So it occurred to me, after reading of today's violent clashes in Sadr City, that there is, perhaps, a more appropriate response to this news item: Will the cease fire ever actually kick-in, let alone hold - forget about whether it signals some grand victory for Maliki?  First things first, after all:

A fragile cease-fire failed to stop fighting in Baghdad's Sadr City where the latest clashes between Shiite extremists and U.S.-backed Iraqi forces killed 11 men and wounded 19, Iraqi hospital officials said Tuesday.

The U.S. military said that it responded to several attacks by militants with precision strikes, but only confirmed killing three militants. Two of the militants were killed in a Hellfire missile strike by an attack aircraft, according to the military. U.S. soldiers also suppressed "enemy fire" in four other clashes with tanks and attack aircraft, the military said.

The clashes erupted late Monday, just hours after Iraq's main Shiite political bloc and supporters of firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr signed a cease-fire with the hope of ending seven-weeks of fighting that has left hundreds of people dead in the capital.

It was not immediately clear if the those killed in the clashes, which escalated early Tuesday, were militants or civilians. There were women and children among the wounded, said hospital officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.

Which is not to be confused with the post-cease fire fighting on Sunday. Or the heavy bombardment on Saturday (according to Voices of Iraq, grain of salt and all). 

There are some good reasons that the status of the cease-fire remains uncertain: For one, Sadr himself has yet to issue a public statement endorsing the truce (though his reps reportedly signed the agreement), the current version permits the US military to continue bombing Sadr City (a big sticking point for obvious reasons) and...the cease fire itself is only slated to last four days!  That renders the current incarnation of the cease fire of the temporary variety.

Despite the foregoing, it is entirely possible that a workable, long-term cease-fire will be hammered out, and that the violence will subside completely over the coming days and weeks.  However, that has not happened yet.  The cease-fire has yet to be fully implemented, and even if it were put into effect immediately, it is set to expire by the end of the week.  The attacks, unfortunately, continue and the civilian casualties mount.

Maybe Bruce McQuain wants to reconsider which of us was a day late and a dollar short.  Or are those dead Iraqis who met their fate in Sadr City on Saturday, Sunday and Monday (and beyond) just an acceptable coda?  Or perhaps it is uncouth, generally, to express concern for civilian deaths when the underlying military operation is nearing an end?  I lose track of proper etiquette sometimes.

I wish that was a joke.  The full and gory details are available in my guest post at Spencer Ackerman's joint.

...in the wake of Cyclone Nargis

News reports on the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis reported on a “huge concession” in the matter of a U.S. C-130 loaded with 17 tons of aid that landed at Yongyon International Airport in Myanmar.

Casual observers will be forgiven for believing that the “huge concession” was the Myanmar regime giving permission for the plane to land.

That’s a forgivable misunderstanding.

The mis-reporting by the international media concerning the state and conditions of aid supply is less forgivable, given the intensely judgmental reporting it has dispensed on the Myanmar situation.

Apparently, there is a “huge concession” involved--by the United States.

It involved shelving the US demand to link aid to access to the scene by its disaster relief teams.

And that concession should be fully and accurately reported, since it has significant implications for disaster relief in Myanmar, and the fate of tens if not hundreds of thousands of refugees afflicted by the cyclone and its aftermath.

Because it means that the Bush administration has probably bowed to the advice and experience of the US military and abandoned its efforts to use the prospect of aid to extract concessions from the Myanmar regime.

I have not found any reporting on the subject, but it appears that US demands that its USAID team in Thailand be admitted into Myanmar as a pre-condition for releasing the aid has been quietly dropped.

My criticism of the United States for insisting on entry for its disaster relief experts—and the support for forcible humanitarian intervention predicated on that insistence, most notably by France’s Bernad Kouchner--attracted some heated criticism in the comments to my previous post on the subject.

However, even if the Myanmar regime’s provision of aid is more dilatory, dishonest, and corrupt than usual, the unconditional aid approach pursued by China and Indonesia—even if their motives are less than disinterested—is more valid and correct than the US demand for access by its disaster relief specialists, supposedly to ensure that aid is distributed properly.

The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami disaster was studied intensively in terms of the effectiveness of response by different organizations.

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, or TEC, concluded that, by far, the vast proportion of immediate disaster relief was provided locally, first by survivors on the scene and then by the national government.

Aid distribution is best handled by the local government.

And that’s why the Chinese—who, between earthquakes, typhoons, and periodic massive flooding of the nation’s heartland, probably have most disaster relief mobilization experience than any other country—are just flying planes in and dumping supplies on the tarmac.

Granted, having the Myanmar junta paw over your precious supplies, relabel them for photo ops, and divert some of them to keep the military fat and happy is not the most pleasing option—but there really aren’t any better ones.

By the time international organizations set up, they are best positioned to assist in post-disaster recovery—not in rescue.

NGOs suffer from their lack of familiarity with local conditions, poor coordination of effort, and the fact that they poach useful local personnel and resources for competing missions.

The rapid access to remote locations and heavy lift capability offered by foreign military forces is tremendously useful—when it is deployed in coordination with the national military of the affected state.

The idea that the world community can brush aside a hostile state and erect an efficient human relief infrastructure in conditions of utter chaos as lives hang in the balance is a fantasy.

Foreign NGOs not already operating inside Myanmar don’t know Myanmar. Even the ones that do have a foothold inside the country possess minimal independent capabilities.

Even to try to operate effectively, they need to monopolize scarce local resources of interpreters, liaison staff, and communications personnel—and attention--even if they come complete with their own transportation infrastructure—which they don’t.

And, of course, in a police state, all foreign visitors need their own set of minders anxiously observing the activity, reporting to home base, and awaiting instructions.

When one considers the limited number of English speakers inside Myanmar, and the fact that the regime is scrambling to coordinate aid with its short list of genuine friends while it conducts its referendum and deals with an immense natural disaster and tries to restore power to the capital and keep a political lid on things, the idea that the government might be unwilling to shoulder the burden of welcoming a group of intruders from a hostile power is understandable.

The same problem applies to the genuinely important and useful role of foreign militaries in the disaster.

The United States might have a bulging folder of plans for invading Myanmar, but when it comes to rescuing its citizens as opposed to destroying its military, we’re going to need the help of Myanmar’s army to communicate, plan, and receive, secure, and distribute supplies on the ground.

The US military’s hands-on experience in the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia is enlightening.

