nadezhda's blog

Obama's Grand Tour and McCain's Circus Roundup

Mon, 21 Jul 2008 23:14:08 +0000

I don't know what has been more fun to follow over the past few days -- the McCain campaign's scramble to play catch-up with Maliki's suppport of an Obama-esque timetable, or the US media starting to go all-meta on their own coverage of the Obama trip. There are too many gems for a single QOTD, so here are a few highlights.

The first stage of "We're f**ked" is Denial

Even though McCain was given an extra 24-hour news cycle -- the delay in coverage by the NYT and WaPo was, as Steve Benen remarked, journalistic malpractice -- he and his campaign are running around like ham-handed headless chickens. They seem to be stuck in the Denial Stage even though the evidence was clear from the outset that Maliki was serious.

The focus in the media and in the McCain campaign's (various) responses has been on whether Maliki really gave a quasi-endorsement of Obama's "sixteen months" -- the whole walkback nonsense. However, the interview has been on Spiegel's site since Saturday, and in the interview Maliki expresses several times the need for an end-date, the sooner the "more realistic". There could have been no confusion on McCain's staff about the overall thrust of Maliki's position if they read the interview. The "mistranslation" excuse was transparently feeble from the outset.

For all McCain's vaunted international experience, this episode is displaying him as someone who isn't what we might call "agile" at handling an unexpected international curveball. Joe Klein hit exactly what I've been thinking:

I suppose that McCain's stubborn brittleness on this subject isn't news. But his inability to respond to a major change in policy from our Iraqi allies -- the announcement that they can take it from here -- certainly is newsworthy. There are three possibilities:

McCain doesn't believe the Iraqis can take it from here. (In the most benign reading, he may see this new position as mere domestic political posturing on Maliki's part, which is no doubt part of the truth.)

McCain doesn't want the Iraqis to take it from here. He still wants long-term, 100 year, military bases.

McCain doesn't move very quickly to adapt to changing facts on the ground.

None of them speak very well of the guy. [emph. added]

I think it's "all of the above" -- but especially the last factor. McCain is so wedded to a particular view of the Iraq War, the GWOT, and the US role in the Middle East, that he can't adapt. If he had had a more realistic understanding of the situation, Maliki's remarks wouldn't have -- or more accurately, shouldn't have -- come as such a bombshell.

The second stage of "We're f**ked" is Anger

Some of McCain's supporters are ahead of their candidate and acknowledging that Maliki appears to mean what he says. But that's not to suggest they're to the Acceptance stage yet. They're getting mad that "our guy" isn't following the script. Rob Farley's been tracking the emergence of the Anger crowd at the Corner.

At 11:38 AM EDT, Rob remarked (echoing a constant refrain of our own Eric Martin):

The conservative media and Right Blogistan have been undertaken to steadfastly ignore any hint that Prime Minister Maliki might and his political allies might have connections with Iran, preferring instead to assert that Iran influences events in Iraq through Sadrist militia and Sunni tribes (!). Given Maliki's statements on withdrawal, I wonder this: How long it will take for an anti-Maliki trope to develop on the American right that concentrates on his Iranian connections?

Ask and ye shall receive! Less than two hours later, Rob noted:

Andrew McCarthy answers my question:

As I've mentioned before, Maliki, of the Shiite Dawa Party which opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq in the first place, has long-standing ties to Iran and Syria -- and has expressed support for Hezbollah. The only thing that surprises me about this story is that anyone is surprised.
McCarthy also chides Maliki for being insufficiently grateful for the awesomeness of the Surge. Look for more of this as Maliki fails to walk back his statements...

But as Daniel Larison points out, maybe John McCain is simply too confused to be angry.

McCarthy is entirely right in what he says here, but that raises a couple questions. First, there is the obvious question of why the U.S. is attempting to pursue a strategy premised on limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and the region while actively backing a government that has no intention of limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and very clearly is led by a sectarian party.

[snip]

Even more than creating a political problem for McCain back home, Maliki’s recent statements have revealed both the untenability of a continued U.S. presence in Iraq and the complete incoherence of U.S. strategy in that country.

Serious ouch! And then John Derbyshire added his two cents. Again from Rob:

Shorter Derb:

All of your country are belong to us now.

Verbatim Derb:

We should tell Maliki, loudly and in public, that he owes his job to us, and that further prosecution of our military operations in his country will be conducted with regard only to U.S. interests, as determined in consensus by our established domestic political processes. And if he doesn't like that, he can go to hell.

God, I am so glad that this incident has caused the right to discard its phony interest in democracy promotion...

To be fair to Derb, he's always been a "To Hell With Them" Hawk, so his sentiments should come as no surprise. As he remarked today: "This absurd and insane desire to be loved and admired by foreigners will be the death of this republic." Derb doesn't have to do Denial -- he starts (and finishes) with Anger.

Those "Listening to Commanders on the Ground" C-i-C Credentials

If there was one piece of Conventional Wisdom we've heard for the last week about Obama's Grand Tour it was that the trip was risky but necessary. Obama had to show voters he would be "acceptable" as Commander-in-Chief. Obviously, he wouldn't be better at foreign relations than the tough, seasoned veteran, John McCain, but Obama had to somehow find his way across the "acceptability barrier."

So here's the Photo of the Day (photo released by US Army via Mark Halperin).

As Michael Crowley notes: "Hmmm, Petraeus doesn't look like he's been telling Obama he's a defeatmonger. "

Worse yet for McCain image-wise are these photos paired together by Ben Smith of Politico: "It's not really close," says Ben. Heh, indeed!

And what would be a Circus without Coverage of the Coverage of the Coverage...

Jesse Taylor is back!

Despite the fact that his foreign policy vision has been largely validated in the past week - McCain caught up to Obama on Afghanistan and the aforementioned endorsement by Maliki - the main discussion today and over the past few days has been whether or not the press is covering Obama’s trip too much and whether or not the coverage of them talking about the coverage results in too much (and too favorable) coverage for Obama. It’s a tesseract of inanity - a new fourth dimension of coverage about the coverage of the coverage will soon emerge, with Jessica Yellin invited on to discuss how she talked about her in-depth discussion of the impact of Obama’s trip on the race...without ever mentioning what Obama did, how he did it or who he did it with.

Call it the Fafblogging of the media: CNN is the whole world’s only source for CNN! [emph added]

Now if we only still had Billmon!

Biden has Obama's Afghan back - updated

Thu, 17 Jul 2008 17:29:28 +0000

Obama's opponents have been trying to make hay over his "failure" to hold hearings on Afghanistan. From Mark Murray at MSNBC's First Read, here's what Joe Biden has to say:

Remember that letter that South Carolina Sen. Jim DeMint (R) sent to Obama -- over the fact that the Foreign Relations subcommittee that Obama chairs hasn't held a hearing on the issue of Afghanistan?

Well, Foreign Relations Committee chairman Joe Biden -- a possible Obama veep pick -- responds to DeMint with his own letter. "As you are aware, under my chairmanship the Foreign Relations Committee has addressed most Afghanistan issues at the full committee level. I believe that this is the best way of ensuring the most comprehensive examination of the complex issues involved, and of ensuring the highest-level Administration participation," he writes.

"On the particular issue of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, we have held three full committee hearings in the last 22 months... At all three of these hearings, we were fortunate enough to have the expert testimony ... of former NATO commander and Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, Gen. James R. Jones (USMC, ret.). At my request, Sen. Obama chaired the confirmation hearing for our next ambassador to NATO, which he focused on NATO’s mission in Afghanistan."

Biden concludes, "Sen. Obama has displayed great leadership on this issue: he called nearly a year ago for the deployment of at least two additional combat brigades to Afghanistan -- it has since become the accepted position of a wide range of U.S. military officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I look forward to working closely with him, and with you, on any future Afghanistan hearings that might be held in our committee."

In other words, ":p".

UPDATE: And the Pentagon seems to have Obama's back as well. From the AP.

Pentagon leaders on Wednesday signaled a surge in U.S. forces in Afghanistan "sooner rather than later," a shift that could send some units there within weeks, as officials prepare to cut troop levels in Iraq.

Senior military officials are looking across the services to identify smaller units and other equipment that could be sent to Afghanistan, according to a defense official.

