| Search |
| Recent comments |
|
| User login |
| Recent blog posts |
|
|
| Navigation |
| Who's online |
| There are currently 0 users and 15 guests online. |
| Who's new |
| Browse archives |
| Feeds |
|
|
nadezhda's blog
[updated below]
Speculation is currently running hot on the political future, or lack thereof, of America's "ally" in Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki. Will the Bush Administration finally try to change horses?
But the US may be looking at a change of horses, voluntary or not, in another important "ally." With yesterday's ruling by Pakistan's Supreme Court that ex-Prime Minister (and mortal Musharraf enemy) Nawaz Sharif can return from exile, Blake Hounshell asks "how long can Musharraf hang on?" He notes:
For a U.S. administration that is nervous about a resurgent al Qaeda and is busy trying to convince Musharraf to share power with Benazir Bhutto, things are getting a little out of hand. Your move, George.
Let me dust off my crystal ball and speculate on George's next move.
As Blake's question suggests, things haven't been going quite according to plan for Musharraf this year. BBC provides a useful timeline:
- 9 March: Musharraf suspends chief justice (Chaudry) for "abuse of power". Lawyers protest
- April: Protests grow, amid clashes with police
- 12 May: 34 people die as rival political groups clash in Karachi
- 11 July: 102 people die when army storms radical Red Mosque in Islamabad
- July-Aug: Sharp rise in suicide attacks by pro-Taleban militants
- 20 July: Supreme Court reinstates chief justice
- 9 Aug: Musharraf rejects emergency rule
- 23 Aug: Supreme Court says exiled ex-PM Nawaz Sharif can return
Elections are to be held in the coming months, but there are more than a couple of wrinkles that have to be ironed out before then. Musharraf intends to retain both the presidency and his uniform as head of Pakistan's military, but the Supreme Court is almost certain to rule that is unconstitutional, which is one of the reasons why Musharraf tried unsuccessfully to sack Chaudry in the first place.
As for the other main players, both ex-PM Benazir Bhutto and Sharif have a bit of unfinished personal legal business if and when they return to Pakistan to contest the elections. Bhutto may have found a formula by which the incredible financial corruption during her regime can be, incredibly but neatly, laid exclusively at the door of her blatantly corrupt husband. Sharif and his brother are still facing charges over the failed attempt to oust Musharraf as head of the military, when the military in response replaced Sharif's civilian government with Musharraf. Setting aside the merits of future legal proceedings against the former PMs, it's clear that Musharraf can no longer rely on a compliant court system to hamstring his political opponents.
The Bush Administration has reportedly been encouraging Musharraf and Bhutto to work out some sort of power-sharing, but no indications of positive results have been forthcoming. Since the main thing Bhutto and Sharif seem to have agreed on during their respective exiles has been their intense opposition to Musharraf and each other, the prospect of Sharif's return is going to make power-sharing discussions both more complex and, at least from the US view, more imperative. At the very least, the US isn't going to want to see electoral competition among the "moderate" parties enhance the political strength of the Islamists or increase any further Musharraf's reluctance to go after US enemies. It has been this very fear of Islamist political power which has been at the root of the Bush Administraton's continued support of Musharraf, despite widespread unhappiness with his performance.
Blake in an American Prospect article from March advocated the US stop supporting Musharraf, who has been failing on the counter-terrorism mission, and instead insist on real elections that would include the exiled leaders of the big political parties. Musharraf isn't the indispensable figure he's made himself out to be. Simple demographics show that an Islamist takeover via the poll box is highly unlikely. Nor is Musharraf the key to US relations with the Pakistani military. According to Blake, Musharraf's departure from the Presidency "would be a welcome return to normalcy for the Army, which considers running the country an annoying diversion from its core mission of preparing for war with India." Blake speculated the aftermath of elections would be far more benign than feared.
There might be a period of political uncertainty, but behind the scenes, the Army would keep relations with the United States on an even keel. "I don't think either Benazir or Nawaz Sharif would change much, because they would know that Western economic and military assistance is crucial for Pakistan's government, says [Hasan-Askari] Rizvi. There might be some populist anti-American rhetoric, but "even if Musharraf goes, Pakistan's counterterrorism policy is not going to change. Maybe five to 10 percent." That's because, although Musharraf often portrays himself as Washington's indispensable ally, he's really just the point man for broader military-to-military ties between the two countries.
Blake concluded that the embrace of a "weak leader with little political legitimacy" is a foolish way for the US to pursue its national security priorities.
Now that there is the prospect of the sort of elections Blake was calling for, is the US likely to follow the balance of Blake's recommendations and cut Musharraf adrift? I doubt the Bush Administration will try to change horses now. Following yesterday's ruling, Musharraf is making noises about "national and political reconciliation" -- although he seems to be saying reconciliation is to follow, not proceed, the elections. Syed Saleem Shahzad of AsiaTimes thinks a government of "national unity", headed by Musharraf, is in the offing.
Street politics in the near term will grab most of the headlines in Pakistan, but the US and its allies are unlikely to change horses in midstream. They are banking on Musharraf to keep hold of the reins, at least until an orderly return to a strong civilian government can be guaranteed.
Shahzad seems to be putting his money on the ultimate powerbrokers continuing to be the US and the Pakistani military and on their continuing support of Musharraf.
Neither Bhutto nor Sharif, nor their patronage-dominated political parties, is a compelling vehicle to accomplish national reconciliation, given their trackrecords both in and out of power. Although Musharraf may not be key to the US-Pakistani security relationship in the long run, neither Benazir nor Sharif has a strong enough core constituency in the Pakistani military for the US to risk openly shifting its political support. Though the US will probably place a few side bets to hedge their risk.
Rather than change horses, I expect the US to embrace fervently each hint from any of the political leaders that "national reconciliation" is possible. In the search for a pony, the Bush Administration will try to bring pressure to bear on Musharraf's non-Islamist opponents to join whatever "national unity" arrangements emerge before or after the elections.
If both Bhutto and Sharif return to contest the elections, the US has an easier job putting a public face on its policies -- lots of cheerleading for the "freedom agenda" and "transformational diplomacy," and sage noises about the "will of the Pakistani people" and the importance of "reconciliation." Ironically, within the Administration, electoral competition will weaken the arguments of those who have become so disenchanted with Musharraf's performance re the Taliban and AlQaeda that they've been promoting "democracy" as the best way to throw the bum out. Promoting a "national reconciliation" program via elections won't increase US leverage in the near term over Musharraf or his counter-terrorism policies.
Whether Pakistan is another case of trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, as in Iraq (or Lebanon), remains to be tested. It seems to me that the real key to the success of this policy in the shortrun, over which the US has little control, is whether Musharraf can indeed "keep hold of the reins," which au fond is the question Blake is posing. Pakistan's judiciary has loosened Musharraf's old grip, but they've also changed the game somewhat, and it's not clear to me that Musharraf's opponents are any closer to challenging his ultimate control. There will certainly be a good deal of theatre over the issue of Musharaff's uniform, since most observers expect the judiciary to rule against him. But will the confrontation become existential?
Retired Major-General Jamshed Ayaz Khan, the president of a national policy think-tank, the Institute of Regional Studies, expects a multi-step process within an agreed "national unity" framework among most of the major parties:
"Even Nawaz Sharif will eventually gravitate towards reconciliation," said Khan.
"The president will have to be elected from Parliament, with uniform, and he will be backed by the military. But only for a transition phase. The military understands that the election of Musharraf in uniform is essential for a smooth transition of power from military hands to a civilian setup," said Khan.
