American Footprints

Very quotable Dahlia Lithwick on our collective terrorist derangement syndrome, and its corrosive effects on the rule of law:

Moreover, each time Republicans go to their terrorism crazy-place, they go just a little bit farther than they did the last time, so that things that made us feel safe last year make us feel vulnerable today.

Policies and practices that were perfectly acceptable just after 9/11, or when deployed by the Bush administration, are now decried as dangerous and reckless. The same prominent Republicans who once celebrated open civilian trials for Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid, the so-called “shoe bomber,” now claim that open civilian trials endanger Americans (some Republicans have now even gone so far as to try to defund such trials). Republicans who once supported closing Guantanamo are now fighting to keep it open. And one GOP senator, who like all members of Congress must take an oath to uphold the Constitution, has voiced his concern that the Christmas bomber really needed to be “properly interrogated” instead of being allowed to ask for a lawyer.

In short, what was once tough on terror is now soft on terror. And each time the Republicans move their own crazy-place goal posts, the Obama administration moves right along with them.

It’s hard to explain why this keeps happening. There hasn’t been a successful terror attack on U.S. soil since 9/11. The terrorists who were tried in criminal proceedings since 9/11 are rotting in jail. The Christmas Day terror attack was both amateurish and unsuccessful. The Christmas bomber is evidently cooperating with intelligence officials without the need to resort to thumbscrews. In a rational universe, one might conclude that all this is actually good news. But in the Republican crazy-place, there is no good news. There’s only good luck. Tick tock. And the longer they are lucky, the more terrified Americans have become.

This week Glenn Greenwald summarized how far the goal posts of normal have moved when he pointed out that “merely advocating what Ronald Reagan explicitly adopted as his policy—’to use democracy’s most potent tool, the rule of law against’ terrorists—is now the exclusive province of civil liberties extremists.” Upon being elected to the U. S. Senate last month, Scott Brown declared: “Our Constitution and laws exist to protect this nation—they do not grant rights and privileges to enemies in wartime. In dealing with terrorists, our tax dollars should pay for weapons to stop them, not lawyers to defend them.” As Adam Serwer observed, “This is the new normal for Republicans: You can be denied rights not through due process of law but merely based on the nature of the crime you are suspected of committing. Brown’s rhetorical framing, that jettisoning the legal system we’ve had for 200-plus years represents ‘tradition’ while granting suspected criminals the right to legal counsel represents liberalism gone mad is new, and I suspect we’ll hear it again.” [...]

Some of the very worst excesses of the Bush years can be laid squarely at the doorstep of a fictional construct: The “ticking time bomb scenario.” Within minutes, any debate about terrorists and the law arrives at the question of what we’d be willing to do to a terrorist if we thought he had knowledge of an imminent terror plot that would kill hundreds of innocent citizens…But here’s the paradox: It’s not a terrorist’s time bomb that’s ticking. It’s us. Since 9/11, we have become ever more willing to suspend basic protections and more contemptuous of American traditions and institutions. The failed Christmas bombing and its political aftermath have revealed that the terrorists have changed very little in the eight-plus years since the World Trade Center fell. What’s changing—what’s slowly ticking its way down to zero—is our own certainty that we can never be safe enough and our own confidence in the rule of law.

It’s amazing how much power we’ve ceded to Osama bin Laden, and how we let al-Qaeda and its pathetic offshoots completely warp our foundational principles of justice and the rule of law.  What’s more amazing is that the people that are in the biggest hurry to grant Osama the most power over reshaping our society are the ones who claim the mantle of being ”tough” on terror.

Right.

Glenn Greenwald makes a very good point about recent revelations that the President is claiming the authority to assassinate U.S. citizens that the President labels “terrorists.” 

But even if you’re someone who does want the President to have the power to order American citizens killed without a trial by decreeing that they are Terrorists (and it’s worth remembering that if you advocate that power, it’s going to be vested in all Presidents, not just the ones who are as Nice, Good, Kind-Hearted and Trustworthy as Barack Obama), shouldn’t there at least be some judicial approval required?  Do we really want the President to be able to make this decision unilaterally and without outside checks?  Remember when many Democrats were horrified (or at least when they purported to be) at the idea that Bush was merely eavesdropping on American citizens without judicial approval?  Shouldn’t we be at least as concerned about the President’s being able to assassinate Americans without judicial oversight?  That seems much more Draconian to me.