Although there are no brigade-sized units that can be deployed quickly into Afghanistan, military leaders believe they can find a number of smaller units such as aviation, engineering and surveillance troops that can be moved more swiftly, said the official, who requested anonymity because the discussions are private.

The moves are expected to happen within weeks rather than months, the official said.

The decisions are being made against the backdrop of shifting priorities for the U.S. military, and were discussed during a meeting Wednesday of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Military leaders are weighing requests from commanders in Afghanistan for more troops, aircraft and other assistance. And they are trying to determine the right balance between the needs of the force in Iraq, versus troops in Afghanistan who are facing a Taliban resurgence.

To date, the fight in Afghanistan has taken a back seat to Iraq, which has been the strategic priority. While Iraq will remains the top goal, it now appears the military believes there should be a more urgent emphasis on Afghanistan than there has been.

Bush's Pakistan-Afganistan-Iran "legacy" - updated

Thu, 17 Jul 2008 16:05:51 +0000

To follow up on AG's post on Burns' announced participation in talks with the Iranians and Haggai's comment that this may be following the North Korea multilateral pattern, I've hiked this from the comments section and "revised and extended my remarks" on the US political implications.

One further thought on the mini-"opening" to Iran, especially if the Guardian is right that State is going to get its way finally and be allowed by the White House to open a US interests section in Teheran.

I think the White House has finally become seriously spooked about Pakistan. When Benazir was assassinated, they lost Plan A and there never was a Plan B. They've been treading water while watching things go from bad to worse in both Pakistan's domestic political chaos and in the border areas with Afghanistan. The US doesn't have more troops to put in, and even if there were a few more brigades available, everybody (except Mr "I authored the Surge(TM)" McCain) seems to realize that the military isn't going to solve this problem, it's only a finger in the dike.

Whoever is the new President come January, US-Pakistan policies are going to have to be reworked entirely. The Biden-Lugar economic aid package, which Obama is sponsoring, is just the first step.

But one factor surely is common to any options for dealing with Af-Pak -- keep western Pakistan stable. Which means having cooperative, if not cordial, relations with the Iranians re Afghanistan has become more than just desirable -- it's an absolute imperative.

Bill Varner at Bloomberg reports today on this topic, although it's framed as the sorts of trouble Iran could cause if it were attacked. However, Varner's observations are equally relevant to the options the US faces in adjusting its approach to the Afghanistan-Pakistan gordian knot.

Khalizad is making noises about the potential mischief Iran could make, and US Ambassador William Wood is claiming that Iran is helping arm the Taliban, under the "fingers in every pot" theory of influence. The Iranians themselves are miffed that the US didn't build on their initial cooperation when the US first invaded Afghanistan, so they're not rushing to help the US counter the Taliban. One assumes, however, that the Iranians aren't eager for western Afghanistan to become a Sunni fundamentalist hotbed. So the US objective should be to persuade the Iranians to shift back to their more cooperative mode on the Taliban.

While the world focuses on tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan 800 miles to the east, U.S. officials keep watch on Iran's expanding presence in Herat and the surrounding province of 2 million people. The region might play a major role if conflict erupts over Iran's nuclear program.

Should Iran's nuclear ambitions spark hostilities, it would use its sway in western Afghanistan as a ``bargaining chip,'' said Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and former envoy to Kabul. If attacked, Iran ``could make life difficult for us'' in Afghanistan, he said in an interview.

Iran has ``intelligence operatives everywhere, military commanders who work for them'' in the region who could be deployed to stir up trouble, including riots, said Barnett Rubin, an Afghanistan specialist at New York University's Center on International Cooperation.

For now, Tehran's investment of $500 million in the region has helped the U.S. by minimizing the influence of the Taliban extremists who once ruled the country and the sort of violence they have inflicted on southern and eastern Afghanistan. Iran paved half of Herat's streets and 40 miles of highway leading north, built schools and health clinics and partnered with Afghan companies in an industrial park.

``It's not just investments, but also trade,'' said Ali Shah Ahmedi, the 43-year-old manager of Herat's Tejarat Hotel. ``I have Iranian businessmen staying here all the time, coming to buy or sell goods'' such as packaged foods and motorcycles.

Sana, 42, holds forth from his office in the Herat Trade Center, a modern nine-story building of gleaming blue glass that helped inspire residents' nickname for their city: ``the Dubai of Afghanistan.'' A hotel, law offices and a finance company that supports farmers are connected by an Afghanistan rarity: an elevator.

Traffic lights in Herat work, in contrast to the capital, Kabul, so vehicles flow smoothly around the Blue Mosque, an 800- year-old, blue-tiled landmark. Herat is cleaner than Kabul, with more trees and parks, and less dangerous, with fewer visible police and troops.

Ties between Iran and Herat run deep. The city was the capital of 15th-century Persia, and Iran held Herat until midway through the 19th century. Heratis, mostly Sunni Muslims, today speak a dialect closer to the Farsi spoken in Tehran than the Dari used in Kabul.

Predominantly Shiite Iran opposed the Sunni Taliban -- who refused to educate girls when they ran Afghanistan, among other strictures -- as extreme.

After the Taliban were toppled for harboring the terrorists behind the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Tehran's government helped the U.S. and the UN begin the political transition that led to Hamid Karzai's election as president.

Iran's leaders feel that contribution wasn't properly acknowledged, said Manouchehr Mottaki, its foreign minister. The slight explains their refusal to help fight the Taliban's current insurgency, he said.

``We limit our cooperation with Afghanistan to helping reconstruct the country,'' Mottaki told reporters at the UN on July 2.

William Wood, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, said Iran now helps arm the Taliban. Tehran's policy is to ``make everyone a loser'' in Afghanistan, he said in a Kabul interview.

Karzai is ``walking a very fine line'' and doesn't accuse Iran of actively supporting the insurgents, said Humayun Hamidzada, the president's chief spokesman.

``President Karzai believes Iran has a positive role to play in Afghanistan,'' Hamidzada said last week in Kabul. ``We are working with the U.S. and Iran, and don't want to become the battleground for their conflict.''

Iran's presence in Afghanistan will be an issue for the next U.S. president.[No kidding!!!]

I would be astonished if the Bush Administration were able to make significant headway with the Iranians on Afghanistan, even though it's clearly in both nations' interest to cooperate. The calendar is increasingly becoming a tyrant for the Bush Admin. There are too many interrelated regional issues within which the nuclear matters (and Iran's long-term security interests) will have to be addressed, and too few months until the height of the election campaign. It's too hard to break the Iranian relations into discrete pieces -- nuclear, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, etc. -- because they're so intertwined. So there's really no way to avoid linkage.

The Bush Administration would also have to go a long way to convince the Iranians they should deal with Bush now rather than wait for the new US President. And whoever the elected President is, he's going to want to have his own say in any overall deal with the Iranians.

However, W seems to be heavily invested in "legacy" planning. I expect he'd like to be able to claim credit for having "laid the foundations" for future progress on these issues to mitigate the blame for leaving an unholy mess behind in Af-Pak. Hence his stated intention, as Haggai noted, that "he expected his remaining months in office to 'leave behind a multilateral framework' for dealing with Iran."

It will be interesting to see how far Bush's commitment to his own "legacy" leaves McCain dangling in the wind on the campaign trail.

UPDATED: Another sign that the White House is increasingly spooked by Afghanistan-Pakistan is this AP interview yesterday with an unidentified "defense official." It suggests the intensity of the scramble underway to meet the needs for additional forces in Afghanistan, which Sec Gates and Adm Mullen have been discussing with the press:

Senior military officials are looking across the services to identify smaller units and other equipment that could be sent to Afghanistan, according to a defense official.

Although there are no brigade-sized units that can be deployed quickly into Afghanistan, military leaders believe they can find a number of smaller units such as aviation, engineering and surveillance troops that can be moved more swiftly, said the official, who requested anonymity because the discussions are private.

The moves are expected to happen within weeks rather than months, the official said.

The decisions are being made against the backdrop of shifting priorities for the U.S. military, and were discussed during a meeting Wednesday of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No wonder McCain suddenly announced the need for one of his Surges(TM) for Afghanistan on Tuesday.

If this isn't a bail-out, then WTF is?

