Eric Martin  May 14 2008 - 11:27am   

Over at QandO, Bruce McQuain treats a Wall St Journal Editorial as a go-to source in terms of assessing the implications of the recently signed truce between the Sadrist trend and the Iraqi government (a truce, it should be pointed out, that has yet to fully take hold).  McQuain reacts to the editorial's claim that, despite early press reports that called the truce a draw, Maliki was the big winner:

A draw? A draw, at least where I come from, doesn't have one side imposing restrictions on the other side. This is dictating terms with the caveat that if they're violated, the destruction of the other side will continue as it was before.

IOW, this "truce" says to the Mahdi Army, accept these conditions and stick with them or well [sic] give you no choice at all.

That interpretation is a bit one-sided (a shock, I know, considering how fair and balanced the WSJ editorial page usually is).  First of all, the Sadrists won concessions as well: as the editorial mentioned, there is to be less targeting of Sadrist members, requirements for police warrants prior to arrest, and provisions for limiting the use of US military personnel in Sadr City (more below).  Further, both sides, not just Maliki's, are issuing warnings and caveats.  According to the only statement issued to date by Moqtada al-Sadr himself, the Mahdi Army's compliance with the truce is contingent on a few factors:

In the event of commitment by this government to the clauses that have been signed by the brothers assigned by us under the seal of this office, then the faithful should commit to what is contained therein and comply with it. However [or "provided that"] there is formed a supervisory council for the implementation of the agreement, so as to protect the power [or honor] of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi resistance.

So if the government lives up to its end of the bargain, and a supervisory council is formed, the Sadrists will comply.  Sadr also contends that the truce limits use of the US military:

Where the above points [legitimate law-enforcement, searches and so on] require it, the government is the relevant party for determining what Iraqi force is required for the extension of security in the city, avoiding recourse to foreign forces.

The Sadrist current is also allowed to keep its small arms (and, in effect, its heavy arms too unless the Iraqi government forces can find and seize the heavier stuff - easier said than done).  All in all a mixed bag, with uncertainty surrounding the implementation, acceptance and durability of the cease-fire.  Not exactly the total victory advertised. 

McQ also gets tied into knots by the editoria'l's claim that the truce signifies a defeat for Iran, as Iran was forced to accept Maliki as a "serious opponent" after it, allegedly, "invested heavily" in Sadr in order to take down Maliki: 

As the WSJ points out, Iran had invested its interests in Sadr and the Mahdi Army. Iran, as it has discovered, backed the wrong horse. We're now supposed to believe that Maliki will...suddenly cozy up to the country which had, directly, been threatening his leadership.

Hmmm.  You know, Iran has "invested heavily" in Maliki's Dawa Party as well.  So much so, that it's extremely unlikely that they'd be trying to take him down.  Some history:

The Dawa party began receiving direct support from the Iranian government at around the time of the Iranian Revolution. In 1979, facing pressure from Saddam's crackdowns (Saddam's response to Dawa-led uprisings) Dawa moved its headquarters to Tehran. During the Iran-Iraq War, Dawa actually fought, with Iran's backing, an insurgency against the Iraqi government (so, in a sense, Dawa fought on the side of the Iranians against Iraqis). In 1983 Dawa simultaneously bombed the American and French embassies in Kuwait and several other domestic and foreign targets in Kuwait (but now, we're BFFs!). Most leaders of al-Dawa, including Maliki for a time, remained in exile in Iran until the US invasion.

So, any "cozying up" to Iran on the part of Maliki in the near future would not count as "sudden."  Nor would the limited supply of arms and funds provided to the Sadrists by Iran qualify as a big investment relative to the decades-long investment in the Dawa party. 

There's more to the story, though.  Maliki's current control of the Iraqi government is entirely dependent on his close alliance with the ISCI party (Sadr's chief Shiite rival).  It is ISCI and Dawa that are behind the anti-Sadrist operations in Sadr City, Basra and elsewhere - actions undertaken to weaken the more popular Sadrist movement ahead of elections, lest ISCI and Dawa lose political ground to their rival.  But ISCI has an even cozier relationship with Iran than Dawa, and talk about heavy investment:

There is little actual doubt about who is Iran’s primary proxy in Iraq: The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), formerly the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI was founded in the early 1980s by exiled Iraqi clerical activists in Iran, with the blessing and support of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) created and trained SCIRI’s armed wing, the Badr Corps (now known as the Badr Organization) [in Iran], for the express purpose of eventually serving as an arm of Iran’s Quds Force in Iraq. SCIRI was among the Iraqi exile parties with whom the U.S. worked in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, but maintained close ties to Iran. ISCI continues to receive Iranian funds, and many members of the Badr militia reportedly still receive pensions from the IRGC. Thousands of these Iranian-trained and indoctrinated militiamen have been incorporated into the Iraqi police and army. [emph. added]

But McQ and the WSJ would have us believe that Iran has been backing the Sadrists to the exclusion of ISCI and Dawa (the parties that it has spent almost a quarter century cultivating).  And, thus, that the recent truce and weakening of Sadr is a blow against Iran.  Uh huh.  Quite the opposite.  Iran (or large factions within Iran's regime) has an interest in the political ascension of ISCI and Dawa (the closest proxies of Tehran and propoenents of the preferred political platform - moreso ISCI in each respect). That being said, while the Iranian regime, overall, might prefer that ISCI/Dawa outperform Sadr at the ballot box, it doesn't want to annihilate the Mahdi Army (nor likely could it if it wanted to).