It would be perverse in the extreme, but wouldn’t it be preferable to at least require the President to demonstrate to a court that probable cause exists to warrant the assassination of an American citizen before the President should be allowed to order it?  That would basically mean that courts would issue “assassination warrants” or “murder warrants” — a repugnant idea given that they’re tantamount to imposing the death sentence without a trial — but isn’t that minimal safeguard preferable to allowing the President unchecked authority to do it on his own, the very power he has now claimed for himself?  And if the Fifth Amendment’s explicit guarantee — that one shall not be deprived of life without due process — does not prohibit the U.S. Government from assassinating you without any process, what exactly does it prohibit?

Well, since you put it that way, maybe Presidential assassination of U.S. citizens by fiat isn’t such a good idea. 

Via Spencer

The new NIE Annual Threat Assessment on Iran is consistent with my theory that Iran does not intend to build an actual nuclear weapon any time soon, but rather wants to bring their capacity to the point that they can do so on short notice should the need arise.  From the NIE Annual Threat Assessment (warning: pdf):

We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

As Steve Hynd reminds us, this is “what Japan, for instance, already has and is sometimes known as a ‘virtual deterrent.’”  Iran’s attempt to attain such a virtual deterrent makes a lot of sense for at least a couple of reasons: First, Iran is wary of U.S. intentions and the potential for armed regime change – with good cause considering it, along with Syria and Iraq, was on the neocon shortlist for shock and awe treatment in the early years of the Bush administration, to say nothing of continued war-drum beating by influential policymakers and pundits to this day.  Second, Khamenei and other senior clerics and political leaders have been quite vocal in the assertion that nuclear weapons are against Islamic principles, and should not be developed.  So no need to walk that back if they remain on the brink only.

If that is, indeed, Iran’s intention, then it sure does take the wind out of the sails of the good ship preventitive airstrikes, doesn’t it?  After all, the main arguments in favor of airstrikes are based on Israel’s fear of a nuclear attack (without a weapon, and with a deterrent rather than aggressive posture, this fear is assuaged), the trepidation surrounding a possible regional arms race (it would be interesting to see if a virtual deterrent race arises, which would be less worrisome, though not completely innocuous) and the notion that a nuclear armed Iran would partake in foreign policy adventurism, seeking to assert dominance in the Gulf (again, without an actual arsenal, this threat is neutered).

Given that, I expect those urging on a military conflict will simply disregard the findings of the NIE Annual Threat Assessment.

Amazingly, experts in interrogation at the FBI are getting results in their interrogations of the underpants bomber.  This, despite not being tortured, not being subjected to military commision’s rules and regulations, despite his being mirandized and despite having an attorney present.  None of this should come as a surpirse or even warrant highlighing under normal circumstances, and yet in the era of the pro-torture, anti-due process Republican Party (and its Democratic allies), this amounts to a newsworthy event if for no other reason than to silence misinformation and other pernicious theories that have incubated divorced from facts.  From the New York Times:

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian man accused of trying to blow up a jetliner bound for Detroit on Dec. 25, started talking to investigators after two of his family members arrived in the United States and helped earn his cooperation, a senior administration official said Tuesday evening.

Mr. Abdulmutallab, 23, began speaking to F.B.I. agents last week in Detroit and has not stopped, two government officials said. The officials declined to disclose what information was obtained from him, but said it was aiding in the investigation of the attempted terrorist attack.

“With the family, the F.B.I. approached the suspect,” the senior administration official said, speaking to reporters at the White House on the condition of anonymity because of the pending legal case. “He has been cooperating for days.”

It is highly doubtful that the family would have been brought in to the process, let alone cooperated, if Abdulmutallab was being tortured, or even kept within the quasi-military justice system.  Would military interrogators have even reached out to the family in the first place?  Luckily, the experts are in charge.  As Matt Yglesias argues:

It’s true that as an investigative technique “convince the guy’s family to convince him to cooperate” isn’t quite as bad-ass as “use Khmer Rouge torture tactics against him.” On the other hand, the non-torture way actually produces reliable information. And note that these are really inconsistent ideas. A family that has confidence in the basic fairness of the US criminal justice system is prepared to help the FBI secure cooperation from their son. A family that believes the US government holds suspects in “black sites” where they’re tortured and/or tries them in kangaroo courts is much less likely to cooperate.

