American Footprints blogs

The Kuchi Issue

Fri, 25 Jul 2008 18:50:23 +0000

The Rumi posts a story about Kuchi Pashtuns terrorizing an area near Kabul:

"Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, the representative Hazara (Shia Muslim) in the parliament has been on a hunger strikes almost a week in order to get attention of the government and stop killing his innocent people.
Kabul government sent police forces to stop the Kuchis but in this video you can see the kuchi-armed groups dressed in Taliban style are walking in front of National Police. Why the police forces cannot take their weapons? What is so special for the kuchies to be armed while the rest of the ethnicities are disarmed?
"The Kuchis have been busy killing animals, student boys with their school backpacks, older men and women, raping girls of Hazara people in Behsood villages.
"The Afghan National TV has been censoring the condition as well as not broadcasting single news, because the Minster of Cultur & Information is a nationalist Pashtun who wants to protect his Kochi brothers. .
Karzai himself who is also related to Kochi tribes keeps client and allows them to do whatever they want in Hazara Land instead of solving the problems as a President of the country. President Karzai who is thinking of to win next Presidential Election, uses the power of Western countries and NATO forces supporting his Pashtun Nationalistic ideologies and terrorizing the non-Pashtun ethnicities.
"A month before President Karzai warned Pakistani government to stop Al Qaeda entering the borders and he added that it’s my responsibility to take care of Pashtuns people, no matter what country they lives. Karzai as a President of a multiethnic country, is allowed to talk in such a manner? America wants to stop the terrorists by going to Pakistani borders but Karzai wants to take advantage of this circumstance establish a greater Pashtunistan in two sides of the borders."

I don't know what the other side to this story might be, but it does illustrate two major points. One is that anyone who claims the Taliban represents a Pashtun resistance to a non-Pashtun government doesn't know what he or she is talking about. At one time the Kabul government was dominated by the Northern Alliance, which was mostly non-Pashtun. However, it no longer is, and in fact for the past couple of years Afghanistan's non-Pashtun leadership has been in opposition in parliament, not holding the levers of power. The Taliban movement cannot be explained using ethnicity theory, which isn't really applicable to Afghanistan anyway.

Another point is that if Afghanistan is to become a stable country, a lot more is going to have to happen that defeating the Taliban insurgency.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Water for Central Asia

Thu, 24 Jul 2008 19:12:04 +0000

Central Asian states are worried about water:

"The issue was at the center of a meeting last month in Dushanbe of officials from Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states. The organization's current secretary-general, Bolat Nurgaliev of Kazakhstan, warned that the water shortage could lead to terrorism and separatism.

"Nurgaliev did not elaborate, but he may have been referring to an incident in March on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Some 150 residents of Tajikistan's Isfara district, led by district Governor Mukhiba Yokubova and accompanied by Tajik police, stormed across the border into Kyrgyzstan's Batken region and tried to destroy a dam built several years ago with financial support from the World Bank. The Tajiks intended to restore the direct water flow to their farms by destroying the dam on the Aksay River, which flows from Kyrgyzstan into Tajikistan and is a major source of irrigation water for Tajik farms in Isfara...
"Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the smallest and poorest countries in the region. Unlike their neighbors, they do not have vast reserves of oil and natural gas. The only source of energy available to them is a major river, the Syr-Darya, which flows through the two countries to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where it flows into the Aral Sea. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan both store water from the Syr-Darya in reservoirs during the summer for use in winter to generate electricity...
"Meanwhile, major regional players Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which can use domestic natural gas to supply electricity and heating in winter, need water from the Syr-Darya in the summer for their vast farms. Those two countries are therefore in competition for the limited amount of water from the Syr-Darya that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan allow to flow to the north. This summer is no exception and Kazakh and Uzbek officials are at odds again."

