Eric Martin  May 13 2008 - 2:14pm   

With news breaking over the weekend of an apparent truce in Sadr City between Iraqi government and US forces on one hand, and Sadr's Mahdi Army militia on the other, the reactions have been as expected.  They range from the triumphalist (suggesting that the truce is a sign of Sadr's defeat (again!), and US victory, such that " hopes of a US failure in Iraq were wrong - as they have always been," and that the ISCI/Dawa victory is a blow against Iran) to the more circumspect (focusing mostly on whether the cease-fire will hold and which side, if any, could claim victory).

So it occurred to me, after reading of today's violent clashes in Sadr City, that there is, perhaps, a more appropriate response to this news item: Will the cease fire ever actually kick-in, let alone hold - forget about whether it signals some grand victory for Maliki?  First things first, after all:

A fragile cease-fire failed to stop fighting in Baghdad's Sadr City where the latest clashes between Shiite extremists and U.S.-backed Iraqi forces killed 11 men and wounded 19, Iraqi hospital officials said Tuesday.

The U.S. military said that it responded to several attacks by militants with precision strikes, but only confirmed killing three militants. Two of the militants were killed in a Hellfire missile strike by an attack aircraft, according to the military. U.S. soldiers also suppressed "enemy fire" in four other clashes with tanks and attack aircraft, the military said.

The clashes erupted late Monday, just hours after Iraq's main Shiite political bloc and supporters of firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr signed a cease-fire with the hope of ending seven-weeks of fighting that has left hundreds of people dead in the capital.

It was not immediately clear if the those killed in the clashes, which escalated early Tuesday, were militants or civilians. There were women and children among the wounded, said hospital officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.

Which is not to be confused with the post-cease fire fighting on Sunday. Or the heavy bombardment on Saturday (according to Voices of Iraq, grain of salt and all). 

There are some good reasons that the status of the cease-fire remains uncertain: For one, Sadr himself has yet to issue a public statement endorsing the truce (though his reps reportedly signed the agreement), the current version permits the US military to continue bombing Sadr City (a big sticking point for obvious reasons) and...the cease fire itself is only slated to last four days!  That renders the current incarnation of the cease fire of the temporary variety.

Despite the foregoing, it is entirely possible that a workable, long-term cease-fire will be hammered out, and that the violence will subside completely over the coming days and weeks.  However, that has not happened yet.  The cease-fire has yet to be fully implemented, and even if it were put into effect immediately, it is set to expire by the end of the week.  The attacks, unfortunately, continue and the civilian casualties mount.

Maybe Bruce McQuain wants to reconsider which of us was a day late and a dollar short.  Or are those dead Iraqis who met their fate in Sadr City on Saturday, Sunday and Monday (and beyond) just an acceptable coda?  Or perhaps it is uncouth, generally, to express concern for civilian deaths when the underlying military operation is nearing an end?  I lose track of proper etiquette sometimes.

Eric Martin  May 13 2008 - 1:36pm   

Paul Bremer actually argued that using the word "occupation" to describe the post-invasion presence of US forces in Iraq had a measurable detrimental impact on our mission; that things would be going better had that word never been used.

I wish that was a joke.  The full and gory details are available in my guest post at Spencer Ackerman's joint.

Eric Martin  May 12 2008 - 11:23am   

Matt Duss passes along news that the Sadrist trend is tightening the rope that binds Sistani to the Maliki government, in all its sagging popularity and misdeed:

An aide to Muqtada al-Sadr has lashed out at Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, for keeping silent over clashes that have killed hundreds in Baghdad. [...]

Speaking at Friday prayers, Sheikh Sattar Battat, an aide to al-Sadr, said he was "surprised" that al-Sistani had failed to condemn the violence.

We are surprised by the silence in Najaf where the highest Shiite religious authority is based," he said, referring to al-Sistani.

"For 50 days Sadr City is being bombed ... Children, women and old people are being killed by all kinds of US weapons, and Najaf remains silent."

Battat said the al-Sadr movement has not seen any "reaction or fatwa [religious decree] from Najaf" criticising the government assault on Shia fighters in Sadr City.

"For us this means that Najaf accepts the massacre in Sadr City," he said.

As Duss observes, Sistani's acquiescence will likely play to Sadr's advantage:

One of the central elements of the elder Sadr’s program (and now of Muqtada’s) was a distinction between the “silent clerics” (represented by Sistani and the Najaf establishment) — bookish sorts who stay remote from the lives of their people — and the “speaking clerics” who take part in the suffering and struggle of the Shia, as Sadeq did. And here the “silent clerics” once again stayed silent while Shia were crushed in Sadr City, of all places, while medical care, food, and shelter are being doled out in Muqtada’s name. It doesn’t require any math to see that Sadr benefits politically from this.

Not just politically, but religiously as well - to the extent the two are separate.  Such a strengthening of Sadr vis-a-vis Sistani is, in my opinion, a shame for reasons beyond the silent/speaking distinctions set forth above (though, obviously, I am not an Iraqi and thus should not get a vote).  Babak Rahimi has an excellent summary of some of Sistani's religious views, and how he espouses a brand of theology that can co-exist with liberal democratic traditions (at least, moreso than Sadr's):

Like his father, Sistani is an adherent of a democratic Shi'i tradition that dates back to the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 to 1911 and continued with the Khatami reformist movement (1997–2005). [...]

Sistani’s insistence on recognizing Islam as a fundamental component of the Iraqi constitution is not intended to make Iraq an Islamist state based on juridical sharia strictures, but rather to limit the total secularization of the constitution, which would deprive a Muslim country of an “authentic” national identity based on its Islamic heritage.

Sadr, on the other hand, is much more amenable to vilayet-e faqih, or an Iranian style rule by clerical jurisprudence that pays less regard to individual rights.  However, our continued assault on the Sadrist trend has been backfiring and increasing his popularity at the expense of religious leaders like Sistani that we should be acting to empower. Shockingly enough, military actions in densely populated areas leading to massive civilian casualties aren't very well received in the target population. 