But most of all, when you’re faced with serious problems you want to rely on seasoned investigators and their proven investigative techniques. You don’t take a problem “more seriously” by handing it over to the military or the CIA. The you take a problem seriously by having it addressed by the appropriate agencies. If we’d handled this in the blood-soaked manner preferred by the right, who knows what kind of nonsense information people would be sorting through right now.

Right.  As the torture of KSM, al-Libbi (connecting al-Qaeda to Iraq) and Zubaydah show, torture leads the tortured to concoct any manner of tale in order to get the torturer to stop.  Once the truth has been exhausted, to the extent it is offered at all, the tortured prisoner will resort to falsehood to satiate the torturer’s desire for certain predetermined information.  But the torturer cannot discern the difference between truth and convenient lie, rendering the entire output unreliable.  At considerable cost to our image and effort to garner intelligence and cooperation from civilians at large.

Adam Serwer makes this a teaching moment, using the development of this case to puncture several pro-torture, anti-due process myths.  A sample:

Mirandizing a suspect prevents intelligence from being collected. Clearly not the case, as Abdulmutallab has continued talking to investigators after being mirandized. Interrogating someone without mirandizing them means that you can’t use that information in court, though it’s still usable as intelligence.

The FBI stopped interrogating Abdulmutallab so they could mirandize him. No. As the LA Times reported, the FBI decided to read Abdulmutallab his rights after he stopped talking.

Putting an “enemy combatant” like Abdulmutallab in the criminal justice system is unprecedented. False, as the Bush administration did it with nearly 150 terrorists convicted in civilian courts over eight years. Most recently, Bush-era CIA Chief Michael Hayden wrote an op-ed criticizing the decision to put Abdulmutallab in the criminal justice system, even though it was standard practice under Bush. A recent example is Bryant Vinas, an al-Qaeda recruit captured in Pakistan in 2008, who as part of a plea deal has reportedly provided a “goldmine” of intelligence. Hayden was CIA chief at the the time and said nothing, because the practice was uncontroversial.

We would have gotten all this information more quickly if we had just tortured him. Unlikely, and there would have been substantial downsides. Part of interrogating a suspect is verifying that information is true, and that takes time whether someone is being tortured or not. But if we had tortured Abdulmutallab, it’s unlikely that his family would have played such a key role in his interrogation. Also, the information he gave wouldn’t have been as reliable. Treating him humanely shows the world that it can trust the United States and encourages Muslims who may have important information to come forward.

These are lessons that the American people need to take stock of.  Along those lines, it would be helpful if the Republican Party, and certain Democratic accomplices – even the Obama administration in certain contexts – would actually lead rather than demagogue or allow themselves to be seduced by the alluring, yet false, expedients that inhabit what Cheney aptly termed the “dark side.”  Of course, Cheney uttered the phrase approvingly.

There have been multiple media reports of late about a still-forming policy of outreach to certain Taliban factions in an effort to seek a negotiated end to the myriad conflicts in Afghanistan.  Robert Dreyfuss provides his take here.  See also, here (reports that Mullah Omar would sever ties with al-Qaeda), here (pdf from Brookings), here and here (a pessimistic take).

Along these lines, Pakistani Army Major Ali Iqbal has a thought-provoking piece at the Small Wars Journal which posits that entering negotiated settlements represents a win-win opportunity regardless of how the accords ultimately turn out.  His thesis is based on the premise that the Taliban currently enjoy an artificially high level of support among certain local populations because: (1) the Taliban is currently out of power and can capitalize on anti-government sentiments without providing an alternate model of governance subject to scrutiny; (2) it can capitalize on vague Pashtun anxieties and feelings of disempowerment that have set in post-2001, again, without providing opportunities and attainable aspirations; and (3) many locals extend the Taliban the benefit of the doubt about their ostensibly “limited” military goals and supposed lack of totalitarian agenda.

So after having looked into the root cause of the issue, where does the solution lie? The solution is simple, talks, parleys, overtures and concessions to the Taliban (Kudos to the Karzai establishment and international community for considering this option). I know that it sounds defeatist in its very nature and that all the efforts of almost a decade may be considered going down the drain, however, it is essential. It is essential, firstly, only for the reason that if the Taliban are actually serious in bringing peace, then what else do we wish for (Best form of Victory is winning without fighting – Sun Tzu).