More Kuntar

Thu, 24 Jul 2008 18:55:14 +0000

Lisa Goldman has a long post up on Samir Kuntar, which includes a link to English transcripts of Kuntar's trial, an interview with Kuntar, and some information about the significance of Kuntar's crime in Israel. I'm not going to read everything, as this issue simply isn't that important to me. Lisa does mention that the assertion that he killed the four-year-old girl was supported by forensic evidence, not just eyewitness testimony.

One irony that I didn't mention earlier, though, is that it is the use of southern Lebanon as a base by militant Palestinian groups like the PFLP that led to the 1982 Israeli invasion. In 1982, the Israelis were actually initially greeted as liberators by many Lebanese Shi'ites, who saw the Palestinian state-within-a-state as a troublesome occupation of its own. I don't think there's any way of know whether things could have evolved differently, but in the event, the Israeli defense establishment saw all Muslims as likely implacable foes and kept to an alliance with Maronite forces who have historically dominated Lebanon at the expense of the growing Shi'ite population. One result of this was the rise of Hizbullah as the primary representative of Lebanese Shi'ites both nationally and internationally, a Hizbullah which now celebrates the type of resistance to Israel its constituents opposed 30 years ago.

UPDATE: IPS has a piece on issues raised by the exchange within Lebanon. Read it to find out what Kuntar did to get booed in his home village.

Max Boot, Idiot Commentator

Wed, 23 Jul 2008 13:05:32 +0000

SHORTER Max Boot: "Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki doesn't know his place - he needs to listen to us conservatives as we tell him what's good for his country."

I suppose this is a common view among the conservatives desperate to continue the war and occupation in the Middle East, but honestly, one could hope for an opinion that was less sneeringly condescendent toward other nations' politically-appointed leaders.

Sovereign-esque

Tue, 22 Jul 2008 20:24:42 +0000

When initially confronted with the Iraq government's repeated statements regarding timelines and horizons for the withdrawal of US forces, McCain assured us that this wasn't really what they wanted. He knew better.

I have been there too many times. I've met too many times with him, and I know what they want. They want it based on conditions and of course they would like to have us out, that's what happens when you win wars, you leave...But the fact is that it should be -- the agreement between Prime Minister Maliki, the Iraqi government and the United states is it will be based on conditions.

Looking over this statement from Michael Goldfarb, one is left wondering whether Maliki and McCain have the same understanding of "conditions":

The deputy director of communications for the McCain 2008 campaign, Michael Goldfarb, yesterday said, "John McCain has said he will only support a withdrawal based on conditions on the ground. It is our belief that the Iraqi leaders share that view. The disposition of a sovereign, democratically elected government is one of the conditions that will be taken into account." [emphasis added]

Got that Maliki: We'll take your opinion under advisement - though this guy gets the ultimate say. So much for sovereignty, huh. And so much for this:

Question: "What would or should we do if, in the post-June 30th period, a so-called sovereign Iraqi government asks us to leave, even if we are unhappy about the security situation there?"

McCain's Answer: "Well, if that scenario evolves than I think it's obvious that we would have to leave because -- if it was an elected government of Iraq, and we've been asked to leave other places in the world. If it were an extremist government then I think we would have other challenges, but I don't see how we could stay when our whole emphasis and policy has been based on turning the Iraqi government over to the Iraqi people."

Truthy!

[UPDATE: Via Spacktackular, Matt Delong passes along this from Randy Scheunemann reiterating the Goldfarbian view of Iraqi sovereignty]

Everybody Rolls with their Fingers Crossed

Tue, 22 Jul 2008 19:29:01 +0000

For years I have been seeking to dispel the notion that the Sadrists are "vassals" of Iran, whereas Maliki's Dawa Party and ISCI (both either formed by, aided by and/or housed in Iran for most of the 80s and 90s) were independent from, if not hostile to, that nation. The origin of this misinformation dates to the moment that the Bush administration gauged (incorrectly apparently) that Dawa/ISCI would be amenable to its long term objectives in Iraq (permanent bases, preferential treatment on oil concessions). From that point onward, Dawa/ISCI's long historical ties to Iran were whitewashed, while the expunged "sins" of those parties were gathered up and then applied, with a broad brush, to a caricature of the Sadrists.