Where the anticipated court ruling against the uniform fits into this scenario is unclear. Perhaps Khan is speculating that the "national unity" arrangement will include an accord to give Musharraf's uniform a few more months of symbolic life beyond the constitutional limits.
As for George W, one assumes that, if nothing else, the Pakistan court's ruling in favor of Sharif has clarified US policy. This is one of those cases in which realpolitik and national values converge, at least on the surface. The Bush Administration will have a public stake in the sort of free and fair electoral process Blake advocated earlier, and it will want that process to go forward without crises. "National reconciliation" is going to be the flavor of the month at the White House which, given the Pakistani military, is likely to mean Musarraf will remain the central figure, at least as viewed from Washington. So unless Musharraf loses hold of the reins before the elections, I would expect the US to try to avoid upsetting the apple cart with the Pakistani electorate, Musharraf or the Pakistani military. Which means no major brouhaha with Pakistan over Afghanistan and AlQaeda. Or in other words, plus ça change...
[UPDATE]
Ah ha! My question answered re the multi-step gavotte over Musharaff's uniform. Benazir Bhutto was on Jim Lehrer, where she provided some details about the deal she's negotiating with Musharraf. She'll get the graft charges dropped, among other items.
Asked what she was offering in return, Bhutto sketched a path through the legal labyrinth that other opposition parties insist preclude Musharraf’s staying on in power.
“There are going to be two presidential elections. The first presidential election is going to take place in September, when General Musharraf is still wearing the (military) uniform,” Ms Bhutto said.
While her Pakistan People’s Party could not vote for him while he remains army chief, she suggested it would endorse him later if he gives up that post. “If the (parliamentary) elections are fair, and we have a level playing field, and he seeks re-election from the next assembly, then certainly the parliament can consider that, if the uniform is not there,” she said.
Sharif's return is likely to be a bit more complicated -- I get the feeling Musharraf really does believe Sharif tried to kill him.
Steve Clemons' take is worth a read: Sharif's Return Shouldn't Change Our Strategy in Pakistan [as I argue above, it won't unless Pakistani politics really blows up].
Here's a follow-up to today's bombings in Algeria and Brian's del.icio.us clips of articles on alQaeda in Algeria and a growing crackdown in Morocco. ABC's The Blotter is reporting that French counterterrorism officials have been on "high alert" in anticipation of a Spring Offensive by alQaeda.
French intelligence officials tell ABC News they have recently increased to 45 the number of terrorist cells they have identified operating in their country, and that they have been on "high alert" for several months. Algerian intelligence sources likewise say they believe "dozens" of terrorist cells linked to an Al Qaeda affiliate have been deployed throughout North Africa.
The Algerian terrorist group thought to be at the center of the offensive, known as "Al Qaeda in the Maghreb," claimed responsibility for today's attacks in a video statement posted on the internet. The post contained three photos of suicide bombers they claimed carried out the attack, and an ominous note that the bombing was "the first of its kind."
[snip]
Today's bombing was only the most recent by the Algerian jihadi group. In February, the group claimed responsibility for seven simultaneous bombings outside police facilities in two Algerian provinces, which reportedly killed six people.
In Morocco, concerns over terrorism are also running high. Yesterday, four members of a terrorist cell linked to a bombing at a cybercafe last month were killed by Moroccan security forces.
Announced today, French security for political events for the upcoming presidential elections will be tightened.
Not surprisingly, there are concerns that some of the increased activity reflects jihadis learning their trade in Iraq, but the cells in France and the Magreb don't seem to rely on the sort of safehaven infrastructure in Iraq posited by Michael Scheuer.
Tell me again, how is the flypaper theory is supposed to work?
Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has suffered a potentially fatal blow to his authority after the country's supreme leader gave an apparent green light for MPs to attack his economic policies.
In an unprecedented rebuke, 150 parliamentarians signed a letter blaming Mr Ahmadinejad for raging inflation and high unemployment and criticising his government's failure to deliver the budget on time. They also condemned him for embarking on a tour of Latin America - from which he returns tomorrow - at a time of mounting crisis.
The signatories included a majority of the president's former fundamentalist allies, now apparently seeking to distance themselves as his prestige wanes.
MPs also criticised Mr Ahmadinejad's role in the UN security council dispute over Iran's nuclear programme amid growing evidence that the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has ordered him to stay silent on the issue.
The supreme leader, who was hitherto loyal to the president, is said to blame Mr Ahmadinejad for last month's UN resolution imposing sanctions over Iran's refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment.
Ayatollah Khamenei has ultimate authority on foreign policy, and is rumoured to be so disillusioned with Mr Ahmadinejad's performance that he has refused to meet him on occasion.
In a further indicator, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, the leader of parliament's fundamentalists and a former lieutenant who helped the president choose his cabinet, denounced Mr Ahmadinejad's economic policies as "wrong" and told him to stop blaming others.
The mounting criticism is fuelling speculation that Mr Ahmadinejad is politically doomed. Observers have even suggested he might be impeached and removed from office.
[snip]
But Iran's deepening economic woes, which prompted Sunday's letter from MPs, suggest that the worst may have yet to come for a man elected on promises to raise living standards and distribute the nation's oil wealth more evenly.
Those pledges jar with increasingly grim realities. Inflation is higher than when Mr Ahmadinejad took office 17 months ago, while unemployment, officially estimated at 12% but probably much higher, has not improved.
Uncontrolled inflation has resulted in soaring food prices and has had a drastic effect on the housing market. Anecdotal evidence suggests house prices and rents in Tehran have risen 50% in six months.
In a poignant development, the government plans to ration petrol to cut rising import costs incurred by Iran's lack of refinery capacity. The proposal gives an ironic twist to Mr Ahmadinejad's election promise to put the country's oil wealth "on people's tables".
The president's growing army of opponents blame the situation on the government's chaotic approach. The failure to deliver a budget bill on time is being attributed to Mr Ahmadinejad's decision to disband the management and planning organisation, a government agency responsible for setting spending priorities but which upset the president by opposing some of his costlier proposals.
Apologies to one and all for the extended down-time for the site. I've just learned how to repair MYSQL databases that have been corrupted when the host server crashes. Just wish "learning from experience" wasn't such an awkward way to acquire rudimentary techie skills!
And for all of us who are Legal Fiction regulars, today's good news is we can now get our publius fix over at Obsidian Wings. One stop shopping, yay!
There's been a great deal of moaning that the ISG Report brought forth a mouse which has vanished from relevancy in near-record time. Personally, I'm of the James Fallows view, that the ISG Report will eventually be seen as the "Walter Cronkite" of the Iraq war that shifts the basis of any future debates.
I recognize that many were suspicious of the entire ISG process, given James Baker's role as "fixer" in 2000, and his long-standing loyalty to the Bush clan. Supposedly, Baker's goal was to give Junior a face-saving way out of the mess he's made in Mesopotamia. However, I've watched Baker in action as a government official in three administrations, and in a considerable range of roles. No one would mistake his style for Broderish bi-partisanism. But Baker has repeatedly earned my admiration for his constructive approach to problems and his effectiveness, even when I often opposed the policies or Presidents he was working for. In his capacity as Treasury Secretary, he was one of the better we've had on international financial system issues, especially when compared to his immediate predecessor and successor. And we could certainly have done worse than the Bush-Scowcroft-Baker team during the collapse of the Soviet empire.