Secondly and most probably, if the Taliban are not serious in bringing peace and have greater designs for their totalitarian rule and hegemony, then their maliciousness will be unveiled to the people. The sincerity of ISAF in giving peace a chance, at the cost of undue concessions and compromising on a few core beliefs would bring a change of heart by the locals. The insurgents after being offered a chance to give people their long awaited shot at tranquility and then losing it through self serving interests would stand alone with little to no popular support.

There is one additional element that seems crucial to Major Iqbal’s proposal:

Involve the locals in parleys with the militants. Let them have a say and then they will feel responsible if the militants do not measure up to their commitments. Their active participation would either make the militants buckle under pressure or turn them against each other.

Major Iqbal points to the experience in the Swat Valley in Pakistan as an example of using a negotiated truce to turn the locals against the erstwhile popular insurgents.  Although not completely analogous, the model has some prospects for success and given the Taliban’s proclivities for overreach, there is no reason to think that a similar ploy couldn’t work in areas of Afghanistan as well.

What’s even more encouraging than the recent recourse to negotiation with Taliban elements, though, are some early signals that the Obama administration may actually be looking for ways to address Pakistani concerns, and account for what Pakistan perceives as its vital interests, in some manner that could lessen its dependence on the Taliban as proxy.  Such an accounting for Pakistan’s position is a prerequisite to a successful winding down of the conflict because without Paksitani buy-in, it will be difficult if not possible to establish any type of lasting accord.  Pakistan has more than enough opportunity to play spoiler if the arrangement in Afghanistan ignores its perceived needs.  Roberty Dreyfuss on some of those encouraging developments:

According to Arnaud de Borchgrave, the ultraconservative commentator and columnist, Obama is sending General James Jones, the national security adviser, to Pakistan to find out what kind of role Pakistan could play in ending the war. More importantly, he says that during his recent tour of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Gates came to the reluctant conclusion that ending the war means rebalancing the Afghan government in a way that takes both Indian and Pakistani interests into account, which happens to be exactly right. Says de Borchgrave:

“All the talk is how to end the Afghan war, not how to win it. … For U.S. Defense Secretary Bob Gates, just back from India and Pakistan, a power-sharing compromise in Kabul is the only way to cut short a war that no longer has the support of the American people.”

The attitude of Pakistan is, and will be, crucial. Yesterday, General Kiyani, the Pakistani chief of staff — whose command and its intelligence service, the ISI, have long supported the Taliban — suggested that Pakistan might be willing to train Afghan security forces in order to help stabilize the country. Reading the intentions of the Pakistani army and ISI are difficult, since they are notorious liars, but it just might be that Kiyani is making a serious offer here. If Pakistan does engage in training Afghan forces, it might create a dynamic in which Pakistan needs to rely less on the Taliban for influence in Afghanistan, and thus Pakistan might be willing to coax the Taliban, or parts of it, to the bargaining table.

Kiyani, speaking to reporters, said:

“We want to have strategic depth in Afghanistan, but that does not imply controlling it. If we have a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan, automatically we will have our strategic depth because our western border will be secure, and we will not be looking at two fronts.”

His offer to train Afghan forces is “being considered by US and Afghan officials,” according to the Times, which added that “Kiyani’s offer appeared to be in part driven by a desire to limit the influence in Afghanistan of India.” Well, duh.

Ideally, Pakistani influence in Afghanistan would be limited and based upon mutual respect, mutual enrichment and non-interference in each others’ affairs.  The same could probably be said for US-Afghan relations it should be noted.  However, given the reality that Pakistan is simply not going to go along with any arrangement that lessens its historical influence while India’s presence grows, it would be wiser to accept this intractable reality and begin searching for alternative vehicles for Pakistani influence that are more constructive, and less pernicious to us, than the Taliban in its pro-al-Qaeda incarnations.  With the onus on Pakistan to accept such a compromise.  A needle I’ve advocated threading for some time now.

As a general rule, a nation should avoid making threats that it cannot back up.  Such gestures tend to lessen the credibility of the party making the threat, and shine a spotlight on the impotence of said nation at the same time.  Neither is helpful.  And yet, Secretary of State Clinton make just such a threat recently in the service of seeking to compel China to cooperate on a new sanctions regime aimed at Iran:

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton warned China on Friday that it would face economic insecurity and diplomatic isolation if it did not sign on to tough new sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program, seeking to raise the pressure on Beijing to fall in line with an American-led campaign.