Sadly, the strategic thinkers in the Bush administration seem incapable of devising a plan to empower favored factions that doesn't involve the employ of self-defeating brute strength.  It would be better if, instead, we adopted some of that fancy counterinsurgency doctrine that Petraeus is supposedly implementing.   

Eric Martin  May 9 2008 - 1:41pm   

Well, this is one way to influence the outcome of elections in Iraq I suppose (refer to Part I and Part II for background):

Iraqi security forces, after more than of 40 days of intense fighting, on Thursday told residents to evacuate their homes in the northeast Shiite slum of Sadr City and to move to temporary shelters on two soccer fields.

The military's call indicated the possibility of stepped-up military operations and came as Iraqi security forces raided a radio station run by backers of Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. In the southern port city of Basra, militants launched rockets that struck a coalition base, killing two contractors and injuring four civilians and four coalition soldiers.

Sadr City has been a battleground since late March, enduring U.S. airstrikes, militia snipers and gunbattles between U.S. and Iraqi forces and the Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to Sadr.

Already some 8,500 people have been displaced from the sprawling slum of some 2.5 million people, according to the Iraqi Red Crescent. For weeks, food, water and medical shortages have affected about 150,000 people, aid agencies said.

Two soccer fields in east and northeast Baghdad are expected to receive some 16,000 evacuees from the southeast portion of the city where the fighting has been most intense.

The BBC offers one version of the grisly death toll:

In the last seven weeks around 1,000 people have died, and more than 2,500 others have been injured, most of them civilians.

Back to McClatchy:

In most of Sadr City, people haven't had food rations for more than a month and a half, and the Red Crescent has distributed thousands of food packs, 100 tons of flour and supplied four tons of medical supplies to the two main hospitals.

Wonder if this hospital was on the receiving end of those supplies:

IRAQI soldiers yesterday detained dozens of policemen and closed down a hospital suspected of treating Shiite militiamen in a Baghdad stronghold of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.

Or maybe this one?

A major hospital in Baghdad's Sadr City slum was damaged Saturday when an American military strike targeted a militia command center just a few yards away, the U.S. military said. [...]

The rocket strike near Sadr Hospital injured 30 people, shattered the windows of ambulances and sent doctors and hospital staff fleeing the scene, hospital officials said.

So let's recap the scene: the US military and its Iraqi "allies" are laying siege to a sprawling neighborhood in Baghdad housing roughly 2.5 million Iraqis, launching air strikes, artillery attacks, tank shells and other assorted ordnance, shutting down hospitals and bombing others, cutting off the supply of food and walling off entire sectors of the embattled region, causing a refugee crisis by their actions - and now actually pursuing a policy with the intent of creating a larger refugee crisis! 

For what reason: because a majority of residents in these regions support a political movement, and militia, that oppose our presence.  Can't have that.  Because we have to keep 150,000 troops in Iraq to safeguard the Iraqi people.  After all, whose gonna set up the tents in the refugee catch basins we so magnanimously helped set up to receive the overflow from our relentless assault on political movements that would make it harder for us to stay in Iraq.  To safeguard the Iraqi people. 

Eric Martin  May 7 2008 - 5:03pm   

That lovable scamp Michael Ledeen is off message again - calling for military action against Iran despite his repeated assertions that he doesn't, you know, favor military action against Iran. 

Well, at least he's consistent. 

Eric Martin  May 7 2008 - 4:35pm   

...or study, or some other comfortable nook where you do your reading, dear reader.  The reason?  The Pentagon has recently released all the documents that it was forced to give to the New York Times in connection with the rent-a-general/pre-war propagnda story.  There's a lot of documents, but there's bound to be some absolutely juicy nuggets nestled in those hills of pulp. 

If anyone finds anything, feel free to leave a comment or shoot me an email.  I can offer you fame and glory, or the utmost anonymity.  Bonus points for anyone that tracks down O'Hanlon related payola.

Eric Martin  May 6 2008 - 2:35pm   

Kevin Drum is an eminently reasonable man, and a blogger who, unlike me, doesn't wander into the reeds donning tin foil armor on too many occasions.  Still, in this post, K-Drum is being overly circumspect even by our respective standards:

So why the sudden spate of stories sugesting that Iran supports only the Mahdi Army, and implying that its support is increasing? There are two options, I guess: (a) because it's true or (b) because it's in somebody's interest to feed this storyline. It's pretty much impossible to say which is more likely, though.

It's that last sentence that stands out like a sore, but even, hand. Impossible to say if the Mahdi Army is the only group in Iraq receiving Iranian support?  Really?  Despite ISCI's historic and long lasting ties, and the fact that some members of its militia, the Badr Corp., are still receiving pensions from the IRGC?  Regardless of the fact that Iranian operatives detained by US forces in Iraq were nabbed at ISCI's headquarters, and were in Iraq on the invitation of ISCI's leadership?

Even worse, Kevin seemingly performs the impossible in the preceding sentence:

Of course, Iran probably is supplying arms to the Mahdi Army. But they've been doing that for a long time, and they also provide support to the Badr Organization, which is allied with the Iraqi government. [emphasis added throughout]

Perhaps it was just sloppy syntax, and Drum meant that the hard to determine part is whether aid to the Mahdi Army is increasing?  He has certainly earned my benefit of the doubt.  His post from yesterday is far more incicive in terms of exposing holes and dubious reporting associated with the above described Sadr/Iran narrative.   

So I'm open to the more innocuous explanation, and the possibility that I'm overreacting.  The more interesting, and indeed murky, line of inquiry leads to just whose interests are served by pushing this transparently doctored storyline.  But that the storyline is false is a given.