Considering both Baker's long political experience and his first-hand familiarity with George W Bush's personality, I doubt Baker held any serious expectations that the ISG's 79 recommendations would be adopted in whole or in part by the White House, despite his marketing the Report as a package deal. From my perspective, Baker's real goal -- if not the goal of the other commissioners -- was to shift the dynamics of both domestic politics and diplomacy on the complex constellation of Iraq/Middle East/Iran/GWOT issues. Or perhaps better stated, to reintroduce a sustainable political process to both the domestic and diplomatic arenas -- to recover, in Bismark's terms, "politics" as the "art of the possible".
Baker titled his memoirs as Secretary of State: The Politics of Diplomacy. In the Preface (pp xiv-xv), he explains why he is convinced that the skills in the art of the possible are as relevant in international relations as in domestic governance. The passage is worth reading because it's not simply the self-serving platitudes of a memoirist. It's an eerily prescient and devastating critique of the conduct of foreign policy by the current Administration over the past six years, not in abstract terms of unilateralism or realism or liberalism or neo-conservatism, but in the practical lingo of a politician.
Politics (in its larger sense -- as opposed to specific electoral campaigns) and policy are inextricably linked. It's only through politics that we can transform philosophy into policy. This is particularly true in geopolitics, where the difference between success and failure is often measured by the ability (or lack thereof) to understand how political constraints inevitably shape the outcome of any negotiation. Indeed, I would argue, with a nod to Clausewitz, that diplomacy is the continuation of politics -- whether in revolution, war, or peace.
We sometimes overlook the fact that most foreign leaders are themselves politicians, frequently elected or members of some ruling party. These senior foreign officials view their problems, and opportunities, through political eyes. To persuade them, it is often helpful to put oneself in their shoes -- to determine how to help them expain, justify, or even rationalize positions to their colleagues and publics. Not surprisingly, foreign political leaders also respect counterparts who can work domstically in order to deliver internationally.
The political skill extends beyond one-on-one relations to the task of building coalitions. Effective U.S. leadership often depends on the ability to persuade others to join with us so we can extend our influence; to build a coalition, a diplomat needs to appreciate what objectives, arguments, and trade-offs are important to would-be partners. To be successful over time, the politician-diplomat also needs to win the confidence of others. That means words must be matched by deeds and promises must be kept.
As in the political world at home, coalitions abroad tend to endure if they are based on shared ideas and purposes. Part of the political diplomat's job is to tend to these alliances, or partnerships, because the time will certainly come when their support will be critical. Differences are inevitable, but they need not overwhelm larger common causes.
Since 9/11, the Bush White House has confused electoral politics with the politics of domestic policy and diplomacy. It has applied its polarizing, "us vs them," Rovian approach to both domestic governance and international relations. Baker, by contrast, is capable of distinguishing between the zero-sum winner-take-all logic of election campaigns versus the politics of managing mutual and conflicting interests in governance and diplomacy. Baker (and Bush pere) is demonstratively of the "win-win" school, which tries to maximize one's interests over the long haul while giving the other party a positive framework in which cooperation can develop and be sustained. Quite a contrast to Junior's "slash and burn" style that tries to demonize, dominate or destroy the other, whether potential partner or enemy.
Clearly, without the thumping Bush received in the midterm elections, the White House would not have been forced to address so publicly the process of defining a "new way forward" in Iraq. And it's also true that, since the initial hullabaloo of the ISG Report's release, its many specific recommendations have failed to become the organizing principles for debate. But the discussions surrounding the release of the Report have succeeded in shining a light on this White House's l'etat c'est moi tendencies. Politics -- in the sense of debate and process, not just political rhetoric -- is starting to be linked again with policy.
Bush continues to claim that, as the Decider, he only has to believe, in the purity of his heart, that he's doing the right thing and await history's verdict. But fewer and fewer are buying that argument. The media, the political class and the military are finally starting to challenge the notion that the Decider has no constraints. There are indeed many constraints on this President which are increasingly being asserted -- the opinion of a large majority of the American public, the views of the military and government staff who will have to try to implement his decisions, and the hard, cruel reality of facts-on-the-ground.
Also thanks to the ISG Report, it is now legitimate for the political class and media to place the violence in Iraq within a broader regional context and less within the "terrorism" straight-jacket. Making it increasingly acceptable to ask in public simple questions such as "how do you expect the regimes in Iran and Syria to do what you want if you won't talk with them and your ultimate objective is to overthrow them?" Or "why should people in the Middle East accept the version of a 'new Middle East' you seem to want to impose"?
The radicalism of the Bush-Cheney-Rove unified theory of elections, governance and "diplomacy" has produced six years during which normal politics -- both domestic and international -- have been MIA. It's ironic that during this period the smallest thing has been hyper-politicized while "politics" has ceased to mean "the art of the possible." The current Administration shows no signs of changing its spots, so a return to "normalcy" for both our political system and diplomacy will have to wait for a new occupant of the White House. And the "last throes" of this Administration clearly won't be pretty. But there are indications that this strange period we've been living through is starting to come to an end, that politicians and media alike are slowly waking up from a long nightmare.
And in the years to come, one of the most important people we have to thank may be James Baker.
This will be a growing story -- Abizaid's supporters say his hands were tied by politics and an insurgency that Bush Admin wouldn't recognize. --n
Abizaid is truly beloved and respected by those who fought and served under him before this stint as CENTCOM commander. Unlike Tommy Franks, whose reputation has continued to crater, Abizaid is going to have a number of highly motivated defenders who will try to pin responsibility for Iraq failures elsewhere. I think history will show that Abizaid's failures weren't due to lack of understanding, imagination or personal leadership but rather that he was caught in a number of factors, such as:
- the irreconcilable internal contradictions of the Bush Admin's "strategy" and policies both in Iraq and in the GWOT more broadly
- the huge rhetoric/reality gap in the GWOT and its inappropriate application to the conflicts the US was trying to manage in Iraq (hence Abizaid's leadership in introducing the "long war" terminology to stress the non-military dimensions across the so-called crescent of instability, most of which in his region)
- the lack of preparedness of the US military for stabilization and COIN operations
- the DOD/Army bureaucracies that failed to set the right priorities to rapidly produce and scale-up the resources (trained personnel, equipment, support such as translators etc) needed by field commanders to implement any sensible COIN strategy on a theatre-wide basis -- so Abizaid chose to try to reduce the amount of face-to-face interaction between US forces and the Iraqi population rather than attempt a widespread Tal Afar-type approach
- Rumsfeld's disastrous handling of potential allies that could have offered early support, not just militarily but economically and politically, and a way to "internationalize" the occupation and the US exit
- total confusion in the chain of command.
Since Abizaid himself was certainly aware that the Bush Admin's ever-shifting "policies" didn't add up to a strategy, and since there was clearly a limit to his authority over operations in Baghdad and his ability to get the resources he needed, the big question is should he have stayed and tried to make the best of it. Or should he have left several years ago, as an indirect way of sending the message that the Bush Admin approach was FUBAR.
It's an ongoing tension in civil-military relations that's compounded by the admirable "can do" attitude of the most successful of the military's leadership. I expect Abizaid's story will be an important case study in the future literature on civil-military relations.--n
It's still too early for final results, especially in Tehran, much to the grumbles of the anti-Ahmadinejad forces. But it's already clear that the results of the twin elections, for local councils and the Council of Experts, are quite positive for the alliance of Ahmadinejad opponents.
The alliance of reformers and "technocratic" conservatives made a big election day splash with a highly publicized joint appearance at a polling station by the former Presidents Rafsanjani (on right), the "pragmatic conservative," and Khatami, the "reformer." In recent elections, reformists have split into several camps, whereas this time it was the conservatives who were divided.