Speaking to students at the École Militaire, the prestigious French war college, Mrs. Clinton said, “China will be under a lot of pressure to recognize the destabilizing effect that a nuclear-armed Iran would have” in the Persian Gulf, “from which they receive a significant percentage of their oil supply.”

In reality, the United States is financially and economically dependent on China, a country that holds nearly $1 trillion in U.S. debt and is an indispensable trading partner.  We are hardly in a position to weaken ties to China.  Further, China’s far-reaching economic clout, and the its attractiveness as a trading partner, means that China has little to fear from European nations and other states that view the Iran nuclear issue as a lower order priority.  And China knows this quite well. 

Oddly enough, the anxiety that Clinton tried to exploit – China’s dependence on Gulf oil, and the United States’ influence with the oil producing Gulf states – is one of the very reasons that China is so reluctant to take up broad-based punitive measures against Iran.  China views Iran as a uniquely valuable ally given its status as outside the U.S. orbit, and thus, not likely to be influenced by U.S. pressure in case of any increased tensions between the U.S. and China.  Why would China burn its one reliable source of oil in the Gulf in an effort to hammer Iran back into the U.S. sphere of influence which would render Iran without a lifeline going forward?

Rather than showing signs of concern, China shot back at the Obama administration over the weekend, taking a swipe at the United States’ penchant for viewing any and all locales around the globe as its legitimate “spheres of influence” (the faraway Persian Gulf in this instance) while denying other powerful nations’ claims to similar prerogatives. 

Just days after United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used the occasion of a speech in Paris to lecture China on its national security interests and warned Beijing of “economic insecurity and diplomatic isolation” if it did not sign onto new sanctions against Iran, China hit back.

On Saturday, Beijing escalated its rhetoric against US arms sales to Taiwan, which it views as part of its territory, by suspending all military exchanges with the US, summoning the American ambassador to Beijing and using Clinton’s own language about “long-term implications”. [...]

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said of the US’s US$6.4 billion arms package for Taiwan that Washington should “truly respect China’s core interests and major concerns, and immediately rescind the mistaken decision to sell arms to Taiwan, and stop selling arms to Taiwan to avoid damaging broader China-US relations”.

The official Xinhua news agency followed this up with hints that the sales could damage diplomacy involving the US’s efforts to get China’s backing in its nuclear stand-offs with Iran and North Korea. It said the sales “will cause seriously negative effects on China-US exchanges and cooperation in important areas, and ultimately will lead to consequences that neither side wishes to see”.

A commentary in the official China Daily chimed in, “From now on, the US shall not expect cooperation from China on a wide range of major regional and international issues. If you don’t care about our interests, why should we care about yours?”

Not exactly chastened, huh?  This is reminiscent of the repeatedly stymied attempts to compel Pakistan to weaken its strategic position vis-a-vis India by attacking its proxies and allies in Afghanistan, whileworking for the stabilization and consolidation of power in Kabul of an Indian friendly regime, because doing so would assist U.S. interests in one of Pakistan’s neighboring states.  Remarkably, or not, Pakistan finds our entreaties unpersuasive, and puts its own interests ahead of ours in its own backyard.  That Pakistan’s position was not obvious from the beginning is a testament either to our ignorance or the overestimation of our ability to dictate terms on such vital matters.  Either way, the results have been a hash.

Daniel Larison has an excellent discussion of the underlying dynamic brought into focus by this episode: the unipolar world of unmitigated power and influence (to the extent it existed) has come and gone, as has the Cold War bipolar world in which the U.S. was given wide latitude by virtue of its position opposite the U.S.S.R.  In its wake is a multipolar world that is not as interested in Washington’s leadership to the extent that it continues to demand compliance with its narrow, uncompromising, self-referential interests.  Speaking of Clinton’s threat:

The threat and the policy behind it take for granted that there is still some united international community that is ready and willing to impose isolation on “rogue states” and their allies. As far as Iran is concerned, such a community does not exist and has not existed for over a decade. Aside from the Gulf states and Egypt, concern over Iran’s nuclear program is purely that of major Western industrialized countries. No one else cares, even if their governments publicly profess boilerplate concern over nuclear proliferation…For that matter, most European governments are not all that interested in isolating Iran, much less Iran’s more powerful allies. We have an Iran policy designed for the 1980s or early 1990s, and it is absolutely ill-suited to the world in which we now live.