Wed, 16 Jul 2008 19:19:40 +0000

And now for something completely different.... Although this blog has generally focused on national security matters, the growing turmoil in the US financial markets certainly merits a look, given its potential impact on the global economy. So here's an overview with a collection of links I've found especially useful and my speculation about the Bush Administration's politics.

At his press conference yesterday, President Bush assured his listeners that he won't do financial sector bail-outs.

President Bush also wanted fast action on his latest proposal to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Congress. He strongly endorsed Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's plan but asserted definitively that the two companies would continue to be held by private investors. Bush also rejected the notion that the government would bail out any private enterprise.

But, but... government support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that doesn't wash out current equity holders is... ummm, how shall we say this... exactly what a "bail-out" is. If we provide financing to keep Fannie and Freddie up and running but leave the equity holders in place, when their shares are underwater, we are bailing them out!

The best summary I've seen of the Fannie/Freddie situaton -- history and current problems -- is by Tanta at Calculated Risk. As they say, read the whole thing. Looking at the core function of the GSEs (government sponsored enterprises) -- which is to provide liquidity to the mortgage origination markets -- she explains:

They have always been about recycling lending capital and taking long-term fixed interest rate risk off depository (and eventually non-depository) lenders much more than about merely absorbing credit risk. This goes against the grain of much current media over-simplification of "securitization" of mortgage loans that sees laying off credit risk as the main or even the only point of selling loans. The GSEs do take on the credit guarantee obligation of the securities they issue, but nobody sells loans to the GSEs just to offload credit risk--in fact, more than a few lenders work hard to negotiate contracts with the GSEs that leave quite a substantial part of the credit risk with the original lender: recourse agreements, indemnifications, servicing options that put a lot of the cost of default on the seller/servicer, not the GSE. They have historically done this because the credit risk of GSE-eligible loans has always been modest, but the benefits of getting 30-year fixed interest rate loans off your balance sheet has been substantial.

For decades, I have believed that Fannie and Freddie either should not have been privatized or should have been more strictly reined in. They serve, and must continue to serve, a critical function for US (and gobal) debt markets. But they're not ordinary financial institutions. They are public utilities which shouldn't be managed, as private financial institutions are, primarily for the benefit of the holders of their capital base (as currently structured, common and preferred shareholders) and their management.

The backing of the Federal government is the sine qua non of these institutions' existence and successful functioning. Without that implicit guarantee, they would never have fulfilled their public roles -- providing reliable liquidity to the mortgage markets in good times and bad, and setting widely-adopted standards for loan origination and servicing, which made the development of a healthy mortgage-backed securities market possible in the first place.

In recent years, managers and shareholders of the GSEs grew sloppy and forgetful about the real nature of these institutions. They forgot the instiutions were public utilities and that they had a duty to protect the implicit guarantee which made their business possible. Instead, they adopted the same expectations as typical corporate management and equity holders, with a focus on growth, retaining market share in a rapidly growing and increasingly risky market, and pumping up earnings, in order to justify huge executive compensation packages and higher share prices. They also had a lousy corporate governance structure, about which critics on both left and right have complained for years.

When housing market innovations started leaving them behind, instead of sticking to their knitting, they went running to Capitol Hill, where they enjoy enormous power on both sides of the aisle. They were allowed to stray into parts of the housing bubble where they didn't belong while simultaneously ignoring and taking advantage of the implicit government guarantee. Their behavior helped to magnify the overall size of the housing bubble and delay its bursting. (See Tanta for a nice summary of recent history.)

Today, the leverage ratio of Fannie's equity to on- and off-balance-sheet liabilities is, depending on which measure one uses, between 68:1 and 128:1. By comparison, leverage for a healthy private financial institution is likely to be in the range of 10:1 to 20:1, depending on what lines of business it is in. The implications of that excessive leverage are spelled out in a restructuring plan proposed by hedge fund manager William Ackman of Pershing Square Capital Management. (See attached pdf, which is an excellent view of the situation, regardless of what you think of Ackman's proposed solution). As Christine Richard of Bloomberg explains:

Ackman, 42, has his own plan that would see Fannie Mae raise about $86 billion in capital by giving investors in $750 billion of senior unsecured notes 90 cents on the dollar in debt of a new company, with the balance in equity. Investors in Fannie Mae's $11 billion of junior debt would get warrants, while common and preferred shareholders would get nothing, according to Ackman.

``We've not yet heard Secretary Paulson's plan but it would be a grave error for the government to invest in the equity of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as they are currently capitalized,'' Ackman, who oversees $6 billion at Pershing Square Capital Management in New York, said in a telephone interview.

[snip]

``The good news is that Fannie Mae has all the capital that it needs,'' Ackman said. ``It just has the capital in the wrong form with too much debt and not enough equity.''

Ackman also suggested the government put in place a stand-by purchase commitment for the new common stock for three years. The government is unlikely to be asked to buy any shares as there would be market demand for equity in the better-capitalized companies, Ackman said.

Although much has been made of the declining quality of the GSEs' portfolio, Ackman's plan shows how the structure of their balance sheets is at the heart of their current difficulties. Even if they hadn't wandered into high risk business, given how highly leveraged they are, Fannie and Freddie would today be nearing the point where the government guarantee would be called into play simply because the drop in housing prices nationally has been so large. The rule of thumb for Fannie's plain vanilla mortgage financing is a minimum 80% Loan to Value (LTV) ratio. That means, in some regions of the country, a large number of mortgages will now exceed the current value of the underlying real estate even if they continue to be performing. That's not the "fault" of the GSEs and doesn't suggest they should stop doing business -- as the housing sector continues to collapse, they are needed now more than ever. Being able to ride through periods of large drops in underlying asset values and growth in non-performing assets is one of the reasons why we have the GSEs in the first place.

In effect, the GSEs are designed to be "bailed out" by the government when market conditions demand. When the government steps in, the GSEs require restructuring and new capital, with existing equity being heavily diluted if not wiped out. That didn't really matter when the government owned the institutions. But when they were privatized and the equity in the GSEs was sold to private investors, the share price should have reflected the risk of dilution if the goverment's implicit guarantee was called. Yet that wasn't the case -- the GSEs behaved, and the market priced their shares, as if there was no risk that the guarantee would be necessary even though their balance sheets were built on the basis of the implicit guarantee. The recent plunge in their share prices is simply the market finally pricing the GSE equity to reflect the central fact that defines their business.

As many have observed today, yesterday's prohibition by the SEC against naked short positions in the shares of the GSEs is either simply political theatre or a case of the panics. (See e.g., Dean Baker, Dealbreaker, Felix Salmon). There are other ways than naked shorts for investors to bet, so the objective of the move is unclear. In any event, even if it Cox's game slows the price decline, it isn't going to make those shares worth any more than they already are, which fundamentally is zero.

The only thing which allows the shares to retain any market value is the political optics against "nationalization" of the GSEs. Together with President Bush's comment, the SEC's concern with the declining market price of GSE shares suggests that, although Treasury Sec Paulson hasn't described the conditions under which the government would provide an equity injection, nonetheless a figleaf of private equity will have some sort of role.

By trying to discourage a fall in share price, the government seems to be encouraging investors to believe in fairy tales -- that a restructuring may not be necessary or that current equity holders may not get washed away entirely in the restructuring-to-come. But if leverage ratios are to be brought down to somewhere closer to earth, new private equity won't come in without the existing equity being washed out. If existing equity holders retain a place in a new capital structure, it will be only because, in effect, the government has provided equity financing at rates far below what the private sector would demand.

Contra President Bush, there's going to be a bail-out. The only questions are how and how much. Retaining a role for private investors in the GSEs as Bush and Cox appear to suggest -- without restructuring the roles of the GSEs and their balance sheets -- is the very essence of the worst kind of government bail-out. Privatize the profits and socialize the costs.

The Plot Thickens

Fri, 24 Aug 2007 22:50:00 +0000

[updated below]

Speculation is currently running hot on the political future, or lack thereof, of America's "ally" in Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki. Will the Bush Administration finally try to change horses?

