Brian Ulrich's blog

The Kuchi Issue

Fri, 25 Jul 2008 18:50:23 +0000

The Rumi posts a story about Kuchi Pashtuns terrorizing an area near Kabul:

"Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, the representative Hazara (Shia Muslim) in the parliament has been on a hunger strikes almost a week in order to get attention of the government and stop killing his innocent people.
Kabul government sent police forces to stop the Kuchis but in this video you can see the kuchi-armed groups dressed in Taliban style are walking in front of National Police. Why the police forces cannot take their weapons? What is so special for the kuchies to be armed while the rest of the ethnicities are disarmed?
"The Kuchis have been busy killing animals, student boys with their school backpacks, older men and women, raping girls of Hazara people in Behsood villages.
"The Afghan National TV has been censoring the condition as well as not broadcasting single news, because the Minster of Cultur & Information is a nationalist Pashtun who wants to protect his Kochi brothers. .
Karzai himself who is also related to Kochi tribes keeps client and allows them to do whatever they want in Hazara Land instead of solving the problems as a President of the country. President Karzai who is thinking of to win next Presidential Election, uses the power of Western countries and NATO forces supporting his Pashtun Nationalistic ideologies and terrorizing the non-Pashtun ethnicities.
"A month before President Karzai warned Pakistani government to stop Al Qaeda entering the borders and he added that it’s my responsibility to take care of Pashtuns people, no matter what country they lives. Karzai as a President of a multiethnic country, is allowed to talk in such a manner? America wants to stop the terrorists by going to Pakistani borders but Karzai wants to take advantage of this circumstance establish a greater Pashtunistan in two sides of the borders."

I don't know what the other side to this story might be, but it does illustrate two major points. One is that anyone who claims the Taliban represents a Pashtun resistance to a non-Pashtun government doesn't know what he or she is talking about. At one time the Kabul government was dominated by the Northern Alliance, which was mostly non-Pashtun. However, it no longer is, and in fact for the past couple of years Afghanistan's non-Pashtun leadership has been in opposition in parliament, not holding the levers of power. The Taliban movement cannot be explained using ethnicity theory, which isn't really applicable to Afghanistan anyway.

Another point is that if Afghanistan is to become a stable country, a lot more is going to have to happen that defeating the Taliban insurgency.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Water for Central Asia

Thu, 24 Jul 2008 19:12:04 +0000

Central Asian states are worried about water:

"The issue was at the center of a meeting last month in Dushanbe of officials from Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states. The organization's current secretary-general, Bolat Nurgaliev of Kazakhstan, warned that the water shortage could lead to terrorism and separatism.

"Nurgaliev did not elaborate, but he may have been referring to an incident in March on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Some 150 residents of Tajikistan's Isfara district, led by district Governor Mukhiba Yokubova and accompanied by Tajik police, stormed across the border into Kyrgyzstan's Batken region and tried to destroy a dam built several years ago with financial support from the World Bank. The Tajiks intended to restore the direct water flow to their farms by destroying the dam on the Aksay River, which flows from Kyrgyzstan into Tajikistan and is a major source of irrigation water for Tajik farms in Isfara...
"Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the smallest and poorest countries in the region. Unlike their neighbors, they do not have vast reserves of oil and natural gas. The only source of energy available to them is a major river, the Syr-Darya, which flows through the two countries to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where it flows into the Aral Sea. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan both store water from the Syr-Darya in reservoirs during the summer for use in winter to generate electricity...
"Meanwhile, major regional players Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which can use domestic natural gas to supply electricity and heating in winter, need water from the Syr-Darya in the summer for their vast farms. Those two countries are therefore in competition for the limited amount of water from the Syr-Darya that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan allow to flow to the north. This summer is no exception and Kazakh and Uzbek officials are at odds again."

More Kuntar

Thu, 24 Jul 2008 18:55:14 +0000

Lisa Goldman has a long post up on Samir Kuntar, which includes a link to English transcripts of Kuntar's trial, an interview with Kuntar, and some information about the significance of Kuntar's crime in Israel. I'm not going to read everything, as this issue simply isn't that important to me. Lisa does mention that the assertion that he killed the four-year-old girl was supported by forensic evidence, not just eyewitness testimony.