Leaving aside the folly of the Iran policy that Clinton is advancing with this threat, as a matter of our relationship with Beijing this sort of talk is reckless. It’s almost as if our government had threatened the USSR with diplomatic isolation because of its support for Cuba, but it is actually much more ridiculous than that. Maintaining stable, good relations with Beijing has to be an important priority for the administration. It seemed as if the administration understood that during the President’s visit to China. Now it is unclear whether they really do understand that the U.S. has no leverage, diplomatic or otherwise, to make China do anything it does not want to do. The Chinese government probably sees Clinton’s threat as the sort of empty, desperate bluster that it is. Unfortunately, this is now what passes for a statement of administration policy towards Iran: making empty threats against a major power on which we have become financially and economically dependent. The good news is that it may have minimal effect on U.S.-Chinese relations because it is an empty threat. The bad news is that it reduces Washington’s credibility that much more in the eyes of all other states.

Mousavizadeh observes, “Conventional American leadership, it is now evident, is as unwelcome in the person of Barack Obama as in George W. Bush.” Of course, it would be. The problem was never the person or the manner in which U.S. policies were carried out, but it was first and foremost the substance of those policies. Obama has followed his predecessors in continuing U.S. foreign policy much as it has been carried out since the end of the Cold War, but he is faced with a world that neither wants nor has to put up with it as often as it once did. The best approach for a real, sustained engagement policy begins with recognition of the way the world is now.

There are multiple centers of power, their interests will sometimes diverge from ours, and the issues that we have declared to be global issues in which all states have common interests often do not matter to other major powers or these conflict with their interests in a significant way. In the future, other powers will become even more capable of advancing their interests and ignoring our demands. This means that Washington has to begin reassessing which interests are genuinely vital to U.S. security and prosperity, and which are extraneous or left over from the Cold War and the last twenty years of activist policy. Once the government does this, it should reach the conclusion that halting or limiting Iran’s nuclear program is not worth damaging or wrecking relations with major powers.

The irony is that China, through its intransigence, might be doing the world a favor.  As Larison, quoting a Nader Mousavizadeh article (a very, very good read in its own right), points out, sanctions such as the ones being pursued are almost always counterproductive – citing the instance of Burma:

This is not to say that the sanctions haven’t had an impact—only that they have been entirely counterproductive. In a series of recent conversations with civil-society leaders, businessmen, and foreign diplomats in Rangoon, a grim picture emerged: a middle class decimated and forced into exile; an educational system entirely unable to develop the country’s human capital; a private sector hollowed out, with only the junta’s cronies able to profit from trade in the country’s natural resources.

This has consistently been the pattern in authoritarian regimes sanctioned by and cut off from developed nations. This is what advocates of sanctions on Iran will produce if they are at all successful in imposing a new round. The lesson is a simple one, but for many Americans it seems not to have sunk in: imposing sanctions on a state to punish the government does far more to punish the people in that country and helps to keep the people weak vis-a-vis their government. Not only do sanctions not compel targeted regimes to change their internal or external behavior, but they actually free up the regimes to become even less responsive to outside influence and grievances.

Whenever engagement with Iran is raised, there are the usual objections that the current Iranian regime needs anti-Americanism too much to ever give it up, which supposedly means that Tehran will never make a meaningful deal with our government. It has always seemed odd to me that the people who say this are also the ones most intent on seeing the current regime overthrown. One would think that nothing could be more fatal to regime propaganda and its deployment of anti-Americanism than a U.S. policy towards Iran that offers full normalization of relations, commercial and educational exchange and an end to thirty years of isolation. Few things could be more useful to the current regime than being able to portray the U.S. as it sees fit and to be able to point to ongoing U.S. policies aimed at cutting off Iran from the outside world. Not only have sanctions not worked, and not only have they made the regime stronger than it would have been otherwise, but they are an impediment to pursuing the one course of action that has some chance of undermining and/or changing the Iranian government. This change is what many in the pro-sanctions crowd always say that they want, but they have chosen one of the worst ways of achieving it.