Rafsanjani, whose political obituary has been written several times in the past, has beat all expectations in the most widely watched race -- the Council (or Assembly) of Experts. As I mentioned earlier, the COE is a small body without much day-to-day business but with enormous power, since it appoints Iran's supreme leader. Ahmadinejad was trying to get his mentor, Yazdi, elected. Yazdi will likely win a seat, but he's trailing significantly behind Rafsanjani, who is leading convincingly, as well as several other candidates. Symbolically, the results are striking, and the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, must be rather relieved. From the Times of London:
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative and former President, was trouncing the hardline Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi and more than 400,000 votes ahead of his nearest rival.
The vote, characterised as a fight between the Shark and the Crocodile, the nicknames of Mr Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, respectively, was symbolic of the assembly elections as a whole. “The results show that voters have learnt from the past and concluded that we need to balance the political scene and support moderate figures,” declared Kargozaran, a newspaper close to Mr Rafsanjani.
Turnout appears to have been high relative to prior elections. As mentioned previously, this was widely expected to be key if the anti-Ahmadinejad forces were to make a good showing. In addition to doing well in the COE voting, reformist candidates claim to have picked up at least six of fifteen seats on Tehran's city council. In other cities, results were also mixed, but the basic pattern is that the Ahmadinejad allies will not be dominating local councils.
In Isfahan, Iran's third city, reformists won two seats on the city council, with Ahmadinejad loyalists and moderate conservatives winning five seats apiece, the Mehr news agency reported.
[...]
Elsewhere, women put in an impressive show, with 25-year-old reformist Fatemeh Houshmand winning the largest number of votes in the southern city of Shiraz -- a feat repeated by female candidates in four other cities.
Ahmadinejad was putting the best spin on things, highlighting the high turnout. The Times of London reports:
He said that the higher-than-expected turnout of about 60 per cent was a show of support for Iran’s Islamic system and claimed that this would help the country to confront its enemies.
“Friday’s elections were the most popular in the world,” he said. “The Iranian people have taken a decision to reach the summit of progress. As soon as they saw that the enemy wants to stop them doing something, they carried it out.”
The results will certainly please Western capitals. Not that we should expect any major shifts in Iran's foreign policy, which in any event isn't controlled by Ahmadinejad.
UPDATE: Here's Pepe Escobar's take in AsiaTimesOnline on what is being increasingly seen in the international press as a "stunning victory" for the alliance (and Supreme Leader Khamenei):
The only crucial policy the Council of Experts has implemented since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has been to appoint Khamenei as Khomeini's successor and new supreme leader, in 1989. It was in fact a white coup - because according to the constitution at the time the supreme leader had to be a marja (source of imitation and top religious leader). Khamenei was not up to standards. Khomeini died while the constitution was being revised; so Khamenei was in fact appointed by a law ratified only after he was already installed as supreme leader.
Yazdi has been trying a different strategy - to take over the Council of Experts from the inside and then overwhelm Khamenei. It's fair to argue that Khamenei has played a very deft hand. He firmly supported Yazdi before the 2005 presidential election, but lately has rallied his followers - and the full machinery of the system - to keep Yazdi and his protege, Ahmadinejad, under control.
"Hashemi" may have been a winner - but most of all it's the supreme leader who seems to be as much in control as he ever was. Khamenei has been politicizing the religious system non-stop, to the point of the Islamic Republic nowadays being neither a democracy nor a theocracy: rather, it's a clerical autocracy.
Neo-conservatives and the Washington establishment should not jump to hasty conclusions. There won't be regime change in Tehran any time soon. This year there has been a serious crackdown on the reformist press, the Internet, personal weblogs, satellite dishes and academia - where more than 50 reformist professors have been targeted.
What is happening now is the moderate/pragmatists reaching a more solid position allied with the reformists - with the extreme right held in check by a supreme leader more supreme than ever. The crocodile may have been rocked. But the Islamic Republic's fierce internal power play is far from over.
Photo: AFP via Yahoo!
FURTHER UPDATE: The blogosphere is a wondrous place. Brian points to this useful post from the always excellent Head Heeb, Jonathan Edelstein on the election results. The one clear conclusion from early results is that the elections confirmed Ahmadinejad's lack of popularity in Tehran.
For a detailed look at how the "clerical autocracy" produces a "selectorate" with limited political space within which there is considerable competition for what must be positions of some political significance, see Professor Matthew Søberg Shugart, Head Orchardist at Fruits & Votes, and his review of initial voting results.
And at Obsidian Wings Hilzoy finds some links on who's in charge of foreign policy in Iran, and Jackmormon sends us to this useful org chart of the Iranian government.
Iranian voters went to the polls today to elect local councils and a powerful clerical body in the first test of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's popularity since he took office.
In the most direct challenge to his authority, an unlikely alliance of liberal reformers and traditional conservatives will seek to thwart Mr Ahmadinejad's ambitions of winning control of Tehran city council, the country's flagship local authority, and unseating its mayor.
[...]
The local authority elections coincide with a poll to the 86-member assembly of experts, a body of religious figures which meets twice yearly and is empowered to appoint or remove Iran's supreme leader, the country's most powerful political figure.
Turnout is expected to be the key -- a story familiar to any political junkie in the US.
And in more news of domestic Iranian politics, Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial conference didn't pass without some students protesting.
UPDATE: Sami Moubayed, the Syrian political analyst, has a fascinating rundown in AsiaTimesOnline on the Byzantine intrigues and struggles between Ahmadinejad as President and Khamenei as Supreme Leader, over the Council of Experts election.
The COE are the guys who appoint the Supreme Leader, and Moubayed says Ahmadinejad is angling to replace Khamenei with his ideological mentor, Ayatollah Mohammad Taghli Misbah Yazdi. Khamenei has as usual been able to partially rig the election through his indirect control over which candidates have been allowed to run.
Moubayed gives us his take on what this all means for readng Iranian tea leaves and for US policy.
One might ask, how is it that this president, who surprised the world with his victory in 2005, finds himself in a difficult position today, unable to impose his will on Iranian society? Is the Ahmadinejad myth a fabrication created by the US? Is the superman president really human - and weak - after all? Perhaps the Americans concentrated on Ahmadinejad more than they should have, because the real powerbroker in Iran is Khamenei - not Ahmadinejad.
It is Khamenei who supports Hezbollah and Khamenei, rather than the president, who is stubborn when it comes to Iran's nuclear issue. Ahmadinejad is simply a figure of state who has limited domestic authority and by no means is a dictator like Saddam Hussein. He achieved victory not because of his revolutionary views, nor for his support and conviction in the Islamic Revolution, but rather because of his promises to grassroots Iranians. By rhetoric, action, dress and origin, he mirrored their plight and realities.
But Ahmadinejad promised more than he could deliver, forgetting during election time that he was not the ultimate ruler and would have to share power with the Majlis (parliament), the Guardian Council, the COE -- and Khamenei.
[...]
Rafsanjani, however, would have worked with Khamenei as an equal. The supreme leader wanted someone he could manipulate. For the exact same reasons, he is now working against Ahmadinejad, who apparently no longer wants to be manipulated or overpowered.
Rather than criticize Ahmadinejad, the US could bide its time and see how Friday's polls play out. Change can be achieved -- through evolution of the Iranian regime and its own system of checks-and-balances -- rather than revolution, or war.
Food for thought.
Photo: Ruhullah Vahdati/AP. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shows his ink-marked finger after casting his ballot.