But the US may be looking at a change of horses, voluntary or not, in another important "ally." With yesterday's ruling by Pakistan's Supreme Court that ex-Prime Minister (and mortal Musharraf enemy) Nawaz Sharif can return from exile, Blake Hounshell asks "how long can Musharraf hang on?" He notes:

For a U.S. administration that is nervous about a resurgent al Qaeda and is busy trying to convince Musharraf to share power with Benazir Bhutto, things are getting a little out of hand. Your move, George.

Let me dust off my crystal ball and speculate on George's next move.

As Blake's question suggests, things haven't been going quite according to plan for Musharraf this year. BBC provides a useful timeline:

9 March: Musharraf suspends chief justice (Chaudry) for "abuse of power". Lawyers protest

April: Protests grow, amid clashes with police

12 May: 34 people die as rival political groups clash in Karachi

11 July: 102 people die when army storms radical Red Mosque in Islamabad

July-Aug: Sharp rise in suicide attacks by pro-Taleban militants

20 July: Supreme Court reinstates chief justice

9 Aug: Musharraf rejects emergency rule

23 Aug: Supreme Court says exiled ex-PM Nawaz Sharif can return

Elections are to be held in the coming months, but there are more than a couple of wrinkles that have to be ironed out before then. Musharraf intends to retain both the presidency and his uniform as head of Pakistan's military, but the Supreme Court is almost certain to rule that is unconstitutional, which is one of the reasons why Musharraf tried unsuccessfully to sack Chaudry in the first place.

As for the other main players, both ex-PM Benazir Bhutto and Sharif have a bit of unfinished personal legal business if and when they return to Pakistan to contest the elections. Bhutto may have found a formula by which the incredible financial corruption during her regime can be, incredibly but neatly, laid exclusively at the door of her blatantly corrupt husband. Sharif and his brother are still facing charges over the failed attempt to oust Musharraf as head of the military, when the military in response replaced Sharif's civilian government with Musharraf. Setting aside the merits of future legal proceedings against the former PMs, it's clear that Musharraf can no longer rely on a compliant court system to hamstring his political opponents.

The Bush Administration has reportedly been encouraging Musharraf and Bhutto to work out some sort of power-sharing, but no indications of positive results have been forthcoming. Since the main thing Bhutto and Sharif seem to have agreed on during their respective exiles has been their intense opposition to Musharraf and each other, the prospect of Sharif's return is going to make power-sharing discussions both more complex and, at least from the US view, more imperative. At the very least, the US isn't going to want to see electoral competition among the "moderate" parties enhance the political strength of the Islamists or increase any further Musharraf's reluctance to go after US enemies. It has been this very fear of Islamist political power which has been at the root of the Bush Administraton's continued support of Musharraf, despite widespread unhappiness with his performance.

Blake in an American Prospect article from March advocated the US stop supporting Musharraf, who has been failing on the counter-terrorism mission, and instead insist on real elections that would include the exiled leaders of the big political parties. Musharraf isn't the indispensable figure he's made himself out to be. Simple demographics show that an Islamist takeover via the poll box is highly unlikely. Nor is Musharraf the key to US relations with the Pakistani military. According to Blake, Musharraf's departure from the Presidency "would be a welcome return to normalcy for the Army, which considers running the country an annoying diversion from its core mission of preparing for war with India." Blake speculated the aftermath of elections would be far more benign than feared.

There might be a period of political uncertainty, but behind the scenes, the Army would keep relations with the United States on an even keel. "I don't think either Benazir or Nawaz Sharif would change much, because they would know that Western economic and military assistance is crucial for Pakistan's government, says [Hasan-Askari] Rizvi. There might be some populist anti-American rhetoric, but "even if Musharraf goes, Pakistan's counterterrorism policy is not going to change. Maybe five to 10 percent." That's because, although Musharraf often portrays himself as Washington's indispensable ally, he's really just the point man for broader military-to-military ties between the two countries.

Blake concluded that the embrace of a "weak leader with little political legitimacy" is a foolish way for the US to pursue its national security priorities.

Now that there is the prospect of the sort of elections Blake was calling for, is the US likely to follow the balance of Blake's recommendations and cut Musharraf adrift? I doubt the Bush Administration will try to change horses now. Following yesterday's ruling, Musharraf is making noises about "national and political reconciliation" -- although he seems to be saying reconciliation is to follow, not proceed, the elections. Syed Saleem Shahzad of AsiaTimes thinks a government of "national unity", headed by Musharraf, is in the offing.

Street politics in the near term will grab most of the headlines in Pakistan, but the US and its allies are unlikely to change horses in midstream. They are banking on Musharraf to keep hold of the reins, at least until an orderly return to a strong civilian government can be guaranteed.

Shahzad seems to be putting his money on the ultimate powerbrokers continuing to be the US and the Pakistani military and on their continuing support of Musharraf.

Neither Bhutto nor Sharif, nor their patronage-dominated political parties, is a compelling vehicle to accomplish national reconciliation, given their trackrecords both in and out of power. Although Musharraf may not be key to the US-Pakistani security relationship in the long run, neither Benazir nor Sharif has a strong enough core constituency in the Pakistani military for the US to risk openly shifting its political support. Though the US will probably place a few side bets to hedge their risk.

Rather than change horses, I expect the US to embrace fervently each hint from any of the political leaders that "national reconciliation" is possible. In the search for a pony, the Bush Administration will try to bring pressure to bear on Musharraf's non-Islamist opponents to join whatever "national unity" arrangements emerge before or after the elections.

If both Bhutto and Sharif return to contest the elections, the US has an easier job putting a public face on its policies -- lots of cheerleading for the "freedom agenda" and "transformational diplomacy," and sage noises about the "will of the Pakistani people" and the importance of "reconciliation." Ironically, within the Administration, electoral competition will weaken the arguments of those who have become so disenchanted with Musharraf's performance re the Taliban and AlQaeda that they've been promoting "democracy" as the best way to throw the bum out. Promoting a "national reconciliation" program via elections won't increase US leverage in the near term over Musharraf or his counter-terrorism policies.

Whether Pakistan is another case of trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, as in Iraq (or Lebanon), remains to be tested. It seems to me that the real key to the success of this policy in the shortrun, over which the US has little control, is whether Musharraf can indeed "keep hold of the reins," which au fond is the question Blake is posing. Pakistan's judiciary has loosened Musharraf's old grip, but they've also changed the game somewhat, and it's not clear to me that Musharraf's opponents are any closer to challenging his ultimate control. There will certainly be a good deal of theatre over the issue of Musharaff's uniform, since most observers expect the judiciary to rule against him. But will the confrontation become existential?

Retired Major-General Jamshed Ayaz Khan, the president of a national policy think-tank, the Institute of Regional Studies, expects a multi-step process within an agreed "national unity" framework among most of the major parties:

"Even Nawaz Sharif will eventually gravitate towards reconciliation," said Khan.

"The president will have to be elected from Parliament, with uniform, and he will be backed by the military. But only for a transition phase. The military understands that the election of Musharraf in uniform is essential for a smooth transition of power from military hands to a civilian setup," said Khan.

Where the anticipated court ruling against the uniform fits into this scenario is unclear. Perhaps Khan is speculating that the "national unity" arrangement will include an accord to give Musharraf's uniform a few more months of symbolic life beyond the constitutional limits.

As for George W, one assumes that, if nothing else, the Pakistan court's ruling in favor of Sharif has clarified US policy. This is one of those cases in which realpolitik and national values converge, at least on the surface. The Bush Administration will have a public stake in the sort of free and fair electoral process Blake advocated earlier, and it will want that process to go forward without crises. "National reconciliation" is going to be the flavor of the month at the White House which, given the Pakistani military, is likely to mean Musarraf will remain the central figure, at least as viewed from Washington. So unless Musharraf loses hold of the reins before the elections, I would expect the US to try to avoid upsetting the apple cart with the Pakistani electorate, Musharraf or the Pakistani military. Which means no major brouhaha with Pakistan over Afghanistan and AlQaeda. Or in other words, plus ça change...

[UPDATE]

Ah ha! My question answered re the multi-step gavotte over Musharaff's uniform. Benazir Bhutto was on Jim Lehrer, where she provided some details about the deal she's negotiating with Musharraf. She'll get the graft charges dropped, among other items.

Asked what she was offering in return, Bhutto sketched a path through the legal labyrinth that other opposition parties insist preclude Musharraf’s staying on in power.