So an outcome that weakens Sadr ahead of the upcoming electoral contests, but that doesn't jeopardize the existence of the movement and militia, seems like an ideal outcome for Iran.  Yet according to McQ and the WSJ, Iran is devastated by the truce it helped negotiate.

Eric Martin  May 14 2008 - 10:48am   

This is...just...well...unbelievable:

For the first time, Bush revealed a personal way in which he has tried to acknowledge the sacrifice of soldiers and their families: He has given up golf.

"I don't want some mom whose son may have recently died to see the commander in chief playing golf," he said. "I feel I owe it to the families to be in solidarity as best as I can with them. And I think playing golf during a war just sends the wrong signal."

Oh for fuck's sake.  Hundreds of thousands of people are dead.  DEAD!!!!  Families torn apart.  Widows.  Orphans.  Brothers without brothers, sisters sisters.  Hundreds of thousands of people are maimed for life: blind, deaf, missing limbs, psychologically scarred, and this man thinks he has sacrficed because he stopped playing golf for a few years?  Yeeeeaaarggghhhhhhhh!!!!!

As you most likely have come to expect, it gets worse:

Bush said he made that decision after the August 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, which killed Sergio Vieira de Mello, the top U.N. official in Iraq and the organization's high commissioner for human rights.

"I remember when de Mello, who was at the U.N., got killed in Baghdad as a result of these murderers taking this good man's life," he said. "I was playing golf - I think I was in central Texas - and they pulled me off the golf course and I said, 'It's just not worth it anymore to do.'"

Great story with one minor flaw: it's a lie.  Bush played golf at least as late as October of 2003, some two months after he supposedly swore off it.  Further, there are medical reasons (muscle tear and sore knees that caused him to give up running for a span) that might have forced him to take a hiatus at the time regardless.

And as Brad Le Roque points out, Bush might have "“sacrificed” playing golf, [but] he still managed to set the all-time presidential record for vacations back in 2005."

Yeah, but he needed all those vacation days.  Think of how stressful it was for him to persevere in the face of a life without golf.  Now I know what Laura was getting at when she scolded the nation by pointing out about the war:

No one suffers more than their president and I do.

Rumor has it, she gave up macrame.

Eric Martin  May 13 2008 - 2:14pm   

With news breaking over the weekend of an apparent truce in Sadr City between Iraqi government and US forces on one hand, and Sadr's Mahdi Army militia on the other, the reactions have been as expected.  They range from the triumphalist (suggesting that the truce is a sign of Sadr's defeat (again!), and US victory, such that " hopes of a US failure in Iraq were wrong - as they have always been," and that the ISCI/Dawa victory is a blow against Iran) to the more circumspect (focusing mostly on whether the cease-fire will hold and which side, if any, could claim victory).

So it occurred to me, after reading of today's violent clashes in Sadr City, that there is, perhaps, a more appropriate response to this news item: Will the cease fire ever actually kick-in, let alone hold - forget about whether it signals some grand victory for Maliki?  First things first, after all:

A fragile cease-fire failed to stop fighting in Baghdad's Sadr City where the latest clashes between Shiite extremists and U.S.-backed Iraqi forces killed 11 men and wounded 19, Iraqi hospital officials said Tuesday.

The U.S. military said that it responded to several attacks by militants with precision strikes, but only confirmed killing three militants. Two of the militants were killed in a Hellfire missile strike by an attack aircraft, according to the military. U.S. soldiers also suppressed "enemy fire" in four other clashes with tanks and attack aircraft, the military said.

The clashes erupted late Monday, just hours after Iraq's main Shiite political bloc and supporters of firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr signed a cease-fire with the hope of ending seven-weeks of fighting that has left hundreds of people dead in the capital.

It was not immediately clear if the those killed in the clashes, which escalated early Tuesday, were militants or civilians. There were women and children among the wounded, said hospital officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.

Which is not to be confused with the post-cease fire fighting on Sunday. Or the heavy bombardment on Saturday (according to Voices of Iraq, grain of salt and all). 

There are some good reasons that the status of the cease-fire remains uncertain: For one, Sadr himself has yet to issue a public statement endorsing the truce (though his reps reportedly signed the agreement), the current version permits the US military to continue bombing Sadr City (a big sticking point for obvious reasons) and...the cease fire itself is only slated to last four days!  That renders the current incarnation of the cease fire of the temporary variety.

Despite the foregoing, it is entirely possible that a workable, long-term cease-fire will be hammered out, and that the violence will subside completely over the coming days and weeks.  However, that has not happened yet.  The cease-fire has yet to be fully implemented, and even if it were put into effect immediately, it is set to expire by the end of the week.  The attacks, unfortunately, continue and the civilian casualties mount.