Eric Martin  May 2 2008 - 3:21pm   

If you only read one thing today (not written by me that is, I mean, let's not get carried away people), you should read this piece from Nir Rosen.  I don't necessarily agree with everything he says, but it's a long post and he covers a lot of ground.  There is, however, a refreshing display of actual knowledge.  Fancy that.

Memo to media outlets large and small: More Nir Rosen, less Michael O'Hanlon.  Actually, I'd settle for just more Nir Rosen.  I'm not greedy. 

Eric Martin  May 1 2008 - 2:25pm   

In Part I of this series, I discussed the primary objective behind the stepped-up assault on the Sadrist movement in Iraq; an assault that has already resulted in a predicted spike of US casualties (51 in April) and an unthinkable level of suffering for the Iraqi people (liberation never felt so good!).  Not to mention the implementation of a corrolary policy of walling off, separating and collectively punishing densely populated neighborhoods of Baghdad.  Brandon Friedman has a good summary of the uptick in violence (as well as a collection of experts tut-tutting the anti-war crowd for refusing to concede that the Surge had resulted in victory, the end):

On the Iraqi side, 925 people were killed in Sadr City in April alone.  Most of these were civilians.  As Sadr City is six square miles in size, that represents roughly 150 deaths per square mile in that section of Baghdad during the month.

As argued in Part I, this is what we hope to gain in exchange for all this death and destruction:

So what, then, would count as victory?  The answer drains most meaning out of the word: disrupt the political and military wings of the Sadrist movement...enough that Iran's main ally in Iraq, ISCI...can prevail in upcoming elections (only). In other words, the US will be aiding and assisting in the undermining of the democratic process that it supposedly invaded Iraq to promote as an example throughout the region...

The Sadrist current represents too large a social phenomenon to actually defeat or eradicate, but short term disruption is feasible.  Why, then, is the goal of weakening the Sadrists in the short term, and helping ISCI ahead of the upcoming elections, so important to the Bush administration?  There are at least three reasons:

1.  Sadr opposes a prolonged US occupation/permanent bases.  The Bush administration obviously values those objectives highly and is in a scramble to come to an agreement on a long-term security/status of forces agreement with the Iraqi government.  In pursuit of this, the Bush team wants as much ostensible legal and popular legitimacy buttressing this agreement as possible (even if in appearances only).  Keeping Sadr down now, and increasing Maliki's mandate (at least de jure if not de facto), is vital.

2.  Sadr opposes heavy foreign involvement in the oil sector.  What, did you really think this had nothing to do with oil?

The third prong is more controversial:

3.  Sadr opposes the fragmenting of the Iraqi state into semi-autonomous sub-regions.

I say "controversial," because I'm not convinced yet that this is important for the Bush administration. At the very least, though, the Bush administration would be willing to endorse such a plan in return for cooperation from ISCI and Iran (who both favor such a break-up of the state - actually ISCI is the only non-Kurdish group pushing for fragmentation).  Which reminds me, the pivot here is that ISCI is more amenable on all three fronts, and so ISCI is the horse we're backing with all the firepower in our arsenal. Despite ISCI's obvious ties to Iran.

Speaking of Iran, their relationships with ISCI and the Sadrists, respectively, are germane to recent developments.  ISCI (whose political wing and militia were formed, funded, trained and indoctrinated in Iran by the Iranian regime) is Iran's main proxy in Iraq.  Yet the Iranians have also been willing, at times, to fund and arm the Sadrists for at least a couple of reasons: First, the Iranians recognized early on that the Sadrists were too powerful to simply ignore, dismiss or quash, so the better to cultivate influence and goodwill.  Second, the Sadrist foot soldiers could provide a useful lever against the US presence in Iraq when necessary.

That being said, Iran does have a strong interest in ensuring the same outcome in upcoming elections as that sought by the Bush administration: namely, a big ISCI/Dawa victory and a poor showing by the Sadrists.  That's because the Sadrist movement's political agenda/rhetoric (nationalistic, at times anti-Persian and staunchly opposed to the creation of a Shiite super region) is more hindrance than benefit to the Iranians - as opposed to the Sadrists' capacity to field an anti-American militia which can still come in handy.  

Thus, Iran would be reluctant to sever ties with the Sadrists completely or cooperate in their annihilation (that's a pretty big chip to simply discard).  And, again, Iran likely realizes that vanquishing such a large movement is very difficult to pull off.  Further, participation in such a massive purge/massacre might spark a severe Shiite nationalist backlash (endangering Iran's position in the Shiite south). But short term disruption is feasible and, at the moment, very desirable. [more after the jump]

Eric Martin  Apr 30 2008 - 11:38am   

I'm normally a big fan of the Abu Muquwama site and its authors, but this recent post from Dr. iRak left me scratching my head.  The good Dr. seems unduly impressed with some recent statements made by the Government of Iraq (or "GoI" as he terms it) scolding Iran for supplying aid and armaments to Shiite militias.  The supposed smoking gun evidence in the present case is a cache of Iranian made weapons (allegedly set aside for the Sadrists) found in the Basra area. 

However, given the nature of Iran's longstanding involvement with certain Shiite Iraqi factions, these "official" statements are more like Claude Raines-styled shock than revelation. From the article cited by Dr. iRak:

The U.S. military official suggested that the "thousands" of munitions uncovered in Basra, and the idea that they were being used by extremists allegedly trained by Iran, had been an eye-opener for Iraq's leaders. "Our discussion is now matched by their understanding," he said. "This is the beginning of a change of public discussion among senior Iraqis." [emphasis added]

Uh huh: Iraq's leaders stunned by the discovery that Iran is funding and training Iraqi Shiite groups.  Funny that, considering one of the main factions in the GoI, ISCI, is just about a wholly owned subsidiary of the Iranian government. You think that assessment is hyperbolic? Some background: ISCI is comprised of Iraqis that fled mostly to Iran during the 1980s and 1990s. While in Iran, the party (then called SCIRI) and its Badr Corp. militia were formed, funded, armed and indoctrinated by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. and other regime elements.  In fact, some ISCI members fought on Iran's side in the Iran/Iraq war, and many still draw pensions from the IRGC, despite the fact that those members returned to Iraq en masse after the Baath regime was toppled. 

