Gregg Carlstrom offered the following theories regarding the motivations behind the recent spate of arrests of Taliban figures by Pakistani security forces :
On the Taliban arrests, there are two major theories about Pakistan’s motives. One says Pakistan rounded up “moderate” Taliban leaders, those who favored reconciliation talks, so they would be replaced by a more “extremist” faction loyal to the ISI. The other argues that Pakistan plans to use the detained “moderates” as conduits back to the Taliban. (I guess there’s a sort-of third theory, that the arrests stem
morepartly from Obama’s diplomacy, but there’s still an element of Pakistani self-interest there.)Both of these theories are good for Pakistan. One is good for the United States. Neither is good for Afghanistan: In both scenarios, Afghan interests will be subjugated to Pakistani interests during reconciliation talks.
Patrick Barry reacts to Carlstrom by preaching the virtues of awareness with respect to Pakistan’s intentions/objectives:
One of the main critiquesof the previous administration’s Pakistan policy was that it paid little mind to understanding Pakistan’s motivations. This inattention allowed President Musharraf to play a double-game with the U.S., extending assurances that he was committed to routing the Taliban with one hand, while actively working against U.S. policy for the sake of Pakistan’s interests with the other. It would be a shame if this administration forgot that lesson, all because Pakistan decided to arrest some militants for reasons that are a mystery to us.
While Barry is right to counsel that attention be paid to Pakistan’s motives, vigilance alone is insufficient. Our policymakers should take it one step further and actually seek to accommodate Pakistani interests (which center around maintaining its influence in Afghanistan as a regional counterbalance to India – whose influence in Afghanistan has increased at the expense of Pakistan’s post-U.S. invasion).
After all, awareness of motives only informs us of the reasons that Pakistan has played, and will play, spoiler. But the double-game, as well as the patient game, of frustrating U.S. designs will persist in some form or another unless and until Pakistan is satisfied that their prior proxy/ally/strategic redoubt is not converted from an asset to a liability vis-a-vis India. In seeking to broach a compromise acceptable to both the U.S. and Pakistan, the U.S. may be able to achieve some level of stability prior to departure, and ensure that Pakistan’s influence manifests in some less pernicious manifestation for the Afghan people and with respect to al-Qaeda’s presence. Without such an accord, the U.S. will either continue to spin its tires, or withdraw without exerting positive influence over Pakistan’s reassertion of influence.
As Carlstrom points out, Afghanistan will likely suffer in the process, but there is little the U.S. can do from half a globe away to change that equation when Pakistan sits right next door, with much shared culture, history, religion and ideology. Further, just as the U.S. has what it perceives as valid security interests in that region such that it demands other nations respect at the expense of their own, so too does Pakistan have its own perceived interests that they place above all others. No matter how much we insist, Pakistan will not substitute our interests for their own.
Thus, the goal should be to not only appreciate Pakistani motives, but to strike a balance that goes as far as possible in terms of protecting the Afghan people while remaining realistic about Pakistan’s vital interests. While unsavory in some ways in the sense that this process accepts some level of foreign interference in Afghanistan, what options aren’t unsavory or dependent on foreign patrons? A 20 year occupation by NATO troops? U.S. forces alone?
Besides, letting Pakistan attempt to cultivate influence in Afghanistan won’t be cost-free for Pakistan, nor will Pakistan be able to easily dominate its less populous neighbor. Alliances will depend on the realization of mutual interests on at least some level, and there are strong currents in Afghanistan that resent heavy-handed Pakistani interference - even within the Taliban movement. In fact, in his memoir, Abdul Salam Zaeef seems to harbor more resentment and animosity toward the Pakistanis than he does toward the Americans (despite his being detained and tortured at Bagram and Gitmo for several years).
Perhaps it would be prudent to get out of the way. There are few other feasible options regardless.
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