Maybe Bruce McQuain wants to reconsider which of us was a day late and a dollar short.  Or are those dead Iraqis who met their fate in Sadr City on Saturday, Sunday and Monday (and beyond) just an acceptable coda?  Or perhaps it is uncouth, generally, to express concern for civilian deaths when the underlying military operation is nearing an end?  I lose track of proper etiquette sometimes.

Eric Martin  May 13 2008 - 1:36pm   

Paul Bremer actually argued that using the word "occupation" to describe the post-invasion presence of US forces in Iraq had a measurable detrimental impact on our mission; that things would be going better had that word never been used.

I wish that was a joke.  The full and gory details are available in my guest post at Spencer Ackerman's joint.

China Hand  May 12 2008 - 5:18pm   

 

...in the wake of Cyclone Nargis

News reports on the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis reported on a “huge concession” in the matter of a U.S. C-130 loaded with 17 tons of aid that landed at Yongyon International Airport in Myanmar.

Casual observers will be forgiven for believing that the “huge concession” was the Myanmar regime giving permission for the plane to land.

That’s a forgivable misunderstanding.

The mis-reporting by the international media concerning the state and conditions of aid supply is less forgivable, given the intensely judgmental reporting it has dispensed on the Myanmar situation.

Apparently, there is a “huge concession” involved--by the United States.

It involved shelving the US demand to link aid to access to the scene by its disaster relief teams.

And that concession should be fully and accurately reported, since it has significant implications for disaster relief in Myanmar, and the fate of tens if not hundreds of thousands of refugees afflicted by the cyclone and its aftermath.

Eric Martin  May 12 2008 - 11:23am   

Matt Duss passes along news that the Sadrist trend is tightening the rope that binds Sistani to the Maliki government, in all its sagging popularity and misdeed:

An aide to Muqtada al-Sadr has lashed out at Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, for keeping silent over clashes that have killed hundreds in Baghdad. [...]

Speaking at Friday prayers, Sheikh Sattar Battat, an aide to al-Sadr, said he was "surprised" that al-Sistani had failed to condemn the violence.

We are surprised by the silence in Najaf where the highest Shiite religious authority is based," he said, referring to al-Sistani.

"For 50 days Sadr City is being bombed ... Children, women and old people are being killed by all kinds of US weapons, and Najaf remains silent."

Battat said the al-Sadr movement has not seen any "reaction or fatwa [religious decree] from Najaf" criticising the government assault on Shia fighters in Sadr City.

"For us this means that Najaf accepts the massacre in Sadr City," he said.

As Duss observes, Sistani's acquiescence will likely play to Sadr's advantage:

One of the central elements of the elder Sadr’s program (and now of Muqtada’s) was a distinction between the “silent clerics” (represented by Sistani and the Najaf establishment) — bookish sorts who stay remote from the lives of their people — and the “speaking clerics” who take part in the suffering and struggle of the Shia, as Sadeq did. And here the “silent clerics” once again stayed silent while Shia were crushed in Sadr City, of all places, while medical care, food, and shelter are being doled out in Muqtada’s name. It doesn’t require any math to see that Sadr benefits politically from this.

Not just politically, but religiously as well - to the extent the two are separate.  Such a strengthening of Sadr vis-a-vis Sistani is, in my opinion, a shame for reasons beyond the silent/speaking distinctions set forth above (though, obviously, I am not an Iraqi and thus should not get a vote).  Babak Rahimi has an excellent summary of some of Sistani's religious views, and how he espouses a brand of theology that can co-exist with liberal democratic traditions (at least, moreso than Sadr's):

Like his father, Sistani is an adherent of a democratic Shi'i tradition that dates back to the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 to 1911 and continued with the Khatami reformist movement (1997–2005). [...]

Sistani’s insistence on recognizing Islam as a fundamental component of the Iraqi constitution is not intended to make Iraq an Islamist state based on juridical sharia strictures, but rather to limit the total secularization of the constitution, which would deprive a Muslim country of an “authentic” national identity based on its Islamic heritage.

Sadr, on the other hand, is much more amenable to vilayet-e faqih, or an Iranian style rule by clerical jurisprudence that pays less regard to individual rights.  However, our continued assault on the Sadrist trend has been backfiring and increasing his popularity at the expense of religious leaders like Sistani that we should be acting to empower. Shockingly enough, military actions in densely populated areas leading to massive civilian casualties aren't very well received in the target population. 

Sadly, the strategic thinkers in the Bush administration seem incapable of devising a plan to empower favored factions that doesn't involve the employ of self-defeating brute strength.  It would be better if, instead, we adopted some of that fancy counterinsurgency doctrine that Petraeus is supposedly implementing.   

China Hand  May 9 2008 - 4:56pm  South Asia   

...To Seek Geopolitical Advantage from Myanmar’s Crisis

For the impassioned interventionist, Myanmar has it all: a corrupt and despotic junta, a gallant pro-democracy princess, and brave, battling monks.  Now it’s got a colossal humanitarian crisis that throws the failures and flaws of the detested regime into sharp relief.

One thing it doesn’t have: a government so callous and shortsighted it will refuse international aid in order to preserve its own rule.