The tsunami struck the rebellious province of Aceh which, please note, was under martial law, off limits to any meddling by international do-gooders, and an environment of mortal peril for any foreign journalist who dared venture there.

For the first two days, the Indonesian government sealed off the province from outside contact as they secured the scene and made sure they had a handle on any political upheaval the disaster and the appearance of foreign services, media, and forces might trigger.

Then they let the US military come in and conduct operations in coordination with the Indonesian military—who, I might point out, are a lot closer to the Myanmar military than to the Boy Scouts in terms of their humanitarian attitudes, particularly toward rebels and dissidents.

It didn’t hurt, of course, that the Indonesian military are, for all their conspicuous faults and brutality, our buddies, and we can always pick up the phone and talk to them.

The TEC report (pg.43) noted:

The TEC Coordination Report (2006) found that most of the international military contingents in Indonesia had their tasks allocated by the military, thus coupling the immense foreign logistics capacity with detailed local knowledge.

As a result, one of the few areas of the Muslim world in which attitudes towards the United States have improved since 2002 is in Indonesia’s Aceh.

With this background, I can sympathize completely with Secretary of Defense Gates’ refusal to consider operations inside Myanmar without the regime’s permission.

And I agree with this compassionate and realistic proposal from a military man:

Retired General William Nash of the Council on Foreign Relations says the U.S. should first pressure China to use its influence over the junta to get them to open up and then supply support to the Thai and Indonesian militaries to carry out relief missions. "We can pay for it — we can provide repair parts to the Indonesians so they can get their Air Force up. We can lend the them two C-130s and let them paint the Indonesian flag on them," Nash says. "We have to get the stuff to people who can deliver it and who the Burmese government will accept, even if takes an extra day or two and even if it's not as efficient as the good old U.S. military."

By contrast, it is difficult to have any respect for Bernard Kouchner’s declaration that France would distribute 1,500 tons of rice aboard the destroyer Mistral without the cooperation of the Myanmar regime and, indeed, that "France would not consider entrusting aid to the Myanmar authorities".

Even if the French had cutting edge intel and accurate maps of Myanmar, they don’t work any more in the aftermath of the cyclone. Villages, landmarks, even the land itself have been washed away or are under water.

And I don’t think the French fleet is particularly well-equipped with Burmese interpreters, either.

I’m left with the picture of the French navy pitching supplies on a random mudbank while the band plays the Marseilles and white-faced mimes comb the devastated countryside for an audience to instruct and uplift with the sublime universal language of gesture.

When I also consider that Kouchner proposed his “responsibility to protect” invocation of Security Council intervention in full knowledge that the Chinese would instantaneously reject his proposal, and every atom of oxygen and iota of attention devoted to promoting it was a profound and deadly waste of time and lives, his empty gestures looks more like shameless grandstanding to his international pro-democracy constituency than the sincere effort of a genuine humanitarian.

So the international community is left with a menu of miserable choices.

Either entrust millions of dollars of aid to a corrupt regime that will undoubtedly exploit some of it to strengthen its own position...

...or spend valuable hours and days trying to push the regime aside to conduct a rescue operation that, without the assistance of the local government, would probably be doomed to failure.

The bitter fact is that this dilemma was, to a certain extent, brought upon the international community by itself, because of the contradiction between aggressive democracy promotion and humanitarian engagement.

Perhaps Samantha Power and the international values-based foreign policy community could have an interesting debate on this topic:

What happens when you devote all your energies to ostracizing and alienating a distasteful regime...but then find out that you need that regime to deliver aid to the very people you’re trying to save?

I am willing to believe that the Myanmar regime is godawful, incompetent, and corrupt.

And I get the feeling that its main strategy for disaster relief is for the survivors to walk or crawl out of the muck to assembly points where the government can feed and shelter them with a minimum expenditure of effort and resources.

And I remember—though I have yet to see it mentioned—that a cyclone can lead to regime change: when Pakistan’s halting response to the disastrous Bhola cyclone of 1970, which claimed as many as 500,000 lives, helped catalyze the separatist movement that gave birth to Bangla Desh.

But what I see in the western media is the cynical and lazy urge for a feel-good narrative of the noble West beating up on the detestable Burmese junta.

The sloppy reporting and irresponsible rhetoric reminds me of the rough justice the press meted out to Saddam Hussein in the run-up to the Iraq invasion. We all remember how satisfying it was to spread tales, no matter how untrue or unlikely, about that unsavory thug, his evil deeds, and his diabolical plans.

And some of us remember how much blood and treasure could have been saved if we had bothered to be accurate about Saddam’s capabilities, objectives, and intentions.

So, when the US ambassadress contradicts the official Burmese reports of the death toll and says as many as 100,000 could be dead, I’m inclined to give her credence.

But I also wonder: how can she know, trapped in her embassy in Yongyon in the aftermath of a natural disaster that has not only disrupted communications—it has caused entire land masses to disappear?

And, when the Oxfam fans the fear of an epidemic affecting 1.5 million people, I recall this sidebar from the TEC report on the 2004 tsunami (pg.53):

One of the recurring myths of natural disasters is that outbreaks of disease inevitably follow disasters...a recent review of over 600 geophysical disasters since 1985 find only three instances where such disasters led to epidemics...This is hardly surprising as disasters often lack the aggregation of populations [which are believed] to be a factor in the biology of epidemics.

So, when I look at the Myanmar catastrophe, I see a deadly mixture of confusion, fear, anger, and callous opportunism...on both sides.

An aide to Muqtada al-Sadr has lashed out at Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, for keeping silent over clashes that have killed hundreds in Baghdad. [...]

Speaking at Friday prayers, Sheikh Sattar Battat, an aide to al-Sadr, said he was "surprised" that al-Sistani had failed to condemn the violence.

We are surprised by the silence in Najaf where the highest Shiite religious authority is based," he said, referring to al-Sistani.

"For 50 days Sadr City is being bombed ... Children, women and old people are being killed by all kinds of US weapons, and Najaf remains silent."

Battat said the al-Sadr movement has not seen any "reaction or fatwa [religious decree] from Najaf" criticising the government assault on Shia fighters in Sadr City.

"For us this means that Najaf accepts the massacre in Sadr City," he said.

