The news emanating from the White House is that President Obama is unsatisfied with the various proposals for Afghanistan policy recently submitted by his review team (each of which called for a substantial increase in the number of troops, with indefinite timelines). He has asked the working group to come back to the table with new options, and Spencer Ackerman provides a hint at what Obama might be looking for:
“They are pulling together the alternatives [Obama] requested” on refining options for resourcing the war, the NSC staffer continued. “They have until Friday to give him three new ones with withdrawal timetables.” [emphasis added]
This development coincides with a leaked memo indicating that one of Obama’s top advisors, US Ambassador to Afghanistan General Karl W. Eikenberry, has counseled against any troop increase at all. The Times‘ version of events confirms the above supposition from Ackerman’s story:
Mr. Obama asked General Eikenberry about his concerns during the meeting on Wednesday, officials said, and raised questions about each of the four military options and how they might be tinkered with or changed. A central focus of Mr. Obama’s questions, officials said, was how long it would take to see results and be able to withdraw.
“He wants to know where the off-ramps are,” one official said.
The president pushed for revisions in the options to clarify how — and when — American troops would turn over responsibility to the Afghan government. He raised questions, officials said, about the exit strategy for American troops and sought to make clear that the commitment by the United States would not be open-ended.
These noises are all to the good, as the multi-decade open-ended commitment/escalation preferred by General McChrystal is simply not in the interests of the United States when weighed against the costs. Nor does the strategy seem likely to bring about the desired outcomes in terms of creating stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan (our policies in the region have, in fact, destabilized Pakistan), while somehow managing to bolsterthe legitimacy of the unpopular Karzai regime such that a divided and warring population is wonover en masse.
Further, Leah Farrall (who knows a thing or two about al-Qaeda) makes a point previously argued on this site: staying in Afghanistan long term plays directly into al-Qaeda’s hands, so using the goal of thwarting al-Qaeda as a rationale for staying in Afghanistan misses the big picture strategic goal – big time. Military occupations are a terrible tool for counterterrorism in general, and given al-Qaeda’s agenda, such occupations in such countries are particularly ill-suited. Says Farrall:
The Obama administration will shortly unveil its new strategy for the Afghan conflict.
A key objective is the denial of al-Qa’ida access to sanctuary in Afghanistan — a goal the Bush administration also shared. There has been vigorous debate within the US political establishment about what strategy will best achieve this goal. Counter-insurgency proponents argue for increased troop levels while others believe it can be achieved by a targeted counter-terrorism campaign with a lighter force footprint.
Both of these approaches rest on the longstanding premise that al-Qa’ida wants another safe haven in Afghanistan. However, this premise is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of its strategic intentions. Afghanistan’s value to al-Qa’ida is as a location for jihad, not a sanctuary. [...]
This was one of the driving reasons behind Osama bin Laden’s decision to attack the US with the specific aim of inciting it to invade Afghanistan. For bin Laden, this created a new, exploitable jihad. Since the US invaded Afghanistan and then Iraq, al-Qa’ida has become the pre-eminent group fighting a self-declared jihad against an occupying force. These invasions allowed al-Qa’ida to exploit allegations that the US was intent on occupying Muslim lands.
A withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan would undoubtedly hand al-Qa’ida and the Taliban a propaganda victory. However, a victory would deny al-Qa’ida its most potent source of power, influence, funding and recruits — the armed jihad.
Without a jihad to fight, al-Qa’ida would be left with only its franchises — all of which are involved in deeply unpopular confrontations with government regimes in the Islamic world. Their indiscriminate acts of violence as well as hostility towards other Muslims not sharing their views have badly damaged al-Qa’ida’s brand. This has driven al-Qa’ida to refocus on Afghanistan because jihad against an occupying force attracts a level of support and legitimacy that attacking Muslim governments does not. It provides additional justification for al-Qa’ida and those supporting it to continue striking US targets.
A reorientation of US strategy away from counterinsurgency or a full or partial withdrawal of US troops is therefore not in al-Qa’ida’s strategic interest. [...]
The Afghan Taliban is moving away from al-Qa’ida and redefining itself as a national liberation movement. For al-Qa’ida, Taliban statements condemning colonialism and inviting good relations with its neighbours put a question mark over their relationship. The solution is the same: to attack the US, forcing a surge in American troop numbers.
This would tie the Afghan Taliban’s hands. Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s legitimacy would be jeopardised were he to publicly disassociate from al-Qa’ida and guarantee he would not again provide it sanctuary. His refusal to do so would then feed the justification for a counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, ensuring the US remains engaged in the conflict.
Al-Qa’ida will continue to try to goad the US into staying involved in the conflict because the sustenance and empowerment the conflict gives al-Qa’ida far outweighs the benefits of a safe haven in Afghanistan. Until this is recognised, the strategies the US employs to protect itself from further attacks are likely to inspire more of them and, more importantly, sustain al-Qa’ida.
Since at least last March of this year, I’ve been holding out hope that Obama was ultimately gearing up for one last military push in Afghanistan to try to better our leverage/negotiating position ahead of an attempt to disentangle ourselves militarily from the web of conflicts in that region. Here’s hoping these recent reports are indicative of Obama’s intention to do just that. It does seem like a good time to stop dancing to bin Laden’s beat now doesn’t it.
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