So is one to assume that ISCI is surprised to find the Iranians arming and training Iraqi Shiites?  And that they're now demanding that Iran stop funding and arming...groups like ISCI?  Not exactly.  Once again, the discussion of Iranian involvement is fixed like a laser on the Sadrist current while the far more extensive ties to our putative allies like ISCI are ignored.

Given this reality, it is more likely that the GoI is pursuing two primary goals by making these statements: First and foremost, placating Bush administration officials concerned about the GoI's ties to Iran (or at least providing the Bush administration with useful PR fodder to counter critics that point out that state of affairs).  Second, though to a lesser degree, trying to corner the market on Iranian money and weapons (not cut the supply off completely).   

Nevertheless, Dr. iRak sees significance behind the facade of Kabuki make-up:

This stance by the GoI serves several purposes simultaneously. First, it can be understood in classic "good cop, bad cop" terms. The United Stats [sic] is playing the saber-rattling bad cop, appearing to threaten war with Iran over new evidence of lethal assistance to JAM "special groups." The then steps in and says "we agree," but we think that things should be resolved diplomatically, thus playing the good cop holding the Americans back. Good coercive diplomacy . . . if it works.

I suppose, but only in a limited sense.  The GoI (meaning ISCI/Dawa) might be playing a little hardball with the Iranian government over its providing support to the Sadrists, but their bluff and bluster can only go so far.  Their ties to Iran are too deep to sever over this issue, and such isolation would leave them at the mercy of the Americans alone.  That's a heck of a leap to take.  More from Dr. iRak:

Second, increasing anti-Iranian rhetoric may help the Maliki government appeal to Sunni leaders and thereby forge cross-sectarian cooperation on other sticky issues.

Not likely.  Again, making a public display of opposition to the fact that Iran is supporting the Sadrists isn't goint to fool Iraqi Sunnis.  Most have a well developed, if not exaggerated, knowledge about the endurance of ties between Iran and ISCI, as well as Iran and Maliki's Dawa party. The GoI statements are mostly for American audiences, with the locals not being as susceptible to such propaganda.

There are elements in this last bit from Dr. iRak that I agree with, though there are also some dubious presumptions:

Finally, emphasizing Iranian involvement provides a useful public "explanation" for the difficulty U.S. and Iraqi forces have had, thus far, in quelling violence in Sadr City. Blame it on Iran, not Sadr/JAM. Why go this route? Because it allows the United States to maintain the fiction that it is only the "special groups" that are fighting the coalition instead of rank-and-file JAM, thus preserving the illusion that the Sadr "freeze" declared last August--a major (perhaps the major) reason for declining violence during the later part of the "surge" period in 2007--has not collapsed. [...]

At the same time, Iranian involvement allows U.S. officials to deflect blame for the fighting from radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, whom they are counting on to sustain a frayed but officially intact truce he called in August for his Mahdi Army militia. Though privately many soldiers here say the Mahdi militia is involved in the current fighting, publicly, the allegation is that "special groups" who have broken away from Sadr and receive training and aid from Iran are causing the troubles.

As discussed previously on this Site, I concur that the "special groups" fiction can be useful.  I'm just not so sure the current strategy looks to take advantage of the "special groups" formulation.  Presently, US and Iraqi forces are not seeking to "quell violence" in Sadr City and Basra - they're initiating it.  That's an enormous difference.  Further, the main purpose of the anti-Sadrist operations is to weaken that movement ahead of regional elections this fall (which only makes the enormous loss of innocent civilian life in Sadr City that much more horrific). 

Thus, keeping this fiction in play is less important than previously, when the Bush administration was contemplating more normalized relations with the Sadrists.  After all, do we really expect Sadr to sustain a cease fire while missles, bombs and tank shells rain down upon his constituents?  The "special groups" fiction wouldn't help him to save face amidst such carnage.  Nor would a cease fire halt the onslaught.

Eric Martin  Apr 29 2008 - 4:00pm   

What a difference 7+ years makes.  Brandon Friedman reminds us of Cheney's comical, in retrospect, denunciation of the degradation of the military under the Clinton administration.  From a Cheney speech on the campaign trail back in 2000:

For eight years, Clinton and Gore have extended our military commitments while depleting our military power.  Rarely has so much been demanded of our armed forces, and so little given to them in return. George W. Bush and I are going to change that, too.  I have seen our military at its finest, with the best equipment, the best training, and the best leadership.  I'm proud of them. I have had the responsibility for their well-being.  And I can promise them now, help is on the way.  Soon, our men and women in uniform will once again have a commander in chief they can respect, one who understands their mission and restores their morale. [emph. added]

And what's not to respect about Dick Deferment and George "Defender of the Texas Skies" Bush.  Friedman proceeds to dispatch the fish lingering in this fetid barrel.  Well worth the read. 

Also providing laughs courtesy of the way-back machine, look what John McCain has to say about a permanent presence in Iraq when we set the dial for 2005:

Three years before the Arizona Republican argued on the campaign trail that U.S. forces could be in Iraq for 100 years in the absence of violence, he decried the very concept of a long-term troop presence.

In fact, when asked specifically if he thought the U.S. military should set up shop in Iraq along the lines of what has been established in post-WWII Germany or Japan — something McCain has repeatedly advocated during the campaign — the senator offered nothing short of a categorical “no.”

“I would hope that we could bring them all home,” he said on MSNBC. “I would hope that we would probably leave some military advisers, as we have in other countries, to help them with their training and equipment and that kind of stuff.”

