Eric Martin's blog

Sovereign-esque

Tue, 22 Jul 2008 20:24:42 +0000

When initially confronted with the Iraq government's repeated statements regarding timelines and horizons for the withdrawal of US forces, McCain assured us that this wasn't really what they wanted. He knew better.

I have been there too many times. I've met too many times with him, and I know what they want. They want it based on conditions and of course they would like to have us out, that's what happens when you win wars, you leave...But the fact is that it should be -- the agreement between Prime Minister Maliki, the Iraqi government and the United states is it will be based on conditions.

Looking over this statement from Michael Goldfarb, one is left wondering whether Maliki and McCain have the same understanding of "conditions":

The deputy director of communications for the McCain 2008 campaign, Michael Goldfarb, yesterday said, "John McCain has said he will only support a withdrawal based on conditions on the ground. It is our belief that the Iraqi leaders share that view. The disposition of a sovereign, democratically elected government is one of the conditions that will be taken into account." [emphasis added]

Got that Maliki: We'll take your opinion under advisement - though this guy gets the ultimate say. So much for sovereignty, huh. And so much for this:

Question: "What would or should we do if, in the post-June 30th period, a so-called sovereign Iraqi government asks us to leave, even if we are unhappy about the security situation there?"

McCain's Answer: "Well, if that scenario evolves than I think it's obvious that we would have to leave because -- if it was an elected government of Iraq, and we've been asked to leave other places in the world. If it were an extremist government then I think we would have other challenges, but I don't see how we could stay when our whole emphasis and policy has been based on turning the Iraqi government over to the Iraqi people."

Truthy!

[UPDATE: Via Spacktackular, Matt Delong passes along this from Randy Scheunemann reiterating the Goldfarbian view of Iraqi sovereignty]

Everybody Rolls with their Fingers Crossed

Tue, 22 Jul 2008 19:29:01 +0000

For years I have been seeking to dispel the notion that the Sadrists are "vassals" of Iran, whereas Maliki's Dawa Party and ISCI (both either formed by, aided by and/or housed in Iran for most of the 80s and 90s) were independent from, if not hostile to, that nation. The origin of this misinformation dates to the moment that the Bush administration gauged (incorrectly apparently) that Dawa/ISCI would be amenable to its long term objectives in Iraq (permanent bases, preferential treatment on oil concessions). From that point onward, Dawa/ISCI's long historical ties to Iran were whitewashed, while the expunged "sins" of those parties were gathered up and then applied, with a broad brush, to a caricature of the Sadrists.

It got so bad that a plethora of conservative pundits (even Vali Nasr!) took to characterizing the recent anti-Sadrist operations undertaken by Dawa and ISCI as a victory by the Maliki government over the forces of Iran (despite the obvious subtext of longstanding rivalry between Shiite rivals, as well as the Sadrists historical antipathy to Iran). Charles Krauthammer, in typical fashion, didn't let pesky facts interfere with a self-serving narrative:

[The Sadrist trend's] sponsor, Iran, has suffered major setbacks, not just in Basra, but in Iraqi public opinion, which has rallied to the Maliki government and against Iranian interference through its Sadrist proxy.

It should be noted that the above cited Krauthammer column is directly contradicted by...an earlier Krauthammer column in which he describes Maliki government stalward, ISCI, as the Iranian cat's paw, and "Shiite Menace":

Of course there are telegenic elements among the Shiites who would like fundamentalist rule by the clerics...many of whom are affiliated with, infiltrated by and financed by Tehran, the headquarters for 20 years of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI].

These Iranian-oriented Shiite extremists are analogous to the Soviet-oriented communists in immediate post-World War II Italy and France. They too had a foreign patron. They too had foreign sources of money, agents and influence.

Now that Maliki has been making it increasingly clear that he is not on board with the Bush/McCain vision for Iraq, the pendulum is swinging back toward Krauthammer 1.0. Some people are feeling had. Although others, like John Derbyshire, are claiming that they were in on the fix all along:

Nothing in any of Maliki's "inartful" statements is the least bit surprising to a "To Hell With Them" Hawk...

Now that our American blood and money has seen off most of the enemies of Maliki and his Iranian pals, it is perfectly natural for them to believe they can finish the job themselves, without further assistance from us.

That's tantamount to an admission that Maliki and his "Iranian pals" have used the Bush administration quite deftly to dispatch their enemies - which, for the record, include the Sadrists to some extent. One wonders why Derbyshire has kept this piece of heretical insight to himself over the past few years? Andy McCarthy pleads non-ignorance as well:

As I've mentioned before, Maliki, of the Shiite Dawa Party which opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq in the first place, has long-standing ties to Iran and Syria — and has expressed support for Hezbollah. The only thing that surprises me about this story is that anyone is surprised. [emphasis added throughout]

Got that folks: It was obvious all along that Maliki and ISCI were Iran's chief proxies in Iraq. Yet, oddly enough, anyone out there questioning the strategy of helping Iran's proxies to consolidate control over Iraq's government were "defeatists." John McCain, for example, has frequently argued that removing US troops would "boost Iranian influence in the region." But did we do something different by offing the enemies of "Maliki and his Iranian pals"?

Swopa, who has always accurately described this dynamic, chides those on both sides of the divide that believed, as the Bush administration did, that ISCI/Dawa would be willing to go along with the plan to make Iraq a major US military outpost in the Middle East:

As Abu Aardvark wrote today, “I know that I’m not the only one who has generally assumed that Maliki and most of the ruling elite preferred McCain’s vision of endless, unconditional American military support.”...