One irony that I didn't mention earlier, though, is that it is the use of southern Lebanon as a base by militant Palestinian groups like the PFLP that led to the 1982 Israeli invasion. In 1982, the Israelis were actually initially greeted as liberators by many Lebanese Shi'ites, who saw the Palestinian state-within-a-state as a troublesome occupation of its own. I don't think there's any way of know whether things could have evolved differently, but in the event, the Israeli defense establishment saw all Muslims as likely implacable foes and kept to an alliance with Maronite forces who have historically dominated Lebanon at the expense of the growing Shi'ite population. One result of this was the rise of Hizbullah as the primary representative of Lebanese Shi'ites both nationally and internationally, a Hizbullah which now celebrates the type of resistance to Israel its constituents opposed 30 years ago.

UPDATE: IPS has a piece on issues raised by the exchange within Lebanon. Read it to find out what Kuntar did to get booed in his home village.

Ezra Klein is Right

Sat, 19 Jul 2008 16:56:33 +0000

About this:

"Maliki, speaking to the German magazine Der Spiegel, said, 'U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama talks about 16 months. That, we think, would be the right timeframe for a withdrawal, with the possibility of slight changes.' In other words, the head of the Iraqi government endorsed the Obama plan -- both its timetable and its timing -- by name. That's huge. And it's the culmination of a weeks-long effort by the Maliki government to drive their desire for a timetable for withdrawal into the American political conversation. But though they've repeatedly expressed their preference for a timetable for withdrawal, this is the first time they've explicitly supported the plan of one candidate or another.

"Fundamentally, Maliki's comment is evidence of what the Iraqi government sees as the primary impediment to their government attaining real legitimacy: Us. The American occupation is hugely unpopular, and if Iraq is to truly stabilize, its government needs to be seen as independent from the occupiers and opposed to their continued presence. McCain needs to either come out with a new Iraq plan featuring a withdrawal component tomorrow, or explain why he believes America should fight for continued military dominance in Iraq over the objections of the American people, the Iraqi people, and the Iraqi government."

(Crossposted to my blog)

Daily Star on Kuntar

Fri, 18 Jul 2008 14:27:06 +0000

For some reason, yesterday I neglected to check the Lebanon Daily Star, which is certainly a useful source for information on Lebanon. The coverage there does focus on the detainees, and a key part of it is that there are now no Lebanese prisoners being held in Israel. Samir Kuntar is the most prominent name mentioned; however, the story portrays the events as subject to dispute, much like this Arabist thread.

As I said yesterday, I trust Israeli courts more than the Arab world, so I'm not defending Kuntar at all. My object in posting is to take a look at his reception, which is often being commented on as glorifying a brutal murderer and demonstrating the inhumanity of mainstream Arab opinion. However, there are key differences in perception that make that moral gap much narrower than some would have it. If your kneejerk reaction is that Israel is lying, then you're celebrating the return of someone who was wrongly imprisoned for almost 30 years.

Israel's Prisoner Swap

Thu, 17 Jul 2008 19:11:00 +0000

I've spent a bit of time today looking over issues related to the recent exchange of prisoners and bodies between Israel and Hizbullah. There are, I think, three issues which require comment.

First, despite some self-righteous bloviating about how "only monsters hold dead bodies for ransom," Israel also handed over 200 bodies of Lebanese and Palestinian fighters it had been holding. You notice that fact buried in this story which focuses primarily on the Israeli views of the exchange. The Arab media, however, tends to have it front and center, as with this story, which mentions Kuntar after the bodies in the headline, has the trucks carrying the bodies as the lead photo, and begins:

"Amidst popular and official celebrations, a convoy carrying the bodies of martyrs of the Lebanese and Arab people which had been surrendered yesterday by Tel Aviv to Hizbullah made their way toward the capital Beirut passing through villages, towns, and cities of the south.

"Upon the long road leading to Beirut, Lebanese and Palestinian nationals assembled and (were inclined away from?) political factions in order to greet the biers of the martyrs along their journey, while women scattering flowers and rice smiled radiantly and cried for joy."

It then goes on to talk about a ceremony in the south involving their families, the reception and celebration in Beirut, and identification and burial preparations. Quntar is in the headline, then doesn't appear again until after the subhead where it discusses his reception and that of the other four prisoners.