Host Chris Matthews pressed McCain on the issue. “You’ve heard the ideological argument to keep U.S. forces in the Middle East. I’ve heard it from the hawks. They say, keep United States military presence in the Middle East, like we have with the 7th Fleet in Asia. We have the German…the South Korean component. Do you think we could get along without it?”

McCain held fast, rejecting the very policy he urges today. “I not only think we could get along without it, but I think one of our big problems has been the fact that many Iraqis resent American military presence,” he responded. “And I don’t pretend to know exactly Iraqi public opinion. But as soon as we can reduce our visibility as much as possible, the better I think it is going to be.”

Ah, to be serious and mavirecky.  Actually, it gets worse.  As Steve Benen documents, McCain goes back and forth on this issue so often he's got enough frequent flier miles racked up that he can finally abandon Cindy's private jet. 

Which would only bolster his non-elitists bona fides.  I mean, has Obama given up his private jet?  Didn't think so.

Eric Martin  Apr 25 2008 - 1:13pm   

In Still Broken, A.J. Rossmiller, recounts his tenure as an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA" - which is the Department of Defense's intelligence shop), which traces his personal eveolution ranging from his initial can-do enthusiasm to eventual dissilusionment and frustration. The narrative arc of Still Broken spans Rossmiller's time spent in intelligence gathering and analysis both in Baghdad and later in the labyrinthine halls of the Pentagon (an ample metaphor for the bureaucratic tangle that serves as the book's primary antagonist).

The recurring vignettes depicting the intrusive politicization of the intelligence gathering/analysis process, the inefficiency, lack of connectedness and bureacratic turf wars are as prevalent in each half of the book as they are inextricable parts of the overall story of the invasion of Iraq itself - from the selling of the war, to the mismanagement in the aftermath. While the generalities surrounding this tale are familiar to many in abstraction and slogan, Rossmiller provides a clearly written, unbiased, first person perspective of how this dysfunction actually plays out on a day to day basis.  In that sense, it is an invaluable contribution to the public record.

Nevertheless, despite Rossmiller's well-supported diagnosis of an intelligence apparatus that was and is "Still Broken," the next step in the treatment regimen is less convincing. Though they can be detected plaintively in the background throughout, the essential questions raised by Still Broken are never really fully reckoned with by the author: Are we capable of forging a long-term, structural fix for what ails our intelligence community? Relatedly, is the cure likely to kill the patient? [more after the jump]

Eric Martin  Apr 25 2008 - 10:18am   

The big news coming out of Iraq, or at least the news getting the most play, is that the Sunni political bloc that had withdrawn from its ministerial positions in the Maliki government back in August 2007 is coming back.  Maybe.  That is, the details still have to be worked out, but there don't appear to be too many insurmountable obstacles that would make such a rapprochement impossible.

However, should this political detente unfold, its impact on larger issues of reconciliation should not be overestimated (which it undoubtedly will by all the usual suspects).  First of all, the Sunni bloc that is pondering its return to the Maliki government (the Accordance Front) is not exactly representative of a wide swathe of Iraqi Sunnis. 

Like the Sadrist current, many Iraqi Sunni groups boycotted the regional elections in 2005, so the Accordance Front is overrepresented due to lack of prior competition.  In recent months, other Sunni groups have begun to enter the political fray.  In particular, the Awakenings groups (especially the Anbar Salvation Council tribal elements) have been demanding a share of the local and national pie from the Accordance Front (which is viewed with some level of animosity and mistrust by outsider Sunni groups due to the Front's collaborative efforts with Maliki and the occupation forces). 

In pursuit of this, the Awakenings groups have been busy forming political parties to compete in the next round of elections tentatively slated for October.  In fact, some of the Awakenings constituents have threatened violence if they are not given a share of political power via elections or some other means.  That's one of the reasons that the Bush administration has been pushing for regional elections (despite the fact that the Sadrists will make a dent in ISCI/Dawa's mandate through those same elections - unless they are weakened.  Hmmm.).

So in a sense, the Accordance Front is facing a similar challenge from previously uninvolved parties that ISCI/Dawa is facing from the Sadrist current.  With that in mind, the Accordance Front has at least a few incentives to rejoin Maliki's government.  For one, its members will be able to take advantage of their insider positions, and access to government machinery, in order to improve performance at the polls come this fall (in both legitimate and less than legitimate ways ).

The stated reasons for re-entry into the government also offer insight into some of the potential motives:

“Our conditions were very clear, and the government achieved some of them,” said Adnan al-Duleimi, the head of Tawafiq, the largest Sunni bloc in the government. Mr. Duleimi said the achievements included “the general amnesty, chasing down the militias and disbanding them and curbing the outlaws.”

The recently passed amnesty law has already led to the release of many Sunni prisoners, encouraging Sunni parties that the government is serious about enforcing it. And the attacks on Shiite militias have apparently begun to assuage longstanding complaints that only Sunni groups blamed for the insurgency have been the targets of American and Iraqi security forces.

There is at least some truth to this.  While possibly exaggerated, the amnesty law has produced positive results.  In addition, many Sunnis - having faced the brunt of sectarian cleansing at the hands of the Mahdi Army - likely applaud the recent anti-Sadrist operations.  By touting these achievements, the Accordance Front can make the case that they have delivered tangible gains to their constituents.  Not a bad thing in an election season, though the incentive to hype these developments is something to consider.

In addition, there could be some behind the scenes quid-pro-quo with Bush administration officials whereby the Accordance Front is given preferential treatment with respect to the elections, or otherwise, in exchange for this PR gift that the Bush team will be touting as a sign of political progress on the reconciliation front.  That's purely speculative, but not exaclty outlandish or beyond the pale.

With respect to reconciliation, though, it's important to remember that the return of the Accordance Front is not a new development, just a reset of the status quo ante in place before their withdrawal.  So, just as the Surge might have succeeded in returning violence to the already horrific 2005 levels, so this move might restore the Green Zone political apparatus to the dysfunctional dynamic in place prior to August 2007. 