However, this is a line that the United States and its allies are pushing, apparently in an effort to delegitimize and weaken the Myanmar regime and maybe tally up a regime change success on the cheap, courtesy of an unprecedented natural disaster.

As a result, we may sacrifice an important source of credibility and leverage in Asia—America’s perceived willingness to provide apolitical disaster relief—and open the door for China to supplant us in this key role.

Eric Martin  May 9 2008 - 1:41pm   

Well, this is one way to influence the outcome of elections in Iraq I suppose (refer to Part I and Part II for background):

Iraqi security forces, after more than of 40 days of intense fighting, on Thursday told residents to evacuate their homes in the northeast Shiite slum of Sadr City and to move to temporary shelters on two soccer fields.

The military's call indicated the possibility of stepped-up military operations and came as Iraqi security forces raided a radio station run by backers of Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. In the southern port city of Basra, militants launched rockets that struck a coalition base, killing two contractors and injuring four civilians and four coalition soldiers.

Sadr City has been a battleground since late March, enduring U.S. airstrikes, militia snipers and gunbattles between U.S. and Iraqi forces and the Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to Sadr.

Already some 8,500 people have been displaced from the sprawling slum of some 2.5 million people, according to the Iraqi Red Crescent. For weeks, food, water and medical shortages have affected about 150,000 people, aid agencies said.

Two soccer fields in east and northeast Baghdad are expected to receive some 16,000 evacuees from the southeast portion of the city where the fighting has been most intense.

The BBC offers one version of the grisly death toll:

In the last seven weeks around 1,000 people have died, and more than 2,500 others have been injured, most of them civilians.

Back to McClatchy:

In most of Sadr City, people haven't had food rations for more than a month and a half, and the Red Crescent has distributed thousands of food packs, 100 tons of flour and supplied four tons of medical supplies to the two main hospitals.

Wonder if this hospital was on the receiving end of those supplies:

IRAQI soldiers yesterday detained dozens of policemen and closed down a hospital suspected of treating Shiite militiamen in a Baghdad stronghold of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.

Or maybe this one?

A major hospital in Baghdad's Sadr City slum was damaged Saturday when an American military strike targeted a militia command center just a few yards away, the U.S. military said. [...]

The rocket strike near Sadr Hospital injured 30 people, shattered the windows of ambulances and sent doctors and hospital staff fleeing the scene, hospital officials said.

So let's recap the scene: the US military and its Iraqi "allies" are laying siege to a sprawling neighborhood in Baghdad housing roughly 2.5 million Iraqis, launching air strikes, artillery attacks, tank shells and other assorted ordnance, shutting down hospitals and bombing others, cutting off the supply of food and walling off entire sectors of the embattled region, causing a refugee crisis by their actions - and now actually pursuing a policy with the intent of creating a larger refugee crisis! 

For what reason: because a majority of residents in these regions support a political movement, and militia, that oppose our presence.  Can't have that.  Because we have to keep 150,000 troops in Iraq to safeguard the Iraqi people.  After all, whose gonna set up the tents in the refugee catch basins we so magnanimously helped set up to receive the overflow from our relentless assault on political movements that would make it harder for us to stay in Iraq.  To safeguard the Iraqi people. 

Eric Martin  May 7 2008 - 5:03pm   

That lovable scamp Michael Ledeen is off message again - calling for military action against Iran despite his repeated assertions that he doesn't, you know, favor military action against Iran. 

Well, at least he's consistent. 

Eric Martin  May 7 2008 - 4:35pm   

...or study, or some other comfortable nook where you do your reading, dear reader.  The reason?  The Pentagon has recently released all the documents that it was forced to give to the New York Times in connection with the rent-a-general/pre-war propagnda story.  There's a lot of documents, but there's bound to be some absolutely juicy nuggets nestled in those hills of pulp. 

If anyone finds anything, feel free to leave a comment or shoot me an email.  I can offer you fame and glory, or the utmost anonymity.  Bonus points for anyone that tracks down O'Hanlon related payola.

Eric Martin  May 6 2008 - 2:35pm   

Kevin Drum is an eminently reasonable man, and a blogger who, unlike me, doesn't wander into the reeds donning tin foil armor on too many occasions.  Still, in this post, K-Drum is being overly circumspect even by our respective standards:

So why the sudden spate of stories sugesting that Iran supports only the Mahdi Army, and implying that its support is increasing? There are two options, I guess: (a) because it's true or (b) because it's in somebody's interest to feed this storyline. It's pretty much impossible to say which is more likely, though.

It's that last sentence that stands out like a sore, but even, hand. Impossible to say if the Mahdi Army is the only group in Iraq receiving Iranian support?  Really?  Despite ISCI's historic and long lasting ties, and the fact that some members of its militia, the Badr Corp., are still receiving pensions from the IRGC?  Regardless of the fact that Iranian operatives detained by US forces in Iraq were nabbed at ISCI's headquarters, and were in Iraq on the invitation of ISCI's leadership?