“There are going to be two presidential elections. The first presidential election is going to take place in September, when General Musharraf is still wearing the (military) uniform,” Ms Bhutto said.

While her Pakistan People’s Party could not vote for him while he remains army chief, she suggested it would endorse him later if he gives up that post. “If the (parliamentary) elections are fair, and we have a level playing field, and he seeks re-election from the next assembly, then certainly the parliament can consider that, if the uniform is not there,” she said.

Sharif's return is likely to be a bit more complicated -- I get the feeling Musharraf really does believe Sharif tried to kill him.

Steve Clemons' take is worth a read: Sharif's Return Shouldn't Change Our Strategy in Pakistan [as I argue above, it won't unless Pakistani politics really blows up].

French flypaper?

Thu, 12 Apr 2007 01:03:22 +0000

Here's a follow-up to today's bombings in Algeria and Brian's del.icio.us clips of articles on alQaeda in Algeria and a growing crackdown in Morocco. ABC's The Blotter is reporting that French counterterrorism officials have been on "high alert" in anticipation of a Spring Offensive by alQaeda.

French intelligence officials tell ABC News they have recently increased to 45 the number of terrorist cells they have identified operating in their country, and that they have been on "high alert" for several months. Algerian intelligence sources likewise say they believe "dozens" of terrorist cells linked to an Al Qaeda affiliate have been deployed throughout North Africa.

The Algerian terrorist group thought to be at the center of the offensive, known as "Al Qaeda in the Maghreb," claimed responsibility for today's attacks in a video statement posted on the internet. The post contained three photos of suicide bombers they claimed carried out the attack, and an ominous note that the bombing was "the first of its kind."

[snip]

Today's bombing was only the most recent by the Algerian jihadi group. In February, the group claimed responsibility for seven simultaneous bombings outside police facilities in two Algerian provinces, which reportedly killed six people.

In Morocco, concerns over terrorism are also running high. Yesterday, four members of a terrorist cell linked to a bombing at a cybercafe last month were killed by Moroccan security forces.

Announced today, French security for political events for the upcoming presidential elections will be tightened.

Not surprisingly, there are concerns that some of the increased activity reflects jihadis learning their trade in Iraq, but the cells in France and the Magreb don't seem to rely on the sort of safehaven infrastructure in Iraq posited by Michael Scheuer.

Tell me again, how is the flypaper theory is supposed to work?

Incompetence is not a dodge in Iran?

Tue, 16 Jan 2007 18:05:47 +0000

Further news on Ahmadinejad's apparently declining political fortunes after last month's electoral disappointments, from Robert Tait, reporting from Tehran, today on Guardian Unlimited:

Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has suffered a potentially fatal blow to his authority after the country's supreme leader gave an apparent green light for MPs to attack his economic policies.

In an unprecedented rebuke, 150 parliamentarians signed a letter blaming Mr Ahmadinejad for raging inflation and high unemployment and criticising his government's failure to deliver the budget on time. They also condemned him for embarking on a tour of Latin America - from which he returns tomorrow - at a time of mounting crisis.

The signatories included a majority of the president's former fundamentalist allies, now apparently seeking to distance themselves as his prestige wanes.

MPs also criticised Mr Ahmadinejad's role in the UN security council dispute over Iran's nuclear programme amid growing evidence that the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has ordered him to stay silent on the issue.

The supreme leader, who was hitherto loyal to the president, is said to blame Mr Ahmadinejad for last month's UN resolution imposing sanctions over Iran's refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment.

Ayatollah Khamenei has ultimate authority on foreign policy, and is rumoured to be so disillusioned with Mr Ahmadinejad's performance that he has refused to meet him on occasion.

In a further indicator, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, the leader of parliament's fundamentalists and a former lieutenant who helped the president choose his cabinet, denounced Mr Ahmadinejad's economic policies as "wrong" and told him to stop blaming others.

The mounting criticism is fuelling speculation that Mr Ahmadinejad is politically doomed. Observers have even suggested he might be impeached and removed from office.

[snip]

But Iran's deepening economic woes, which prompted Sunday's letter from MPs, suggest that the worst may have yet to come for a man elected on promises to raise living standards and distribute the nation's oil wealth more evenly.

Those pledges jar with increasingly grim realities. Inflation is higher than when Mr Ahmadinejad took office 17 months ago, while unemployment, officially estimated at 12% but probably much higher, has not improved.

Uncontrolled inflation has resulted in soaring food prices and has had a drastic effect on the housing market. Anecdotal evidence suggests house prices and rents in Tehran have risen 50% in six months.

In a poignant development, the government plans to ration petrol to cut rising import costs incurred by Iran's lack of refinery capacity. The proposal gives an ironic twist to Mr Ahmadinejad's election promise to put the country's oil wealth "on people's tables".

The president's growing army of opponents blame the situation on the government's chaotic approach. The failure to deliver a budget bill on time is being attributed to Mr Ahmadinejad's decision to disband the management and planning organisation, a government agency responsible for setting spending priorities but which upset the president by opposing some of his costlier proposals.

Miscellaney

Fri, 12 Jan 2007 16:05:00 +0000

Apologies to one and all for the extended down-time for the site. I've just learned how to repair MYSQL databases that have been corrupted when the host server crashes. Just wish "learning from experience" wasn't such an awkward way to acquire rudimentary techie skills!

And for all of us who are Legal Fiction regulars, today's good news is we can now get our publius fix over at Obsidian Wings. One stop shopping, yay!

Rediscovering the "art of the possible"

Fri, 22 Dec 2006 00:35:02 +0000

There's been a great deal of moaning that the ISG Report brought forth a mouse which has vanished from relevancy in near-record time. Personally, I'm of the James Fallows view, that the ISG Report will eventually be seen as the "Walter Cronkite" of the Iraq war that shifts the basis of any future debates.

I recognize that many were suspicious of the entire ISG process, given James Baker's role as "fixer" in 2000, and his long-standing loyalty to the Bush clan. Supposedly, Baker's goal was to give Junior a face-saving way out of the mess he's made in Mesopotamia. However, I've watched Baker in action as a government official in three administrations, and in a considerable range of roles. No one would mistake his style for Broderish bi-partisanism. But Baker has repeatedly earned my admiration for his constructive approach to problems and his effectiveness, even when I often opposed the policies or Presidents he was working for. In his capacity as Treasury Secretary, he was one of the better we've had on international financial system issues, especially when compared to his immediate predecessor and successor. And we could certainly have done worse than the Bush-Scowcroft-Baker team during the collapse of the Soviet empire.

Considering both Baker's long political experience and his first-hand familiarity with George W Bush's personality, I doubt Baker held any serious expectations that the ISG's 79 recommendations would be adopted in whole or in part by the White House, despite his marketing the Report as a package deal. From my perspective, Baker's real goal -- if not the goal of the other commissioners -- was to shift the dynamics of both domestic politics and diplomacy on the complex constellation of Iraq/Middle East/Iran/GWOT issues. Or perhaps better stated, to reintroduce a sustainable political process to both the domestic and diplomatic arenas -- to recover, in Bismark's terms, "politics" as the "art of the possible".

Baker titled his memoirs as Secretary of State: The Politics of Diplomacy. In the Preface (pp xiv-xv), he explains why he is convinced that the skills in the art of the possible are as relevant in international relations as in domestic governance. The passage is worth reading because it's not simply the self-serving platitudes of a memoirist. It's an eerily prescient and devastating critique of the conduct of foreign policy by the current Administration over the past six years, not in abstract terms of unilateralism or realism or liberalism or neo-conservatism, but in the practical lingo of a politician.

Politics (in its larger sense -- as opposed to specific electoral campaigns) and policy are inextricably linked. It's only through politics that we can transform philosophy into policy. This is particularly true in geopolitics, where the difference between success and failure is often measured by the ability (or lack thereof) to understand how political constraints inevitably shape the outcome of any negotiation. Indeed, I would argue, with a nod to Clausewitz, that diplomacy is the continuation of politics -- whether in revolution, war, or peace.