I think that the key mistake many observers...[make is that t]hey forget that the government Maliki represents wasn’t created by the Americans — it came about following popular elections demanded by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who also established the coalition to which Maliki belongs and lent his considerable prestige to ensure its victory. And Sistani probably didn’t go through all that trouble just to be known as the guy who rubber-stamped a permanent U.S. occupation.

Back in Febuary 2004, Anthony Shadid of the Washington Post wrote a profile of Sistani that has long influenced my writings on Iraq; it describes the grand ayatollah as primarily motivated by memories of 1920 — when Shiites rebelled directly against the British, and were rewarded with 80 years of Sunni/secular domination — and determined not to let his followers miss this opportunity.

It’s always seemed to me that his solution was to cooperate initially with the U.S. invasion, use the American military as a contractor of sorts to help cement a Shiite-led government’s power, then nudge us aside when the task was more or less complete. Maliki’s newfound spine, if anything, just means that they think that time is drawing closer.

At times when describing the Bush administration's decision to target the Sadrists, I emphasized the fact that the Bush administration thought it would get a better deal from the ISCI/Dawa tandem than the Sadrists, and that this lay behind the decision to side with ISCI/Dawa against Moqtada. On occasion, I was not careful enough to point out that even though this was the Bush administration's assessment, it might have pinned false hopes on an unlikely champion (ISCI/Dawa).

Ultimately, the differences for many on the progressive side of this issue came down to the question of timing: Many (including myself) believed that the Shiite power structure would eventually want us out, but that ISCI/Dawa, and even Sistani, were not yet approaching the levels of confidence that would lead them to push for a departure of US forces. They were too vulnerable and unpopular to be willing to lose their enforcer just yet. Or so the thinking went.

But as Swopa has been quick to remind me: Even under the so called "immediate withdrawal" plans, the process will take years. Maliki et al seem ready to at least begin that process. So much so, that they've decided to strike a severe political blow to John of 100 Years.

If You Go Straight Long Enough You'll End Up Where You Were

Mon, 21 Jul 2008 19:15:03 +0000

In other Iraq news, the Sunni bloc that had previously withdrawn from Maliki's government last August has returned (in the nick of time - more on that below):

The main Sunni Muslim bloc in Iraq has rejoined the Shia-led government, in what correspondents called an important step for national reconciliation.

The return of six ministers from the Accordance Front to the cabinet was approved by lawmakers.

There are good reasons to doubt that the return of the AF is such an "important step." As I have argued in the past, the AF was already a part of the Maliki government for many months prior to its withdrawal, and that government was most frequently described as dysfunctional with no track recored of successful progress on key reconciliation items.

Further, the AF does not represent a large majority (or a majority?) of Sunni Iraqis, so their actions should not necessarily be interpreted as representative of the very constituency deemed crucial to reconciliation. In fact, the AF's relative lack of popularity vis-a-vis the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq tribal/insurgent elements in some Sunni regions is a large part of the motivation for the Front to return to Maliki's government at this juncture. The BBC article eventually gets around to hinting at this:

Their return is especially significant ahead of provincial elections that are expected later this year, the BBC's Jim Muir in Baghdad says.

The pertinent questions are how significant and in what ways? Is this the AF's way of hedging its electoral bets by reclaiming the reins of government ahead of the elections (it's good to count the ballots ya know!)? Or is this the culmination of some type of quid-pro-quo between the AF and Maliki/the Bush administration that speaks of potential widespread fraud/shpaing operations?

I tend toward the former interpretation, but don't see that as a positive in terms of increasing Sunni contentment with the political situation in Iraq. The latter would be even worse.

Gone Til November, January, February, March, April, May

Mon, 21 Jul 2008 17:53:08 +0000

Marc Lynch provides an update regarding the status of the provincial elections that were slated for October 1, but which have long seemed destined for a delay. According to various news outlets cited by the Aardvark, the elections will likely be pused back to December - or perhaps some time in 2009 - due to the fact that the Iraqi government has not even been able to pass the law governing those elections yet. No surprise here: the debate over the election law is, in many ways, a microcosm of the larger debate concerning Iraq's future, and each of the various factions' roles in it, and so the process is being contested pretty strenuously by various actors.

As I mentioned in that prior post, Lynch views the delays as a positive, and remains somewhat optimistic about the prospect that the delay may give the time and space necessary for the various parties to hone the election law in order to reach an acceptable compromise:

As I wrote earlier this week about the debates over the election law, better that these elections be done right than that they be done on an arbitrary schedule. There's little substantive difference between October 1 and the end of December, other than the former might generate a 'purple finger' moment to influence the American election campaign (which really shouldn't be a consideration either way - though the risk of violence around the provincial elections should also be taken into account by those who do). At the same time, a lot of actors - especially, but not only, the various 'Awakenings' groupings - have been impatiently waiting for these elections to get the share of power to which they feel entitled... so hopefully they won't be postponed too long. Hopefully they will just set a new, realistic but hard date, pass an electoral law acceptable to all trends, and then make provisions for serious international monitoring. I know, I know, here I go with my optimism again... sorry 'bout that.

Obviously, I'm not as sanguine about getting a law "acceptable to all trends" or the eventual inclusion of "provisions for serious international monitoring." But I want to clarify my position and ostensible criticism of Lynch. First of all, Lynch is entirely correct that it would be better to delay these elections than push them forward under the current conditions - whether to match up with the US domestic elections calendar, or otherwise (say, to capitalize on the political shaping operations vis-a-vis the Sadrists).