As Duss observes, Sistani's acquiescence will likely play to Sadr's advantage:

One of the central elements of the elder Sadr’s program (and now of Muqtada’s) was a distinction between the “silent clerics” (represented by Sistani and the Najaf establishment) — bookish sorts who stay remote from the lives of their people — and the “speaking clerics” who take part in the suffering and struggle of the Shia, as Sadeq did. And here the “silent clerics” once again stayed silent while Shia were crushed in Sadr City, of all places, while medical care, food, and shelter are being doled out in Muqtada’s name. It doesn’t require any math to see that Sadr benefits politically from this.

Not just politically, but religiously as well - to the extent the two are separate.  Such a strengthening of Sadr vis-a-vis Sistani is, in my opinion, a shame for reasons beyond the silent/speaking distinctions set forth above (though, obviously, I am not an Iraqi and thus should not get a vote).  Babak Rahimi has an excellent summary of some of Sistani's religious views, and how he espouses a brand of theology that can co-exist with liberal democratic traditions (at least, moreso than Sadr's):

Like his father, Sistani is an adherent of a democratic Shi'i tradition that dates back to the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 to 1911 and continued with the Khatami reformist movement (1997–2005). [...]

Sistani’s insistence on recognizing Islam as a fundamental component of the Iraqi constitution is not intended to make Iraq an Islamist state based on juridical sharia strictures, but rather to limit the total secularization of the constitution, which would deprive a Muslim country of an “authentic” national identity based on its Islamic heritage.

Sadr, on the other hand, is much more amenable to vilayet-e faqih, or an Iranian style rule by clerical jurisprudence that pays less regard to individual rights.  However, our continued assault on the Sadrist trend has been backfiring and increasing his popularity at the expense of religious leaders like Sistani that we should be acting to empower. Shockingly enough, military actions in densely populated areas leading to massive civilian casualties aren't very well received in the target population. 

Sadly, the strategic thinkers in the Bush administration seem incapable of devising a plan to empower favored factions that doesn't involve the employ of self-defeating brute strength.  It would be better if, instead, we adopted some of that fancy counterinsurgency doctrine that Petraeus is supposedly implementing.   

For the impassioned interventionist, Myanmar has it all: a corrupt and despotic junta, a gallant pro-democracy princess, and brave, battling monks.  Now it’s got a colossal humanitarian crisis that throws the failures and flaws of the detested regime into sharp relief.

One thing it doesn’t have: a government so callous and shortsighted it will refuse international aid in order to preserve its own rule.

However, this is a line that the United States and its allies are pushing, apparently in an effort to delegitimize and weaken the Myanmar regime and maybe tally up a regime change success on the cheap, courtesy of an unprecedented natural disaster.

As a result, we may sacrifice an important source of credibility and leverage in Asia—America’s perceived willingness to provide apolitical disaster relief—and open the door for China to supplant us in this key role.

A casual Western reader could be forgiven for believing that the Myanmar regime is refusing to accept international aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.

From Reuters:

In Myanmar, desperate survivors cried out for food, water and other supplies nearly a week after 100,000 people were feared killed by Cyclone Nargis as it roared across the farms and villages of the low-lying Irrawaddy delta region.

"We're outraged by the slowness of the response of the government of Burma (Myanmar) to welcome and accept assistance," U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, told reporters.

"It's clear that the government's ability to deal with the situation, which is catastrophic, is limited."

France’s Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, suggested that the UN Security Council invoke a “responsibility to protect” (designed for cases of genocide) to override Myanmar sovereignty and enable relief operations inside the country without the government’s permission.

Asia Times’ Southeast Asia editor Shawn Crispin (who bills himself as “Asia Hand”...hmmm) completely jumped the shark in my opinion with a piece entitled “The case for invading Myanmar”:

Should the junta continue to resist foreign assistance while social and public health conditions deteriorate in clear view of global news audiences, the moral case for a UN-approved, US-led humanitarian intervention will grow... the deteriorating situation presents a unique opportunity for Bush to burnish his foreign policy legacy... it is almost sure-fire that Myanmar's desperate population would warmly welcome a US-led humanitarian intervention, considering that its own government is now withholding emergency supplies... Now, Cyclone Nagris and the government's woeful response to the disaster have suddenly made that once paranoid delusion into a strong pre-emptive possibility, one that Bush's lame-duck presidency desperately needs.

Easy, tiger.

A more balanced view of Myanmar affairs--and one that doesn't fit with the narrative of criminal dysfunction by the Myanmar regime--might be gained by looking across the tarmac at Yongon International Airport.

YANGON, May 7 (Xinhua) -- A special big aircraft carrying 500,000 U.S. dollars' worth of relief materials from China arrived at the Yangon International Airport Wednesday afternoon as part of China's one million dollars' emergency relief aid to cyclone-devastated Myanmar.

    The 60-ton relief supplies, carried by a Boeing 747-400 aircraft, include compressed food, tents and blankets.

May 7 is two days before “the first big aid flights” (according to AP) arrived.  The China mission was a development that the Western press apparently missed.

China subsequently pledged an additional $4.25 million in aid, making them the largest pledged donor as well as the largest provider of actual aid to date, as far as I can tell.

The Western response?

Well, as of May 9, if you type “China aid Myanmar” into Google, the first hit you get, from ABC News :

“Is China’s Aid to Myanmar a PR Stunt?”

Actually, politics is all over the issue of Myanmar relief, and most of it is coming from the Western countries.

In an interesting coincidence, President Bush happened to be awarding a medal to Aung San Suu Kyi and used the opportunity to throw a few rocks at the government we’re supposedly negotiating with in the midst of a titanic humanitarian disaster:

President Bush spoke at a ceremony where he signed legislation awarding the Congressional Gold Medal to democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi.

"This is a fitting tribute to a courageous woman who speaks for freedom for all the people of Burma and who speaks in such a way that she's a powerful voice, in contrast to the junta that currently rules the country," Bush said.

Returning to the troubles of the UN and the Western governments in getting their aid into Myanmar.

Per the Independent:

"We will not just bring our supplies to an airport, dump it and take off," said [The World Food Programme's regional director Anthony Banbury]. "This is one reason why there is a hold up now, because we are going to bring in not just supplies but a lot of capacity to go with them to make sure the supplies get to the people."

In other words, the UN, the US, and some Western governments have made delivery of their aid contingent upon getting visas for their teams of experts to accompany the aid and supervise its distribution.

