Abu Aardvark has an interesting post that outlines a challenge I had not previously seen - the fact that there are no Arab embassies in Baghdad to keep the monstrosity known as the Taj Mahal US Embassy company.

Finally, the Saudi position, from which other GCC states will likely take their lead, can be seen in Saud al-Faisal's announcement that security concerns prevent opening an embassy in Baghdad, and in today's column by the well-connected al-Arabiya director Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed dismissing the American and Iraqi demands on debt and embassies as a side issue:  security is the "first, second, and third Arab issue", he writes, and when that is solved the rest will fall into place.   None of this is surprising.  The real reasons, I suspect, lie in their continuing perception of Maliki as a pro-Iranian, sectarian leader and Iraqi state institutions as deeply penetrated by Iranian influence - as well as their lack of interest in doing the US any favors right now. As Ambassador Edward Gnehm, one of America's most experienced diplomats in the Arab world, told me:

Gulf Arab states reacted predictably to Secretary Rice’s blandishments urging those states to open embassies in Baghdad and to forgive Iraqi debts.  Those states remain wary and concerned over Shia dominance of the Iraqi political scene, Iranian influence that they perceive follows, and doubts that the U.S. really has an end game plan for Iraq that protects their interests.  Both actions are seen as means to pressure the Shia political figures to give Sunni Iraqis their “rightful” place in the power structure as well as to nudge Iraq back toward the “Arab” camp.  Until they conclude that Shia political figures are ready to move on these fronts, they will not act --- and they certainly will not make the concessions to the U.S.

In that regard, perhaps the most interesting thing I've seen in the wake of the conference is what seems to be an unusually direct outreach to Saudi concerns over the last two days, with an abrupt about-face on the part of senior Iraqi officials.  In Kuwait Maliki  called "on all our brothers and friends and all neighbouring countries to make more effort and to strengthen security measures to prevent terrorists from infiltrating our territory through joint borders." Arabs seem to have taken this as directed at them, rather than Iran, particularly when Maliki specifically expressed his dismay with the level of Arab support for Iraq. 

So if we can't get the Arab community to reach out and start state-to-state negotiations with its troubled neighbor, how exactly will this Iraqi adventure suceed in becoming a stabilizing force for the region?