Ultimately, there will need to be a certain interval between the passage of the law and the elections themselves in order to allow for the logistical preparations, and this interval should not be abridged for arbitrary or capricious reasons. Further, at least by pushing back the deadline the possibility remains that eventually a decent law, reasonably acceptable to enough of the factions, will be adopted. While I don't rate that possibility as high, it's the only thing to root for at this point with respect to this process, and I don't fault Lynch for that.

In summation, a delay is better than the alternative, but the end result will likely disappoint regardless.

If at First You Don't Succeed, Succeed and Suceed Again

Fri, 18 Jul 2008 16:29:14 +0000

You might expect that after brash declarations like "Mission Accomplished" (2003), "last throes" Part I (2005), "last throes" Part II (2006), and Rich Lowry's infamous "We're Winning" cover photo and story (2005), Iraq war supporters would have developed a little healthy circumspection. You could have assumed that after declaring every new development over the past 5+ years the turning point and pivot to victory (the killing of Uday and Qusay, capture of Saddam, handover from CPA to interim government, elections, constitution, etc), that a more mature and cautious "wait and see" approach would be the norm. You would, of course, be wrong (you always are).

John McCain on the campaign trail lets the American people in on the best kept secret: we've actually already won the Iraq war. Who knew?

I repeat my statement that we have succeeded in Iraq, not we are succeeding we have succeeded in Iraq. The strategy has worked and we now have the Iraqi government and military in charge in the major cities in Iraq. Al Qaeda is on their heels and on the run... [emph. added]

Of course, it's the kind of success that requires Americans to continue to fight and die in the war. That's already won. And over.

...but the success that we have achieved is still fragile and could be reversed, and it’s still – if we do what Sen. Obama wants to do, then all of that could be reversed and we could face again the chaos, increased Iranian influence and American loss and defeat.

Ah, sweet victory. Still no definition of success or victory - but who cares, whatever it is, it's ours! And again, we see the absurd suggestion that Iranian influence has been lessened by our efforts to facilitate the consolidation of power by Iran's main proxies, ISCI and Dawa. Right. But I'll put that aside because now would be a good time to check in with the Kagans who, just last month, were telling us that we were "very close to succeeding." One can only imagine the progress of their pollyanna:

All of the most important objectives of the surge have been accomplished in Iraq. The sectarian civil war is ended; al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been dealt a devastating blow; and the Sadrist militia and other Iranian-backed militant groups have been disrupted.

The sectarian war has ended? Or is it just in its last throes (more on this below)? What of the Iranian-backed political parties (ISCI, Dawa) that are getting stronger? Regardless, what about that political reconciliation stuff that Bush and Petraeus said was the most important objective of The Surge, and without which, the various conflicts would eventually re-ignite?

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government has accomplished almost all of the legislative benchmarks set by the U.S. Congress and the Bush administration. More important, it is gaining wider legitimacy among the population. The attention of Iraqis across the country is focused on the upcoming provincial elections, which will be a pivotal moment in Iraq's development.

Wow. That sets a new benchmark for mendacity. Regarding provincial elections, the results are being cooked and, as such, will represent a "pivotal moment" the same way the last two rounds have - not so much. As to the benchmarks being "accomplished," the Kagans (with Jack Keane, "KKK" for short - I kid) are, quite frankly, lying.

The Bush administration has recently released an assessment that stated that the Iraqi government was making "satisfactory" progress on 15 of 18 benchmarks. KK & K translate "satisfactory progress" to already "accomplished." In reality, though, some of that progress cited by the Bush administration includes the passage of laws that have not yet been implemented (call it reconciliation on the books). Sameer Lalwani commenting on KK & K:

Uh-Oh, Surgio!

Tue, 15 Jul 2008 21:28:27 +0000

In a recent two-part series, I tried to unpack the term "The Surge" and correctly identify what effect, if any, the actual Surge has had on events in Iraq, as opposed to the other shifts in tactics/strategies (as well as serendipitous events/trends) that roughly coincided with that troop escalation. To repeat what Jim Henley said:

[T]he practical meaning of "The Surge" has changed while the pretended meaning has stayed the same.

The pretended meaning is, The US increased troop strength in Iraq for a period of time beginning in 2007. The actual meaning is, the US increased troop strength WHILE ramping up a program to pay off Sunni resistance leaders WHILE Iraq’s warring ethno-religious factions finished completely remaking Iraq’s demographic patterns, owing to tens-to-hundreds of thousands of dead and millions of exiled and internally displaced, WHILE the US turned the capital into a warren of barricades. The net result of all those changes has been a less obtrusively violent Iraq for the time being, and the whole arrangement is "The Surge" in practice, but the cheerleaders talk as if it was all due to The Surge in pretense. [ed: Add to this list, the Sadr initiated cease fire]

The Surge, as I argued, is being hailed mendaciously as a once-size-fits-all panacea for what ails Iraq - in fact, the triumphalists claim that it has already led to victory! Such credulity shown to one's own propaganda is dangerous. The last 7+ years have taught us that. The good folks over at Abu Mook give us good cause to fear the next four as envisioned by John McCain:

...Eli Lake at the NY Sun:

An adviser to the campaign told The New York Sun that, in a speech to be delivered in Albuquerque, N.M., the senator will call for an increase in combat troops and the creation of a special Afghanistan tsar to coordinate policy toward the country. "There will be a surge for Afghanistan. It will be moving combat troops in and applying the lessons from Iraq and the strategy that was successful in Iraq and taking that to Afghanistan," this official said.

