick to point out that this cost is unsustainable and will leave Afghanistan dependent for ever on the largesse of the international community. Some have even raised the spectre (suggested by the example of Pakistan) that this will lead to a military coup. But the more basic question is about our political principles. We should not encourage the creation of an authoritarian military state. The security that resulted might suit our short-term security interests, but it will not serve the longer interests of Afghans.

Given the unappetizing, politically unpalatable menu of options available in terms of crafting an Afghanistan policy, Obama seems to be picking and choosing ala carte, while vastly overselling the risk of starvation, as well as the sumptuousness of the feast – a meal that is doomed as much by the basic ingredients as by their haphazard combination. If the recent escalation is part of one last push to try to set a decent stage for fuller withdrawal, so be it. But mission creep is an omnipresent concern with so amorphous and ambitious a set of goals (already there is talk that McChrystal will request thousands more troops from Obama in the near future – one wonders what the response will be and under what rationale?).

Unless and until Obama scales back his goals, and takes a more measured reckoning of the actual costs of withdrawal (total or partial), the policy manifestations will continue to be plagued by an incoherent blend of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, targeting segments of the Afghan population while ostensibly under the rubric of population centric protection, air strikes and hearts and minds, nation building and piecemeal aid, erecting a centralized state and showing sensitivity to the local culture of decentralization, etc., all sold using the ominous rhetoric of an existential threat and the resource allocation of a middling concern.