As is customary with the ebb and flow of the Iraq withdrawal debate, Col. Timothy Reese’s widely disseminated memo calling for a slightly accelerated timeline for removing troops from Iraq has provoked responses from those that warn against deviating from the original timeline (at least in terms of getting out ahead of schedule), and those that advocate pushing the ultimate withdrawal date back a decade, or longer (as necessary).
The latter link is from a Barbara Walter column in the Los Angeles Times which argues that the risks of a civil war re-erupting in Iraq should compel us to maintain a troop presence in Iraq for "an additional five to 10 years" beyond the 2011 deadline imposed by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) previously agreed to by the governments of Iraq and the United States.
In making her case, Walter undermines the narrative of the successful Surge. Recall, the Surge was supposed to create space for the various warring factions to forge a lasting political reconciliation. Its critics, however, have claimed that the Surge has only managed to freeze conflicts in place, conflicts which would be thawed out and revisited at a later date (and even then, the Surge was only able to achieve this with the help of extenuating circumstances):
A country that has experienced one civil war is much more likely to experience a second and third civil war.
That’s partly because violence tends to exacerbate the political, economic and social problems that caused war to break out in the first place. But it is also because the first civil war often ends with no clear victor and no enforceable peace settlement. As soon as the combatants have rested and resupplied, strong incentives exist to try to recapture the state. [...]
Combatants who end their civil war in a compromise settlement — such as the agreement to share power in Iraq — almost always return to war unless a third party is there to help them enforce the terms.
While she may have a point about the likelihood of various civil wars reigniting, it’s less clear that there has ever been even a compromise agreement to "share power in Iraq." That power sharing agreement, the elusive ‘political reconciliation’ that was, again, the primary goal of the Surge, has yet to emerge. The current governing pact has never really had widespread buy-in from various insurgent and insurgent-friendly groups – hence the need to expand beyond the four corners of the current political set-up, amend the constitution and reach accords on various other key issues such as federalism/centralism, control of oil, incorporation of Sunnis into the security forces, etc.
Perhaps that only bolsters her point regarding the risks for the resumption of violence. Where she is on decidedly shakier ground, however, is in her estimation of the ability of US soldiers to prevent that eventuality.
American soldiers have kept a lid on internecine fighting. But the recent increase in violence in some of Iraq’s cities reveals that different groups began jockeying for position as U.S. troops left the cities in the hands of Iraqi security forces in June and in anticipation of complete U.S. withdrawal.
Right now, U.S. forces serve two important purposes. First, they signal to Maliki and the dominant Shiite population that a decisive victory over the Sunnis and Kurds will not be possible. They also signal to the less-numerous Sunni and Kurdish populations that both of these groups will be protected from Shiite exploitation over time. Remove U.S. forces and U.S. involvement in Iraq and you simultaneously embolden the Shiites while telling the weaker groups they must fend for themselves.
On the other hand, the presence of US forces in Iraq – and their concomitant support for the ruling government (Maliki’s government) - has also made it easier for Maliki to ignore the need to offer real political concessions to aggrieved factions. After all, he’s been insulated from the effects of taking a maximalist position by the presence of US forces which have acted as his government’s de facto guardian.
Along these lines, the US military has actively supported Maliki’s campaigns to weaken rivals such as the Sadrists, and stood passively by as Maliki has balked at paying the salaries of the Sunni Awakenings/Sons of Iraq militias that had ceased insurgent activities in exchange for an alliance with US forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq and, supposedly, a place in Iraq’s nascent security forces and a paycheck from the Iraqi government. The latter two inducements have not been forthcoming.
Further, contra Walter, while US troops have been in Iraq for well over 6 years, it’s not entirely clear to what extent they’ve been able to "keep a lid on internecine fighting." Even in the supposedly Post-Surge Victorious Iraq, hundreds of Iraqis are dying each month due to political violence. That represents an improvement over the civil war period, but that figure remains ghastly enough.
However, a large number of US troops were present during that excessively bloody chapter which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, led to the displacement of roughly 4 million more and caused severe demographic shifts in key cities and towns (from heterogeneous ethnic/sectarian blends to homogeneous enclaves). But if such an episode was possible with 150,000 troops present, why is Walter so certain that the 50,000 troops she envisions remaining behind will be able to prevent a sequel?
The U.S. needs to decide what outcome it is willing to live with in Iraq. It’s likely that if the U.S. withdraws all of its troops on schedule, the strategic balance will dramatically shift in favor of the Shiites, and they will press for full control over the state. This, in turn, will probably goad the Sunnis and Kurds back to war, likely ending in a brutal Shiite victory and the establishment of an authoritarian state.
The hope is that Shiite leaders (and their constituents) would rather avoid such a massive conflict, and in pursuit of that objective, would offer real political concessions and other inducements (and the aggrieved factions would show similar willingness and forbearance). But if Shiite leaders are not so inclined now, there is little reason to think they will be differently disposed in 5-10 years. If exerting full control is a goal worth fighting and dying for, what difference does a decade make – especially when the roughly 9 years leading up to the 2011 deadline had thus far not altered the calculus?
This is especially true when the Shiite-dominated government in power has two things going for it – two things that will stay with it during the extension of the withdrawal deadline proposed by Walter. The Shiite-dominated government can continue to consolidate power while US troops remain in Iraq playing a helpful role, and as soon as US forces outlive their utility, the Shiite-dominated government can demand that US forces leave according to the timeline in the SOFA or according to the terms of a subsequent agreement.
We do not have any credible leverage anymore, and it is unclear to what extent we ever had as much influence as our pundits/politicians liked to pretend (see, ie, Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s ability to dictate events). Put another way, if political reconciliation was such an important goal to the US throughout the past 6+ years, why haven’t we been able to impose our will to bring it about? If the answer is that we lacked the ability to impose such a decision on the Iraqi population, why would that ability be greater now?
Walter’s arguments are at their weakest when she ignores the reality of the timeline imposed by the SOFA, when she talks past the lack of leverage and when she tries to formulate an actual plan for reconciliation:
If the U.S. wants to avert this scenario, it will need to create real incentives for Maliki and the Shiites to offer a fair deal that transfers real political power to the Sunnis and Kurds by the 2011 deadline, and then it needs to help them enforce it over time. This would require that those 50,000 "support troops" remain in Iraq until the new political institutions are firmly established, something most experts believe will take an additional five to 10 years.
"Real incentives"? What, exactly, are those? Where have they been hiding for the past 6+ years? Walter doesn’t say. Also left unmentioned is the means by which the US would unilaterally void an agreement between two sovereign governments and simply opt to stay in Iraq against the will of the Maliki government.
Or is it that we will offer Maliki such an overwhelmingly compelling set of "real incentives" that he will be happy to cede power to his rivals and acquiesce to a prolonged US troop presence? Again, what is this irresistible package of incentives? Shouldn’t we try to come up with that silver bullet before showing up with guns in hand? Then again, maybe if we stay another decade, we’ll find that pony after all.
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