The next point I want to comment on concerns Kuntar's reception as a hero. From what I can tell, simply saying that he expresses no remorse for his actions is misleading. He apparently claims he did not kill the four-year-old girl and her father, and that they were killed in the shoot-out. I'm not sure how credible such a claim is, as I trust Israeli courts more than Arabs do, but this does give an idea of what people are saying and thinking in the Arab world. This troubled me, as even if you blame Hizbullah for the focus on Kuntar, he seems like a uniquely unsavory choice. I know plenty of Arabs who hate Israel and support all manner of fighting Israelis but balk at that level of brutality, if not before.

Finally, all this needs to be seen as part of a broader struggle, one which does not always divide neatly into separate conflicts Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinians. Michael Cohen, to take just one example, refers to these events in isolation with, "Not to take sides here, but when people wonder about the recalcitrance of Israeli leaders to enter peace agreements with their neighbors this revolting episode serves as a worthwhile reminder."

Arabs don't have a monopoly on making the unsavory into heroes. How, after all, did the Israeli settler movement respond to Baruch Goldstein, who committed the 1994 Hebron massacre? According to Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar's Lords of the Land:

"In October 1994, about half a year after the massacre, the saint's admirers and devotees began to establish a grandiose site at his grave, at the northern exit from Kiryat Arba. The money for building the shrine came from private donations from Israel and abroad. On Goldstein's tomb they wrote that 'he had sacrificed himself for the sake of Israel, his Torah, and his land" and that he had been "murdered in the sanctification of the Holy Name." The graveside attained the dimensions of a mausoleum. The spot became a place of pilgrimage. Mass 'midnight corrections' - all-night Torah study sessions - were held there. Barren women prostrated themselves on the grave to pray for offspring. A nucleus of worshipers came there every day. Throughout the country aid funds and charities were established in Goldstein's name. An extensive 'souvenir' industry developed in memory of the murderer. His admirers distributed a prayer book dedicated to 'the elevation of the sainted soul,' T-shirts with his portrait, and key chains with Goldstein's picture on the backdrop of the Tomb of the Patriarchs...Only at the conclusion of prolonged parliamentary and legal struggles...did bulldozers come to destroy the shrine at the end of December 1999. Only an ordinary marble tombstone remained, but the pilgrimage to the grave and the cult of the saint did not end."

As seen in the government's eventual destruction of the shrine, most Israelis are too sane for this, and probably sickened by it, though my two years in Jerusalem taught me not to underestimate the numbers of those who aren't, and who today are more likely to be calling for the release of Yigal Amir at a soccer game. Israel, however, continues to support the settlement movement by carving up the West Bank via sealed roads Palestinians have to go around and providing settlements with utilities and IDF protection.

UPDATE: Arabist, in comments, provides a perspective on Kuntar's reception that tracks with what I said above.

Attacking Social Services

Wed, 16 Jul 2008 22:54:13 +0000

It's long been said that Hamas is popular because of its social services. Israel's defense establishment is now on the case:

"Israeli military officials have identified Hamas's civilian infrastructure in the West Bank as a major source of the Islamic group's popularity, and have begun raiding and shutting down these institutions in cities like Hebron, Nablus and Qalqilyah.

"Last week, troops focused their efforts in Nablus, raiding the city hall and confiscating computers. They also stormed into a shopping mall and posted closure notices on the shop windows. A girls' school and a medical centre were shut down in the city, and a charitable association had its computers impounded and documents seized.

"This policy, officials say, is meant to deny the Islamic group, which is committed to Israel's destruction, the ability to use these institutions as a pipeline by which money is channelled to finance attacks on the Jewish state. But the main goal of this campaign is to stem Hamas's growing popularity in the West Bank, and ensure it does not seize control of the area as it did in Gaza a year ago, when its forces vanquished the more moderate Fatah movement headed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas...

"In recent months, the army has also closed down an orphanage, a bakery and other institutions in Hebron, which Israel believes are associated with Hamas. In Gaza, meanwhile, Israel and the Islamic group are observing a truce, but this does not pertain to the West Bank where the Israeli military operates freely."

Are they serious? Having Israel attack Hamas orphanages and medical centers is supposed to make Palestinians turn against Hamas?