It got so bad that a plethora of conservative pundits (even Vali Nasr!) took to characterizing the recent anti-Sadrist operations undertaken by Dawa and ISCI as a victory by the Maliki government over the forces of Iran (despite the obvious subtext of longstanding rivalry between Shiite rivals, as well as the Sadrists historical antipathy to Iran). Charles Krauthammer, in typical fashion, didn't let pesky facts interfere with a self-serving narrative:

[The Sadrist trend's] sponsor, Iran, has suffered major setbacks, not just in Basra, but in Iraqi public opinion, which has rallied to the Maliki government and against Iranian interference through its Sadrist proxy.

It should be noted that the above cited Krauthammer column is directly contradicted by...an earlier Krauthammer column in which he describes Maliki government stalward, ISCI, as the Iranian cat's paw, and "Shiite Menace":

Of course there are telegenic elements among the Shiites who would like fundamentalist rule by the clerics...many of whom are affiliated with, infiltrated by and financed by Tehran, the headquarters for 20 years of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI].

These Iranian-oriented Shiite extremists are analogous to the Soviet-oriented communists in immediate post-World War II Italy and France. They too had a foreign patron. They too had foreign sources of money, agents and influence.

Now that Maliki has been making it increasingly clear that he is not on board with the Bush/McCain vision for Iraq, the pendulum is swinging back toward Krauthammer 1.0. Some people are feeling had. Although others, like John Derbyshire, are claiming that they were in on the fix all along:

Nothing in any of Maliki's "inartful" statements is the least bit surprising to a "To Hell With Them" Hawk...

Now that our American blood and money has seen off most of the enemies of Maliki and his Iranian pals, it is perfectly natural for them to believe they can finish the job themselves, without further assistance from us.

That's tantamount to an admission that Maliki and his "Iranian pals" have used the Bush administration quite deftly to dispatch their enemies - which, for the record, include the Sadrists to some extent. One wonders why Derbyshire has kept this piece of heretical insight to himself over the past few years? Andy McCarthy pleads non-ignorance as well:

As I've mentioned before, Maliki, of the Shiite Dawa Party which opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq in the first place, has long-standing ties to Iran and Syria — and has expressed support for Hezbollah. The only thing that surprises me about this story is that anyone is surprised. [emphasis added throughout]

Got that folks: It was obvious all along that Maliki and ISCI were Iran's chief proxies in Iraq. Yet, oddly enough, anyone out there questioning the strategy of helping Iran's proxies to consolidate control over Iraq's government were "defeatists." John McCain, for example, has frequently argued that removing US troops would "boost Iranian influence in the region." But did we do something different by offing the enemies of "Maliki and his Iranian pals"?

Swopa, who has always accurately described this dynamic, chides those on both sides of the divide that believed, as the Bush administration did, that ISCI/Dawa would be willing to go along with the plan to make Iraq a major US military outpost in the Middle East:

As Abu Aardvark wrote today, “I know that I’m not the only one who has generally assumed that Maliki and most of the ruling elite preferred McCain’s vision of endless, unconditional American military support.”...

I think that the key mistake many observers...[make is that t]hey forget that the government Maliki represents wasn’t created by the Americans — it came about following popular elections demanded by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who also established the coalition to which Maliki belongs and lent his considerable prestige to ensure its victory. And Sistani probably didn’t go through all that trouble just to be known as the guy who rubber-stamped a permanent U.S. occupation.

Back in Febuary 2004, Anthony Shadid of the Washington Post wrote a profile of Sistani that has long influenced my writings on Iraq; it describes the grand ayatollah as primarily motivated by memories of 1920 — when Shiites rebelled directly against the British, and were rewarded with 80 years of Sunni/secular domination — and determined not to let his followers miss this opportunity.