Reality keeps racing ahead of any of the options the Bush Administration might consider for Iraq. Though both the ISG Report and the Adminstration throw cold water on a de jure partition strategy, even the soft Gelb-Biden version, the sectarian laundry that's being operated in Baghdad may produce a de facto partition, with lines drawn by which groups can produce the most fear and violence.
There are considerable risks to ignoring the problem simply because the War President wants to defeat the "enemy" (whoever that may be), or because frustrated US officials and military leaders want to put the Mookster in his box, or because some genius has decided on the "Go Shiite" option. The Times of London has published today what it calls a "new" map being used by the US miiltary to trace the "ethno-sectarian fault lines" and "the mixed neighbourhoods considered to be most explosive."
More and more, Baghdad is splintering into Shia and Sunni enclaves that are increasingly no-go areas for anyone from outside. The trend is fuelled by the ugliest sectarianism. It also reflects a crude power grab, with both sides egged on by political parties aiming to maximise their clout in the Iraqi Government by dominating as much of the capital as possible. The result is that since February, when Sunnis bombed the golden-domed mosque in Samarra, a Shia shrine, 146,322 individuals have been displaced in Baghdad, according to the International Organisation for Migration.
[snip]
Four of the five [most explosive neighborhoods] are on the western bank of the Tigris, called Karkh, where mixed neighbourhoods are still prevalent. Predominently Shia Kadhamiya and the largely Sunni areas of Qadisiya, Amariya and Ghazaliya have become the deadliest battlegrounds, according to US forces.
The violent struggle for neighbourhoods goes well beyond a fight among outlaws. Armed groups belonging to the parliament’s two main Sunni and Shia political blocs fuel much of the violence, according to senior Iraqi officials. “There is a very clear connection between some of the displacements caused by armed groups in some neighbourhoods in and around Baghdad and the political parties that are in the Council of Representatives,” Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the Iraqi National Security Adviser, told The Times.
Most debates about the "new way forward" for the US in Iraq have ignored a swelling refugee crisis stoked by violence, with large numbers of Iraqis not only displaced internally but leaving the country.
In a report released this week, Refugees International, a Washington-based advocacy group, put the total at close to two million and called their flight “the fastest-growing humanitarian crisis in the world.” Its president, Kenneth Bacon, said, “The United States and its allies sparked the current chaos in Iraq, but they are doing little to ease the humanitarian crisis caused by the current exodus.”
There are many good reasons for the widespread reluctance to contemplate abandoning the dream of a unitary Iraq. One of the most frequently cited is that it could spark a regional conflict as Iraq's neighbors get pulled into protecting their clients or proxies among Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups or, like Turkey, take steps to protect themselves from the fallout. But between the current civil war and the refugee crisis, the regionalization of the conflict looks to be just a matter of time if the US stays on its present course.
Since the ISG Report was issued, there's been an increased amount of news coverage of the refugee problem -- see SusanUnPC at No Quarter, who has been tracking the issue. The NYT did a big story on the problem, drawing on a recent UN report and showing the problems confronting Iraq's neighbors, especially Jordan and Syria.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated in a report released last month that more than 1.6 million Iraqis have left since March 2003, nearly 7 percent of the population. Jordanian security officials say more than 750,000 are in and around Amman, a city of 2.5 million. Syrian officials estimate that up to one million have gone to the suburbs of Damascus, a city of three million. An additional 150,000 have landed in Cairo. Every month, 100,000 more join them in Syria and Jordan, the report said.
Syria, which is the only country keeping its borders open, is particularly affected, as Kenneth Bacon of Refugees International explained in a WashPost op-ed:
[Syria] can't maintain its open-door policy without international support. Refugees already strain social services. Yet, the international response to the Iraqi refugee crisis has been dismal. Despite numbers that rival the displacement in Darfur, there has been scant media attention and even less political concern. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is doing little.
An increase in resources for UNHCR could make a huge difference. As winter approaches, the need is growing for portable heaters, warm clothing and help in paying electric bills and warm clothing. Mental health services for traumatized Iraqis are equally needed. And legal and financial help to maintain their visa status would prevent deportations back to a precarious life in Iraq.
The refugee problem isn't solely a humanitarian crisis in the making. The disappearance of much of Iraq's professional class, which has consistently been a disproportionate target of violence since 2003, will cripple any chance for Iraq to build a functioning government, social sector or economy. Even six months ago, the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants was estimating that 40 percent of Iraq's professionals had fled the country. The number today must be considerably higher.
Yesterday, the interior ministers of Jordan and Iraq met to coordinate intelligence and counterterrorism, with border issues including exit visas and residency permits on the agenda. Perhaps the ministers also took up the problem of relocating the Iranian Kurds who have been camped for the past two years in No Man's Land on the Iraqi side of the Jordanian border.
Also yesterday, Senator Bill Nelson (D-FLA) met in Damascus with Asaad, who said Syria would be willing to "cooperate with the U.S. to control the porous border between Syria and Iraq used by insurgents". Given the urgency and severity of Syria's problem dealing with Iraqi refugees, Asaad's indication of interest shouldn't simply be dismissed. Methinks there ought to be something of mutual interest to talk to the Syrians about.
The dilemmas presented by sectarian cleansing and refugees aren't restricted to internal displacement or spill-over in the region. The refugee problem is also beginning to raise its ugly head for US immigration policy. George Packer recently argued "If the United States leaves Iraq, our last shred of honor and decency will require us to save as many of these Iraqis as possible." He advocates:
We should start issuing visas in Baghdad, as well as in the regional embassies in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, and Basra. We should issue them liberally, which means that we should vastly increase our quota for Iraqi refugees. (Last year, it was fewer than 200.) We should prepare contingency plans for massive airlifts and ground escorts. We should be ready for desperate and angry crowds at the gates of the Green Zone and U.S. bases. We should not allow wishful thinking to put off these decisions until it's too late. We should not compound our betrayals of Iraqis who put their hopes in our hands.
Changing US policy vis a vis Iraqi refugees isn't going to be a simple task, however. In a look at the issue over at The Plank, Brad Plumer neatly summarizes the mess the Bush Administration finds itself in:
Ah. The administration won't prepare for an onslaught of refugees because it still thinks it's going to "win," whatever that means--or at least doesn't want to give the impression that things are bad (because no one would figure it out otherwise.). It also seems like there's a potential battle-in-waiting with regards to Iraq's Christians, who are currently enduring "killings, torture, destruction of churches, assassination of priests, and confiscation of property." I assume that religious leaders in this country will, at some point, make a major push to have them accepted as refugees--but it would pose some rather obvious problems if the United States were to offer asylum to Iraqi Christians and shut its door to Muslims who want out.
Soft partition may start looking like a better and better option.
UPDATE: Rick Moran (RightWingNutHouse agrees this a problem we should be talking to the Syrians (and Iranians) about, sooner rather than later. And Eric awards a score to Jim Henley in the Thirty Years War of the blog titles.
Data on Baghdad's displaced persons from TimesOnline:
City of the displaced
6.7m : the population of Baghdad
146,322: Baghdad residents displaced since February
38,766: displaced persons living in Baghdad (as of December 11)
85 per cent of displaced living in Baghdad come from within the city
72 per cent of displaced living in Baghdad are Shia
27 per cent of displaced living in Baghdad are Sunni
17 per cent of displaced living in Baghdad are Yazidi
Source: International Organisation for Migration
US military map of Baghdad: via TimesOnline
Graphic of Iraqi refugees: via NYT
That's the conclusion of Asia Time's senior guy who covers Pakistan, Syed Saleem Shahzad, when he did a tour of the Taliban in the Kandahar area. It's hair-raising stuff. Quotes from an interview with one of the Taliban's local military leaders:
"They used to carry out air strikes. Now this has come to an end. They did have an effective network of informers, but we have successfully eliminated it and therefore they do not have any knowledge of our bases, so the air strikes stopped. They have conducted limited ground operations, but they came under attack. So they stopped. We do not attack their base because they would retaliate with air strikes," said Qari.