Reasons given range from “the Myanmar government is overwhelmed” to “otherwise the aid will go to feed the army instead of the people” (which some will recognize as a reprise of the accusations that North Korea diverts food aid to feed its army while its people starve).

The aid kabuki theater continued, with the United States pledging $3 million in aid, but not to the Myanmar government.  Instead, it was put in the hands of the USAID team waiting in Thailand for permission to enter:

The White House said Tuesday the U.S. will send more than $3 million to help victims of the devastating cyclone in Myanmar, up from an initial emergency contribution of $250,000.

The additional commitment of funds, announced by press secretary Dana Perino, came as Myanmar continued to resist entry for a U.S. disaster assessment team. The Bush administration said permission for such a team to enter the Southeast Asian nation and look at the damage would allow quicker and larger aid contributions.

In the meantime, the decision was made to funnel $3 million more to the disaster-stricken zone. Perino said the money would be allocated by a USAID disaster response team that is currently positioned in Thailand.[emph. added]

In a USAID press conference, some reporter was able to get to the nub of the issue, despite Director of Foreign Disaster Assistance jefe Ky Luu’s dogged attempts to tap-dance around the issue of tying aid to access:

QUESTION: I’m sorry, one more question. Well, why not just give everything through the UN and allow the UN to distribute everything? Why does it have to go through U.S. transport planes or U.S. assets? Why not give everything to the UN and have them -- you know -- through the World Food Program, through all their agencies, seeing as how their planes are being allowed in now?

MR. LUU: Well, not all their planes are being allowed in.

QUESTION: Well, there are several at this point.

MR. LUU: They have received, what we’ve been told, permission for four flights and for food. They are similarly situated, as are our other colleagues, in terms of being able to bring in staff. As I said here, the UNDAC team, they were only allowed to grant visas for four staff, so – the point being is if there’s a large infrastructure that we can support, we will look at that option. But the point is that it shouldn’t be narrowed in scope. Everybody has to become involved and we hope and urge that the regime will allow the access to take place as soon as possible.

The Jakarta Post picked up on another report indicating that it seemed more important for the United States to get its people rather than its food and supplies into Myanmar:

While directly pushing Myanmar to admit international disaster relief, the United States has asked Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, India, China and others to use "any leverage" they may have with Myanmar to allow relief teams into the country, AFP reported.

It’s easier to say “Myanmar is dragging its feet on aid” than “Myanmar desperately wants the aid but we are withholding it until we get what we want”, but that’s what’s happening.

And that leads to scenes like this:

The U.N. World Food Program said two planeloads of supplies containing enough high-energy biscuits to feed 95,000 people were seized Friday, prompting the world body to say it was suspending aid flights.

Later, WFP chief spokeswoman Nancy Roman said the flights would resume on Saturday while negotiations continued for the release of the supplies.

Myanmar's government acknowledged taking control of the shipments and said it plans to distribute the aid itself to the affected areas.

Compare and contrast:

Three Red Cross aid flights loaded with shelter kits and other emergency supplies landed in Myanmar Friday without incident.

"We are not experiencing any problems getting in (unlike) the United Nations," Danish Red Cross spokesman Hans Beck Gregersen said.

The International Red Cross is apparently a trusted and established channel for channel for distributing aid into Myanmar:

Canwest reported:

While many relief groups continue to face delays in helping the cause, Red Cross groups have been able to access some victims and distribute aid to some areas.

Michael Annear, Southeast Asia Regional Disaster Management Co-ordinator for the International Red Cross, said the organization did deal with some hassle in starting its operations, but things are improving.

"Initially, there was some slight delay (on obtaining visas)," Annear said during a conference call Thursday, "(but) we've been quite successful in developing a system with the Myanmar embassies in other countries and also working from within the Myanmar Red Cross, who is working closely with the government to get approval for individuals to come in."

The personnel from the International Red Cross would be in addition to the Myanmar Red Cross, which has about 27,000 local volunteers working to help victims since the cyclone hit last Saturday.

The organization has a permanent delegation of workers in Yangon, with external experts also coming in to help. More technical delegates are expected to arrive Friday and through the weekend.

Annear says the familiarity local Red Cross volunteers have with the area and its culture are an asset in distributing materials - purchased locally - to the most vulnerable regions.

The Chinese Red Cross is also working with the Myanmar Red Cross Society to funnel aid into Myanmar.

In the case of supplies, it would seem to be the right thing to flood Yongyon airport with supplies on a dump-and-go basis and hope that the Burmese regime has strong enough instincts for compassion and self-preservation and the Red Cross has enough access and capability to push the food and equipment out to the afflicted areas.

The Burmese regime may be more corrupt and inept than most, but totalitarian regimes tend to be rather good at disaster relief, when the security mechanisms for monitoring and control can shift to humanitarian outreach.  Its performance in this unprecedented national crisis will be a key test of whether it can continue to cling to power.

When one looks at the Western response in detail, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Western governments are exploiting the suffering to dramatize the weaknesses of the Burmese regime and undermine its legitimacy and rule—and that the Western media is enamored of the narrative that the United States can stand in judgment of the rest of the world on disaster relief *cough* Katrina and humanitarian intervention *cough* Iraq to the point of self-delusion.

That’s not a narrative that Myanmar’s Asian neighbors are particularly interested in.

One could draw the conclusion that, in the matter of Cyclone Nargis, self-serving outrage is a monopoly of the Western powers, but meaningful assistance is not.

While reporting the high-profile complaints of the UN, Europe, and the United States, the Independent noted in passing:

Navy ships from India and planes from Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Laos and Bangladesh have arrived in recent days with medicine, candles, instant noodles, raincoats and other relief supplies.

From Bangkok, Canwest acknowledged that aid was arriving, and reported the self-inflicted difficulties faced by the Western countries:

Only "friendly" governments such as China, India and Thailand have been allowed to help so far, and even they have been limited to delivering supplies and leaving.

This kind of "drop-off assistance" does not sit well with many Western governments, however. After years of ignoring calls for reform and sloughing off punishing sanctions, most governments do not trust the Myanmar generals to distribute the aid on offer, rather than stockpile it for themselves and the military.

The Western-powers versus Asia dynamic played itself out in an interesting way in the UN Security Council.

The French representative dutifully followed up on Bernard Kouchner’s “responsibility to protect” scheme by floating the idea of Security Council intervention in an e-mail.

China, Russia, Vietnam, South Africe, and Indonesia publicly slapped it down.