It’s always seemed to me that his solution was to cooperate initially with the U.S. invasion, use the American military as a contractor of sorts to help cement a Shiite-led government’s power, then nudge us aside when the task was more or less complete. Maliki’s newfound spine, if anything, just means that they think that time is drawing closer.

At times when describing the Bush administration's decision to target the Sadrists, I emphasized the fact that the Bush administration thought it would get a better deal from the ISCI/Dawa tandem than the Sadrists, and that this lay behind the decision to side with ISCI/Dawa against Moqtada. On occasion, I was not careful enough to point out that even though this was the Bush administration's assessment, it might have pinned false hopes on an unlikely champion (ISCI/Dawa).

Ultimately, the differences for many on the progressive side of this issue came down to the question of timing: Many (including myself) believed that the Shiite power structure would eventually want us out, but that ISCI/Dawa, and even Sistani, were not yet approaching the levels of confidence that would lead them to push for a departure of US forces. They were too vulnerable and unpopular to be willing to lose their enforcer just yet. Or so the thinking went.

But as Swopa has been quick to remind me: Even under the so called "immediate withdrawal" plans, the process will take years. Maliki et al seem ready to at least begin that process. So much so, that they've decided to strike a severe political blow to John of 100 Years.

Obama's Grand Tour and McCain's Circus Roundup

Mon, 21 Jul 2008 23:14:08 +0000

I don't know what has been more fun to follow over the past few days -- the McCain campaign's scramble to play catch-up with Maliki's suppport of an Obama-esque timetable, or the US media starting to go all-meta on their own coverage of the Obama trip. There are too many gems for a single QOTD, so here are a few highlights.

The first stage of "We're f**ked" is Denial

Even though McCain was given an extra 24-hour news cycle -- the delay in coverage by the NYT and WaPo was, as Steve Benen remarked, journalistic malpractice -- he and his campaign are running around like ham-handed headless chickens. They seem to be stuck in the Denial Stage even though the evidence was clear from the outset that Maliki was serious.

The focus in the media and in the McCain campaign's (various) responses has been on whether Maliki really gave a quasi-endorsement of Obama's "sixteen months" -- the whole walkback nonsense. However, the interview has been on Spiegel's site since Saturday, and in the interview Maliki expresses several times the need for an end-date, the sooner the "more realistic". There could have been no confusion on McCain's staff about the overall thrust of Maliki's position if they read the interview. The "mistranslation" excuse was transparently feeble from the outset.

For all McCain's vaunted international experience, this episode is displaying him as someone who isn't what we might call "agile" at handling an unexpected international curveball. Joe Klein hit exactly what I've been thinking:

I suppose that McCain's stubborn brittleness on this subject isn't news. But his inability to respond to a major change in policy from our Iraqi allies -- the announcement that they can take it from here -- certainly is newsworthy. There are three possibilities:

McCain doesn't believe the Iraqis can take it from here. (In the most benign reading, he may see this new position as mere domestic political posturing on Maliki's part, which is no doubt part of the truth.)

McCain doesn't want the Iraqis to take it from here. He still wants long-term, 100 year, military bases.

McCain doesn't move very quickly to adapt to changing facts on the ground.

None of them speak very well of the guy. [emph. added]

I think it's "all of the above" -- but especially the last factor. McCain is so wedded to a particular view of the Iraq War, the GWOT, and the US role in the Middle East, that he can't adapt. If he had had a more realistic understanding of the situation, Maliki's remarks wouldn't have -- or more accurately, shouldn't have -- come as such a bombshell.

The second stage of "We're f**ked" is Anger

Some of McCain's supporters are ahead of their candidate and acknowledging that Maliki appears to mean what he says. But that's not to suggest they're to the Acceptance stage yet. They're getting mad that "our guy" isn't following the script. Rob Farley's been tracking the emergence of the Anger crowd at the Corner.

