American Footprints

In another example of the pushback against Colonel Reese’s call for a slightly accelerated timetable for withdrawal from Iraq, The New Republic’s Michael Crowley makes an appeal to the “tar baby conundrum,” as I termed it back in March 2008:

The tar baby conundrum goes something like this: If things in Iraq are chaotic and violent, well, we just can’t leave can we – I mean, what about the oil…? On the other hand, if things in Iraq are quieting down, we can’t leave lest we disturb the peace. Especially because once we leave, the various factions will have at it. Even Petraeus said so.

Here is Crowley on why Obama should reconsider his plans for pulling US forces out of Iraq:

Moreover, the strategic calculus has changed since Obama unveiled his withdrawal plan in October 2007. Back then, American troops were dying as they policed a civil war that looked nearly impossible to resolve peacefully. Today, however, there’s reason to think that it’s U.S. troops who are the only thing holding Iraq together.

Of course, Crowley was amongst the chorus of voices issuing warnings back in 2007 that withdrawal in the midst of such heightened civil war violence was too risky.  Only now, according to Crowley, we can’t leave because of the relative peace.  Either way, we stay.

Crowley’s assertion that US forces are the “only thing holding Iraq together” is also highly dubious, if convenient.  For 6+ years, Iraq has been a violent, roiling mess of insurgencies (plural) and civil wars (plural).  During that period, US forces have been unable to put a halt to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis (actually, US forces were one faction that was adding to the body count), nor have our soldiers been able to prevent the internal and external displacement of 4 million Iraqis (over 15% of Iraq’s population), amongst other horrific events.  Despite this prior impotence, now our forces have become all powerful in determining outcomes?

Due to a series of developments associated with the Surge – though not dependent on US forces necessarily or entirely (ie the Awakenings shift, the walling off of cities, the effects of ethnic/sectarian cleansing, Sadr ceasefire, etc) - violence has been reduced considerably (though not eliminated).  But despite this confluence of events that work to keep violence at relatively low levels, Crowley would have us believe that our troops are the “only” thing keeping Iraq together.  More likely, Iraqis will or will not perpetuate these conflicts according to their own prerogatives and objectives, as they have done during the prior 6+ years of US occupation.  And as many continue to do to this day.

Next Crowley offers a puzzling bit of analysis steeped heavily in the narrative of Petraeus as savior of Iraq - but that narrative is juxtaposed with a series of hypothetical events that belies Petraeus’ reputation, not that Crowley notices:

If Iraq does seem to be headed back towards chaos as U.S. troops withdraw, what will Obama do? It’s hard to say for sure. During the campaign, he was tonally emphatic about ending America’s commitment there. But he has always allowed for revisions based on the judgment of his commanders. It’s awfully hard to imagine that surge architect David Petraeus would be willing to watch his gains there disappear in a maelstrom of car bombs and sectarian assassinations. If Petraeus says we need to maintain a substantial troop committment, will Obama defy him?

Crowley is arguing that Petraeus, whose popularity and esteem is based largely on his ostensible success with the Surge, is someone whose wisdom even the President should heed.  However, if the Surge (Petraeus’ claim to fame) turns out to be the failure its critics have claimed and no political reconciliation materializes and Iraq’s warring factions resume their suspended (not abandoned) conflicts, Crowley asks if Obama will “defy” a general who is deemed so wise…because of his Surge-related success that turns out to be a chimera!?!?

That logical doozy leaves aside the upside-down view Crowley sketcheswith respect to the relationship between civilian and military leaders.  Crowley suggests that Petraeus might not be “willing to watch his gains disappear.”  Then asks, “will Obama defy him?”  But that’s completely backwards – and indicative of a dangerous trend in American political life whereby military leaders are deified and granted an undue presumption of wisdom in terms of policy making.

First of all, Obama is the Commander in Chief.  He gives the orders, and Petraeus follows them.  By definition, Obama could never “defy” Petraeus – although the inverse is certainly possible.  Military leaders deserve respect and deference within a certain range of military policy discussions/battlefield planning, but they are not best suited to make larger strategic and/or policy decisions.  Decisions such as whether and when to withdraw troops from a war zone (though certainly their input is invaluable with respect to the logistics of that process).

There are several very good reasons to preserve this civilian-military dynamic.  For one, Petraeus might favor preserving “his” gains because that is “his” goal based on military objectives that are, by nature, narrowly construed.   Petraeus does not need to consider the astronomical costs involved.  He does not have to worry about budgets, deficits, taxes, revenues and debt.  He does not concern himself with domestic policy issues that require funding, nor does he bother with environmental crises that require attention.  He does not answer to the American people via the ballot box.

Yet because of the importance of those issues, factors that don’t enter a general’s calculus under most circumstances, and in order to preserve civilian dominance over military personnel necessary to safeguard liberal democracy, it is vital that the chain of command – and presumption – favors the Commander in Chief.  So, no, Obama should not hesitate to defy Petraeus if doing so is in the best interest of the American people, even if such a decision comes at the expense of a general’s ego.

Crowley ends his piece with another head scratcher:

Ultimately what this means is that Obama may be faced with an excruciating choice: Will he use limited American military resources to stabilize Afghanistan?–or to maintain stability in Iraq? It is, ultimately, not unlike the choice faced by George W. Bush, who neglected Afghanistan not out of stupidity, but because he believed that anarchy in Iraq posed the greater threat to American security. Obama has suggested he believes the opposite to be true. If Iraq starts teetering on the brink of collapse, we’ll see how firmly he believes it.

But that analysis of Bush’s motives – and wisdom – is plausible only if you look at history from late March 2003 on, ignoring the events that created the predicament.  One could argue that after Bush decided to invade Iraq and unleash breathtaking chaos in that country while Afghanistan was itself an unsettled question, he was faced with a difficult choice in terms of allocating limited resources between two needy theaters of war.

But that would ignore the recklessness and, yes, the sheer stupidity of deciding to invade Iraq while troops were fighting a bitter battle in Afghanistan with the outcome uncertain, and the situation so desperately in need of more resources and attention.  Whatever credit Crowley wants to bend over backwards to give Bush for his attempts to pick the less destructive path while prioritizing two wars should be wiped away completely by reminder of the fact that Bush would have had only one war to focus on if Bush hadn’t willingly, and foolishly, rushed to open a second front with the first still active.  For no good reason.

Which is, at the absolute very least, a remarkably stupid thing to do. But really, it’s far more tragic than that.

Related posts:

1. The Pony Local
2. No SOFA Referendum?
3. By Invitation Only
4. Remarkably, Our Land War in Asia Is Not Proceeding as Planned
5. Ramble On
6. Serve the Servants
7. From the Iraq Documents