Large scale reconciliation will only be possible (eventually) after truly representative elections that produce leaders that speak for, and address the concerns of, large majorities in the various segments Iraqi society.  Ironically, the return of the Accordance Front could portend the opposite in terms of the Sunni electorate, just as Maliki's crackdown of the Sadrist current threatens to mute the electoral voice of large chunks of the Shiite population.

One step forward, two steps back.  The Iraq shuffle.

(hat tip to Cernig for the link above, and some of the ideas expressed herein)

Eric Martin  Apr 24 2008 - 3:38pm   

Cheryl Rofer is growing frustrated with the kabuki theater surrounding Israel's nuclear arsenal - a topic germane to at least three news stories currently in circulation.  Rofer is always worth the read in connection with anything nuclear-related.  And not.

Ilan Goldenberg takes note of some more "Special Groups" semantic chicanery.  This site has been taking note of such word play in recent days.  Cernig follows up with a post on the significance of 73% - and the recurrence of that very percentage.  We need better propagandists.

I wish I had more time to blog, but you see, 73% of my day is currently being absorbed battling Special Projects from my bosses - at least, those of my bosses working direclty with the regime in Tehran in an elaborate effort to distract me from the unfolding plot to nuke defenseless Israel. 

Vote McCain!

Eric Martin  Apr 22 2008 - 1:17pm   

Anthony Cordesman surveys the lay of the land (pdf) in the era of all-out war with the Sadrists in Iraq and games out the possibilities.  Of the three, none is overly promising, even if certain outcomes are preferable to others.  They are, according to Cordesman:

First, Maliki can win, defeat Sadr’s militia—the Mahdi Army, or Jaish al Mahdi (JAM)—and marginalize the Sadr movement. Second, Maliki can provoke Sadr into open violence and a new form of insurgency. Or, both sides become locked in a lingering intra-Shi’ite power struggle that mixes violence with political power plays.

Cordesman is using strained definitions of "win" and "defeat" when contemplating the first scenario.  A recent Reuters piece clarifies the matter somewhat, echoing points that this site has been making for some time: 

Ultimately, say experts, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki may never be able to defeat the popular cleric by force, and his attempt to do so could make Iraq far more unstable at a time when U.S. troops are reducing in numbers.

"I think the threat should be taken very seriously indeed," said Reidar Visser, editor of the Iraq-focused website historiae.org and an expert on southern Shi'ite Iraq.

"The Sadrists represent a strong popular movement with deep roots in Iraqi society, and it is entirely unrealistic to deal with them through military solutions alone."

Even Cordesman hedges and pares back his notions of winning and defeating:

The practical problem is that it is much easier to provoke an ideological and political movement with even the most successful tactical attacks than it is to defeat it as a religious and political force. Iraq’s poorer and more religious Shi’ites will not disappear no matter how good the military gains are against the JAM. They will be a major political force in any future elections regardless of whether Sadr survives, Sadrists are allowed to run, or the elections are fair or partly rigged. No one in Iraq goes quietly into that great night.

So what, then, would count as victory?  The answer drains most meaning out of the word: disrupt the political and military wings of the Sadrist movement sufficient enough that Iran's main ally in Iraq, ISCI (aka SIIC), can prevail in upcoming elections (only). In other words, the US will be aiding and assisting in the undermining of the democratic process that it supposedly invaded Iraq to promote as an example throughout the region:

One can question the impact of a Maliki victory from the perspective of democratic theory. Virtually all experts agree that the Sadrist movement probably has more mass support among Shi’ites than the combination of Dawa and SIIC. In some mix of local and provincial elections that was held on the basis of ideal democracy, Sadr would win significant strength in Baghdad and the south, and do so with as much legitimacy as any other populist demagogue.

More practically, it is hard to dismiss the possibility that the fighting that began on March 25 has been directed largely against Sadr precisely because he was becoming an increasingly better organized political force and more of a threat to Dawa and SIIC leaders who gained power more because they rode the US-led invasion into power than because of real popular support.

Would making a mockery of the democratic process in such a transparently hypocritical fashion be worth it for the US?  All things being equal, there are some legitimate reasons to prefer ISCI/Dawa over the Sadrists (a topic I will examine in greater length in Part II).  But all things aren't equal (nor is the basis for the preference overwhelmingly compelling). 

For one, as mentioned above, any realistic conception of "victory" is inherently fleeting: the Sadrists might be shut out of the next round of elections, but they cannot be marginalized indefinitely. Reuters notes:

"The provincial elections are ahead and if the Sadrists were banned from participating, wide-scale confrontation is looming," said Iraqi university professor Saad al-Hadithi.

In addition, continuing to publicly promote democracy and claim it as the driving force of our foreign policy while working tirelessly to unravel democratic results when they don't meet our preferences greatly tarnishes our image and undermines our ability to encourage democratic growth (see, ie, Gaza, Pakistan, etc.).

Most importantly, though, continuing the massive assault on the Sadrist movement (besieging neighborhoods that house over 2 million Iraqis) will result in higher casualties for Coalition forces and, to a much larger extent, Iraqis - both militants and civilian bystanders alike.  

All of those considerable and hefty costs will be incurred for the short term electoral gain of some tentative allies in Iraq that will, under ideal circumstances, result in the following net gain - according to Cordesman:  

If this "best case" scenario occurs, it would almost certainly increase the prospects of the US staying in Iraq and have some impact on the November elections in the US. It would, however, be as much the "fog ahead" as the "way ahead."

And that's the best case scenario.

Eric Martin  Apr 21 2008 - 11:10am   

Back in July 2003, President Bush issued a now infamous taunt to the then-nascent Iraqi insurgency, urging militants intent on attacking Coalition forces to, "Bring 'em on."  The Coalition had suffered three hundred or so fatalities at the time Bush made that ill-fated challenge. Since then, the number has grown to roughly 4,350.  Careful what you wish for.