We sometimes overlook the fact that most foreign leaders are themselves politicians, frequently elected or members of some ruling party. These senior foreign officials view their problems, and opportunities, through political eyes. To persuade them, it is often helpful to put oneself in their shoes -- to determine how to help them expain, justify, or even rationalize positions to their colleagues and publics. Not surprisingly, foreign political leaders also respect counterparts who can work domstically in order to deliver internationally.

The political skill extends beyond one-on-one relations to the task of building coalitions. Effective U.S. leadership often depends on the ability to persuade others to join with us so we can extend our influence; to build a coalition, a diplomat needs to appreciate what objectives, arguments, and trade-offs are important to would-be partners. To be successful over time, the politician-diplomat also needs to win the confidence of others. That means words must be matched by deeds and promises must be kept.

As in the political world at home, coalitions abroad tend to endure if they are based on shared ideas and purposes. Part of the political diplomat's job is to tend to these alliances, or partnerships, because the time will certainly come when their support will be critical. Differences are inevitable, but they need not overwhelm larger common causes.

Since 9/11, the Bush White House has confused electoral politics with the politics of domestic policy and diplomacy. It has applied its polarizing, "us vs them," Rovian approach to both domestic governance and international relations. Baker, by contrast, is capable of distinguishing between the zero-sum winner-take-all logic of election campaigns versus the politics of managing mutual and conflicting interests in governance and diplomacy. Baker (and Bush pere) is demonstratively of the "win-win" school, which tries to maximize one's interests over the long haul while giving the other party a positive framework in which cooperation can develop and be sustained. Quite a contrast to Junior's "slash and burn" style that tries to demonize, dominate or destroy the other, whether potential partner or enemy.

Clearly, without the thumping Bush received in the midterm elections, the White House would not have been forced to address so publicly the process of defining a "new way forward" in Iraq. And it's also true that, since the initial hullabaloo of the ISG Report's release, its many specific recommendations have failed to become the organizing principles for debate. But the discussions surrounding the release of the Report have succeeded in shining a light on this White House's l'etat c'est moi tendencies. Politics -- in the sense of debate and process, not just political rhetoric -- is starting to be linked again with policy.

Bush continues to claim that, as the Decider, he only has to believe, in the purity of his heart, that he's doing the right thing and await history's verdict. But fewer and fewer are buying that argument. The media, the political class and the military are finally starting to challenge the notion that the Decider has no constraints. There are indeed many constraints on this President which are increasingly being asserted -- the opinion of a large majority of the American public, the views of the military and government staff who will have to try to implement his decisions, and the hard, cruel reality of facts-on-the-ground.

Also thanks to the ISG Report, it is now legitimate for the political class and media to place the violence in Iraq within a broader regional context and less within the "terrorism" straight-jacket. Making it increasingly acceptable to ask in public simple questions such as "how do you expect the regimes in Iran and Syria to do what you want if you won't talk with them and your ultimate objective is to overthrow them?" Or "why should people in the Middle East accept the version of a 'new Middle East' you seem to want to impose"?

The radicalism of the Bush-Cheney-Rove unified theory of elections, governance and "diplomacy" has produced six years during which normal politics -- both domestic and international -- have been MIA. It's ironic that during this period the smallest thing has been hyper-politicized while "politics" has ceased to mean "the art of the possible." The current Administration shows no signs of changing its spots, so a return to "normalcy" for both our political system and diplomacy will have to wait for a new occupant of the White House. And the "last throes" of this Administration clearly won't be pretty. But there are indications that this strange period we've been living through is starting to come to an end, that politicians and media alike are slowly waking up from a long nightmare.

And in the years to come, one of the most important people we have to thank may be James Baker.

A Soldier's Soldier, Outflanked

Thu, 21 Dec 2006 19:11:35 +0000

This will be a growing story -- Abizaid's supporters say his hands were tied by politics and an insurgency that Bush Admin wouldn't recognize. --n

Abizaid is truly beloved and respected by those who fought and served under him before this stint as CENTCOM commander. Unlike Tommy Franks, whose reputation has continued to crater, Abizaid is going to have a number of highly motivated defenders who will try to pin responsibility for Iraq failures elsewhere. I think history will show that Abizaid's failures weren't due to lack of understanding, imagination or personal leadership but rather that he was caught in a number of factors, such as:

the irreconcilable internal contradictions of the Bush Admin's "strategy" and policies both in Iraq and in the GWOT more broadly
the huge rhetoric/reality gap in the GWOT and its inappropriate application to the conflicts the US was trying to manage in Iraq (hence Abizaid's leadership in introducing the "long war" terminology to stress the non-military dimensions across the so-called crescent of instability, most of which in his region)
the lack of preparedness of the US military for stabilization and COIN operations
the DOD/Army bureaucracies that failed to set the right priorities to rapidly produce and scale-up the resources (trained personnel, equipment, support such as translators etc) needed by field commanders to implement any sensible COIN strategy on a theatre-wide basis -- so Abizaid chose to try to reduce the amount of face-to-face interaction between US forces and the Iraqi population rather than attempt a widespread Tal Afar-type approach
Rumsfeld's disastrous handling of potential allies that could have offered early support, not just militarily but economically and politically, and a way to "internationalize" the occupation and the US exit
total confusion in the chain of command.

Since Abizaid himself was certainly aware that the Bush Admin's ever-shifting "policies" didn't add up to a strategy, and since there was clearly a limit to his authority over operations in Baghdad and his ability to get the resources he needed, the big question is should he have stayed and tried to make the best of it. Or should he have left several years ago, as an indirect way of sending the message that the Bush Admin approach was FUBAR.

It's an ongoing tension in civil-military relations that's compounded by the admirable "can do" attitude of the most successful of the military's leadership. I expect Abizaid's story will be an important case study in the future literature on civil-military relations.--n

Comeback Kid, or the Shark eats the Crocodile? [further updated]

Tue, 19 Dec 2006 17:54:20 +0000

It's still too early for final results, especially in Tehran, much to the grumbles of the anti-Ahmadinejad forces. But it's already clear that the results of the twin elections, for local councils and the Council of Experts, are quite positive for the alliance of Ahmadinejad opponents.

The alliance of reformers and "technocratic" conservatives made a big election day splash with a highly publicized joint appearance at a polling station by the former Presidents Rafsanjani (on right), the "pragmatic conservative," and Khatami, the "reformer." In recent elections, reformists have split into several camps, whereas this time it was the conservatives who were divided.

Rafsanjani, whose political obituary has been written several times in the past, has beat all expectations in the most widely watched race -- the Council (or Assembly) of Experts. As I mentioned earlier, the COE is a small body without much day-to-day business but with enormous power, since it appoints Iran's supreme leader. Ahmadinejad was trying to get his mentor, Yazdi, elected. Yazdi will likely win a seat, but he's trailing significantly behind Rafsanjani, who is leading convincingly, as well as several other candidates. Symbolically, the results are striking, and the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, must be rather relieved. From the Times of London:

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative and former President, was trouncing the hardline Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi and more than 400,000 votes ahead of his nearest rival.

The vote, characterised as a fight between the Shark and the Crocodile, the nicknames of Mr Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, respectively, was symbolic of the assembly elections as a whole. “The results show that voters have learnt from the past and concluded that we need to balance the political scene and support moderate figures,” declared Kargozaran, a newspaper close to Mr Rafsanjani.

Turnout appears to have been high relative to prior elections. As mentioned previously, this was widely expected to be key if the anti-Ahmadinejad forces were to make a good showing. In addition to doing well in the COE voting, reformist candidates claim to have picked up at least six of fifteen seats on Tehran's city council. In other cities, results were also mixed, but the basic pattern is that the Ahmadinejad allies will not be dominating local councils.

In Isfahan, Iran's third city, reformists won two seats on the city council, with Ahmadinejad loyalists and moderate conservatives winning five seats apiece, the Mehr news agency reported.

[...]

Elsewhere, women put in an impressive show, with 25-year-old reformist Fatemeh Houshmand winning the largest number of votes in the southern city of Shiraz -- a feat repeated by female candidates in four other cities.

Ahmadinejad was putting the best spin on things, highlighting the high turnout. The Times of London reports:

He said that the higher-than-expected turnout of about 60 per cent was a show of support for Iran’s Islamic system and claimed that this would help the country to confront its enemies.