Ok, this is six kinds of interesting. Charlie would love to know which specific "strategy" has been nominated for export....and whether it was based on any assessment of, you know, Afghanistan. There are some basic COIN best practices that might improve the situation in Afg (one word: sanctuary), but the broader population centric approach would require significant changes to be successfully applied there. And if McCain's crew think they can blindly transfer "lessons" from the Anbar Awakening to the assorted tribes in Afg (and NWFP?) then we're gonna have some real fireworks.

Great plan. All we have to do is: get the Afghans to divide the population through massive ethnic/sectarian cleansing, wall off the various factions, get Moqtada al-Sadr to tell his Afghan buddies to stand down (they're all Islamofascists taking orders from A-Jad bin Laden after all), strike a deal with those tribal elements that were fighting us but would be willing to enlist our support to help them vis-a-vis the Karzai government and then...balanced budget from the victory dividend!

Remember to Remember to Vote on the Vote

Tue, 15 Jul 2008 19:23:33 +0000

As Marc Lynch reports, today's scheduled vote in the Iraqi parliament to determine the rules governing the provincial elections slated for October has been postponed until Thursday. Thursday is overly optimistic as well, however. The final vote on the vote, so to speak, will likely face further delays which will, in turn, push the date of the elections themselves back. Lynch thinks this is actually a good thing:

It isn't clear yet whether this will mean the postponement of the provincial elections, as the UN facilitators have warned. But hopefully it will: the consequences of these elections will be enormous, and it would be foolhardy to rush into them with half-baked, politically controversial rules simply to meet an artificial deadline.

The issues raised by the provincial election law cut to the heart of competing visions of Iraq's political future. [...]

After early skepticism, I've long since been persuaded of the importance of these elections, mostly by the stock placed on them by Iraqis. But that only increases the importance of taking the time to get the rules right and to not be stampeded by an artificial deadline.

It is precisely the magnitude of the stakes involved, however, that should engender pessimism regarding the possibility of a positive outcome even with the delay. At the root of the need to postpone the vote on the election law lie controversies that have, in some form or another, led to the many overlapping conflicts that have beset Iraq for the past 5+ years.

Those issues include, but are not limited to: (1) the status of Kirkuk (with implications as to the autonomy and economic viability of Kurdistan, strength of the central government, ethnic/sectarian tensions); (2) the use of open lists/closed lists (closed lists restrict voter options to parties not individuals, and favor the established UIA/Kurdish brands at the expense of would-be outsiders, which serves to strengthen sectarian paradigms - not to mention ther fact that the Sadrists won't be permitted to run as a party thus limiting their prospects); (3) the use of religious symbols/iconography; and (4) the possibility of voting rights, if any, for the roughly 5 million internally and externally displaced Iraqis (which is relevant to questions of the composition/stability of the country going forward).

The problem is that extra time hasn't been able to untangle these conundrums thus far. For example, settling the status of Kirkuk has been such a thorny subject that its resolution has been kicked down the road so many times that the can resembles a silver dollar. First, it was agreed that a decision would have to wait for the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution. Then, in order to secure passage of that Constitution, the Kirkuk issue was tabled - putting off the decision for a referenudm to be held years down the line. Then the deadline for that referendum came last year, and went, with no vote. So the deadline for the referendum was extended to June 2008. Again, that already-extended deadline came and went with no vote. And now: more delays.

The reason for time's inadequacy as a facilitator of resolution stems from the stubborness of the convuluted and cross-cutting matrix of conflicts that continue to plague Iraq: various groups of Iraqis are battling to determine the political future of their country (unitary state vs. fragmented state, Islamist vs. secular, etc.), to dictate their roles in it (various ethnic/sectarian groups vying for safety, survival, economic and political power) to determine the level of foreign occupation/involvement (American, Iranian, etc.) and to redress crimes and injustices both recent (5 million internal/external refugees, hundreds of thousands dead, etc.) and historical (Shiite/Kurdish suffering at the hands of Saddam). How does more time to discuss the various positions/demands undo that? The answer is, generally, it doesn't.

Thus, just as in the case of Surge enthusiasts, Lynch's optimism (though obviously well meaning) is based on a misread of symptom for pathology. With respect to The Surge's objective, the basic strategic error lies in the fact that the various warring parties were not battling each other because there was no period of lessened violence that they could use to forge political accord. Rather, there was no period of lessened violence because of the difficulty in reaching that same political accord.

Similarly, while some combination of calendar extensions and punting on sensitive issues might eventually lead to an election law that parliament approves, there are no ways to, as Lynch put it, "get the rules right." The rules are just a superficial manifestation of the more important subterranean tectonic clashes. Right for some on the rules will be wrong for others, and the major issues will remain.

So the wars rage on, even if in slow motion for all.

The Harder You Flash, the Harder You Get Flashed On

Fri, 11 Jul 2008 15:51:10 +0000

While I'm usually the one complaining about the neverending string of stories telling of Moqtada al-Sadr's demise, which began in 2003 and continue to this day (with each new contribution showing little concern for the unbroken streak of error that preceded it), this piece by Andrew Lebovich goes too far in the other direction. Lebovich's conclusion:

Thus the surge cannot necessarily be said to have weakened militia groups in Iraq. Rather, we have succeeded in reworking the militia structure, inadvertently aiding the Sadrists both in the streets and in parliament by eliminating their rivals, while not posing a serious threat to the organization. They are still armed, and as-Sadr is still just as opposed to America's occupation of Iraq, and Iraq's current government. Ultimately, it is Iraq's political process that has shifted towards as-Sadr, not the other way around.