(Crossposted to my blog)

Gary Sick: Bolton is Right

Wed, 16 Jul 2008 22:24:50 +0000

Former NSC member Gary Sick posted the following to a private professional list-serve, with permission to cite and duplicate. It seems of interest to American Footprints readers. -BU

As usual, John Bolton is absolutely right. His policy prescriptions may be reckless to the point of foolishness ("When in doubt, bomb!"), but his understanding of what is happening in Washington policy (as outlined in his op-ed in the Wall Street Journal yesterday) is unerringly accurate.

While much of the world was hyper-ventilating over the possibility that the United States (and maybe Israel) were getting ready to launch a new war against Iran, Bolton was looking at the realities and concluding that far from bombing the US was preparing to do a deal with Iran. He had noticed that over the past two years the US had completely reversed its position opposing European talks with Iran.

First, the US indicated that it would participate if the negotiations showed progress. Then, when they didn't, we went further and actively participated in negotiating a new and more attractive offer of incentives to Iran. Bolton noticed that when that package was delivered to Tehran by Xavier Solana, the signature of one Condoleeza Rice was there, along with representatives of the other five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.

He had probably also noticed Secretary Rice's suggestion of possibly opening a US interests section in Tehran -- the first step toward reestablishing diplomatic relations. And he didn't overlook the softening of rhetoric in Under Secretary Wm Burn's recent testimony to the Congress about Iran.

Now, just one day after Bolton's cry of alarm that the US is going soft on Iran, we learn that the same Bill Burns will participate directly in the talks that are going to be held on Saturday in Geneva with the chief Iranian negotiator on the nuclear file. Bolton's worst suspicions seem to be confirmed.

Unlike many observers and commentators, Bolton has been looking, not at what the US administration says, but what it does. Ever since the congressional elections of 2006, the US has been in the process of a fundamental change in its policy on a number of key issues: the Arab-Israel dispute, the North Korean nuclear issue, and Iran. Since the administration proclaims loudly that its policies have not changed, and since the tough rhetoric of the past dominates the discussion, it is easy to overlook what is actually going on.

Bolton no doubt noticed that Rumsfeld is gone and replaced with Robert Gates, a very different sort of secretary of Defense. He will have observed that the worst of the neocons (including himself) are now writing books and spending more time with families and friends, cheer-leading for more war by writing op-eds from the outside rather than pursuing their strategies in policy meetings in the White House.

He will have seen the gradual shift of the policy center of gravity from Dick Cheney to Rice and Gates. He will have been listening when the Chairman of the JCS and others have said as clearly as they realistically can that the military option, though never renounced as a theoretical possibility, is the least attractive option available to us and in fact is close to impossible given our over-stretch in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In other words, Bolton, as someone whose policies (in my view) are certifiably insane, recognizes real pragmatism and moderation in Washington when he sees it. And he does not like what he sees in this lame duck administration.

Over the past two or three years, we have been treated to one sensational threat after another about the likelihood of imminent war with Iran. All of these alarms and predictions have one thing in common: they never happened. Perhaps it is time for us to join Bolton in looking at the real indicators. When Bolton quits writing his jeremiads or when he begins to express satisfaction with the direction of US policy, that is when we should start to get worried.

-Gary Sick

Kabul Embassy Bombing

Wed, 09 Jul 2008 18:57:41 +0000

Thanks to this situation, I'm still a little out of touch with the world, and so just found out about the terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul. However, Barnett Rubin as great commentary here and here. Once I have my life fully rebooted, I plan to write a post on the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. There are far more of those than there are similarities.

Mullah Omar Challenged

Sun, 06 Jul 2008 17:44:12 +0000

Jalaluddin Haqqani, an Afghan mujahid, has called for sidelining Mullah Omar as Taliban leader:

"The open letter to Taliban fighters and other Afghan insurgents is written in the Pashto language under the logo and title of the 'Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan.' Haqqani’s message describes Mullah Omar as an illiterate person and claims that his erroneous decisions might cause the collapse of the Taliban (Payman Daily [Kabul], June 14). As stated in Haqqani’s letter, it is time for the neo-Taliban to change the head of the Taliban leadership council. Haqqani claims to have consulted many Taliban commanders who were in agreement that this is the right time to bring about changes in the leadership (a full facsimile of the letter is published at www.kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article1816).

