In the aftermath of Obama’s big speech on Afghanistan, Judah Grunstein observed that the prospective plan as enunciated had something for everyone – as well as the potential to disappoint all listeners. That was my immediate take as well – not that it was a unique or particularly insightful observation. This push/pull was probably not unintentional, either, as Secretary of State Clinton was ready with the same message for the media later in the day.
In focusing on the parts of the plan that appeal to me – and acknowledging, even then, the contingent nature of those aspects – my basic summation is: it could have been worse. That is to say that if Obama is serious about the 2011 date to begin withdrawal (or if he finds himself boxed into a political/logistical corner regardless), then his Afghanistan plan is at least tolerable when compared to the alternatives.
Allow me to clarify.
My biggest fears have centered around the possibility that Obama would heed the advice of the new counterinsurgency (COIN) gurus that were either in place already (Petraeus) or promoted, en masse, from CNAS (and other DC/defense environs) to key positions in the White House/Pentagon/Foggy Bottom, etc.
According to CNAS’s analysis, “success” in Afghanistan entails, amongst other exceedingly difficult objectives: creating a stable Afghanistan governed by a legitimate, representative government, eradicating all Pakistani safe-havens, wiping out the poppy crop and stabilizing the region generally speaking. And that’s for starters.
Even the proponents (who have every incentive to lowball estimates) predict that, if all goes well, the task will take an additional 5-10 years (or more), require tens of thousands of additional troops and will ring up a price tag that will end up in the trillions. Not only are the objectives unrealistic and the strategic necessity dubious, but pursuing this course would be crushingly expensive and demand an outsized share of America’s other resources at a time when there are so many other pressing needs.
However, Obama seemed to create a good amount of space between his path forward and that recommended by either the CNAS/COIN manual or neocon/liberal hawk delusions. As Glenn Greenwald points out, Obama’s speech sought to scale back unrealistic goals and propagandistic embellishment, signaling the lack of an open-ended commitment and, in connection therewith, a willingness to seek more realistic solutions that would facilitate an exit beginning circa 2011.
[Obama] explicitly rejected a mission of broad nation-building “because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests“; he said he “refuse[d] to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests”; and even vowed to incorporate the convertible factions of the Taliban into the government.
And that is the key. If Obama is serious about the 2011 date, and serious about abandoning the fanciful notions of reorganizing Afghanistan’s entire political life and quarter century commitments, then his plan is a decent enough alternative (I would prefer an accelerated timeline, of course, but I’m not in charge). As mentioned in a recent post with respect to my fears that Obama was leaning toward the COIN camp:
Since at least last March of this year, I’ve been holding out hope that Obama was ultimately gearing up for one last military push in Afghanistan to try to better our leverage/negotiating position ahead of an attempt to disentangle ourselves militarily from the web of conflicts in that region.
Even under my ideal version of events, due to logistical constraints, withdrawal would take months to set in motion anyway. So 18 months (July 2011) doesn’t seem like too long a period during which to make that final push – even if it ends up being ill-fated and wasteful (or I could be wrong and it might lead to some significant and lasting beneficial effect).
However, the push won’t come without costs. In addition to delaying the commencement of withdrawal (which would begin the savings), the surge of troops will come with a hefty price tag. Travis Sharp has the details:
Adding 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan will cost $30 billion during Fiscal Year (FY) 2010…
This $30 billion comes in addition to the previously requested FY 2010 defense budget of $68 billion for Afghanistan…
In 2010 alone, U.S. military spending on Afghanistan will equal nearly one-half of total spending on the war since 2001…
In 2010, the troop increase in Afghanistan will cost each individual American taxpayer $195 dollars. (IRS)
In 2010, the troop increase in Afghanistan will cost $2.5 billion per month, $82 million per day, $3.4 million per hour, $57,000 per minute, and $951 per second…
In 2010, the United States will spend more on Afghanistan than every other country in the world spends on defense individually, with the exception of China. Of course, total U.S. defense spending in 2010, at over $700 billion, will be roughly five times greater than China’s total military budget.
And that doesn’t even count the loss of human life that our stepped up military operations will lead to.
Then, of course, there’s the very real fear that Obama will not stick to his timeline – out of his own designs, or fear of crossing the potent defense establishment that never quite finds the right conditions for withdrawal. Speaking of which, there are some disturbing initial wisps of smoke about Obama delaying the SOFA withdrawal dates for Iraq at the request of Odierno and other military leaders on the ground. Odierno’s recalcitrance should surprise no one.
Nor should an Afghan version of military foot dragging come as a shock when it eventually, inevitably materializes. In fact, as Michael Crowley points out, there is already plenty of early caveating and jockeying with respect to the fluidity of the 2011 date.
However, just as there will be institutional pushback on the 2011 date, so too will there be pressure for withdrawal from certain sectors. For one, our European allies are unlikely to keep up commitments past that date. At the very least, the political leaders involved will pay a higher price to do so, and will likely try to make 2011 less tentative.
In turn, it will be up to American voters and Democratic lawmakers to tie Obama to his own timeline to the greatest extent possible. Take him at his word, and treat his speech like he meant it.
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