While I agree with Lebovich that the recent anti-Sadrist operations in Basra, Sadr City and Amarah don't pose a "serious threat to the organization" itself (the org. is too big with too, long a tradtion), the military campaign has proven to be a setback for the Sadrists both politically and with respect to their militia. And that is exactly what these campaigns werwe intended to achieve. They were undertaken with an eye on the upcoming election schedule (with local elections slated, tentatively, for this fall, and nationwide elections to be held in 2009).

First, the intention has been to weaken the Sadrists so that ISCI/Dawa can maintain its control of the local government machinery in the Shiite-dominated South, then ISCI/Dawa could use that position to ensure a strong showing (by hook or crook) in the national elections in 2009. Thus far, the anti-Sadrist operations have succeeded in supplanting the Sadrist presence in Basra and other parts in the south, while deposing the Sadr-friendly (or led) government n Amara.

While the Sadrists remain popular, ISCI/Dawa have attained a position to control the election machinery which is, arguably, more important. As Boss Tweed famously opined after an election in 1844, "The ballots [don't] make the outcome. The counters [do]." So, for the time being, ISCI/Dawa have muscled the Sadrists out of a position to "count" or even effectively "observe."

Further, the Mahdi Army militia (JAM) itself has taken heavy losses, as it always does when it goes toe-to-toe with the US military (see, ie, 2004 uprising). That doesn't, as some overenthusiastic commenters argue, mean that the JAM is defeated. But then, to state a truism, defeating an insurgency/guerilla movement is exceedingly difficult. It's too easy for guerilla movements to melt away, adjust, adapt and re-emerge to fight another day, another way. Gary Brecher (he of War Nerd fame), sheds some light:

The most recent and ridiculous take is that "Moqtada al Sadr is renouncing violence." Talk about naive! What led these geniuses to that conclusion is that on June 13, Moqtada al Sadr, leader of the biggest and toughest Shia militia, the Mahdi Army, sent out a big announcement: "From now on, the resistance will be exclusively conducted by only one group. ... The weapons will be held exclusively by this group." In other words, he's switching from a big, sloppy, amateur force to a select group of professional guerrillas.

Brecher sees this as a natural evolution, akin to the transformation undertaken by the IRA (no, not a perfect analogy - but it's not meant as that. There are definitely strong parallels though):

The trouble is, when po' folks organize, they have this fatal addiction to big, fancy titles and military fol-der-ol. It's easy to understand: It helps stomped-on people feel braver, have a little pride. So these groups always go for show, a lot of pomp and uniforms, and a traditional military organizational chart. Pretty soon the guy next door is a colonel, the clerk in the corner store is a four-star general, and they're strutting around in homemade uniforms feeling ready to take on Genghis Khan. Good for morale, but fatal to real urban guerrilla war. There are two reasons for that. First, these amateur armies get slaughtered when they go up against professional troops; and second, the traditional open organizational chart makes it very easy for the occupiers to identify everyone who's anyone in the insurgency. When an organization starts out fighting mobs from the enemy tribe, that's fine. So when the IRA tried to fight the British Army head to head in the 1970s, it got stomped; so did Sadr's militia when it went up against U.S. troops in April 2004.

Due to the JAM's popularity and community base, Brecher argues that the Maliki government and US forces have been able to take advantage of informants (sometimes tortured or coerced) to pick off JAM members, most of whom are well known to many if not most of the locals. So now, a shift:

Our Friends Hate Us To Become Successful

Wed, 09 Jul 2008 18:45:19 +0000

Adam Blickstein takes John McCain to task for suggesting that the recent statements by the Maliki government regarding a timeline for the withdrawal of US forces are simply the product of political posturing:

The subtext of John McCain's response to the Iraqi government's strident assertions demanding clarity on the withdrawal of foreign forces in Iraq is this: Maliki is pandering to his political constituents who want to see American forces leave, for his own political gain, but any eventual agreement will be vague, flexible and conditional enough to allow us to stay. McCain calling Malki "a politician" seems to further confirm this line of thinking, allowing him to dismiss any clarion call of withdrawal as simply political rhetoric.

I think Blickstein has a point, but then, McCain might as well. I'll explain what I mean, but first some background.

Judging by the increasingly strident statements made by his government's spokesmen, Maliki seems far less committed to a long term military relationship with the US than he did in November of 2007 when he signed a Declaration of Principles with Bush that established the general parameters of a future Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). After all, the Declaration of Principles made no mention of a timetable for withdrawal, and yet Team Maliki are suggesting that such a timeline is now the sine qua non for any future agreement(s).

There are at least two (perhaps overlapping) reasons for Maliki's recent pushback and sudden demand for clear timetables. First, Maliki and his advisors (never enamored with the prospect of US forces remaining in the country long term) caught a glimpse of the SFA and SOFA that the Bush administration had in mind (or caught an earful from Sistani/the Iraqi people), and balked at the onerous and overreaching terms. Combine this with the Maliki team's knowledge that a new administration is likely on its way in, and Maliki et al may have decided that their leverage has improved to the point that they can dictate the SFA/SOFA terms along the lines of their true preferences (or those of Sistani/the Iraqi people to the extent they differ).

The other possibility, the one McCain has been pushing, goes something like this: details of the SFA/SOFA leaked to the media/Iraqi population, and Maliki et al have been forced, by domestic political concerns (read: the nationalism of the Sadrists), to take a hard line position on withdrawal and the terms of the SFA/SOFA. Behind the scenes, however, Maliki will give the Bush team what it wants. This view is, circumstantially, supported by the fact the Iraqi people (outside Kurdistan) overwhelmingly prefer a timeline for withdrawal, and have reacted in strong opposition to the details of the SFA/SOFA that were made public - though that doesn't necessarily militate in favor of the argument that Maliki wants us to stay, just that there would be public opposition regardless.