At 11:38 AM EDT, Rob remarked (echoing a constant refrain of our own Eric Martin):

The conservative media and Right Blogistan have been undertaken to steadfastly ignore any hint that Prime Minister Maliki might and his political allies might have connections with Iran, preferring instead to assert that Iran influences events in Iraq through Sadrist militia and Sunni tribes (!). Given Maliki's statements on withdrawal, I wonder this: How long it will take for an anti-Maliki trope to develop on the American right that concentrates on his Iranian connections?

Ask and ye shall receive! Less than two hours later, Rob noted:

Andrew McCarthy answers my question:

As I've mentioned before, Maliki, of the Shiite Dawa Party which opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq in the first place, has long-standing ties to Iran and Syria -- and has expressed support for Hezbollah. The only thing that surprises me about this story is that anyone is surprised.
McCarthy also chides Maliki for being insufficiently grateful for the awesomeness of the Surge. Look for more of this as Maliki fails to walk back his statements...

But as Daniel Larison points out, maybe John McCain is simply too confused to be angry.

McCarthy is entirely right in what he says here, but that raises a couple questions. First, there is the obvious question of why the U.S. is attempting to pursue a strategy premised on limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and the region while actively backing a government that has no intention of limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and very clearly is led by a sectarian party.

[snip]

Even more than creating a political problem for McCain back home, Maliki’s recent statements have revealed both the untenability of a continued U.S. presence in Iraq and the complete incoherence of U.S. strategy in that country.

Serious ouch! And then John Derbyshire added his two cents. Again from Rob:

Shorter Derb:

All of your country are belong to us now.

Verbatim Derb:

We should tell Maliki, loudly and in public, that he owes his job to us, and that further prosecution of our military operations in his country will be conducted with regard only to U.S. interests, as determined in consensus by our established domestic political processes. And if he doesn't like that, he can go to hell.

God, I am so glad that this incident has caused the right to discard its phony interest in democracy promotion...

To be fair to Derb, he's always been a "To Hell With Them" Hawk, so his sentiments should come as no surprise. As he remarked today: "This absurd and insane desire to be loved and admired by foreigners will be the death of this republic." Derb doesn't have to do Denial -- he starts (and finishes) with Anger.

Those "Listening to Commanders on the Ground" C-i-C Credentials

If there was one piece of Conventional Wisdom we've heard for the last week about Obama's Grand Tour it was that the trip was risky but necessary. Obama had to show voters he would be "acceptable" as Commander-in-Chief. Obviously, he wouldn't be better at foreign relations than the tough, seasoned veteran, John McCain, but Obama had to somehow find his way across the "acceptability barrier."

So here's the Photo of the Day (photo released by US Army via Mark Halperin).

As Michael Crowley notes: "Hmmm, Petraeus doesn't look like he's been telling Obama he's a defeatmonger. "

Worse yet for McCain image-wise are these photos paired together by Ben Smith of Politico: "It's not really close," says Ben. Heh, indeed!

And what would be a Circus without Coverage of the Coverage of the Coverage...

Jesse Taylor is back!

Despite the fact that his foreign policy vision has been largely validated in the past week - McCain caught up to Obama on Afghanistan and the aforementioned endorsement by Maliki - the main discussion today and over the past few days has been whether or not the press is covering Obama’s trip too much and whether or not the coverage of them talking about the coverage results in too much (and too favorable) coverage for Obama. It’s a tesseract of inanity - a new fourth dimension of coverage about the coverage of the coverage will soon emerge, with Jessica Yellin invited on to discuss how she talked about her in-depth discussion of the impact of Obama’s trip on the race...without ever mentioning what Obama did, how he did it or who he did it with.

Call it the Fafblogging of the media: CNN is the whole world’s only source for CNN! [emph added]

Now if we only still had Billmon!

ICG | Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan & Lebanon

Mon, 21 Jul 2008 22:31:19 +0000

Our commentariat has been clammoring for more info on the Iraqi refugee problems, and their wish is our command.

