Matt Duss makes some excellent points (complete with useful links) regarding the growing religious opposition in Iran. The main takeaway: Islamist mullahs of high standing are attacking the Ahmadinejad/Khamenei regime on Islamic grounds, and the varying attitudes that Islamists take toward democratic principles should inform our understanding of the different strains of Islamism.
Part of the ire of of the opposition mullahs, as Duss points out, has to do with the rising power of the increasingly secular, only opportunistically religious Revolutionary Guard Corps, but also, importantly, the weakening of democratic principles in general:
Here’s an easy way to tell where someone stands on the Iran question: If they constantly refer to “the mullahs” (religious leaders) who rule Iran, then you’re most likely dealing with someone who is disdainful of U.S.-Iran engagement, who thinks that the only problem with the Bush administration’s 2003-06 hardline approach was that it wasn’t hard enough, and who buys the nonsensical “Islamofascist” construct that powered the “Global War on Terror.” You’re probably also dealing with someone who either hasn’t been following, or would like to ignore, the way that the Iranian system has been changing, especially in the wake of the June 12 elections, from one controlled primarily by “the mullahs” into one that, though still presided over by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and furnished with a fading veneer of religious legitimacy by a cadre of extremist clerics, is increasingly a military dictatorship controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.
While using “the mullahs” in such a pejorative fashion may allow certain commentators to communicate their prejudices in a marginally acceptable way and stoke fear of scary guys in robes and turbans, it also elides one of the most important aspects of the current situation in Iran: The role of the mullahs in confronting “the mullahs.”
Duss continues, discussing the recent death of the most formidable opposition religious voice:
Flipping through the TV channels late last night, I landed on the 700 Club just as Pat Robertson was offering his, err, “analysis” of Iran. Suppressing with great difficulty the urge to turn away from the stupid, I watched as Pat assured his viewers that the Iranian people “hate those mullahs,” but then noted that the latest anti-government demonstrations had occurred at the funeral of the dissident Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Montazeri, “one of the better-liked mullahs.” I could see on Pat’s face that he realized that he’d just kind of clowned himself, but this is the situation that a lot of conservatives find themselves in now. Having fulminated for years against “the mullahs,” they’re unsure how to react to an Iranian opposition movement powered in considerable part by mullahs.
And not just mullahs, but Islamist mullahs, such as Montazeri himself, who even though he had turned against what the Iranian Islamic Republic had become, remained a firm believer in the principles of the Iranian revolution, in the idea of an Islamic Republic, and in the appropriateness of Islam as the organizing force in society.
The religious/democratic based critique is being echoed by leading opposition political figures as well, such as Mehdi Karroubi:
President Ahmadinejad has betrayed the Iranian Revolution, violated the country’s Constitution and may be unable to serve his full term, his most vocal opposition rival has told The Times. [...]
Responding to written questions, Mr Karroubi mocked the regime’s charge that the opposition was guilty of sedition. He said that it was the regime that was hijacking the revolution. Mr Karroubi declared: “In today’s Iran, republicanism and Islamism are severely damaged and a lot of the revolution’s principles and the Imam’s \ have been undermined.”
The people had lost the right to make their own decisions. The military now controlled politics, the economy and even cultural affairs. The rape and torture of detainees were shameful spots on Iranian and Islamic culture. “If the Imam were alive, without doubt this would not have happened,” he said. “As one of the Imam’s students and close friends I frankly say that those who claim to act on his thoughts had the least personal, emotional and intellectual closeness to him.”
However, it is important to understand the likely parameters of this burgeoning opposition as well as the potential. The opposition religious and political leaders are mostly of revolutionary pedigree, relying on closeness to Khomeini to shield their boldness of action and word. Further, the vast majority of these leaders prefer to maintain the Islamic framework for organizing social and political structures, and most also strongly favor continuing the nuclear program.
Westerners should understand that for many Iranians, the nuclear program (and the West’s attempts to contain it) is a proxy for a familiar colonial dynamic whose scars run deep. Iranians believe that as a sovereign, signatory to the NPT, they are well within their rights to develop a nuclear program, and the interference from the West is yet another attempt by foreign powers to usurp their sovereignty and independence. In other words, even if the “green” revolution swept to power, the pursuit of the nuclear program would continue apace.
Interestingly, the opposition leader in the last election, Mousavi, is a strong proponent of the nuclear power, and even recently attacked Ahmadinejad from the hawkish flank by critiquing the President’s willingness to even consider compromises proposed by the West. Karroubi, too, sounds a familiar note:
In a surprising twist, however, Mehdi Karroubi warned the West against exploiting the regime’s weakness to strike a deal to halt a nuclear programme that was, he insisted, for peaceful purposes.