"So what are you doing here, just having your meals, drinking tea and roaming all around with your weapons?" My question elicited a burst of laughter in the room.
"Yes, and they are bored in their bases with no chance to do any activities," Qari said, smiling. "We are not in any haste. Since the masses invited the Taliban to come down [from the mountains] to their areas, our strength is increasing with every passing day. Six months ago, groups of Taliban were operating with about 10 people. Now they have 50 members and growing. So we have enough time till next spring, and they [NATO] know what will happen until next year," Qari said.
"What will happen and what do they know?" I asked.
"They know that we will mobilize our strength and occupy the Herat-Kandahar highway and establish our pockets all over," said Qari.
"So that way you will isolate the Sangin district and the district of Gerishk - cut them off from the rest of the country?" I asked.
"Yes. And then we will not give them a chance to even find an escape route in their helicopters. We will hold parts of the Kandahar-Herat highway and our friends will hold other points. So Kandahar and other places will automatically come under siege and there will be little chance of reinforcements," Qari said, eating his final piece of bread.
"Until then they are sitting here, we are sitting here, face to face and all around them."
Yikes! No wonder the growing complaints in the UK about military overstretch are coming from all quarters these days.
Photo: Asia Times Online
Via Robin Wright in the WashPost, Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, has resigned his post suddenly and flown home.
Turki, a long-serving former intelligence chief, told his staff yesterday afternoon that he wanted to spend more time with his family, according to Arab diplomats. Colleagues said they were shocked at the decision.
The exit -- without the fanfare, parties and tributes that normally accompany a leading envoy's departure, much less a public statement -- comes as his brother, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the highly influential Saudi foreign minister, is ailing.
[snip]
Turki has been the subject of both high praise and controversy. In the 1980s, while he was intelligence chief, he reportedly met al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden several times during the U.S.- and Saudi-backed support of mujaheddin fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He subsequently denounced bin Laden.
Turki later served as ambassador to Britain. "He was regarded as being one of the most effective ambassadors from any country and was held in very high regard," a British diplomat said yesterday.
Awkward timing to say the least, given how the Saudis are up to their necks in addressing crises in Lebanon and Iraq, dealing with the Syrians and Israeli/Palestinian matters, and navigating Gulf-Iranian relations. Saudi-bashing may be a favorite intramural sport, but it's disconcerting if there's a vacuum there, even temporary.
Photo: Getty Images, via WashPost.
A multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the Coast Guard's fleet has suffered delays, cost increases, design flaws and, most recently, the idling of eight 123-foot patrol boats that were found to be not seaworthy after an $88 million refurbishment.
[...]
Deepwater, awarded in 2002 and modified in 2005, lays out an ambitious plan to modernize and greatly expand the Coast Guard's aging fleet of ships, planes and helicopters, equipping the fleet with more modern technology in the process. The aim is to carry out expanded homeland security missions, including offshore patrols, port protection, and vessel boarding and escorting duties, which the Coast Guard said will consume 68,500 operational hours a year for its Island cutters. In that time, Deepwater's cost grew from $17 billion to $24 billion.
The first problems appeared in 2004, when the patrol boat Matagorda was fleeing Hurricane Ivan off the coast of Florida. The Island-class ship had just undergone an $11 million upgrade that included extending its hull from 110 feet to 123 feet. Adm. Thomas H. Collins, then commandant of the Coast Guard, called it the "leading symbol of our service's transformation." Soon after the hurricane, the Coast Guard found a six-inch crack in the ship's deck and buckling in its hull.
The Coast Guard abandoned plans to overhaul all 49 of its 110-foot boats. In 2005, the eight ships already converted were put on restrictive duty that prohibited them from operating in seas higher than eight feet.
Last month, the Coast Guard found new structural problems beneath the main engines of some ships -- a safety risk. All eight boats were pulled out of commission. Officials said they are now figuring out how to fix them, acknowledging that it will probably require more money.
To make matters worse, the proposed replacement ships for those cutters have also run into technical problems.
The 140-foot Fast Response Cutter is meant to be speedier and tougher than its predecessor, capable of operating in higher seas and for longer periods, and resupplying less often. Responding to a Coast Guard demand to fast-track up to 58 new cutters, contractors proposed a hull design using composite materials instead of steel, which they said would weigh less and be cheaper in the long run. The Coast Guard approved the approach despite having never used such material, a Coast Guard spokesman said.
But, according to a GAO report, concern soon emerged within the service about the form and design of the hull, which was to be built at a Gulfport, Miss., shipyard owned by Northrop Grumman's Ship Systems of Pascagoula, Miss. By February 2006, those concerns had been confirmed by an independent review, and the Coast Guard suspended work on the $3 billion program after spending $25 million.
The Coast Guard is now looking for another stopgap measure, perhaps even ordering an existing ship that would be deployed by 2010, agency officials said.
The WaPo article flags a handful of factors that have become familiar warning signs in US government acquisition and procurement madness.
- a "fast-track" major acquisition program deemed essential for an urgent expansion of an agency's mission, all in the name of imponderable risks to Americans that should have been eliminated yesterday -- yep, check!
- new technology, or technology with which the agency is unfamiliar -- yep, check!
In August, the Homeland Security inspector general reported that the companies had not consistently followed information-technology testing procedures and that the Coast Guard had "limited influence" over some contractor decisions.
- reliance on the program contractor to define the program with little in-agency capacity to either direct the program or oversee the contractor's performance -- yep, check!
The program's problems have been compounded by the Coast Guard's hands-off management. The primary contractors, Bethesda-based Lockheed and Northrop Grumman of Los Angeles, have been given unusual authority to run the program through Integrated Coast Guard Systems, according to several government reports. The companies make many of the important decisions, including which ships and aircraft are needed and which subcontractors will design and build them, according to GAO and inspector general reports.
[...]
One contracting official told the inspector general that the Coast Guard, because of personnel shortages, struggles to review documents within the 30 days the contractors allow. By the time it reviews the documents, the companies may have moved ahead with their plans, leaving the agency to accept the work or try to change it at additional cost, the report said.
- production facility in the home district/state of important members of Congress and Senators -- yep, check!
House members tried to cut $121 million of the $1.1 billion appropriated this year for the $24 billion Deepwater modernization program, but the attempt was defeated by the program's defenders in the Senate. Citing plans for some of the replacement cutters to be built in Mississippi, critics said some decision making was influenced by Coast Guard attempts to curry favor with Mississippi GOP senators Thad Cochran, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and Trent Lott, the incoming minority leader.
- no clear way to hold anybody responsible -- yep, check!
"Deepwater is a mess. Over the last five years the Coast Guard procurement has been riddled with problems," said Rep. David W. Obey (D-Wis.), incoming chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. "Coast Guard needs to put in place a plan to fix this problem immediately."
"The big problem here is the boat doesn't work," said Sen. Judd Gregg (R-N.H.), outgoing chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on homeland security. "The people who manufactured these boats are going to have responsibility for their failure. . . . Someone's got to figure out who's responsible."
