American Footprints

One justification for continuing (and possibly escalating) our military/non-military commitment in Afghanistan centers around the potential for al-Qaeda to establish safe havens in that country from which to coordinate attacks on US targets.  This al-Qaeda-based rationale rests on several assumptions that include, but perhaps are not limited to:

1. If we withdraw or significantly reduce our military presence, the Taliban will retake Afghanistan (presumably that means the Taliban will exert more control than the permanent presence it currently maintains in more than 80% of that nation’s territory).

2. If the Taliban retakes Afghanistan, they will invite al-Qaeda back in that country, allowing al-Qaeda a free range of motion akin to what existed pre-9/11 (this, despite the fact that the Taliban currently controls vast swaths of Afghan territory and most US military and intelligence leaders – including Petraeus and McChrystal – maintain that there is no serious al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan at this time).

3. A safe haven in Afghanistan is necessary for al-Qaeda to coordinate attacks against the United States (the current safe haven in Pakistan is, according to this reasoning, significantly less ideal, and the myriad small scale safe havens and potential new safe havens in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere are also substantially inferior to the potential and coveted Afghan safe haven).

4. Despite the vastly increased focus - and allocation of resources – dedicated to counterterrorism efforts on the part of the US law enforcement community, intelligence community, political leadership and military establishment, a safe haven in Afghanistan would significantly increase al-Qaeda’s ability to carry off successful attacks on US interests (the current safe haven in Pakistan, according to this reasoning, does not similarly increase al-Qaeda’s efficacy, and the myriad small scale safe havens and potential new safe havens in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere would also not augment efficacy in the same manner as the potential and coveted Afghan safe haven).

5. Even if items 1-4 are correct, the United States could not successfully disrupt Afghan safe havens from afar using air power and other targeted military strikes (with much looser rules of engagement governing air strikes, more focus and a higher priority placed on anti-terrorist operations, our posture with respect to air strikes varies greatly from the days leading up to 9/11, and such strikes have been used to great success in places like Somalia and Yemen where we maintain very light to non-existent boots-on-the-ground presence).

Without addressing items 1-5 in their entirety, there are some recent developments that call into question the likelihood of item #2 – that the Taliban would welcome al-Qaeda back and provide them with free range of motion in terms of operations, should the Taliban exert greater control over Afghan territory.  Via Marc Lynch, Vahid Brown of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has been picking up chatter on key jihadi websites regarding a growing rift between the Taliban and al-Qaeda: 

Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders have been issuing some very mixed messages of late, and the online jihadi community is in an uproar, with some calling these developments “the beginning of the end of relations” between the two movements.  Beginning with a statement from Mullah Omar in September, the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta-based leadership has been emphasizing the “nationalist” character of their movement, and has sent several communications to Afghanistan’s neighbors expressing an intent to establish positive international relations. 

In what are increasingly being viewed by the forums as direct rejoinders to these sentiments, recent messages from al-Qa’ida have pointedly rejected the “national” model of revolutionary Islamism and reiterated calls for jihad against Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan and China. However interpreted, these conflicting signals raise serious questions about the notion of an al-Qa’ida-Taliban merger. [...]

[O]ne thing is clear: the recent shift in the Quetta Shura’s strategic communications is not to al-Qa’ida’s liking, and it is raising serious concerns among the broader Salafi jihadi movement about the religio-political legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership.

Like Marc Lynch, I would caution against interpreting these online trends as a definitive indicator of an underlying schism, but this rhetoric is not to be dismissed either.  According to Lynch:

…Brown’s post reminds me of the online furor over the Islamic State of Iraq which foreshadowed the dramatic split in the Iraqi insurgency in which key insurgency factions flipped to the U.S. side and formed the backbone of the Awakenings/ Sons of Iraq.  Back then, in the fall of 2006 through early 2007 we saw growing discord on the forums between al-Qaeda in Iraq’s umbrella group the Islamic State of Iraq and key insurgency factions.  Some of the discord focused on local complaints (ISI attacks on moderate imams), but a lot focused on this tension between the nationalist goals of the Iraqi insurgency factions (which mainly wanted to drive American forces out of Iraq) and the universalist goals of AQI (which mainly wanted to use Iraq as the base for global jihad). 