Indonesia, one might recall, was a major beneficiary of foreign assistance in Aceh following the devastating 2004 tsunami and might be considered sympathetic to the idea of accelerated and forcible humanitarian access.

But it drew the opposite conclusion, according to Xinhua:

Based on Indonesia's past experiences in dealing with disasters, especially the 2004 deadly tsunami, [Indonesia’s UN ambassador] Natalegawa said that most probably the aid delivery efforts were hampered by conditions in the field.

"It's quite possible that the obstacles hampering the relief assistance delivery are not caused by political things, but by the complexity of conditions in the field," he said.

Indonesia went on to state:

"We think there are other better forums to discuss the humanitarian dimension of the Myanmar situation," Indonesian Ambassador Marty Natalegawa told reporters ahead of a Security Council meeting.

"There is a already a readiness on the part of Myanmar to open itself to assistance," he said. "The last thing we would want is to give a political spin to the technical realities and the situation on the ground."

The Chinese went public with their displeasure, and even the chief UN aid guy was cool to the idea.

Beijing's deputy permanent representative, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, made it clear that China, which has veto powers on the council, opposed any involvement of the U.N. Security Council.

"The current issue of Myanmar is a natural disaster," he said. "It's not an issue for the Security Council. It might be a good issue for other forums of the U.N."

Liu said the council should not politicize the issue and should "let the humanitarian assistance go on."

U.N. humanitarian affairs chief John Holmes has indicated that the French approach would not be helpful and could be seen by some as confrontation.

Western diplomats acknowledged that it would be difficult to persuade skeptics on the council about the need for getting the council involved. Council diplomats said Washington was among the most supportive of the French idea.

One might say that the West scored an own goal, sacrificed the moral high ground, picked up a stone to throw and instead dropped it on its own foot, or (insert suitable metaphor here) by pushing Kouchner’s over-the-top proposal.

One might also say that the people of Myanmar would have been better served by a prompt release of aid that erred on the side of compassion and trust, instead of wasting time at the UN Security Council on futile jibber-jabber concerning the liberal fantasy of forcible humanitarian intervention or haggling over the access of our experts.

Instead, intensive diplomatic efforts could have been devoted to negotiating a genuine, life-saving measure: permitting US helicopter crews to fly humanitarian missions to cut-off villages.

Asian disaster relief is, interestingly, an important role for the United States military, in particular the U.S. Navy.

Since we are technically at peace with all of the states in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans—at least until the next war—the Navy needs an excuse to keep steaming around there, making port calls, and making the case for a sustained US military presence out there.

One mission the US Navy has claimed is humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters, most conspicuously and successfully demonstrated in the case of the case of the 2004 tsunami.

The Navy has a ship in the area, the Essex, that could provide 19 helicopters with cargo lift capability, and it would be nice to see them deployed to get supplies to people desperately clinging to life in the flooded Irrawaddy delta.

Unfortunately, USAID’s Ky Luu, got a little carried away and proposed that the US military drop supplies without permission of the Myanmar government.

Secretary of Defense Gates, who seems to be the sole voice of reason in the Bush administration these days, quashed the idea, stating:

"I cannot image us going in without the permission of the Myanmar government."

Presumably, Secretary Gates drew the conclusion that nothing would discredit the humanitarian mission of the US military in Asia quicker than unapproved operations. 

Nobody’s going to welcome the 7th Fleet in the region if they are worried about helicopters full of Marines buzzing across the horizon to “rescue” some pro-US rebel group from an attack by government forces on the pretext of a rainstorm.

Even under the most favorable of circumstances, a deal on US forces flying missions into Myanmar would probably be unachievable.

But, given the unnecessary and quite possibly cynically deliberate two-step on admission of US and UN aid workers, it’s impossible, and many people may die as a result.

In the wake of the disaster and the politicized Western posturing, I think that there will be an assessment that an effective, non-US disaster relief capability needs to be present in the region—from Indonesia, India, or China.

The Chinese may be quick to jump on the opportunity.

As the AP pointed out:

China is a relative newcomer to major international disaster relief operations and its armed forces, despite their vast size, have limited capacity for quickly delivering supplies beyond its borders.

Beijing may decide it needs something like the Essex sailing around in the Pacific with helicopters on deck, ready to offer disaster relief both to its close and unpopular allies like Burma and any state that wants to avail itself of the resource—and not only for humanitarian reasons or to provide more opportunities for the display of Chinese soft-power benevolence..

A Chinese disaster relief capability would also deny the United States another pretext for a significant military presence in the west Pacific and Indian Ocean, and give the Chinese military forces humanitarian cover for development of their blue-water and regional force-projection capabilities.

And, when the Western posturing on Myanmar is recalled, Asian states might be willing to swallow their suspicions of Chinese military reach and accept Beijing instead of the United States as a primary provider of regional disaster relief.

That’s not good for us.

Even if the Myanmar regime collapses as a result of the post-cyclone chaos, that win may not be enough to compensate for the loss of US standing and prestige in the region.

Iraqi security forces, after more than of 40 days of intense fighting, on Thursday told residents to evacuate their homes in the northeast Shiite slum of Sadr City and to move to temporary shelters on two soccer fields.

The military's call indicated the possibility of stepped-up military operations and came as Iraqi security forces raided a radio station run by backers of Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. In the southern port city of Basra, militants launched rockets that struck a coalition base, killing two contractors and injuring four civilians and four coalition soldiers.

Sadr City has been a battleground since late March, enduring U.S. airstrikes, militia snipers and gunbattles between U.S. and Iraqi forces and the Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to Sadr.

Already some 8,500 people have been displaced from the sprawling slum of some 2.5 million people, according to the Iraqi Red Crescent. For weeks, food, water and medical shortages have affected about 150,000 people, aid agencies said.

Two soccer fields in east and northeast Baghdad are expected to receive some 16,000 evacuees from the southeast portion of the city where the fighting has been most intense.

The BBC offers one version of the grisly death toll:

In the last seven weeks around 1,000 people have died, and more than 2,500 others have been injured, most of them civilians.

Back to McClatchy:

In most of Sadr City, people haven't had food rations for more than a month and a half, and the Red Crescent has distributed thousands of food packs, 100 tons of flour and supplied four tons of medical supplies to the two main hospitals.

Wonder if this hospital was on the receiving end of those supplies:

IRAQI soldiers yesterday detained dozens of policemen and closed down a hospital suspected of treating Shiite militiamen in a Baghdad stronghold of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.