Even worse, Kevin seemingly performs the impossible in the preceding sentence:

Of course, Iran probably is supplying arms to the Mahdi Army. But they've been doing that for a long time, and they also provide support to the Badr Organization, which is allied with the Iraqi government. [emphasis added throughout]

Perhaps it was just sloppy syntax, and Drum meant that the hard to determine part is whether aid to the Mahdi Army is increasing?  He has certainly earned my benefit of the doubt.  His post from yesterday is far more incicive in terms of exposing holes and dubious reporting associated with the above described Sadr/Iran narrative.   

So I'm open to the more innocuous explanation, and the possibility that I'm overreacting.  The more interesting, and indeed murky, line of inquiry leads to just whose interests are served by pushing this transparently doctored storyline.  But that the storyline is false is a given.

Brian Ulrich  May 6 2008 - 2:13pm  Israel   

Over the past few days, Israel has suddenly become awash with rumors that the end may be near for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. At issue are allegations that he accepted bribe's from American businessman Morris Talansky during his days as Jerusalem mayor. Israel is under a tight gag order that even Reuters is forced to follow, so we rely on the New York Post to explain this development that could end what remains of the Annapolis peace process.  Of course, it's not actually clear to me why this might force Olmert out when nothing else has.

Olmert's coalition is actually at least temporarily down to 64 after three MK's left the Pensioners to form a new Social Justice party linked to Russian billionaire Arcadi Gaydamak. However, they are interested in joining the coalition. Gaydamak has previously been rumored to have his sights on becoming Jerusalem's mayor himself, and even toyed with making a supermarket chain he acquired kosher to appeal to the city's religious voters.

(Crossposted to my blog.)

Armchair Generalist  May 5 2008 - 1:58pm  Bush Administration  Foreign Affairs  Iran   

You know, back when Paul Bremer was running things in Iraq - in his unique fashion - I was amazed by the stories of Republican advocates in his staff trying to push their style of democracy onto the nation. They were trying gun rights, flat taxes, all kinds of silly things. Now it sounds like the proponents of "let capitalism have a chance" are back and bigger than ever.

Forget the rocket attacks, concrete blast walls and lack of a sewer system. Now try to imagine luxury hotels, a shopping center and even condos in the heart of Baghdad.

That's all part of a five-year development "dream list" - or what some dub an improbable fantasy - to transform the U.S.-protected Green Zone from a walled fortress into a centerpiece for Baghdad's future.

But the $5 billion plan has the backing of the Pentagon and apparently the interest of some deep pockets in the world of international hotels and development, the lead military liaison for the project told The Associated Press.

For Washington, the driving motivation is to create a "zone of influence" around the new $700 million U.S. Embassy to serve as a kind of high-end buffer for the compound, whose total price tag will reach about $1 billion after all the workers and offices are relocated over the next year.

"When you have $1 billion hanging out there and 1,000 employees lying around, you kind of want to know who your neighbors are. You want to influence what happens in your neighborhood over time," said Navy Capt. Thomas Karnowski, who led the team that created the development plan.

Yes, this is a Grand Idea! Because there is nothing like having the vast and unforgiving chasm between the "haves" and the "have nots" being shown to the dirt-poor Sadr City occupants on a daily basis to make them happier and obedient servants of the United States government. Can you just imagine the propaganda that will flow if this "Wizard of Oz" city is allowed to flourish? Exactly what kind of social science idiots are being employed here?

UPDATE: More opinions here.

Eric Martin  May 2 2008 - 3:21pm   

If you only read one thing today (not written by me that is, I mean, let's not get carried away people), you should read this piece from Nir Rosen.  I don't necessarily agree with everything he says, but it's a long post and he covers a lot of ground.  There is, however, a refreshing display of actual knowledge.  Fancy that.

Memo to media outlets large and small: More Nir Rosen, less Michael O'Hanlon.  Actually, I'd settle for just more Nir Rosen.  I'm not greedy. 

Eric Martin  May 1 2008 - 2:25pm   

In Part I of this series, I discussed the primary objective behind the stepped-up assault on the Sadrist movement in Iraq; an assault that has already resulted in a predicted spike of US casualties (51 in April) and an unthinkable level of suffering for the Iraqi people (liberation never felt so good!).  Not to mention the implementation of a corrolary policy of walling off, separating and collectively punishing densely populated neighborhoods of Baghdad.  Brandon Friedman has a good summary of the uptick in violence (as well as a collection of experts tut-tutting the anti-war crowd for refusing to concede that the Surge had resulted in victory, the end):

On the Iraqi side, 925 people were killed in Sadr City in April alone.  Most of these were civilians.  As Sadr City is six square miles in size, that represents roughly 150 deaths per square mile in that section of Baghdad during the month.

As argued in Part I, this is what we hope to gain in exchange for all this death and destruction:

So what, then, would count as victory?  The answer drains most meaning out of the word: disrupt the political and military wings of the Sadrist movement...enough that Iran's main ally in Iraq, ISCI...can prevail in upcoming elections (only). In other words, the US will be aiding and assisting in the undermining of the democratic process that it supposedly invaded Iraq to promote as an example throughout the region...