Those tensions on the forums proved to be a crucial leading indicator of real splits on the ground which energized the “Awakenings” movement.

The prospect for such a rift developing would not be outlandish either, considering the fundamental differences in outlook and orientation of the two parties involved.  While there is some religious and ideological affinity, Afghans (including Taliban) have tended to bristle at the tendency of the foreign al-Qaeda contingent to disregard the concerns, and authority, of the locals.  The Taliban’s overriding goal is to take power in Afghanistan, and maintain that power.  al-Qaeda, on the other hand, is more interested in an international religious struggle – with its primary adversary, in the near term, being the United States. 

Recall, al-Qaeda’s past strikes on the US are responsible for the Taliban losing power and suffering much hardship in the process.  The provocation of the United States, and the aftermath, angered many Taliban, and their experience facing the onslaught of the US military left an impression, to say the least.  In portions of this intriguing piece by Sami Yousafzai (which collected first hand reports by Taliban fighters), some of that animosity comes through quite clearly:

HAQQANI: Two days before the September 11 attacks on America, we were all celebrating the death of [Northern Alliance commanderAhmed Shah] Masood, [who was assassinated by Qaeda agents posing as television reporters]. His forces were already on the verge of defeat, so his death all but assured us of total victory in Afghanistan. But the September 11 attacks turned our cheer into deep concern. We gave those camels [a derogatory Afghan term for Arabs] free run of our country, and they brought us face to face with disaster. We knew the Americans would attack us in revenge.

Realizing the danger, I immediately sent my wife and children to Pakistan. The entire government started to fall apart. I never thought the Taliban would collapse so quickly and cruelly under U.S. bombs.

AKHUNDZADA: When the bombing started, I was commanding some 400 fighters on the front lines near Mazar-e Sharif. The bombs cut down our men like a reaper harvesting wheat. Bodies were dismembered. Dazed fighters were bleeding from the ears and nose from the bombs’ concussions. We couldn’t bury the dead. Our reinforcements died in their trenches. [...]

YOUNAS: …The Islamic Emirate’s collapse was like a nightmare.

I watched as wounded, disabled, and defeated Taliban fighters straggled into Wana and the surrounding villages, along with Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks. Every morning as I went to school I could see them wandering around town, almost like homeless beggars. Little by little, the tribal people started helping them, giving them food. Some people even took them into their houses; at first these once proud jihadis survived, thanks to the people’s charity.

The Arabs were disappointed the Taliban hadn’t stood and fought. They told me they had wanted to fight to the death. They were clearly not as distressed as the Afghans. That was understandable. The Arabs felt they had lost a battle. But the Afghans were much more devastated—they had lost their country.  [...]

HAQQANI: I admit Taliban commanders are being captured and killed, but that hasn’t stopped us, and it won’t. Our jihad is more solid and deep than individual commanders and fighters—and we are not dependent on foreigners, on the ISI [Pakistan's intelligence agency], or Al Qaeda. Personally I think all this talk about Al Qaeda being strong is U.S. propaganda. As far as I know, Al Qaeda is weak, and they are few in numbers. Now that we control large amounts of territory, we should have a strict code of conduct for any foreigners working with us. We can no longer allow these camels to roam freely without bridles and control.

Again, this is not to say that the Taliban would expel al-Qaeda en masseshould it consolidate its position in Afghanistan.  But it is a definite possibility considering the goals of each party, and the stakes should the Taliban continue to allow al-Qaeda to provoke retaliation from the US from Afghan soil.

Related posts:

1. Our Midas Guns
2. We Chiseled and We Switched
3. The Af-Pak Unpack
4. I Like Eik
5. Mind the Gap
6. When I Am Numbering My Foes, Part I
7. Your Empire Falls and You Lose Every Cent