Or maybe this one?

A major hospital in Baghdad's Sadr City slum was damaged Saturday when an American military strike targeted a militia command center just a few yards away, the U.S. military said. [...]

The rocket strike near Sadr Hospital injured 30 people, shattered the windows of ambulances and sent doctors and hospital staff fleeing the scene, hospital officials said.

So let's recap the scene: the US military and its Iraqi "allies" are laying siege to a sprawling neighborhood in Baghdad housing roughly 2.5 million Iraqis, launching air strikes, artillery attacks, tank shells and other assorted ordnance, shutting down hospitals and bombing others, cutting off the supply of food and walling off entire sectors of the embattled region, causing a refugee crisis by their actions - and now actually pursuing a policy with the intent of creating a larger refugee crisis! 

For what reason: because a majority of residents in these regions support a political movement, and militia, that oppose our presence.  Can't have that.  Because we have to keep 150,000 troops in Iraq to safeguard the Iraqi people.  After all, whose gonna set up the tents in the refugee catch basins we so magnanimously helped set up to receive the overflow from our relentless assault on political movements that would make it harder for us to stay in Iraq.  To safeguard the Iraqi people. 

Well, at least he's consistent. 

If anyone finds anything, feel free to leave a comment or shoot me an email.  I can offer you fame and glory, or the utmost anonymity.  Bonus points for anyone that tracks down O'Hanlon related payola.

So why the sudden spate of stories sugesting that Iran supports only the Mahdi Army, and implying that its support is increasing? There are two options, I guess: (a) because it's true or (b) because it's in somebody's interest to feed this storyline. It's pretty much impossible to say which is more likely, though.

It's that last sentence that stands out like a sore, but even, hand. Impossible to say if the Mahdi Army is the only group in Iraq receiving Iranian support?  Really?  Despite ISCI's historic and long lasting ties, and the fact that some members of its militia, the Badr Corp., are still receiving pensions from the IRGC?  Regardless of the fact that Iranian operatives detained by US forces in Iraq were nabbed at ISCI's headquarters, and were in Iraq on the invitation of ISCI's leadership?

Even worse, Kevin seemingly performs the impossible in the preceding sentence:

Of course, Iran probably is supplying arms to the Mahdi Army. But they've been doing that for a long time, and they also provide support to the Badr Organization, which is allied with the Iraqi government. [emphasis added throughout]

Perhaps it was just sloppy syntax, and Drum meant that the hard to determine part is whether aid to the Mahdi Army is increasing?  He has certainly earned my benefit of the doubt.  His post from yesterday is far more incicive in terms of exposing holes and dubious reporting associated with the above described Sadr/Iran narrative.   

So I'm open to the more innocuous explanation, and the possibility that I'm overreacting.  The more interesting, and indeed murky, line of inquiry leads to just whose interests are served by pushing this transparently doctored storyline.  But that the storyline is false is a given.

Olmert's coalition is actually at least temporarily down to 64 after three MK's left the Pensioners to form a new Social Justice party linked to Russian billionaire Arcadi Gaydamak. However, they are interested in joining the coalition. Gaydamak has previously been rumored to have his sights on becoming Jerusalem's mayor himself, and even toyed with making a supermarket chain he acquired kosher to appeal to the city's religious voters.

(Crossposted to my blog.)

Forget the rocket attacks, concrete blast walls and lack of a sewer system. Now try to imagine luxury hotels, a shopping center and even condos in the heart of Baghdad.

That's all part of a five-year development "dream list" - or what some dub an improbable fantasy - to transform the U.S.-protected Green Zone from a walled fortress into a centerpiece for Baghdad's future.

But the $5 billion plan has the backing of the Pentagon and apparently the interest of some deep pockets in the world of international hotels and development, the lead military liaison for the project told The Associated Press.

For Washington, the driving motivation is to create a "zone of influence" around the new $700 million U.S. Embassy to serve as a kind of high-end buffer for the compound, whose total price tag will reach about $1 billion after all the workers and offices are relocated over the next year.

"When you have $1 billion hanging out there and 1,000 employees lying around, you kind of want to know who your neighbors are. You want to influence what happens in your neighborhood over time," said Navy Capt. Thomas Karnowski, who led the team that created the development plan.

Yes, this is a Grand Idea! Because there is nothing like having the vast and unforgiving chasm between the "haves" and the "have nots" being shown to the dirt-poor Sadr City occupants on a daily basis to make them happier and obedient servants of the United States government. Can you just imagine the propaganda that will flow if this "Wizard of Oz" city is allowed to flourish? Exactly what kind of social science idiots are being employed here?

Memo to media outlets large and small: More Nir Rosen, less Michael O'Hanlon.  Actually, I'd settle for just more Nir Rosen.  I'm not greedy. 

On the Iraqi side, 925 people were killed in Sadr City in April alone.  Most of these were civilians.  As Sadr City is six square miles in size, that represents roughly 150 deaths per square mile in that section of Baghdad during the month.

As argued in Part I, this is what we hope to gain in exchange for all this death and destruction:

So what, then, would count as victory?  The answer drains most meaning out of the word: disrupt the political and military wings of the Sadrist movement...enough that Iran's main ally in Iraq, ISCI...can prevail in upcoming elections (only). In other words, the US will be aiding and assisting in the undermining of the democratic process that it supposedly invaded Iraq to promote as an example throughout the region...

The Sadrist current represents too large a social phenomenon to actually defeat or eradicate, but short term disruption is feasible.  Why, then, is the goal of weakening the Sadrists in the short term, and helping ISCI ahead of the upcoming elections, so important to the Bush administration?  There are at least three reasons:

1.  Sadr opposes a prolonged US occupation/permanent bases.  The Bush administration obviously values those objectives highly and is in a scramble to come to an agreement on a long-term security/status of forces agreement with the Iraqi government.  In pursuit of this, the Bush team wants as much ostensible legal and popular legitimacy buttressing this agreement as possible (even if in appearances only).  Keeping Sadr down now, and increasing Maliki's mandate (at least de jure if not de facto), is vital.

2.  Sadr opposes heavy foreign involvement in the oil sector.  What, did you really think this had nothing to do with oil?

