I tend to come down on the John Cole side of the Cole/Sullivan debate about whether Obama should fire Janet Neopalitano prior to the results are in from the fact finding effort. Regardless, other than some unfortunate phrasing taken out of context and blown wildly out of proportion, it remains unclear whether she did anything wrong in her capacity as head of the Department of Homeland Security with respect to the most recent failed terrorist attack.
Spencer Ackerman makes a compelling case that there might not be a culpable party, or parties, in connection with Abdulmutallab’s ability to board the flight in question:
New information may surface. But based on this, is it really fair to point the finger at the intelligence community here? Abdulmutallab’s father told embassy officials in Abuja that he didn’t know where his son was, but mightbe in Yemen. The CIA had that information. NSA has information that a Nigerian might be used for an attack sponsored by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. If all of this had gone into the [National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)], would someone have put two and two together — setting off the process for pulling Abdulmutallab’s visaor putting him on the no-fly? Maybe. And the rationale for the all-source, multi-agency NCTC is all about intelligence sharing. But remember: the inputs are that the guy’s dad says he’s dangerous; he’s Nigerian; he might be in Yemen; and al-Qaeda in Yemen may be looking to use a Nigerian in a forthcoming attack. Is that really enough?
The answer to that question most certainly requires a policy decision, not an intelligence decision. The intelligence community is drinking from a fire hose of data, a lot of it much more specific than what was acquired on Abdulmutallab. If policymakers decide that these thin reeds will be the standard for stopping someone from entering the United States, then they need to change the process to enshrine that in the no-fly system. But it will make it much harder for people who aren’t threatening to enter, a move that will ripple out to effect diplomacy, security relationships (good luck entering the U.S. for a military-to-military contact program if, say, you’re a member of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq, since you had contacts with known extremists), international business and trade, and so on. Are we prepared for that?
Similarly, there’s a reasonable issue to investigate about intelligence-sharing processes even in the pre-specific-threat level. But remember: that just increases the firehose of data NCTC must process. Information is supposed to filter up to NCTC in strength and specificity from the component intelligence agencies so that NCTC isn’t overwhelmed. If we want to say that there should be a lower standard for sharing with NCTC, fine. But then either NCTC needs to be given more resources, or we risk missing the nextAbdulmutallab because NCTC’s analysts will be drowning in nonspecific data and trying to rope it to flotillas of additional information. It’s reasonable to ask, however, what the CIA did post-Nov. 19 to investigate Abdulmutallab specifically. But it’s also important to remember that barely a month passed between his father’s warning and Flight 253.
None of this is to excuse any complacency. It’s to provide context for evaluating whatever complacency occurred.
Something to consider. Attempting to perfect homeland security will inevitably require tradeoffs in terms of what policies receive funding from an already strapped budget, as well as compromising freedom and liberty, both domestically and for foreigners experiencing contact with the United States. The latter, by the way, should be an asset in terms of building connections and relationships that redound to our benefit in terms of creating goodwill. The higher the walls we erect around fortress America, the less positive the experience will be.
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