“Nuclear science and achieving peaceful nuclear technology is a right reserved for all NPT [Nuclear Proliferation Treaty] members,” he said. “We ask Western governments not to use this internal situation as a bargaining chip with the present Iranian Government to reach agreements which would undermine the rights of the Iranian people.”
He also urged the West against trying to help the opposition in its battle against the regime, saying that such efforts would “pave the way for suppression and accusations of dependency on foreigners”. He added: “The challenges in this country should be solved by its own people.”
Regarding that last point, it is easy to appreciate President Obama’s decision to keep a low profile during the election-related protests. It was the best way to help the opposition. A deeper understanding of the religious landscape also helps to dispel a lot of the fearmongering ginned up around the dread mullahs.
[UPDATE: Via the always interesting Doug Saunders, the regime is looking twitchy:
In what appear to be reprisals for new anti-regime protests, the Iranian government yesterday fired opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi from his government post and its supporters ransacked the office of an opposition cleric.
Something to keep an eye on for sure.]
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Eric.
Firstly it is not Iran’s desire to have a nuclear program that has ever been the problem. Why do you choose to fudge and mislead on this? The problem has always been the clandestine nature of that program which leads to the suspicion that Iran is intent to developing nuclear weapons. Iran could dispel that suspicion ovenight, but, like saddam, has chosen not to do so.
To add to the suspicion, the regime has been conducting saddam-like purges of the democracy “Green movement” ever since the June election, and appears to be gearing up to a high level purge which might further emulate saddam’s best efforts.
Secondly, the Iranian Islamic revolution always rested on a democratic base. Right from the beginning. We can go back to 1979 and criticise US policy makers for not understanding they were seeing an Islamic re-run of Calvin’s fundamentalist revolution in Geneva in the 16th century – right down to the structure of government that was set up in Iran. But how many 20/21st century policy makers, especially in the US, know more or care less than diddley squat about European history and the modernisation/secularisation of the superstitions of the Catholic church’s ancien regime? For instance, can’t recall you ever pointing out the democratic base of the 1979 Iranian revolution when the shiites took power in Iraq in 2005? To the contrary, my impression was you saw Iranian influenced shiite empowerment as a US policy failure? A response typical of sunni-arabcentric-ancien-regime views prevalent in US pundits.
In the event, since the sunni-led insurgency was largely defeated, Iraq has made great strides in developing a genuine representative democracy with constitutional safeguards against executive power.
So perhaps we should be considering that the Iranian Islamic revolution itself is not the problem, but the subversion and takeover of the revolution by an extreme wing of Islamic religious fundamentalism which bears some resemblance in christian history to a clash between Savanarola and Calvin strads of thinking? A response to overwhelming pressures to modernise (ie secularise) driven by inescapable economic imperatives?
So, Eric. Is the world safer if the Savanarolists take control of Iran, destroy the democratic base of the Iranian revolution and then acquire nuclear weapons? That seems to me to be the real problem for Obama?
Firstly it is not Iran’s desire to have a nuclear program that has ever been the problem. Why do you choose to fudge and mislead on this?
But it has been. Even now, acceptable compromises on enrichment capacity are the stuff of negotiation/concern. Even in terms of full accountability/openness. Why do you choose to fudge and mislead on this?
For instance, can’t recall you ever pointing out the democratic base of the 1979 Iranian revolution when the shiites took power in Iraq in 2005? To the contrary, my impression was you saw Iranian influenced shiite empowerment as a US policy failure? A response typical of sunni-arabcentric-ancien-regime views prevalent in US pundits.
Not at all. Go back and re-read, or cite something that I actually wrote. I was actually pointing out that those that argued that the Iraq war would weaken the Iranian regime were, um, mistaken. I don’t think this is that controversial. So, if the policy aim was weakening Iran, it was a policy failure.
In the event, since the sunni-led insurgency was largely defeated, Iraq has made great strides in developing a genuine representative democracy with constitutional safeguards against executive power.
Unfortunately, those safeguards have been lacking. There has been some improvement, but there is still a long way to go, and the gains are fragile.
So, Eric. Is the world safer if the Savanarolists take control of Iran, destroy the democratic base of the Iranian revolution and then acquire nuclear weapons? That seems to me to be the real problem for Obama?
Not safer, no. But the real question for Obama is how to deal with that possibility or eventuality. For instance, there are ways of addressing this potential or eventuality that would make us even less safe than the status quo ante.