It's hard to scope out the extent of the problems -- the data on external refugee flows is notoriously uncertain -- but the International Crisis Group, in their new report, gives it a try. Together with their patented recommendations for everyone and his uncle, including the UN and US.

Executive Summary | Full Report (pdf)

Among the issues discussed -- as the Iraqi government enjoys more and more oil revenue, getting funds to Iraqi citizens living abroad should become a high priority -- e.g. paying pensions. And accurate methods for tallying refugees in near-by countries will be one of many logistical challenges in preparing for the upcoming elections Eric has been discussing. --n

Russia Blog | Russian Companies Now Own 10% of U.S Steel Industry

Mon, 21 Jul 2008 22:26:49 +0000

Recycling petrodollars, 2008 edition --n

Whereas many American analysts describe U.S. steelmaking as a sunset industry that cannot compete with cheap steel imports from China, Russian tycoons, who have experience modernizing outdated Soviet mills in Russia, perceive value. The weak dollar has made many U.S. companies cheap in comparison to their counterparts in the Euro zone.

In addition to the dollar devaluation making American exports cheaper, in the past year skyrocketing world oil prices have tripled the cost of sending a standard shipping container from China to the U.S., reducing China's market share for steel in North America. Chinese manufacturers increasingly find themselves not only paying more to ship their low-margin goods abroad, but paying more for oil, iron ore, and other raw materials needed to produce these products, all while having their low-wage advantage undercut by competitors in Vietnam, India and other Asian countries.

If You Go Straight Long Enough You'll End Up Where You Were

Mon, 21 Jul 2008 19:15:03 +0000

In other Iraq news, the Sunni bloc that had previously withdrawn from Maliki's government last August has returned (in the nick of time - more on that below):

The main Sunni Muslim bloc in Iraq has rejoined the Shia-led government, in what correspondents called an important step for national reconciliation.

The return of six ministers from the Accordance Front to the cabinet was approved by lawmakers.

There are good reasons to doubt that the return of the AF is such an "important step." As I have argued in the past, the AF was already a part of the Maliki government for many months prior to its withdrawal, and that government was most frequently described as dysfunctional with no track recored of successful progress on key reconciliation items.

Further, the AF does not represent a large majority (or a majority?) of Sunni Iraqis, so their actions should not necessarily be interpreted as representative of the very constituency deemed crucial to reconciliation. In fact, the AF's relative lack of popularity vis-a-vis the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq tribal/insurgent elements in some Sunni regions is a large part of the motivation for the Front to return to Maliki's government at this juncture. The BBC article eventually gets around to hinting at this:

Their return is especially significant ahead of provincial elections that are expected later this year, the BBC's Jim Muir in Baghdad says.

The pertinent questions are how significant and in what ways? Is this the AF's way of hedging its electoral bets by reclaiming the reins of government ahead of the elections (it's good to count the ballots ya know!)? Or is this the culmination of some type of quid-pro-quo between the AF and Maliki/the Bush administration that speaks of potential widespread fraud/shpaing operations?

I tend toward the former interpretation, but don't see that as a positive in terms of increasing Sunni contentment with the political situation in Iraq. The latter would be even worse.

Gone Til November, January, February, March, April, May

Mon, 21 Jul 2008 17:53:08 +0000

Marc Lynch provides an update regarding the status of the provincial elections that were slated for October 1, but which have long seemed destined for a delay. According to various news outlets cited by the Aardvark, the elections will likely be pused back to December - or perhaps some time in 2009 - due to the fact that the Iraqi government has not even been able to pass the law governing those elections yet. No surprise here: the debate over the election law is, in many ways, a microcosm of the larger debate concerning Iraq's future, and each of the various factions' roles in it, and so the process is being contested pretty strenuously by various actors.