It is actually quite difficult to determine which narrative is more accurate. Some, such as Swopa, have long argued that Maliki and his UIA allies have simply been biding their time, waiting for the right moment to evict the American interlopers - in which case, the first narrative seems more likely. Others, such as myself at times, have argued that the fragile Maliki/ISCI coalition view US support as essential to maintaining their grip on power (at least for a little while longer) - in which case, the second option would be closer to the truth (unless the pressure from Sistani/the Iraqi people proved irresistible). To clarify, it is been my contention that eventually Maliki/ISCI would want us out, as soon as they deemed their consolidation of power sufficient, but that such a moment might be some years off.

There are a few underlying trends that are significant no matter which storyline is more accurate in its description of reality. As Blickstein points out, even if one assumes that Maliki and his allies are reluctant to see their American protectors depart, they might have boxed themselves into a withdrawal/sovereignty corner and created expectations that will be hard to walk back regardless. But then, the same argument was made when Maliki made strong statements about kicking Blackwater out of the country after the October 2007 shootings that left 17 Iraqi civilians dead. Little to nothing came of that Maliki bluster, and he, indeed, was able to walk out of the corner that he had supposedly boxed himself into with an inflamed public. He has proven that he is willing to act contrary to popular opinion, and could do so again. Further, Sistani's actual views are still not known with any certainty.

More importantly, what does it say of McCain's argument for staying in Iraq that the alleged opposition to our long term presence from the elected government is simply a political move to bolster its support. That is, our continued presence is so unpopular that even our allies are forced to pretend that they oppose us in order to secure votes in upcoming elections. That doesn't sound like a position that we can maintain long term. Even if Maliki can dupe the Iraqi population this election (assuming, ex arguendo, that that is his intention), how many times can he pull that stunt? And will he survive long enough, politically, for a redux?

Nice and Smooth

Wed, 09 Jul 2008 16:49:31 +0000

Fun with euphemisms! Time reports on the recent anti-Sadrist operations in multiple locations in Iraq:

Indeed, despite a low profile, [Brigadier General Saad Ali] Harbia says the support provided by the U.S. forces has been a key component in Amara's success. And having learned their lesson from Basra and Sadr City, Harbia says, the Mahdi Army is now on the run, and Iraqi forces are using the campaign to pave the way for smoother provincial elections in October — or as members of the Sadrist movement allege, to weaken support for Sadrist-allied candidates ahead of the elections.

"The operation was to create the atmosphere for proper provincial elections. One of the goals is to make the election go smoothly," says Harbia. [emphasis added]

Speaking of lessons learned, let me fix this paragraph:

Indeed, despite a low profile, [Brigadier General Saad Ali] Harbia says the support provided by the U.S. forces has been a key component in Amara's success. And having learned their lesson from the Gaza elections, the Bush administration is now on the move, and US and Iraqi forces are using the campaign to manipulate the outcome of the provincial elections in October in favor of certain parties — or as members of the Sadrist movement allege, to weaken support for Sadrist-allied candidates ahead of the elections.

"The operation was to create the atmosphere for proper provincial elections where parties preferred by the Bush administration would perform well despite weak levels of popular support. One of the goals is to make the election go smoothly for the parties preferred by the Bush administration," says Harbia.

Now that's democracy we can believe in!

Don't Get Too Comfortable on that SOFA

Tue, 08 Jul 2008 22:34:28 +0000

Though a grain of salt is warranted (only reported in one outlet thus far, and an Iranian one at that), if true, this is absolutely huge:

The Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most revered Shiite leader in Iraq on Tuesday rejected any security agreement with US, stressing such deal will affect the country's sovereignty.

In a meeting with Iraqi national security adviser Muwaffaq Al-Rubaie who was briefing al-Sistani in Najaf on the progress of the government's security efforts, and the talks on US security deal, Ayatollah said his country will not accept such a security deal which is seeking to justify the illegal presence of US military troops in the war-torn country.

Ayatollah Sistani's statements came after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Monday that Iraq was seeking a timetable for withdrawal of US troops as part of its negotiations with Washington on a controversial US security pact that guarantees long-term presence of the US troops in Iraq after the UN's mandate expires at the end of 2008.

If Sistani says go, we go. It's that simple.*

[UPDATE: Matt Duss has more, including confirmation from the Washington Post that Rubaie met with Sistani and made fairly strong statements shortly thereafter:

"There should not be any permanent bases in Iraq unless these bases are under Iraqi control," Rubaie said. "We would not accept any memorandum of understanding with [the U.S.] side that has no obvious and specific dates for the foreign troops' withdrawal from Iraq." [...]

Rubaie spoke to reporters after briefing Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's top Shiite religious leader.

The timing of Rubaie's statements definitely creates the impression that Sistani is asserting himself yet again. Something to watch to say the least.]

(*yes, we could stay even if he says go, but his opposition would increase the costs of staying - both in terms of lives lost and resources expended - that even those ambivalent about withdrawal would be forced to concede to the harshness of reality. There would be a real risk of helicopters on rooftops and the like.)

No Fortunate Sons?