Even Bush, not one to contemplate past errors, has admitted that this bluster was a "big mistake."   So when I saw the news over the weekend that Moqtada al-Sadr had issued a final ultimatum to the Iraqi government/US forces (halt the attacks on his movement, or he would fully lift the cease fire and declare all out war), I held out hope that the Bush administration might, at last, take this warning seriously and not make the same mistake again.  For the Bush administration, however, it is one thing to begrudgingly admit culpability for previous lapses, and another to learn the implicit lesson therein:

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice mocked anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr as a coward on Sunday, hours after the radical leader threatened to declare war unless U.S. and Iraqi forces end a military crackdown on his followers.

Rice, in the Iraqi capital to tout security gains and what she calls an emerging political consensus, said al-Sadr is content to issue threats and edicts from the safety of Iran, where he is studying...

"I know he's sitting in Iran," Rice said dismissively, when asked about al-Sadr's latest threat to lift a self-imposed cease-fire with government and U.S. forces. "I guess it's all-out war for anybody but him," Rice said. "I guess that's the message; his followers can go too their deaths and he's in Iran."

So Condi, soon to return to that precarious forward operating base at Foggy Bottom, is calling out Sadr for urging others into battle from afar - reminiscent of Bush's prior bravado from a safe distance.  Regardless of the transparent hypocrisy in the charge, this is an extremely disturbing development.  As I have been cautioning of late, the Bush administration seems intent on provoking a full-on confrontation with the Sadrist movement.  Again, careful what you wish for. 

Tragically, the Bush administration is underestimating the capacity of the Sadrist movement today in much the same way it did the Sunni insurgency back in 2003.  But then, it's easy to bluff big with other peoples' chips lives.  She might even admit it was a "big mistake" in a few years.  If we're lucky. 

(hat tip Cernig)

Eric Martin  Apr 11 2008 - 4:10pm   

I would be pretty nervous right now if I were a high ranking ISCI official.

Iraqi police imposed a curfew to prevent an outbreak of violence in the southern Shi'ite holy city of Najaf on Friday, after a senior aide to anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr was shot dead.

Police set up road blocks and drove through the city with loudspeakers ordering shops closed and people off the streets after Riyadh al-Nuri, a top Sadr aide whose sister is married to the cleric's brother, was gunned down.

Sadr blamed the United States and the U.S.-backed Iraqi government for the slaying.

"This is the hand of the occupier and his successor reaching out traitorously and aggressively against our precious martyr," the cleric said in a statement. "It is my vow that I will not forget this precious blood."

Dozens of angry followers gathered at Shi'ite Islam's main cemetery in the holy city to bury Riyadh.

In a speech to mourners, Sadr aide Abdul-Hadi al-Mohammedawi quoted the cleric as saying followers should remain "calm and not to drift into strife".

It's good to hear appeals to calm, but I'd bet there's going to be a tit for this tat in the next couple of weeks.  Worse still, it is indicative of a larger trend.  As I noted recently, the US and its Iraqi allies seem to headed toward a full-on confrontation with Sadr and his constituency. 

Recent airstrikes in populated areas, as well as collective punishment tactics employed against Sadr City and the Shula districts of Baghdad (home to roughly 2.5 million Iraqis), are creating a deep bitterness in much of the Shiite population toward occupation and Green Zone forces. 

That population is an unwieldy size to try to suppress with such measures, and it is hard to imagine such hardened attitudes will disappear in short oder.  The situation could easily spiral out of control - to the extent that it hasn't already.  On the other hand, the Surge is working, we are (still) winning (again) and the Democrats refuse to acknowledge our imminent victory out of political calculation.

Eric Martin  Apr 11 2008 - 11:19am   

I can feel your prying, accusatory eyes.  I know, I haven't posted in a day or so.  I got a day job ya know, so sue me. 

Better yet, go read Blake Hounshell on The Surge and why we're all wasting our time arguing about whether it's working or not.  It's meaningless.

Also: Katulis and Duss, tag team cage match vs. Fred and Kimberly Kagan.  Katulis and Duss have the distinct advantage of...well, using actual facts.  Verdict: KO in the first round (figure-four leg lock of empirical evidence).

Finally, Cernig updates us on the latest Iraq war supporter to abandon Bush's Titanic.  This time, its erstwhile stalwart Con Coughlin of the Daily Telegraph in the UK.

Eric Martin  Apr 9 2008 - 11:51am   

Reidar Visser has an interesting, and at times counterfactual, piece up about the recent fighting in Basra and the related issues of Iranian infiltration of the political scene. Some key takeaways from Visser's analysis: First, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not exactly dominated by ISCI (though ISCI has carved out substantial "fiefdoms" within the ISF).  Perhaps more importantly, there is potential friction between Maliki and ISCI over the issue of federalization - with ISCI favoring a near fragmented Iraq while Maliki favors a stonger centralized state, even opposing the creation of the Shiite super region in the south.

While this is true in terms of the parties' respective ideological foundations, it has long been my contention that Maliki has been forced by his dependence on ISCI and the Kurdish parties to acquiesce to their shared agenda of federalization and de-centralization.  Functionally, the underlying ideological differences could end up mattering little if Maliki remains tied to ISCI and the Kurds.  In this, we are doing Maliki no favors by acting to suppress the nationalist elements (such as the Sadrists) that are most vehemently opposed to the federalization/de-centralization program.