The Sadrist current represents too large a social phenomenon to actually defeat or eradicate, but short term disruption is feasible.  Why, then, is the goal of weakening the Sadrists in the short term, and helping ISCI ahead of the upcoming elections, so important to the Bush administration?  There are at least three reasons:

1.  Sadr opposes a prolonged US occupation/permanent bases.  The Bush administration obviously values those objectives highly and is in a scramble to come to an agreement on a long-term security/status of forces agreement with the Iraqi government.  In pursuit of this, the Bush team wants as much ostensible legal and popular legitimacy buttressing this agreement as possible (even if in appearances only).  Keeping Sadr down now, and increasing Maliki's mandate (at least de jure if not de facto), is vital.

2.  Sadr opposes heavy foreign involvement in the oil sector.  What, did you really think this had nothing to do with oil?

The third prong is more controversial:

3.  Sadr opposes the fragmenting of the Iraqi state into semi-autonomous sub-regions.

I say "controversial," because I'm not convinced yet that this is important for the Bush administration. At the very least, though, the Bush administration would be willing to endorse such a plan in return for cooperation from ISCI and Iran (who both favor such a break-up of the state - actually ISCI is the only non-Kurdish group pushing for fragmentation).  Which reminds me, the pivot here is that ISCI is more amenable on all three fronts, and so ISCI is the horse we're backing with all the firepower in our arsenal. Despite ISCI's obvious ties to Iran.

Speaking of Iran, their relationships with ISCI and the Sadrists, respectively, are germane to recent developments.  ISCI (whose political wing and militia were formed, funded, trained and indoctrinated in Iran by the Iranian regime) is Iran's main proxy in Iraq.  Yet the Iranians have also been willing, at times, to fund and arm the Sadrists for at least a couple of reasons: First, the Iranians recognized early on that the Sadrists were too powerful to simply ignore, dismiss or quash, so the better to cultivate influence and goodwill.  Second, the Sadrist foot soldiers could provide a useful lever against the US presence in Iraq when necessary.

That being said, Iran does have a strong interest in ensuring the same outcome in upcoming elections as that sought by the Bush administration: namely, a big ISCI/Dawa victory and a poor showing by the Sadrists.  That's because the Sadrist movement's political agenda/rhetoric (nationalistic, at times anti-Persian and staunchly opposed to the creation of a Shiite super region) is more hindrance than benefit to the Iranians - as opposed to the Sadrists' capacity to field an anti-American militia which can still come in handy.  

Thus, Iran would be reluctant to sever ties with the Sadrists completely or cooperate in their annihilation (that's a pretty big chip to simply discard).  And, again, Iran likely realizes that vanquishing such a large movement is very difficult to pull off.  Further, participation in such a massive purge/massacre might spark a severe Shiite nationalist backlash (endangering Iran's position in the Shiite south). But short term disruption is feasible and, at the moment, very desirable. [more after the jump]

Eric Martin  Apr 30 2008 - 11:38am   

I'm normally a big fan of the Abu Muquwama site and its authors, but this recent post from Dr. iRak left me scratching my head.  The good Dr. seems unduly impressed with some recent statements made by the Government of Iraq (or "GoI" as he terms it) scolding Iran for supplying aid and armaments to Shiite militias.  The supposed smoking gun evidence in the present case is a cache of Iranian made weapons (allegedly set aside for the Sadrists) found in the Basra area. 

However, given the nature of Iran's longstanding involvement with certain Shiite Iraqi factions, these "official" statements are more like Claude Raines-styled shock than revelation. From the article cited by Dr. iRak:

The U.S. military official suggested that the "thousands" of munitions uncovered in Basra, and the idea that they were being used by extremists allegedly trained by Iran, had been an eye-opener for Iraq's leaders. "Our discussion is now matched by their understanding," he said. "This is the beginning of a change of public discussion among senior Iraqis." [emphasis added]

Uh huh: Iraq's leaders stunned by the discovery that Iran is funding and training Iraqi Shiite groups.  Funny that, considering one of the main factions in the GoI, ISCI, is just about a wholly owned subsidiary of the Iranian government. You think that assessment is hyperbolic? Some background: ISCI is comprised of Iraqis that fled mostly to Iran during the 1980s and 1990s. While in Iran, the party (then called SCIRI) and its Badr Corp. militia were formed, funded, armed and indoctrinated by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. and other regime elements.  In fact, some ISCI members fought on Iran's side in the Iran/Iraq war, and many still draw pensions from the IRGC, despite the fact that those members returned to Iraq en masse after the Baath regime was toppled. 

So is one to assume that ISCI is surprised to find the Iranians arming and training Iraqi Shiites?  And that they're now demanding that Iran stop funding and arming...groups like ISCI?  Not exactly.  Once again, the discussion of Iranian involvement is fixed like a laser on the Sadrist current while the far more extensive ties to our putative allies like ISCI are ignored.

Given this reality, it is more likely that the GoI is pursuing two primary goals by making these statements: First and foremost, placating Bush administration officials concerned about the GoI's ties to Iran (or at least providing the Bush administration with useful PR fodder to counter critics that point out that state of affairs).  Second, though to a lesser degree, trying to corner the market on Iranian money and weapons (not cut the supply off completely).   