“Friday’s elections were the most popular in the world,” he said. “The Iranian people have taken a decision to reach the summit of progress. As soon as they saw that the enemy wants to stop them doing something, they carried it out.”

The results will certainly please Western capitals. Not that we should expect any major shifts in Iran's foreign policy, which in any event isn't controlled by Ahmadinejad.

UPDATE: Here's Pepe Escobar's take in AsiaTimesOnline on what is being increasingly seen in the international press as a "stunning victory" for the alliance (and Supreme Leader Khamenei):

The only crucial policy the Council of Experts has implemented since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has been to appoint Khamenei as Khomeini's successor and new supreme leader, in 1989. It was in fact a white coup - because according to the constitution at the time the supreme leader had to be a marja (source of imitation and top religious leader). Khamenei was not up to standards. Khomeini died while the constitution was being revised; so Khamenei was in fact appointed by a law ratified only after he was already installed as supreme leader.

Yazdi has been trying a different strategy - to take over the Council of Experts from the inside and then overwhelm Khamenei. It's fair to argue that Khamenei has played a very deft hand. He firmly supported Yazdi before the 2005 presidential election, but lately has rallied his followers - and the full machinery of the system - to keep Yazdi and his protege, Ahmadinejad, under control.

"Hashemi" may have been a winner - but most of all it's the supreme leader who seems to be as much in control as he ever was. Khamenei has been politicizing the religious system non-stop, to the point of the Islamic Republic nowadays being neither a democracy nor a theocracy: rather, it's a clerical autocracy.

Neo-conservatives and the Washington establishment should not jump to hasty conclusions. There won't be regime change in Tehran any time soon. This year there has been a serious crackdown on the reformist press, the Internet, personal weblogs, satellite dishes and academia - where more than 50 reformist professors have been targeted.

What is happening now is the moderate/pragmatists reaching a more solid position allied with the reformists - with the extreme right held in check by a supreme leader more supreme than ever. The crocodile may have been rocked. But the Islamic Republic's fierce internal power play is far from over.

Photo: AFP via Yahoo!

FURTHER UPDATE: The blogosphere is a wondrous place. Brian points to this useful post from the always excellent Head Heeb, Jonathan Edelstein on the election results. The one clear conclusion from early results is that the elections confirmed Ahmadinejad's lack of popularity in Tehran.

For a detailed look at how the "clerical autocracy" produces a "selectorate" with limited political space within which there is considerable competition for what must be positions of some political significance, see Professor Matthew Søberg Shugart, Head Orchardist at Fruits & Votes, and his review of initial voting results.

And at Obsidian Wings Hilzoy finds some links on who's in charge of foreign policy in Iran, and Jackmormon sends us to this useful org chart of the Iranian government.

Purple-finger Watch, Iran version (updated)

Fri, 15 Dec 2006 19:20:20 +0000

For all the distortions and failings of Iran's political system, it's always good to remember that it's not monolithic and there is some genuine competition. Today's local elections, along with voting for the assembly of experts, are worth watching.

Iranian voters went to the polls today to elect local councils and a powerful clerical body in the first test of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's popularity since he took office.

In the most direct challenge to his authority, an unlikely alliance of liberal reformers and traditional conservatives will seek to thwart Mr Ahmadinejad's ambitions of winning control of Tehran city council, the country's flagship local authority, and unseating its mayor.

[...]

The local authority elections coincide with a poll to the 86-member assembly of experts, a body of religious figures which meets twice yearly and is empowered to appoint or remove Iran's supreme leader, the country's most powerful political figure.

Turnout is expected to be the key -- a story familiar to any political junkie in the US.

And in more news of domestic Iranian politics, Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial conference didn't pass without some students protesting.

UPDATE: Sami Moubayed, the Syrian political analyst, has a fascinating rundown in AsiaTimesOnline on the Byzantine intrigues and struggles between Ahmadinejad as President and Khamenei as Supreme Leader, over the Council of Experts election.

The COE are the guys who appoint the Supreme Leader, and Moubayed says Ahmadinejad is angling to replace Khamenei with his ideological mentor, Ayatollah Mohammad Taghli Misbah Yazdi. Khamenei has as usual been able to partially rig the election through his indirect control over which candidates have been allowed to run.

Moubayed gives us his take on what this all means for readng Iranian tea leaves and for US policy.

One might ask, how is it that this president, who surprised the world with his victory in 2005, finds himself in a difficult position today, unable to impose his will on Iranian society? Is the Ahmadinejad myth a fabrication created by the US? Is the superman president really human - and weak - after all? Perhaps the Americans concentrated on Ahmadinejad more than they should have, because the real powerbroker in Iran is Khamenei - not Ahmadinejad.

It is Khamenei who supports Hezbollah and Khamenei, rather than the president, who is stubborn when it comes to Iran's nuclear issue. Ahmadinejad is simply a figure of state who has limited domestic authority and by no means is a dictator like Saddam Hussein. He achieved victory not because of his revolutionary views, nor for his support and conviction in the Islamic Revolution, but rather because of his promises to grassroots Iranians. By rhetoric, action, dress and origin, he mirrored their plight and realities.

But Ahmadinejad promised more than he could deliver, forgetting during election time that he was not the ultimate ruler and would have to share power with the Majlis (parliament), the Guardian Council, the COE -- and Khamenei.

[...]

Rafsanjani, however, would have worked with Khamenei as an equal. The supreme leader wanted someone he could manipulate. For the exact same reasons, he is now working against Ahmadinejad, who apparently no longer wants to be manipulated or overpowered.

Rather than criticize Ahmadinejad, the US could bide its time and see how Friday's polls play out. Change can be achieved -- through evolution of the Iranian regime and its own system of checks-and-balances -- rather than revolution, or war.

Food for thought.

Photo: Ruhullah Vahdati/AP. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shows his ink-marked finger after casting his ballot.

Facts on the Ground

Thu, 14 Dec 2006 16:21:20 +0000

Reality keeps racing ahead of any of the options the Bush Administration might consider for Iraq. Though both the ISG Report and the Adminstration throw cold water on a de jure partition strategy, even the soft Gelb-Biden version, the sectarian laundry that's being operated in Baghdad may produce a de facto partition, with lines drawn by which groups can produce the most fear and violence.

There are considerable risks to ignoring the problem simply because the War President wants to defeat the "enemy" (whoever that may be), or because frustrated US officials and military leaders want to put the Mookster in his box, or because some genius has decided on the "Go Shiite" option. The Times of London has published today what it calls a "new" map being used by the US miiltary to trace the "ethno-sectarian fault lines" and "the mixed neighbourhoods considered to be most explosive."

More and more, Baghdad is splintering into Shia and Sunni enclaves that are increasingly no-go areas for anyone from outside. The trend is fuelled by the ugliest sectarianism. It also reflects a crude power grab, with both sides egged on by political parties aiming to maximise their clout in the Iraqi Government by dominating as much of the capital as possible. The result is that since February, when Sunnis bombed the golden-domed mosque in Samarra, a Shia shrine, 146,322 individuals have been displaced in Baghdad, according to the International Organisation for Migration.

[snip]

Four of the five [most explosive neighborhoods] are on the western bank of the Tigris, called Karkh, where mixed neighbourhoods are still prevalent. Predominently Shia Kadhamiya and the largely Sunni areas of Qadisiya, Amariya and Ghazaliya have become the deadliest battlegrounds, according to US forces.

The violent struggle for neighbourhoods goes well beyond a fight among outlaws. Armed groups belonging to the parliament’s two main Sunni and Shia political blocs fuel much of the violence, according to senior Iraqi officials. “There is a very clear connection between some of the displacements caused by armed groups in some neighbourhoods in and around Baghdad and the political parties that are in the Council of Representatives,” Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the Iraqi National Security Adviser, told The Times.

Most debates about the "new way forward" for the US in Iraq have ignored a swelling refugee crisis stoked by violence, with large numbers of Iraqis not only displaced internally but leaving the country.

In a report released this week, Refugees International, a Washington-based advocacy group, put the total at close to two million and called their flight “the fastest-growing humanitarian crisis in the world.” Its president, Kenneth Bacon, said, “The United States and its allies sparked the current chaos in Iraq, but they are doing little to ease the humanitarian crisis caused by the current exodus.”