Mon, 07 Jul 2008 21:42:13 +0000

Back in April, when rumors of the return of the main Sunni political bloc (IAF) to the Maliki government were swirling, I preached caution - as similar stories had been reappearing regulary, to no avail, since August 2007 when the IAF withdrew. Nevertheless, the prospect of the IAF re-upping with the Maliki government has never seemed like a bridge too far considering a few of the relevant factors.

For one, the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq groups have been forming political parties to challenge the IAF's stranglehold on Sunni politics at the national and local levels. In fact, the demand by the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq for a share of the political pie has been, ostensibly, one of the major impetuses behind the Bush administration's call for regional elections in Iraq. The IAF, however, lacks widespread support in the Sunni community due, in part, to being viewed as collaborators with the occupation/Maliki government, as well as the fact that many Sunnis (Sons of Iraq/Awakenings) boycotted the last rounds of elections so the IAF's legitimacy as representatives of Sunni Iraqis has always been dubious.

So in many ways, the IAF is facing a similar intra-sect challenge that Maliki/ISCI are facing from the Sadrists: factions that had boycotted recent regional elections, benefiting from outsider status and anti-occupation credibility, mobilizing to challenge unpopular incumbents tied to the Americans. Given this common predicament, it's not entirely surprising to see reports (caution: still speculative) that the IAF might be looking to rejoin the Maliki government (again) if it can obtain an electoral advantage vis-a-vis its intra-sect rivals in the same ways that Maliki/ISCI have been attempting with respect to the Sadrists. Marc Lynch:

The move to break up the Awakenings now is also, according to al-Khaleej, tied to a secret deal with the Islamic Party of Tareq al-Hashemi (which as part of the IAF has finally announced its return to the Maliki government ). Maliki, reportedly, would move to weaken the Awakenings ahead of provincial and Parliamentary elections, breaking up their power and barring them from forming political parties (using the "no parties with militias" as the legal pretext, perhaps).

Lynch, quite correctly, points out that the Maliki government has never been willing to integrate and embrace the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq groups and, thus, that it shares the goal of weakening them generally speaking. So the IAF would have a willing ally in Maliki. He goes on to suggest, however, that such a move by Maliki would likely run afoul of the Bush administration's designs. But I'm not so sure.

If the IAF is willing to offer the Bush administration the same level of cooperation with respect to long term bases and sweetheart oil agreements, the Bush team might be foolish enough to think that the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq are expendable. Or better yet, that "they can be targeted, marginalized and/or dismissed." After all, the Bush braintrust has - mistakenly - taken that position with respect to the Sadrists.

Further, considering that the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq consist of former insurgents, and that many have been known to discuss the long term desire to unseat the Shiite government and reclaim Baghdad, it's not unreasonable to think that the Bush administration is wary of the Awakenings groups' commitment to long-term friendly relations with the US military/economic interests. I predicted as much back in April, but I would caution, as I did then, that this is still in the realm of the speculative:

In addition, there could be some behind the scenes quid-pro-quo with Bush administration officials whereby the IAF is given preferential treatment with respect to the elections, or otherwise, in exchange for this PR gift that the Bush team will be touting as a sign of political progress on the reconciliation front. That's purely speculative, but not exaclty outlandish or beyond the pale.

Speaking of that PR blitz, and the undemocratic machinations required to achieve it, the conclusion to that post remains applicable:

With respect to reconciliation, though, it's important to remember that the return of the IAF is not a new development, just a reset of the status quo ante in place before their withdrawal. So, just as the Surge might have succeeded in returning violence to the already horrific 2005 levels, so this move might restore the Green Zone political apparatus to the dysfunctional dynamic in place prior to August 2007.

Large scale reconciliation will only be possible (eventually) after truly representative elections that produce leaders that speak for, and address the concerns of, large majorities in the various segments Iraqi society. Ironically, the return of the IAF could portend the opposite in terms of the Sunni electorate, just as Maliki's crackdown of the Sadrist current threatens to mute the electoral voice of large chunks of the Shiite population.

One step forward, two steps back. The Iraq shuffle.

This won't end well. Let's hope these are just unfounded rumors.

We'll Just Say that You Were Never Here

Thu, 03 Jul 2008 20:02:58 +0000

As I have been arguing for months, despite Bush administration spin to the contrary, the recent anti-Sadrist military operations in Iraq (Basra, Sadr City, Amarah) have had more to do with weakening the Sadrist movement politically, than with a general anti-militia policy implemented by Prime Minister Maliki. After all, Maliki has not unleashed the Iraqi Security Forces on any other militia - Shiite, Kurd or Sunni (including, obviously, those of his allies).

Not only is the Maliki government (backed by US forces) singling out Sadr's militia out of many, but Maliki & Co. have been targeting non-militia members of the political wing as well. Nowhere has this been more obvious than in the siege in Amarah, where the pretext for military action was weakest. Unlike Sadr City, Amarah has not been used as a base to launch attacks on the Green Zone government. Unlike Basra, there is little strife between rival militias creating instability.

In fact, Amarah (whose government is populated by Sadrists and officials sympathetic thereto) is something of a success story in terms of good governance. And yet, Maliki and the US chose to target that city as part of its supposed crackdown on the Mahdi Army militia. And by "militia" of course, I mean political leaders with some track record of success:

In the southern city of Amarah, Iraqi security forces arrested three top loyalists of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in a crackdown on militias, police said. Sadr officials said the men -- Abdul Jabar Wahid, Abdul Latif Jawad and Fadhil Na'ima -- are senior members of the local governing council in Maysan province, of which Amarah is the capital.