Though these sorts of acquisition, procurement and contracting problems are especially acute and of long-standing in the military-homelandsecurity-intel-industrial complex, they have become increasingly common throughout the US government. The Clinton/Gore "reinventing government" programs made a lot of important and useful changes and introduced some essential modernization. But "reinventing government" tended, in broad terms, to move performance capacity away from permanent civil servants in departments and agencies and to individuals on short-term contracts and outside contractors. All well and good, but only if those departments and agencies maintain the internal capacity to make policy, define programs and projects to execute policy, and oversee the people and firms responsible for implementing programs and projects.
In broad brush terms, we have watched over the past six years as the Bush Administration, with its disdain for government and its preference for staffing with ideologues or political hacks, has dismantled much of the institutional capacity necessary for the government to perform what Congress authorizes. There's an enormous amount of clean-up and rebuilding to do after 2008.
The Coast Guard is quoted as saying they're on a "learning curve." When will we ever learn?!?
UPDATE: via Rob Farley see this long article on the history and components of the Deepwater modernization program in the NYT
Chart: via Defense Industry Daily.
See also WaPo's "Deepwater Inventory" -- graphics of the aircraft and ships that make up the Deepwater program.
With all the focus on Iraq and Iran, it's important to remember that Bob Gates has a much larger agenda that will confront him when he moves into his digs at the Pentagon. At Foreign Policy, Blake and Carolyn O'Hara have a nice "roundup of experts" that looks at a broad range of issues.
There's some hope, given his background in intel, that Gates can make progress on rationalizing DOD's intelligence activities and better integrating them with the rest of the intelligence community, especially with the departure of Stephen Cambone. The experts also see Gates as a postive factor in dealing more realistically with North Korea. On the other hand, not much change of direction is expected on Rumsfeld's more messy heritage in prosecuting the GWOT, such as Gitmo.
But the overriding question is whether there will be major adjustments in the overall shape of the budget, particularly the competition for dollars between sustaining the Big War military versus the Army and Marine Corp's boots on the ground. The latest Quadrennial Review process produced an all-things-to-all-men rationale for not setting priorities. No major changes were proposed to either force structure or weapons programs, even though the strategic thrust was on the so-called Long War, where the QDR admitted the Big War military has little role to play. Our own Armchair Generalist captured the most common critique of the QDR when it was issued last February.
[T]he need to transform from a Cold War military force to a modern, expeditionary force capable of confronting terrorism is long overdue. If the U.S. military is expected to defend the homeland, fight multiple and simultaneous wars, and combat terrorism on a global basis, we need a strategy, force structure, and budget that allows this plan to succeed. We didn't get that in this QDR.
So should we expect major changes in direction under Bob Gates during what's likely to be a two-year term? It's a function of the interplay of a number of factors, each discussed in brief in the FP round-up:
- Time -- Next year's budget is already well underway. Gates will have only one budget cycle until we're deep into another presidential election.
- China -- the hypothetical threat from a near-peer competitor, read China, has been the main tool to rationalize the maintenance and modernization of the Big War capability. Blake quotes Tom Barnett: "No shift in China policy would mean 'no significant shift of resources from the Big War crowd to the much-stressed Army and Marines.'" Gates seems to have a far more relaxed view of China than Rumsfeld, for whom China's modest but growing military budget has been an idee fixe of long standing.
- Missile defense -- Gates also has a history of being more relaxed about the need for missile defense than his fellow Cold Warrior, Rumsfeld. FP quotes Jeffrey Lewis (ArmsControlWonk) offering this bit of (relative) good news:
Gates is “a wonk, not a hack,” and therefore his report [to Congress on ballistic missle threats] was more “nuanced and balanced” than the Rumsfeld effort. “His professionalism can only improve the decision-making out of the E-ring,” added Lewis, a critic of missile defense spending.
- Transformation -- The elephant in the room is the "transformation" agenda, which unfortunately seems to have become a convenient label to slap on any system, platform or program to keep it away from the budgeteers axes. Gates may not be a Rumsfeldian true-believer in the "revolution in military affairs," but Noah Shachtman of DefenseTech thinks "transformation" has taken on a life of its own -- “At this point” he says, “[transformation has] become Pentagon orthodoxy.”
Although not discussed in the FP piece, a lot of the issues surrounding the Big War military have as much to do with the porkbarrel politics of the military-industrial complex as with grand strategy. Still, even the GOP rubber-stamp Congress has been getting antsy about the size of DOD budgets plus gargantuan supplementals, where anything even tangentially related to Iraq, Afghanistan on terrorism has been finding a home. Fiscal constraints are going to start to bind sometime soon, and priorities will have to start being set. Some programs that are less than popular on the Hill, most notably the Army's Future Combat Systems, have already been feeling the ax.
It will be interesting to see whether Gates and his counterparts in the new Democratic leadership of the armed services and appropriations committees can fashion a common agenda. And whether that agenda will survive Vice President Cheney's "one percent doctrine."
Photo: Doug Mills/NYT. Robert Gates greeted by the leaders of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senators John Warner and Carl Levin.
Via Matt Yglesias, Peter Beinart is fighting "the good fight" against his greatest fear -- an American "Iraq Syndrome" -- by advocating greater US financial support for UN peacekeeping efforts.
Looking at the post-Iraq world, two realities jump out. In the United States, nation-building will be a dirty word. And, across the globe, nation-building will remain desperately necessary. As Oxford University's Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have shown, peacekeeping is the most cost-effective way to prevent a country from sliding back into chaos. Indeed, the rise of international peacekeeping deserves significant credit for the decline in civilian deaths since the end of the cold war.
If the United States no longer has much appetite for such endeavors, we should at least support those who do. Largely as a result of the Congo, U.N. peacekeeping costs have shot up, and it is easy to imagine the United States trying to rein them in. We should do exactly the reverse.
Politically, given the growing allergy of parts of the American political system to foreign military adventures, Beinart sees the UN as a way for liberal hawks to join hands with committed humanitarian multilateralists. He argues:
The United States goes through missionary phases and anti-missionary phases, but, in the end, this isn't really about us. The important thing isn't who saves countries like the Congo; it is that they get saved.
Practically, working through the UN also has merits as a way to reduce costs in blood and treasure and improve the chances of success. Beinart uses the recent (relative) successes in the Congo as a text and also points to the James Dobbin-led RAND study that concluded the UN has a higher success rate than the US in post-conflict nation-building operations, even excluding the current Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
All UN operations are not created equal. Let's set to one side the larger debates over when/whether interventions make sense, or how to create the sort of political environment -- locally and internationally -- that Yglesias rightly points to as necessary preconditions. BruceR (flit) instead looks at some of the military conditions for success. He gives especially high marks to the Indian army.
UN-sponsored interventions seem to fail for one of two reasons: either the mandate is flawed (as with the current UNIFIL mission; their mandate clearly states they are to assist the Lebanese military in reoccupying South Lebanon and confronting Hezbollah, not doing it themselves. Since the Lebanese military has no interest in confronting Hezbollah, UNIFIL has had nothing to do) or because the countries that know what they're doing and can ante up, such as India, aren't involved.
The Indians don't have the sort of power projection capabilities of the US, French or Brits, but they've got a track record and organization that can handle counterinsurgency.
[T]he success in Congo has more to do with the current excellence of the Indian military that is conducting it (with Pakistani and Bangladeshi assistance) than anything else. The Indian peacekeeping tradition (as originally defined in the 1960 ONUC intervention, also in the Congo, and beautifully typified most recently in their nearly unilateral 2000 rescue of Indian soldiers that had been surrounded in Sierra Leone) is to put up with local non-cooperation until things get really violent, and then go at the bad guys, Kashmir-style: the residue of peacekeeping experience that Beinart attributes to the UN is mostly tied up in places like the Indian army staff college at Dehra Dun, not in New York.