As a political matter here at home, such extensive and full engagement with Tehran is naturally a non-starter. Too many Americans in and outside the political class remain wedded to a model of global order in which Washington proposes and the rest of the world is supposed to fall in line. Anything other than this is viewed as capitulation, weakness or appeasement. Eventually, Washington will be unable to ignore that the world does not work this way, but that may not be before our government plunges into yet another disastrous conflict or embarks on dead-end policies that will continue to strengthen all the “rogue states” it is trying to punish.

Touting the limitations of U.S. power is not exactly a means of ensuring a long and distinguished career in foreign policy making, a field in which exceptionalism, and the virtues of an iron “will” and rhetorical “strength,” receive outsized reverence.  Still, we would be better served by a more realistic appraisal.

[UPDATE: Ben Katcher has more.]

Listening to critics of Obama’s decision to try certain terrorist suspects in civilian courts, one gets the impression that Obama is taking a big risk, and that civilian courts are either ill-equipped to handle such cases, or the rules governing the proceedings in those venues create too big an advantage for defendants.  Obama’s critics argue that military commissions should be used instead – presumably because they are better suited for adjudicating such matters.

Here’s the problem, though: civilian courts have a much better track record of convicting terrorists than military commissions – and the sentences tend to be longer when a conviction is handed down.  Patrick Barry explains by way of Ken Gude:

Ken Gude, of the Center for American Progress, writes, “The facts are clear: Criminal courts are a far tougher and more reliable forum for prosecuting terrorists than military commissions.”

The record of federal courts for trying terrorists, particularly since 9/11 is formidable.  Former Republican Congressman from Oklahoma Mickey Edwards writes: “[Critics] scowl and declare that our American courts will not, or can not, convict terrorists.  They seem pretty damned certain of that.  Which is weird since nearly 200 terrorists have been convicted in our federal courts in the last nine years (that’s 65 times as many as have been convicted by military commissions).” A 2009 report by Human Rights First written by a team of former federal prosecutors found that terror trials in civilian courts had “a conviction rate of 91.121%.” And for those still think the NYC issue somehow stems from the courts effectiveness at prosecuting extremists, a study by NYU’s center on Law and Security, found that NYC courts have a zero acquittal rate for terrorism cases. [...]

Support for military commissions might make sense, if the commissions themselves weren’t so ineffective and soft. Gude explains, “military commissions have never handled a single case of murder or attempted murder and have doled out shockingly short sentences to terrorists—even to a close associate of Osama bin Laden.”  Moreover, “since their formation in November 2001, military commissions have only had one trial, negotiated one plea bargain, and convicted one defendant after he boycotted the proceedings,” while sustaining multiple supreme court challenges.  Of the three individuals convicted in military commissions, two received sentences less than a year long. 

Meanwhile, Adam Blickstein attempts to shoot down some of the miranda warning/right to counsel/interrogation nonsense flowing from the Obama administration’s handling of the underwear bomber’s arrest and interrogation.  First, quoting Spencer Ackerman:

Collins said in a statement that the fact that the FBI read Abdulmutallab his Miranda rights “likely foreclosed the collection of additional intelligence information.” But over the weekend, The Associated Press published the most comprehensive account to date of Abdulmutallab’s interrogation and found no evidence that Mirandization inhibited interrogators’ access to valuable information. FBI interrogators, to the contrary, read him his Miranda rights after they were satisfied that he had no further information about any further attacks.

And, again, quoting Ken Gude:

These conservatives clearly believe that the criminal system impedes intelligence collection because defendants get lawyers in the criminal system who always tell their clients to stop talking to the government. The only problem with this argument is that their recommended solution to this apparent problem—charging detainees in military commissions or holding them without charge in military detention—doesn’t change a defendant’s access to an attorney…Military commissions also have procedures prohibiting self-incrimination and ensuring that statements from the defendant are made voluntarily. There is virtually no difference between military commissions and criminal courts in the provision and availability of defense counsel.

Gude also undercuts Jindal’s argument by describing the litany of valuable and actionable intelligence America has obtained from terrorists with lawyers present. This intelligence gathered in the presence of legal counsel has, in fact, kept America safe…And, my god, all that information without torture!

Right, don’t let the facts get in the way of a good talking point.  It would be nice if the Republican Party decided to take a principled stand, embrace the facts and stop demagoguing these issues, which political opportunism serves to erode this nation’s commitment to the rule of law and basic human rights – whether it be increased affinity for torture amongst the population, or willingness to detain suspects indefinitely without recourse.  These cheap shots can be quite expensive in the long run.