"Haqqani suggests that the passage of time has led to the understanding that errors by the Taliban leadership have caused the loss of many prominent commanders, including Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Osmani, Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Abdul Manan and Mullah Saifullah Mansoor. The veteran jihadi commander believes that the Taliban’s shura (consultative council) in Quetta has made a deal with intelligence agencies to kill those insurgent commanders who are opposed to working with Mullah Omar’s representatives. Singled out for criticism is Mullah Omar’s cooperation and coordination with his relatives, such as Mullah Azizullah Eshaq Zai, Mullah Abdul Shakoor and Mullah Jan Muhammad Baloch, whom Haqqani accuses of issuing orders that have caused losses to Taliban forces. Haqqani claims that those loyal leading commanders of the Taliban who learn of the shura’s deals with intelligence agencies and no longer want to work with them have either been killed by Taliban figures or murdered by foreign forces allied with the Taliban leadership.

"In other parts of his letter, Jalaluddin Haqqani informs the Taliban that the leadership of the organization is not hereditary and that one family should not lead the Taliban forever. Instead, he suggests that the Taliban leadership should be given to a person who is literate and knowledgeable about political issues. He should also have the ability to bring positive changes for the political development, unity and international relations of the Taliban. The Taliban needs to have productive diplomacy around the world and Haqqani points out that not all countries and governments are foes of the Taliban. Criticizing past decisions of Mullah Omar, Haqqani stresses that the leadership system of the Taliban with its poor decisions and egotism has led to the infamy of the organization and threatened it with collapse."

I noted the Haqqani network previously here. It should surprise no one that Mullah Omar as come under fire from within. For one thing, there were lots of signs that Musharraf's government in Pakistan was once trying to promote Beitullah Mehsud at Mullah Omar's expense. Mehsud has been far more visible and successful than Mullah Omar over the past year or more, and has now become the leader of a group called the "Taliban Movement of Pakistan." Haqqani may be interested in seeing him take over as the leader of the entire Taliban movement, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the border means little in these matters. Furthermore, Mullah Omar, despite pretensions, remains little more than a tribal leader who doesn't have the education customarily expected from Muslim religious leaders. He came to power because he was able to assemble a band of followers that succeeded in gradually expanding a zone of law and order during the chaos of the 1990's civil war, and the general population saw them as an improvement over predatory warlords. Now, however, the Taliban is engaged in an insurgency against a multinational coalition, which requires a different skill set, one Mullah Omar simply may not possess.

Torture and Terrorists

Fri, 27 Jun 2008 21:40:18 +0000

Chris Zambelis has a must-read piece at the Jamestown Foundation arguing that torture by Arab governments has played a critical role in radicalizing recruits for al-Qaeda and related organizations, and that the implication of the United States in torture both within and beyond the region helps solidify arguments that we are a legitimate target of terrorism for participating with those regimes in their most deplorable practices. You should really read the whole thing, but here's a sample:

"There is ample evidence that a number of prominent militants—including al-Qaeda deputy commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and the late al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—endured systematic torture at the hands of the Egyptian and Jordanian authorities, respectively (see Terrorism Monitor, May 4, 2006). Many observers believe that their turn toward extreme radicalism represented as much an attempt to exact revenge against their tormentors and, by extension, the United States, as it was about fulfilling an ideology. Those who knew Zawahiri and can relate to his experience believe that his behavior today is greatly influenced by his pursuit of personal redemption to compensate for divulging information about his associates after breaking down amid brutal torture sessions during his imprisonment in the early 1980s [3]. For radical Islamists and their sympathizers, U.S. economic, military, and diplomatic support for regimes that engage in this kind of activity against their own citizens vindicates al-Qaeda’s claims of the existence of a U.S.-led plot to attack Muslims and undermine Islam. In al-Qaeda’s view, these circumstances require that Muslims organize and take up arms in self-defense against the United States and its allies in the region."