Salah al-Obaidi, a senior spokesman for Sadr, denounced the arrests as part of a concerted effort by the Iraqi government to undermine the cleric's movement. Sadr had agreed to cooperate with the military offensive in Amarah as long as Iraqi soldiers did not indiscriminately target his followers without proper evidence and court-issued arrest warrants. Obaidi said the arrests violated the deal.

"In every province where a military operation takes place, the first to be targeted are the Sadrists," Obaidi said. "We are at a point where there is no longer a chance for negotiation, understanding or dialogue."

Not only is this policy being sold under false pretenses, but it is bound to end poorly. As I've mentioned previously, the Sadrist movement has deep roots in Iraqi culture, and is comprised of between 3-5 million Iraqis by most counts. There is no way to "defeat" a movement of that size militarily or politically absent brutally repressive and/or undemocratic means.

Ironically, while the US should be encouraging the integration of such a vast constituency within the political process in order to attempt to normalize and deescalate the situation, we're pursuing a policy that accomplishes the opposite. We're actively assisting in the purging of Sadrists from regional governments throughout the Shiite south as part of an effort to constructively disenfranchise a large portion of the Shiite population ahead of the upcoming regional elections.

This is pure Bush administration wishful thinking as policymaking: Because the Sadrist movement opposes certain of the Bush administration's objectives, Bush administration policymakers assume they can be targeted, marginalized and/or dismissed. Despite indigenous support. Call it the Hamas/Hezbollah approach. Which has been a smashing success of course.

Unconscionable

Wed, 02 Jul 2008 15:11:01 +0000

The hits, they just keep coming. And by hits, I mean punches to the gut of course:

The military trainers who came to Guantánamo Bay in December 2002 based an entire interrogation class on a chart showing the effects of “coercive management techniques” for possible use on prisoners, including “sleep deprivation,” “prolonged constraint,” and “exposure.”

What the trainers did not say, and may not have known, was that their chart had been copied verbatim from a 1957 Air Force study of Chinese Communist techniques used during the Korean War to obtain confessions, many of them false, from American prisoners.

The recycled chart is the latest and most vivid evidence of the way Communist interrogation methods that the United States long described as torture became the basis for interrogations both by the military at the base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Shame. Profound and bitter shame. I want more from my country than for our top government officials to go diving in the dumpsters of Communist regimes in order to recycle discarded manuals on torture. And for all you apologists and semantic hair splitters that insist on dancing the torture/not torture two step: you've been had. Not that you'd know it or admit it.

Anyway, there's a presidential election this November. One of the candidates, John McCain, wants to continue to permit our government to engage in a policy of torture gleaned from observing the methods employed by brutal Communist regimes. The other candidate, Barack Obama, doesn't.

Tough choice.

(via Gary Farber, whose Nietzche reference is spot on)

[UPDATE: Yglesias makes a good point which I noticed, but in my anger, overlooked drawing attention to:

I've seen lots of commentary on the revelation that Bush administration torture techniques have been modeled on the work of the ChiComs but not much specific focus on the fact that the main purpose of these Chinese torture techniques was to elicit false confessions. That's not very surprising as the main use of torture in interrogations has always been to elicit false confessions.

Word.]

VitameataSurgeamin!, Part II

Tue, 01 Jul 2008 15:31:05 +0000

David Brooks a week ago today:

But before long, the more honest among the surge opponents will concede that Bush, that supposed dolt, actually got one right. Some brave souls might even concede that if the U.S. had withdrawn in the depths of the chaos, the world would be in worse shape today.

That paragraph touches on, either expressly or implicitly, the various ways in which The Surge has been mythologized, exaggerated and shaped into a cudgel for political use, as discussed in Part I. There is the unqualified assertion that The Surge succeeded, that as a result victory is within reach, and that those that supported The Surge showed superior judgment and thus should be rewarded at the ballot box. That's a lot of tendentiousness to unpack.

Initially, it is important to repeat, again, that the ostensible purpose of The Surge was to greatly reduce violence such that the various ethnic/religious/political factions could take advantage of the lull in fighting to nail down the many planks considered the foundation of long term, lasting political reconciliation (without which, presumably, the fighting will continue). As measured against its stated purpose, as enunciated by President Bush himself, The Surge has failed almost entirely.

Far from fostering political reconciliation, the Maliki government is losing allies and falling back on ever slimmer parliamentary majorities (if that). Most key components of the so-called benchmark legislation remain unpassed, and those measures that have passed (such as the relaxation of the De-Baathification law) have not been implemented in such a way as to achieve the desired result. It's not enough to simply pass legislation with benchmark titles after all. The only worth such laws have is in how they effect the incentives of the warring parties, so implementation is everything.

The reasons that The Surge has failed should be familiar, and they reveal the serious conceptual flaws underlying this policy. First, The Surge was, by design, a short-lived troop escalation. As Daniel Larison points out, it was always unrealistic to expect that a temporary influx of soldiers would be able to hold the window open long enough to achieve the many difficult compromises associated with the reconciliation agenda.

But even that begs the question. The entire strategic foundation of The Surge rests on the assumption that the primary impediment to reconciliation is the violence itself - that if the groups could just stop fighting, they would agree to reconcile the issues that...led them to fight in the first place. That only confuses the symptoms for the pathology.

It is not intra-Iraqi violence that is preventing the parties from agreeing on a vision of the future Iraq and from sharing power and wealth in order to achieve reconciliation. Rather, the violence itself is a symptom of the unwillingness of groups with power to share, and the deep disagreement between many parties on a host of vital issues pertaining to the future character of Iraq as a nation (partition vs. unitary, sovereign vs. heavy-handed foreign presence, etc.). [more after the jump]