Nevertheless, Dr. iRak sees significance behind the facade of Kabuki make-up:

This stance by the GoI serves several purposes simultaneously. First, it can be understood in classic "good cop, bad cop" terms. The United Stats [sic] is playing the saber-rattling bad cop, appearing to threaten war with Iran over new evidence of lethal assistance to JAM "special groups." The then steps in and says "we agree," but we think that things should be resolved diplomatically, thus playing the good cop holding the Americans back. Good coercive diplomacy . . . if it works.

I suppose, but only in a limited sense.  The GoI (meaning ISCI/Dawa) might be playing a little hardball with the Iranian government over its providing support to the Sadrists, but their bluff and bluster can only go so far.  Their ties to Iran are too deep to sever over this issue, and such isolation would leave them at the mercy of the Americans alone.  That's a heck of a leap to take.  More from Dr. iRak:

Second, increasing anti-Iranian rhetoric may help the Maliki government appeal to Sunni leaders and thereby forge cross-sectarian cooperation on other sticky issues.

Not likely.  Again, making a public display of opposition to the fact that Iran is supporting the Sadrists isn't goint to fool Iraqi Sunnis.  Most have a well developed, if not exaggerated, knowledge about the endurance of ties between Iran and ISCI, as well as Iran and Maliki's Dawa party. The GoI statements are mostly for American audiences, with the locals not being as susceptible to such propaganda.

There are elements in this last bit from Dr. iRak that I agree with, though there are also some dubious presumptions:

Finally, emphasizing Iranian involvement provides a useful public "explanation" for the difficulty U.S. and Iraqi forces have had, thus far, in quelling violence in Sadr City. Blame it on Iran, not Sadr/JAM. Why go this route? Because it allows the United States to maintain the fiction that it is only the "special groups" that are fighting the coalition instead of rank-and-file JAM, thus preserving the illusion that the Sadr "freeze" declared last August--a major (perhaps the major) reason for declining violence during the later part of the "surge" period in 2007--has not collapsed. [...]

At the same time, Iranian involvement allows U.S. officials to deflect blame for the fighting from radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, whom they are counting on to sustain a frayed but officially intact truce he called in August for his Mahdi Army militia. Though privately many soldiers here say the Mahdi militia is involved in the current fighting, publicly, the allegation is that "special groups" who have broken away from Sadr and receive training and aid from Iran are causing the troubles.

As discussed previously on this Site, I concur that the "special groups" fiction can be useful.  I'm just not so sure the current strategy looks to take advantage of the "special groups" formulation.  Presently, US and Iraqi forces are not seeking to "quell violence" in Sadr City and Basra - they're initiating it.  That's an enormous difference.  Further, the main purpose of the anti-Sadrist operations is to weaken that movement ahead of regional elections this fall (which only makes the enormous loss of innocent civilian life in Sadr City that much more horrific). 

Thus, keeping this fiction in play is less important than previously, when the Bush administration was contemplating more normalized relations with the Sadrists.  After all, do we really expect Sadr to sustain a cease fire while missles, bombs and tank shells rain down upon his constituents?  The "special groups" fiction wouldn't help him to save face amidst such carnage.  Nor would a cease fire halt the onslaught.

Eric Martin  Apr 29 2008 - 4:00pm   

What a difference 7+ years makes.  Brandon Friedman reminds us of Cheney's comical, in retrospect, denunciation of the degradation of the military under the Clinton administration.  From a Cheney speech on the campaign trail back in 2000:

For eight years, Clinton and Gore have extended our military commitments while depleting our military power.  Rarely has so much been demanded of our armed forces, and so little given to them in return. George W. Bush and I are going to change that, too.  I have seen our military at its finest, with the best equipment, the best training, and the best leadership.  I'm proud of them. I have had the responsibility for their well-being.  And I can promise them now, help is on the way.  Soon, our men and women in uniform will once again have a commander in chief they can respect, one who understands their mission and restores their morale. [emph. added]

And what's not to respect about Dick Deferment and George "Defender of the Texas Skies" Bush.  Friedman proceeds to dispatch the fish lingering in this fetid barrel.  Well worth the read. 

Also providing laughs courtesy of the way-back machine, look what John McCain has to say about a permanent presence in Iraq when we set the dial for 2005:

Three years before the Arizona Republican argued on the campaign trail that U.S. forces could be in Iraq for 100 years in the absence of violence, he decried the very concept of a long-term troop presence.

In fact, when asked specifically if he thought the U.S. military should set up shop in Iraq along the lines of what has been established in post-WWII Germany or Japan — something McCain has repeatedly advocated during the campaign — the senator offered nothing short of a categorical “no.”

“I would hope that we could bring them all home,” he said on MSNBC. “I would hope that we would probably leave some military advisers, as we have in other countries, to help them with their training and equipment and that kind of stuff.”

Host Chris Matthews pressed McCain on the issue. “You’ve heard the ideological argument to keep U.S. forces in the Middle East. I’ve heard it from the hawks. They say, keep United States military presence in the Middle East, like we have with the 7th Fleet in Asia. We have the German…the South Korean component. Do you think we could get along without it?”