There are many good reasons for the widespread reluctance to contemplate abandoning the dream of a unitary Iraq. One of the most frequently cited is that it could spark a regional conflict as Iraq's neighbors get pulled into protecting their clients or proxies among Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups or, like Turkey, take steps to protect themselves from the fallout. But between the current civil war and the refugee crisis, the regionalization of the conflict looks to be just a matter of time if the US stays on its present course.

Since the ISG Report was issued, there's been an increased amount of news coverage of the refugee problem -- see SusanUnPC at No Quarter, who has been tracking the issue. The NYT did a big story on the problem, drawing on a recent UN report and showing the problems confronting Iraq's neighbors, especially Jordan and Syria.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated in a report released last month that more than 1.6 million Iraqis have left since March 2003, nearly 7 percent of the population. Jordanian security officials say more than 750,000 are in and around Amman, a city of 2.5 million. Syrian officials estimate that up to one million have gone to the suburbs of Damascus, a city of three million. An additional 150,000 have landed in Cairo. Every month, 100,000 more join them in Syria and Jordan, the report said.

Syria, which is the only country keeping its borders open, is particularly affected, as Kenneth Bacon of Refugees International explained in a WashPost op-ed:

[Syria] can't maintain its open-door policy without international support. Refugees already strain social services. Yet, the international response to the Iraqi refugee crisis has been dismal. Despite numbers that rival the displacement in Darfur, there has been scant media attention and even less political concern. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is doing little.

An increase in resources for UNHCR could make a huge difference. As winter approaches, the need is growing for portable heaters, warm clothing and help in paying electric bills and warm clothing. Mental health services for traumatized Iraqis are equally needed. And legal and financial help to maintain their visa status would prevent deportations back to a precarious life in Iraq.

The refugee problem isn't solely a humanitarian crisis in the making. The disappearance of much of Iraq's professional class, which has consistently been a disproportionate target of violence since 2003, will cripple any chance for Iraq to build a functioning government, social sector or economy. Even six months ago, the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants was estimating that 40 percent of Iraq's professionals had fled the country. The number today must be considerably higher.

Yesterday, the interior ministers of Jordan and Iraq met to coordinate intelligence and counterterrorism, with border issues including exit visas and residency permits on the agenda. Perhaps the ministers also took up the problem of relocating the Iranian Kurds who have been camped for the past two years in No Man's Land on the Iraqi side of the Jordanian border.

Also yesterday, Senator Bill Nelson (D-FLA) met in Damascus with Asaad, who said Syria would be willing to "cooperate with the U.S. to control the porous border between Syria and Iraq used by insurgents". Given the urgency and severity of Syria's problem dealing with Iraqi refugees, Asaad's indication of interest shouldn't simply be dismissed. Methinks there ought to be something of mutual interest to talk to the Syrians about.

The dilemmas presented by sectarian cleansing and refugees aren't restricted to internal displacement or spill-over in the region. The refugee problem is also beginning to raise its ugly head for US immigration policy. George Packer recently argued "If the United States leaves Iraq, our last shred of honor and decency will require us to save as many of these Iraqis as possible." He advocates:

We should start issuing visas in Baghdad, as well as in the regional embassies in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, and Basra. We should issue them liberally, which means that we should vastly increase our quota for Iraqi refugees. (Last year, it was fewer than 200.) We should prepare contingency plans for massive airlifts and ground escorts. We should be ready for desperate and angry crowds at the gates of the Green Zone and U.S. bases. We should not allow wishful thinking to put off these decisions until it's too late. We should not compound our betrayals of Iraqis who put their hopes in our hands.

Changing US policy vis a vis Iraqi refugees isn't going to be a simple task, however. In a look at the issue over at The Plank, Brad Plumer neatly summarizes the mess the Bush Administration finds itself in:

Ah. The administration won't prepare for an onslaught of refugees because it still thinks it's going to "win," whatever that means--or at least doesn't want to give the impression that things are bad (because no one would figure it out otherwise.). It also seems like there's a potential battle-in-waiting with regards to Iraq's Christians, who are currently enduring "killings, torture, destruction of churches, assassination of priests, and confiscation of property." I assume that religious leaders in this country will, at some point, make a major push to have them accepted as refugees--but it would pose some rather obvious problems if the United States were to offer asylum to Iraqi Christians and shut its door to Muslims who want out.

Soft partition may start looking like a better and better option.

UPDATE: Rick Moran (RightWingNutHouse agrees this a problem we should be talking to the Syrians (and Iranians) about, sooner rather than later. And Eric awards a score to Jim Henley in the Thirty Years War of the blog titles.

Data on Baghdad's displaced persons from TimesOnline:

City of the displaced

6.7m : the population of Baghdad

146,322: Baghdad residents displaced since February

38,766: displaced persons living in Baghdad (as of December 11)

85 per cent of displaced living in Baghdad come from within the city

72 per cent of displaced living in Baghdad are Shia

27 per cent of displaced living in Baghdad are Sunni

17 per cent of displaced living in Baghdad are Yazidi

Source: International Organisation for Migration

US military map of Baghdad: via TimesOnline

Graphic of Iraqi refugees: via NYT

NATO sitting ducks?

Thu, 14 Dec 2006 15:50:41 +0000

That's the conclusion of Asia Time's senior guy who covers Pakistan, Syed Saleem Shahzad, when he did a tour of the Taliban in the Kandahar area. It's hair-raising stuff. Quotes from an interview with one of the Taliban's local military leaders:

"They used to carry out air strikes. Now this has come to an end. They did have an effective network of informers, but we have successfully eliminated it and therefore they do not have any knowledge of our bases, so the air strikes stopped. They have conducted limited ground operations, but they came under attack. So they stopped. We do not attack their base because they would retaliate with air strikes," said Qari.

"So what are you doing here, just having your meals, drinking tea and roaming all around with your weapons?" My question elicited a burst of laughter in the room.

"Yes, and they are bored in their bases with no chance to do any activities," Qari said, smiling. "We are not in any haste. Since the masses invited the Taliban to come down [from the mountains] to their areas, our strength is increasing with every passing day. Six months ago, groups of Taliban were operating with about 10 people. Now they have 50 members and growing. So we have enough time till next spring, and they [NATO] know what will happen until next year," Qari said.

"What will happen and what do they know?" I asked.

"They know that we will mobilize our strength and occupy the Herat-Kandahar highway and establish our pockets all over," said Qari.

"So that way you will isolate the Sangin district and the district of Gerishk - cut them off from the rest of the country?" I asked.

"Yes. And then we will not give them a chance to even find an escape route in their helicopters. We will hold parts of the Kandahar-Herat highway and our friends will hold other points. So Kandahar and other places will automatically come under siege and there will be little chance of reinforcements," Qari said, eating his final piece of bread.

"Until then they are sitting here, we are sitting here, face to face and all around them."

Yikes! No wonder the growing complaints in the UK about military overstretch are coming from all quarters these days.

Photo: Asia Times Online

Shakeup in Saudi?

Tue, 12 Dec 2006 14:38:24 +0000

Via Robin Wright in the WashPost, Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, has resigned his post suddenly and flown home.

Turki, a long-serving former intelligence chief, told his staff yesterday afternoon that he wanted to spend more time with his family, according to Arab diplomats. Colleagues said they were shocked at the decision.

The exit -- without the fanfare, parties and tributes that normally accompany a leading envoy's departure, much less a public statement -- comes as his brother, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the highly influential Saudi foreign minister, is ailing.

[snip]

Turki has been the subject of both high praise and controversy. In the 1980s, while he was intelligence chief, he reportedly met al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden several times during the U.S.- and Saudi-backed support of mujaheddin fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He subsequently denounced bin Laden.

Turki later served as ambassador to Britain. "He was regarded as being one of the most effective ambassadors from any country and was held in very high regard," a British diplomat said yesterday.

Awkward timing to say the least, given how the Saudis are up to their necks in addressing crises in Lebanon and Iraq, dealing with the Syrians and Israeli/Palestinian matters, and navigating Gulf-Iranian relations. Saudi-bashing may be a favorite intramural sport, but it's disconcerting if there's a vacuum there, even temporary.

Photo: Getty Images, via WashPost.