[snip]
Their capability for close military cooperation in overseas theatres with the other two major UN troop contributing countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, stemming from common British military traditions as well as the linguistic commonalities, makes them even more formidable.
BruceR also notes that "[the Indians] operate at a higher level of general staff training than most armies (they have real corps and divisions, and still practice how to use them), and because unlike most more developed countries they have an army still built on a peacekeeping scale making their resources in a low-intensity situation effectively inexhaustible (1.3 million full-time troops)."
So what's in it for India?
India is clearly looking past the Iraq situation, and the post-Iraq world order, and has decided that old-style UN military interventions, not formal alliances or "coalitions of the willing" are the best hope for helping failed states without eroding the international order still further, and so are investing their national capital as a rising world military power into bolstering the largest one.
From that we might conclude that, for the US (and Beinart's liberal hawks) to benefit from India's unique contributions to peacekeeping, Americans are going to have to come to terms with a "post-Iraq world order" that doesn't rely on American-led ad hocery and does give pride of place to political and financial support for international institutions where the Indias of the world have a meaningful voice.
Replacing John Bolton with someone like Jim Leach would be a good place to start.
NOTE: per BruceR "For reference, currently, in addition to the four-battalion brigade with the mission in Congo, the Indians have two battalions on the Chapter VII UNMIS mission in South Sudan, and also a battalion on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border (UNMEE). Pakistan and Bangladesh are committed heavily alongside the Indians in Congo and Sudan, and have their own joint efforts in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, as well. The only other countries with large-sized UN deployments at present (over 1,000 troops) are: Brazil, Uruguay and Jordan in Haiti (MINUSTAH); Ethiopia and Nigeria in Liberia (UNMIL); France, Italy and Spain in Lebanon (UNIFIL); Jordan again in the Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI); and Nepal, Uruguay again, and South Africa in the Congo (MONUC)."
Photo by Rabih Daher/EPA via MSNBC: UN peacekeepers from India carry the body of one of the UN observers who was killed in Israel's airstrike in southern Lebanon
Without a doubt The New Republic has been making quite a fool of its collective self over the past few weeks. Jason Zengerle's malicious and fact-challenged "speculations" about a pay-to-play gig - masterminded by Markos Moulitsas and Jerome Armstrong and involving most of the liberal blogosphere - has produced the most fodder for the next blogger ethics panel.
But even before Zengerle, I'd been transfixed watching Marty Peretz' discovery of the joys of blogging, which has offered all the fascination of a slow-motion trainwreck. Though he doesn't seem to quite get what this blogging stuff is all about - apparently he thought that owning TNR meant he can produce whatever flashes across his brain without reading or linking to the production of others. Still, Peretz has been covering himself, if not his colleagues, with glory. We now get regular progress reports on his lonely mission to uncover anti-Semitism lurking under every bed. And he's also apparently recently discovered hyperlinks, so watch out world!
Not to be outdone, along came Lee Siegel, who has single-handedly invented a new badge of honor for the reality-based community. For a guy who makes a living trying to dissect American culture, that's quite a coup. Not content to rest on his laurels, he's giving it another try, though personally I don't think "bring back the guillotine" has the legs of "blogofascism."
But then today I come across a beautifully written essay by Spencer Ackerman on how some members of the US military, who have taken the road from Gitmo to Hamdan, have shown the world a courageous commitment to principles we hold dear.
So TNR, you're half-forgiven. Now I just have to convince myself that Zengerle, Peretz, Siegel et al are simply performance artists.
UPDATE: hilzoy has some advice for Lee Siegel when his Robespierre impulses get too much for him. Heh, indeed.
Shorter Hamden:
George W. Bush was not made King on 9/11, and the "unitary executive doctrine" took a major hit. [See Glenn Greewald, The significance of Hamden v Rumsfeld.]
The GWOT is not a state-of-emergency that overrides the basic constitutional system of powers. [See Scott Lemiux at LG&M and my previous post, Ron Suskind and the Revolt of the Professionals.]
If Congress won't assert its prerogatives, the Supreme Court will do it for them. [See Jack Balkin, Hamdan as Democracy-Forcing Decision.]
The ball is now in Congress' court -- not only on Gitmo and torture, but re NSA/FISA and other claims that the-President-trumps-Congress. [See Orrin Kerr, Justice Kennedy, Youngstown and Article II and Glenn Greenwald, supra.]
The 5-3 opinion was written by 87-year-old Justice Stevens. By such a slender thread . . .
Photo of Justice John Paul Stevens via Portland Indy Media Center.
Last December, during the brouhaha over the New York Times' previous act of "treason" -- the NSA surveillance stories -- I posted about a terrific column by David Ignatius on "the revolt of the professionals."
As Ignatius explained, the pros who were speaking out and leaking to the press and Congress -- the "officers' revolt" against Rumsfeld and the intel folks and diplomats pushing back against the Cheney-Rumsfeld "cabal" -- were not (simply) engaged in turf fights. The pros were trying to push the government back onto paths that would be more operationally effective and sustainable than the emergency measures adopted by the Bush Admin in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
The points I made six months ago have been amply reinforced by all we have since learned about the government's surveillance and detention activities as well as the bizzare legal theories the Bush Admin has embraced, both to justify its actions and repudiate any Congressional and judicial oversight.
Many of the actions taken in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 may have made some sense at the time, but they were not well-thought through as long-term policy shifts. Since 9/11, however, the dominating fear of another attack has kept the White House focused on not losing the next skirmish rather than promoting the nation's long-term interests.
The result of continuing to operate in a state-of-emergency mode, what Jack Balkin calls "governing through terrorism," has been a pattern of policymaking that has often turned out to be short-sighted and self-defeating, whether in the wars we've chosen to wage and how we've waged them, the methods we have used to capture and handle detainees, or the ways we have confused spin and propaganda with public diplomacy.
When Ignatius wrote his column last December, he was heartened by the apparent "rebalancing" represented by challenges to the Bush Admin's state-of-emergency policies.
The national security structure that the Bush administration created after Sept. 11, 2001, began to crumble this month because of a bipartisan revolt on Capitol Hill. Newly emboldened legislators forced the administration to accept new rules for the interrogation of prisoners, delayed renewal of the Patriot Act and demanded an investigation of warrantless wiretapping by the National Security Agency.
[...]
The civil liberties debate is indeed a welcome sign that we are returning to normality. We wouldn't be anguishing over these issues if terrorists were continuing to fly airplanes into our skyscrapers. As we learned after Sept. 11, a frightened nation loses its sense of balance. Now that the nation feels more secure, we insist anew on the rule of law. Presidents may claim extraordinary powers in times of crisis (and Bush is hardly the first), but the checks and balances inherent in our system push us back toward the center line drawn by the Founders.
Unfortunately, Ignatius was wrong about the checks and balances working. Even as the media continue to discover additional overreaching by the executive branch, the Bush Admin has pushed its "unitary executive" theories even more forcefully. Signing statements that unilaterally change the meaning of legislation, such as torture prohibitions, continue to proliferate. Accountability in the courts is avoided by claims of "state secrets" privileges. And feeble Congressional attempts to exercise some modest oversight are ignored.
In the absence of functioning checks and balances, Ignatius' "revolt of the professionals" has continued to grow. Now comes Ron Suskind's new book, The One-Percent Doctri