McCain held fast, rejecting the very policy he urges today. “I not only think we could get along without it, but I think one of our big problems has been the fact that many Iraqis resent American military presence,” he responded. “And I don’t pretend to know exactly Iraqi public opinion. But as soon as we can reduce our visibility as much as possible, the better I think it is going to be.”

Ah, to be serious and mavirecky.  Actually, it gets worse.  As Steve Benen documents, McCain goes back and forth on this issue so often he's got enough frequent flier miles racked up that he can finally abandon Cindy's private jet. 

Which would only bolster his non-elitists bona fides.  I mean, has Obama given up his private jet?  Didn't think so.

Armchair Generalist  Apr 29 2008 - 9:33am  Arab League  Foreign Affairs  Middle East   

Abu Aardvark has an interesting post that outlines a challenge I had not previously seen - the fact that there are no Arab embassies in Baghdad to keep the monstrosity known as the Taj Mahal US Embassy company.

Finally, the Saudi position, from which other GCC states will likely take their lead, can be seen in Saud al-Faisal's announcement that security concerns prevent opening an embassy in Baghdad, and in today's column by the well-connected al-Arabiya director Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed dismissing the American and Iraqi demands on debt and embassies as a side issue:  security is the "first, second, and third Arab issue", he writes, and when that is solved the rest will fall into place.   None of this is surprising.  The real reasons, I suspect, lie in their continuing perception of Maliki as a pro-Iranian, sectarian leader and Iraqi state institutions as deeply penetrated by Iranian influence - as well as their lack of interest in doing the US any favors right now. As Ambassador Edward Gnehm, one of America's most experienced diplomats in the Arab world, told me:

Gulf Arab states reacted predictably to Secretary Rice’s blandishments urging those states to open embassies in Baghdad and to forgive Iraqi debts.  Those states remain wary and concerned over Shia dominance of the Iraqi political scene, Iranian influence that they perceive follows, and doubts that the U.S. really has an end game plan for Iraq that protects their interests.  Both actions are seen as means to pressure the Shia political figures to give Sunni Iraqis their “rightful” place in the power structure as well as to nudge Iraq back toward the “Arab” camp.  Until they conclude that Shia political figures are ready to move on these fronts, they will not act --- and they certainly will not make the concessions to the U.S.

In that regard, perhaps the most interesting thing I've seen in the wake of the conference is what seems to be an unusually direct outreach to Saudi concerns over the last two days, with an abrupt about-face on the part of senior Iraqi officials.  In Kuwait Maliki  called "on all our brothers and friends and all neighbouring countries to make more effort and to strengthen security measures to prevent terrorists from infiltrating our territory through joint borders." Arabs seem to have taken this as directed at them, rather than Iran, particularly when Maliki specifically expressed his dismay with the level of Arab support for Iraq. 

So if we can't get the Arab community to reach out and start state-to-state negotiations with its troubled neighbor, how exactly will this Iraqi adventure suceed in becoming a stabilizing force for the region?

China Hand  Apr 29 2008 - 4:26am  China   

...With Some Help From the TPUM

I'm not about to say that stories about the Tibet People's Uprising Movement (TPUM) are getting spiked in some kind of journalistic omerta dedicated to keeping the existence of this awkward group out of reporting on the Tibetan disturbances...

...but I was interested enough in the issue to send a query about the absence of TPUM from news reports to a distinguished Asian correspondent.

He responded! and advised that he considered that TPUM was not important enough to merit mention in dispatches.

Not important! I sputtered to myself.

I think TPUM's plenty important.

So do the Chinese, for that matter.

Eric Martin  Apr 25 2008 - 1:13pm   

In Still Broken, A.J. Rossmiller, recounts his tenure as an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA" - which is the Department of Defense's intelligence shop), which traces his personal eveolution ranging from his initial can-do enthusiasm to eventual dissilusionment and frustration. The narrative arc of Still Broken spans Rossmiller's time spent in intelligence gathering and analysis both in Baghdad and later in the labyrinthine halls of the Pentagon (an ample metaphor for the bureaucratic tangle that serves as the book's primary antagonist).

The recurring vignettes depicting the intrusive politicization of the intelligence gathering/analysis process, the inefficiency, lack of connectedness and bureacratic turf wars are as prevalent in each half of the book as they are inextricable parts of the overall story of the invasion of Iraq itself - from the selling of the war, to the mismanagement in the aftermath. While the generalities surrounding this tale are familiar to many in abstraction and slogan, Rossmiller provides a clearly written, unbiased, first person perspective of how this dysfunction actually plays out on a day to day basis.  In that sense, it is an invaluable contribution to the public record.

Nevertheless, despite Rossmiller's well-supported diagnosis of an intelligence apparatus that was and is "Still Broken," the next step in the treatment regimen is less convincing. Though they can be detected plaintively in the background throughout, the essential questions raised by Still Broken are never really fully reckoned with by the author: Are we capable of forging a long-term, structural fix for what ails our intelligence community? Relatedly, is the cure likely to kill the patient? [more after the jump]