The third prong is more controversial:

3.  Sadr opposes the fragmenting of the Iraqi state into semi-autonomous sub-regions.

I say "controversial," because I'm not convinced yet that this is important for the Bush administration. At the very least, though, the Bush administration would be willing to endorse such a plan in return for cooperation from ISCI and Iran (who both favor such a break-up of the state - actually ISCI is the only non-Kurdish group pushing for fragmentation).  Which reminds me, the pivot here is that ISCI is more amenable on all three fronts, and so ISCI is the horse we're backing with all the firepower in our arsenal. Despite ISCI's obvious ties to Iran.

Speaking of Iran, their relationships with ISCI and the Sadrists, respectively, are germane to recent developments.  ISCI (whose political wing and militia were formed, funded, trained and indoctrinated in Iran by the Iranian regime) is Iran's main proxy in Iraq.  Yet the Iranians have also been willing, at times, to fund and arm the Sadrists for at least a couple of reasons: First, the Iranians recognized early on that the Sadrists were too powerful to simply ignore, dismiss or quash, so the better to cultivate influence and goodwill.  Second, the Sadrist foot soldiers could provide a useful lever against the US presence in Iraq when necessary.

That being said, Iran does have a strong interest in ensuring the same outcome in upcoming elections as that sought by the Bush administration: namely, a big ISCI/Dawa victory and a poor showing by the Sadrists.  That's because the Sadrist movement's political agenda/rhetoric (nationalistic, at times anti-Persian and staunchly opposed to the creation of a Shiite super region) is more hindrance than benefit to the Iranians - as opposed to the Sadrists' capacity to field an anti-American militia which can still come in handy.  

Thus, Iran would be reluctant to sever ties with the Sadrists completely or cooperate in their annihilation (that's a pretty big chip to simply discard).  And, again, Iran likely realizes that vanquishing such a large movement is very difficult to pull off.  Further, participation in such a massive purge/massacre might spark a severe Shiite nationalist backlash (endangering Iran's position in the Shiite south). But short term disruption is feasible and, at the moment, very desirable. [more after the jump]

So with US and Iranian objectives in a rare moment of alignment, reports like these begin popping up:

Iran voiced support on Monday for Iraq's prime minister in a crackdown on a Shi'ite militia but blamed U.S. forces for civilian deaths in the fighting.

The Islamic Republic also said the United States, its old foe, had requested a new round of talks on improving security in Iraq and Tehran was considering it. [...]

Analysts say Tehran and Washington, despite their mutual accusations, may still have a shared interest in a stable Iraq.

And then the counterpunch:

Sadr spokesman Salah al-Obeidi (al-Ubaydi) in Najaf bitterly attacked Iran, accusing it of seeking to share with the US in influence over Iraq. He pointed to the Iranian's regime's failure to condemn the long-term mutual security agreement being crafted by the Bush administration and the al-Maliki government. Al-Obeidi's angry denunciation suggests that Iran is backing PM Nuri al-Maliki and his current chief ally, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim against the Sadr Movement of Muqtada al-Sadr.

Note how the long-term security agreement issue comes up in this context.  Today, more interesting - though underreported - news regarding maneuvers related to the recent shock! on the part of the Iraqi government at the discovery that Iran has been funding Shiite militias (ISCI was particularly scandalized).  Most major outlets, like the New York Times, are reporting that the Iraqi government is sending a contingent to forcefully confront Iran on its aid to the Sadrist current. The truth, however, lies elsewhere:

We have it on the excellent authority of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq itself (ISCI, formerly SCIRI, aka just the "Supreme Council") that its leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim took a phone call from President Bush yesterday afternoon, after receiving a visit from ambassador Crocker and special ambassador Satterfield. And following the meeting and the phone call he convened a meeting of United Iraqi Alliance (the Shiite bloc that once included Sadrists and Fadhila, but now includes only the Supreme Council and the Dawa Party), which he also heads. (As RoadstoIraq, which first called attention to these events, noted: "Bush-Hakim are up to something").

Then this morning the New York Times reports that a delegation of senior Dawa and Supreme Council people was sent yesterday to Tehran for talks. The delegation included Hadi al-Ameri, head of the Badr Organization, the military wing of the Supreme council. (Interestingly, the NYT didn't identify Hadi al-Ameri as head of the Badr Organization, merely calling him a "senior member of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a Shiite party in Mr Maliki's coalition.")

So: Bush calls Hakim; Hakim convenes the Shiite coalition; and a delegation including the Badr Organization head is sent to Tehran. And the NYT this morning, leaving out the Bush phone-call and the resulting UIA meeting, spins the events like this: "American officials supported the trip, but portrayed it as the brainchild of Mr Maliki." [emphasis added]

Brainchild?  The last time we heard about Maliki birthing his own ideas was when US and Iraqi forces carried out an assault on Basra that was long planned for by US military officials.  But I digress.  What stands out is the identity of the members of the Iraqi government team: ISCI members, Dawa members and other individuals identified as close to the Iranians.  Are we really to believe that ISCI is going to Tehran to draw a line in the sand in a stand-off with its long-time and primary benefactor?  I'm guessing, no. 

This looks more like coordination and cooperation with respect to the shared objective of ensuring strong showings for ISCI/Dawa at the expense of the Sadrists in the next round of elections.  With Bush and Crocker in on the discussions, I'd guess the long-term security arrangement and the Bush administration's acquiescence with respect to (if not active support for) the Shiite super region as the underlying quid pro quo.  In exchange, Iran would continue to look the other way as Sadr City burns, while tightening the spigot on its support for the Sadrists.

At least that's my take.

However, given the nature of Iran's longstanding involvement with certain Shiite Iraqi factions, these "official" statements are more like Claude Raines-styled shock than revelation. From the article cited by Dr. iRak:

The U.S. military official suggested that the "thousands" of munitions uncovered in Basra, and the idea that they were being used by extremists allegedly trained by Iran, had been an eye-opener for Iraq's leaders. "Our discussion is now matched by their understanding," he said. "This is the beginning of a change of public discussion among senior Iraqis." [emphasis added]

Uh huh: Iraq's leaders stunned by the discovery that Iran is funding and training Iraqi Shiite groups.  Funny that, considering one of the main factions in the GoI, ISCI, is just about a wholly owned subsidiary of the Iranian government. You think that assessment is hyperbolic? Some background: ISCI is comprised of Iraqis that fled mostly to Iran during the 1980s and 1990s. While in Iran, the party (then called SCIRI) and its Badr Corp. militia were formed, funded, armed and indoctrinated by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. and other regime elements.  In fact, some ISCI members fought on Iran's side in the Iran/Iraq war, and many still draw pensions from the IRGC, despite the fact that those members returned to Iraq en masse after the Baath regime was toppled. 