Further, Visser contends that Maliki is less beholden to Iran than ISCI, and as evidence, Visser points out that the ISF under Maliki's leadership have taken action against some groups that are considered staunch Iranian allies - in the recent Basra crackdown and before.  While Visser claims that Maliki is still intent on maintaining "independence vis-a-vis ISCI and Iran," again, we are not helping that cause by knocking the legs out of the other Iraqi groups that share Maliki's stance.  To the extent that Maliki must rely on ISCI, his preferences might not matter as much.  Ironically, increased US/Iraqi military pressure on the Sadrist current may have pushed Moqtada closer to Iran which, in turn, could have given Iran even more influence - now with a reliable ally on both sides of the centralization divide:

...[T]he conclusion of a ceasefire on Iranian soil shows that Tehran’s ability to influence the other end of the spectrum – the traditionally Iraqi nationalist Sadrist movement – may now be stronger than ever before, quite possibly the result of Muqtada’s relocation to Iran at the beginning of “the surge”, when he may have felt cornered by US policy.

Visser's conclusions are worth considering - as is the zinger he slips in at the end about our choice of allies in Iraq:

To the US, the best way of rectifying these problems would be to abandon the current policy of unquestioningly going after whomever Maliki defines as a terrorist. Instead Washington could emulate the Iranians: talk to as many Shiite factions as possible, which could be done simply by supporting free and fair local elections in October without giving in to very predictable schemes by Maliki and ISCI to exclude or obstruct the Sadrists and other undesirable competitors. Unfortunately, however, Washington appears headed in a different direction. The Bush administration fails to acknowledge that Iranian influences in Iraq operate through several channels, including some of Washington's best friends. In reality, the Iraqi nationalist component of Maliki’s government is wafer-thin, and unless this problem at the Green-Zone level is addressed and anti-Iranian currents among the Shiites are better represented, no amount of bottom-up progress, “breathing room” or American material support in the provinces will be sufficient to achieve national reconciliation.

In sum, the Iraqi system is locked at the top level. The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq [ISCI] is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side. [emphasis added - that's gotta sting]

Looking at the big picture, it seems that the Bush administration places a greater emphasis on the prospect of securing permanent military bases and beneficial terms for foreign investment in the oil sector (which ISCI and the Kurds appear willing to dangle) than it does for limiting Iran's influence (which we would better achieve by propping up or at least not weakening nationalist elements including, even, the Sadrist current).  At least that's one interpretation.

Eric Martin  Apr 8 2008 - 12:18pm   

Kevin Drum elevated a comment that I made on his site to an update of the post in question, so I wanted to clarify my argument since it was a little vague.  The subject of Drum's post has to do with a clever bit of wording that was adopted by Petraeus/Crocker around the time that Moqtada al-Sadr declared his cease fire - specifically, use of the term "Special Groups" in relation to certain segments of Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia (aka JAM). 

First, some background.  Realizing the opportunity presented by Sadr's self-imposed cease-fire, Petraeus/Crocker made several good faith gestures (including later making a point of praising Sadr's efforts publicly and referring to Sadr by the honorific, "Sayyed" - used to denote direct lineage to the Prophet Mohammed).  In connection with this charm offensive, Petraeus/Crocker began differentiating between the core of JAM, and those splinter factions that were designated as "Special Groups." 

The Special Groups were then loaded up with all of the sins of JAM - both real and imagined.  The Special Groups were accused of being tools of Iran, and were deemed responsible for the ethnic cleansing and criminal conduct perpetrated by some JAM members.  In the process, JAM-central was redeemed. 

There was a seed of truth to each of those claims, and Sadr himself was concerned about rogue factions that were improperly coopting the JAM name, and other JAM members whose discipline was fraying such that they were tainting the legitimacy and moral foundation of the overall program.  In a limited sense, Sadr was willing to countenance some "culling" of these fringe elements through US military and Iraqi government operations (read: Badr) in order to consolidate control and to bring JAM in line with the ideological and religious undergirdings of the movement.

In this way, Petraeus/Crocker offered Sadr a face saving avenue to begin probing the normalization of relations.  For a time, Sadr could afford to maintain the cease fire despite the assaults because those actions ostensibly targeted groups that were no longer considered legitimate JAM members, and so no response was necessary.  As I have been warning for months, however, the US military and Iraqi government forces began cutting into the core of JAM - as well as arresting and detaining non-militia members of the Sadrist current.  Petraeus/Crocker continued to praise Sayyed al-Sadr and maintain the fiction of targeting only the Special Groups, but the actions were speaking louder than the increasingly hollow words. 

Pressure began mounting steadily from within the Sadrist movement for Moqtada to lift the cease fire and retaliate.  Initially, he called off the cease fire as it relates to ISCI (whose Iranian trained Badr Corp militia had been relentlessly harrassing JAM, both in its capacity as officially recognized Iraqi Security Forces and as a stand alone militia).  Eventually, Sadr declared that the cease fire did not preclude actions against any party; if in self-defense. Thus, following the recent Basra offensive, all hell broke loose - at least for a short time. 

Back to Kevin Drum, who passes along this bit from Thomas Ricks' liveblogging of the Petraeus/Crocker testimony:

Later in his prepared statement, Crocker makes real news. In the wake of the Basra operation, he reveals, Moqtada al-Sadr's main militia, Jayash al-Mahdi, seems to have linked back up with the so-called "Special Groups," or splinter elements of the militia.

I hadn't seen that before. As Crocker says in his statement, that is "a dangerous development."

K-Drum, logically, states that it should come as no surprise that JAM is re-linking with the Special Groups considering the tendency to unite in the face of a common enemy and agrees that it is a "dangerous development."  That is quite possibly the case, though I have my doubts. 

Regardless, I find Crocker's assertion itself, not the underlying truth, to be the "dangerous development."  What that signals to me is that Petraeus/Crocker are dropping the Special Groups pretense and are no longer probing a conciliatory track with Sadr.  Petraeus/Crocker will resume pre-cease fire attempts to tar the entire Sadrist current with assorted sins - again, real and imagined.  That, to me, looks like the rhetorical groundwork for a full-on confrontation, moreso than even the overly aggressive culling actions described above.  A lifting of the cease-fire would be the logical next step if Crocker's choice of words is as significant as I fear.

Hold on to your hats.