As I mentioned in that prior post, Lynch views the delays as a positive, and remains somewhat optimistic about the prospect that the delay may give the time and space necessary for the various parties to hone the election law in order to reach an acceptable compromise:

As I wrote earlier this week about the debates over the election law, better that these elections be done right than that they be done on an arbitrary schedule. There's little substantive difference between October 1 and the end of December, other than the former might generate a 'purple finger' moment to influence the American election campaign (which really shouldn't be a consideration either way - though the risk of violence around the provincial elections should also be taken into account by those who do). At the same time, a lot of actors - especially, but not only, the various 'Awakenings' groupings - have been impatiently waiting for these elections to get the share of power to which they feel entitled... so hopefully they won't be postponed too long. Hopefully they will just set a new, realistic but hard date, pass an electoral law acceptable to all trends, and then make provisions for serious international monitoring. I know, I know, here I go with my optimism again... sorry 'bout that.

Obviously, I'm not as sanguine about getting a law "acceptable to all trends" or the eventual inclusion of "provisions for serious international monitoring." But I want to clarify my position and ostensible criticism of Lynch. First of all, Lynch is entirely correct that it would be better to delay these elections than push them forward under the current conditions - whether to match up with the US domestic elections calendar, or otherwise (say, to capitalize on the political shaping operations vis-a-vis the Sadrists).

Ultimately, there will need to be a certain interval between the passage of the law and the elections themselves in order to allow for the logistical preparations, and this interval should not be abridged for arbitrary or capricious reasons. Further, at least by pushing back the deadline the possibility remains that eventually a decent law, reasonably acceptable to enough of the factions, will be adopted. While I don't rate that possibility as high, it's the only thing to root for at this point with respect to this process, and I don't fault Lynch for that.

In summation, a delay is better than the alternative, but the end result will likely disappoint regardless.

War at the ministry | EconIntelUnit

Sun, 20 Jul 2008 14:59:00 +0000

The ruthless former head of Russia's Federal Tax Service is making waves as Minister of Defense. --n

After years without meaningful military reform, Russia’s civilian defence minister is wresting control of the armed forces from the General Staff. This is one of the first signs of change since Vladimir Putin handed the presidency to Dmitry Medvedev. In the first instance, the aim is to reduce waste and corruption, and to improve financial management.

[snip]

What is needed is a fundamental reappraisal of both the likely threats facing Russia and its long-term priorities. Until now, such doctrinal debates have been dominated by the generals and their conservative interests. Mr Serdyukov has wrested doctrine from the generals’ hands but does not yet seem to know what to do with it. Nor, despite his more emollient style, has Mr Medvedev yet shown himself willing to reassess Mr Putin’s security and foreign policy. That said, with the rise of more practical technocratic generals such as General Makarov who favour smaller, better-trained and more professional forces and a decisive shift in power between the ministry and the General Staff, there is at last the opportunity to introduce meaningful reform—once the political leadership finally decides what kind.

Ezra Klein is Right

Sat, 19 Jul 2008 16:56:33 +0000

About this:

"Maliki, speaking to the German magazine Der Spiegel, said, 'U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama talks about 16 months. That, we think, would be the right timeframe for a withdrawal, with the possibility of slight changes.' In other words, the head of the Iraqi government endorsed the Obama plan -- both its timetable and its timing -- by name. That's huge. And it's the culmination of a weeks-long effort by the Maliki government to drive their desire for a timetable for withdrawal into the American political conversation. But though they've repeatedly expressed their preference for a timetable for withdrawal, this is the first time they've explicitly supported the plan of one candidate or another.

"Fundamentally, Maliki's comment is evidence of what the Iraqi government sees as the primary impediment to their government attaining real legitimacy: Us. The American occupation is hugely unpopular, and if Iraq is to truly stabilize, its government needs to be seen as independent from the occupiers and opposed to their continued presence. McCain needs to either come out with a new Iraq plan featuring a withdrawal component tomorrow, or explain why he believes America should fight for continued military dominance in Iraq over the objections of the American people, the Iraqi people, and the Iraqi government."