Israel, Syria, and Water

Thu, 26 Jun 2008 19:29:57 +0000

The issue of water resource management in the Gulf reminds me of a point I've been meaning to make about its role in the conflict between Israel and Syria, particularly amid reports that Turkey may be using it as leverage. Israel's most important source of water is the Sea of Galilee, from which the National Water Carrier carries it to the populated center and arid south. For that reason, Israel seeks to retain control of the entire shoreline, which Syria finds unacceptable. The issue of water rights in that area was a source of conflict even before the Six Day War, when Israel bombed a Syrian dam aimed at diverting water from the sea at Israel's expense.

Over the decades, however, desalination technology has become much more affordable. Desalination one cubic meter of sea water costs on average about 50 cents. Israel's National Water Carrier can carry about 600 million cubic meters per year. Replacing its entire capacity would this carry annual running costs of only about $300 million, and certainly no one is talking about Israel losing all, or even most, rights to that body of water. When compared to the cost of maintaining state-of-the-art military equipment, that of investing in new sources of water isn't really that great, though perhaps something most easily ponied up by a willing superpower.

One more aspect of this is that, based on my time there, Israel appears to have more water right now than it really needs. Water pressure is generally what you would find in the United States, and many times greater than that in Jordan or Syria. I'm also not sure they're doing all they can to conserve water, both in agricultural processes and day-to-day living. To give just one example, the place I did my laundry used top-loading washing machines. I'm not sure how much stuff like that matters, but "water shortage" in Israel's case seems to denote something still above having enough to live comfortably.

(Crossposted to my blog)

Feeding the Arab Gulf

Thu, 26 Jun 2008 13:31:11 +0000

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are trying to lock in food supplies by investing directly in South Asian farmland:

"With Gulf countries importing 60 percent of their food on average, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are taking the lead in investing in Asia and Africa to secure supplies of cereals, meat and vegetables...

"Calling for transforming the buyer-seller relationship in the energy sector between India and the Gulf countries into a more substantial and enduring relationship, Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee told the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research last month, 'I see India’s requirement for energy security and that of the Gulf countries for food security as opportunities that can be leveraged to mutual advantage.'

"Similarly, during Prime Minister Yousaf Gillani’s visit to Saudi Arabia in early June, Pakistan sought 6 billion dollars in financial and oil aid in return for 'hundreds of thousands of acres of agricultural land, which could be tilled by the Saudis.'

"Such arrangements are likely to become increasingly common since inflation and food shortage are likely to worsen worldwide in future, said Shoaib Ismail, a halophyte agronomist who studies utilising plants for food, fuel, feed, and fiber...

"Media reports indicate that the UAE government and private entities like Abraaj Capital have already acquired about 800,000 acres of farmland in Pakistan. As incentive, Islamabad is offering legal and tax concessions to foreign investors in specialised agriculture and livestock ‘free zones’, and may also introduce legislation to exempt such investors from government-imposed export bans."

From the standpoint of the Gulf countries, this move replaces ill-starred attempts to develop their own agricultural sectors. Outside of Oman, which has lots of fertile wadis, only the UAE sits atop enough water in aquifers to meet its own consumption needs. Developing agriculture would require huge investments in desalination and irrigation. I am, however, interested in what deals like this might mean for the global markets in both food and oil. If some gets locked in to direct bilateral exchanges, there's less to meet rising demand on the open market, right?

UPDATE: Sticking with the UAE angle on things, I've been poking around with water use statistics, and what I find is mostly in the ballpark of this 2002 report from Abu Dhabi. Between 85% and 90% of water use in the UAE is for agriculture and other purposes which require irrigation. This has led to over-pumping of groundwater at up to 20 times the natural replenishment rate. I don't know how much of that agricultural use is related to the government's efforts to promore self-sufficiency, but you can see that without it, the problem would be reduced to manageable proportions.

(Crossposted to my blog)

The Arghandab Operation

Tue, 24 Jun 2008 21:51:53 +0000

There's been some speculation about what, exactly, the Taliban was trying to accomplish with their seizure last week of the Arghandab district of Kandahar province, which they simply and predictably evacuated following a joined Canadian-ANA assault. Here are some theories:

"A June 19 statement from Taliban spokesman Qari Yusof Ahmadi outlined some aspects of the movement’s strategy: "There were some hidden objectives behind our plan to enter Arghandab… The obvious aim of this was to show that we can easily enter an area and then leave it without suffering any casualties whenever we want to. We also wanted to divert the enemy’s attention to this area so that our prisoners could safely return to their homes" (Voice of Jihad, June 19)...