So is one to assume that ISCI is surprised to find the Iranians arming and training Iraqi Shiites?  And that they're now demanding that Iran stop funding and arming...groups like ISCI?  Not exactly.  Once again, the discussion of Iranian involvement is fixed like a laser on the Sadrist current while the far more extensive ties to our putative allies like ISCI are ignored.

Given this reality, it is more likely that the GoI is pursuing two primary goals by making these statements: First and foremost, placating Bush administration officials concerned about the GoI's ties to Iran (or at least providing the Bush administration with useful PR fodder to counter critics that point out that state of affairs).  Second, though to a lesser degree, trying to corner the market on Iranian money and weapons (not cut the supply off completely).   

Nevertheless, Dr. iRak sees significance behind the facade of Kabuki make-up:

This stance by the GoI serves several purposes simultaneously. First, it can be understood in classic "good cop, bad cop" terms. The United Stats [sic] is playing the saber-rattling bad cop, appearing to threaten war with Iran over new evidence of lethal assistance to JAM "special groups." The then steps in and says "we agree," but we think that things should be resolved diplomatically, thus playing the good cop holding the Americans back. Good coercive diplomacy . . . if it works.

I suppose, but only in a limited sense.  The GoI (meaning ISCI/Dawa) might be playing a little hardball with the Iranian government over its providing support to the Sadrists, but their bluff and bluster can only go so far.  Their ties to Iran are too deep to sever over this issue, and such isolation would leave them at the mercy of the Americans alone.  That's a heck of a leap to take.  More from Dr. iRak:

Second, increasing anti-Iranian rhetoric may help the Maliki government appeal to Sunni leaders and thereby forge cross-sectarian cooperation on other sticky issues.

Not likely.  Again, making a public display of opposition to the fact that Iran is supporting the Sadrists isn't goint to fool Iraqi Sunnis.  Most have a well developed, if not exaggerated, knowledge about the endurance of ties between Iran and ISCI, as well as Iran and Maliki's Dawa party. The GoI statements are mostly for American audiences, with the locals not being as susceptible to such propaganda.

There are elements in this last bit from Dr. iRak that I agree with, though there are also some dubious presumptions:

Finally, emphasizing Iranian involvement provides a useful public "explanation" for the difficulty U.S. and Iraqi forces have had, thus far, in quelling violence in Sadr City. Blame it on Iran, not Sadr/JAM. Why go this route? Because it allows the United States to maintain the fiction that it is only the "special groups" that are fighting the coalition instead of rank-and-file JAM, thus preserving the illusion that the Sadr "freeze" declared last August--a major (perhaps the major) reason for declining violence during the later part of the "surge" period in 2007--has not collapsed. [...]

At the same time, Iranian involvement allows U.S. officials to deflect blame for the fighting from radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, whom they are counting on to sustain a frayed but officially intact truce he called in August for his Mahdi Army militia. Though privately many soldiers here say the Mahdi militia is involved in the current fighting, publicly, the allegation is that "special groups" who have broken away from Sadr and receive training and aid from Iran are causing the troubles.

As discussed previously on this Site, I concur that the "special groups" fiction can be useful.  I'm just not so sure the current strategy looks to take advantage of the "special groups" formulation.  Presently, US and Iraqi forces are not seeking to "quell violence" in Sadr City and Basra - they're initiating it.  That's an enormous difference.  Further, the main purpose of the anti-Sadrist operations is to weaken that movement ahead of regional elections this fall (which only makes the enormous loss of innocent civilian life in Sadr City that much more horrific). 

Thus, keeping this fiction in play is less important than previously, when the Bush administration was contemplating more normalized relations with the Sadrists.  After all, do we really expect Sadr to sustain a cease fire while missles, bombs and tank shells rain down upon his constituents?  The "special groups" fiction wouldn't help him to save face amidst such carnage.  Nor would a cease fire halt the onslaught.

For eight years, Clinton and Gore have extended our military commitments while depleting our military power.  Rarely has so much been demanded of our armed forces, and so little given to them in return. George W. Bush and I are going to change that, too.  I have seen our military at its finest, with the best equipment, the best training, and the best leadership.  I'm proud of them. I have had the responsibility for their well-being.  And I can promise them now, help is on the way.  Soon, our men and women in uniform will once again have a commander in chief they can respect, one who understands their mission and restores their morale. [emph. added]

And what's not to respect about Dick Deferment and George "Defender of the Texas Skies" Bush.  Friedman proceeds to dispatch the fish lingering in this fetid barrel.  Well worth the read. 

Also providing laughs courtesy of the way-back machine, look what John McCain has to say about a permanent presence in Iraq when we set the dial for 2005:

Three years before the Arizona Republican argued on the campaign trail that U.S. forces could be in Iraq for 100 years in the absence of violence, he decried the very concept of a long-term troop presence.

In fact, when asked specifically if he thought the U.S. military should set up shop in Iraq along the lines of what has been established in post-WWII Germany or Japan — something McCain has repeatedly advocated during the campaign — the senator offered nothing short of a categorical “no.”

“I would hope that we could bring them all home,” he said on MSNBC. “I would hope that we would probably leave some military advisers, as we have in other countries, to help them with their training and equipment and that kind of stuff.”

Host Chris Matthews pressed McCain on the issue. “You’ve heard the ideological argument to keep U.S. forces in the Middle East. I’ve heard it from the hawks. They say, keep United States military presence in the Middle East, like we have with the 7th Fleet in Asia. We have the German…the South Korean component. Do you think we could get along without it?”

McCain held fast, rejecting the very policy he urges today. “I not only think we could get along without it, but I think one of our big problems has been the fact that many Iraqis resent American military presence,” he responded. “And I don’t pretend to know exactly Iraqi public opinion. But as soon as we can reduce our visibility as much as possible, the better I think it is going to be.”

Ah, to be serious and mavirecky.  Actually, it gets worse.  As Steve Benen documents, McCain goes back and forth on this issue so often he's got enough frequent flier miles racked up that he can finally abandon Cindy's private jet. 

Which would only bolster his non-elitists bona fides.  I mean, has Obama given up his private jet?  Didn't think so.