(Crossposted to my blog)

If at First You Don't Succeed, Succeed and Suceed Again

Fri, 18 Jul 2008 16:29:14 +0000

You might expect that after brash declarations like "Mission Accomplished" (2003), "last throes" Part I (2005), "last throes" Part II (2006), and Rich Lowry's infamous "We're Winning" cover photo and story (2005), Iraq war supporters would have developed a little healthy circumspection. You could have assumed that after declaring every new development over the past 5+ years the turning point and pivot to victory (the killing of Uday and Qusay, capture of Saddam, handover from CPA to interim government, elections, constitution, etc), that a more mature and cautious "wait and see" approach would be the norm. You would, of course, be wrong (you always are).

John McCain on the campaign trail lets the American people in on the best kept secret: we've actually already won the Iraq war. Who knew?

I repeat my statement that we have succeeded in Iraq, not we are succeeding we have succeeded in Iraq. The strategy has worked and we now have the Iraqi government and military in charge in the major cities in Iraq. Al Qaeda is on their heels and on the run... [emph. added]

Of course, it's the kind of success that requires Americans to continue to fight and die in the war. That's already won. And over.

...but the success that we have achieved is still fragile and could be reversed, and it’s still – if we do what Sen. Obama wants to do, then all of that could be reversed and we could face again the chaos, increased Iranian influence and American loss and defeat.

Ah, sweet victory. Still no definition of success or victory - but who cares, whatever it is, it's ours! And again, we see the absurd suggestion that Iranian influence has been lessened by our efforts to facilitate the consolidation of power by Iran's main proxies, ISCI and Dawa. Right. But I'll put that aside because now would be a good time to check in with the Kagans who, just last month, were telling us that we were "very close to succeeding." One can only imagine the progress of their pollyanna:

All of the most important objectives of the surge have been accomplished in Iraq. The sectarian civil war is ended; al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been dealt a devastating blow; and the Sadrist militia and other Iranian-backed militant groups have been disrupted.

The sectarian war has ended? Or is it just in its last throes (more on this below)? What of the Iranian-backed political parties (ISCI, Dawa) that are getting stronger? Regardless, what about that political reconciliation stuff that Bush and Petraeus said was the most important objective of The Surge, and without which, the various conflicts would eventually re-ignite?

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government has accomplished almost all of the legislative benchmarks set by the U.S. Congress and the Bush administration. More important, it is gaining wider legitimacy among the population. The attention of Iraqis across the country is focused on the upcoming provincial elections, which will be a pivotal moment in Iraq's development.

Wow. That sets a new benchmark for mendacity. Regarding provincial elections, the results are being cooked and, as such, will represent a "pivotal moment" the same way the last two rounds have - not so much. As to the benchmarks being "accomplished," the Kagans (with Jack Keane, "KKK" for short - I kid) are, quite frankly, lying.

The Bush administration has recently released an assessment that stated that the Iraqi government was making "satisfactory" progress on 15 of 18 benchmarks. KK & K translate "satisfactory progress" to already "accomplished." In reality, though, some of that progress cited by the Bush administration includes the passage of laws that have not yet been implemented (call it reconciliation on the books). Sameer Lalwani commenting on KK & K:

Daily Star on Kuntar

Fri, 18 Jul 2008 14:27:06 +0000

For some reason, yesterday I neglected to check the Lebanon Daily Star, which is certainly a useful source for information on Lebanon. The coverage there does focus on the detainees, and a key part of it is that there are now no Lebanese prisoners being held in Israel. Samir Kuntar is the most prominent name mentioned; however, the story portrays the events as subject to dispute, much like this Arabist thread.

As I said yesterday, I trust Israeli courts more than the Arab world, so I'm not defending Kuntar at all. My object in posting is to take a look at his reception, which is often being commented on as glorifying a brutal murderer and demonstrating the inhumanity of mainstream Arab opinion. However, there are key differences in perception that make that moral gap much narrower than some would have it. If your kneejerk reaction is that Israel is lying, then you're celebrating the return of someone who was wrongly imprisoned for almost 30 years.