"There is some speculation within Afghanistan that the Pakistani government organized and financed the operation as covert retaliation for successive U.S. strikes on targets within Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (Hasht-e Sobh, June 18)...

"Until last October the leading Alokozai elder was Mullah Naqib, a famous anti-Soviet mujahideen and a leading backer of the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul. Though he resisted Taliban encroachment into Arghandab, Mullah Naqib was also prominent at times in negotiations with the Islamist militants. Following his death from a heart attack last fall, the Mullah was replaced by his 26-year-old son on the orders of Hamid Karzai. The appointment of this untested youth broke with tradition—tribes generally choose their own leaders—and overlooked a number of capable fighters and leaders in the tribe. There is reason to think that the Taliban operation was intended to intimidate the Alokozai into cooperation or passivity, eventually clearing the way into Kandahar."

My sense is that this was definitely an operation designed to make statements rather than actually take territory. As others have suggested, this was probably about muscle flexing, and the most likely target was the local population as part of a general strategy of trying to appear both benign and inevitable. The specific choice of target may have been chosen because it is at once Karzai's Pashtun base and yet an area where his strength is newly in doubt due to leadership changes, I doubt there is a Pakistani connection, though speculation to that effect within Afghanistan is to be expected. I'm not sure what difference we should theoretically see between Pakistan quietly supporting a specific Taliban operation and what they do normally. The Taliban are pefectly capable of organizing their own efforts.

PJAK and the U.S.

Mon, 23 Jun 2008 15:45:13 +0000

Iran accuses the United States of supporting PJAK, a Kurdish nationalist terrorist organization:

"In an apparent escalation in its insurgency, however, PJAK forces are reported to have attacked the Command Headquarters of the Iranian Air Force in the capital of Tehran. This attack represents the first time Kurdish insurgents have used violence in the capital (Rooz, June 5). This move may signify a strategic escalation of PJAK’s campaign to include striking at targets outside of Iranian Kurdistan. Kurdish and Iranian assessments of casualties sustained by both sides differ dramatically. PJAK sources claim to have killed over 90 members of the Iranian security forces [1]. Official Iranian sources, however, report far fewer casualties (Fars, June 5).

"Although ethnic Kurdish dissident groups have a history of political activism and violence in Iran, Tehran accuses PJAK and Komeleh of acting at the behest of foreign interests seeking to destabilize the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, Iran implicates the United States in allowing PJAK to operate from Iraq, where it is alleged to be enjoying support from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a group engaged in its own violent nationalist struggle against Turkey, the PKK is widely regarded as PJAK’s ideological inspiration and its operational partner—a claim PJAK denies. Unlike PJAK, however, the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States. In fact, many observers believe that the creation of PJAK represents an effort to circumvent the restrictions on the PKK due to its designation as a terrorist organization (see Terrorism Monitor, May 15).

"Tehran considers the low-key visit of exiled PJAK leader Abdul Rahman Haji-Ahmadi to Washington in 2007 as proof of a U.S. hand in PJAK’s armed struggle (Iran Daily, September 12, 2007). Iranian concerns about foreign meddling in its internal affairs are exacerbated by the belief that vocal American elements advocating violent regime change in Iran see groups such as PJAK as leverage over the Islamic Republic, possibly in the run-up to a future military campaign. Ironically, in a May 7 press release, PJAK criticized the United States for providing Turkey with intelligence used to attack PJAK positions during missions targeting PKK positions in northern Iraq. The statement went as far as to threaten retaliatory strikes against the United States for its support for Turkey [2]. The group later denied making what was apparently an unauthorized statement (see Terrorism Monitor, May 15; Today’s Zaman, May 5)."

I'd actually be interested in finding out what this PJAK leader did on that visit to Washington. The United States hasn't really figured out what to do with the Kurds, who have been our one dependable ally in Iraq, but whose demands alienate Turkey and may hinder a nationwide settlement. I also suspect some elements in the Bush administration want to use PJAK against Iran even as others want to restrain the organization in support of our other alliances. (Crossposted to my blog)