| Search |
| Recent comments |
|
| User login |
| Navigation |
| Who's online |
| There are currently 0 users and 12 guests online. |
| Who's new |
| Browse archives |
| Feeds |
|
|
That lovable scamp Michael Ledeen is off message again - calling for military action against Iran despite his repeated assertions that he doesn't, you know, favor military action against Iran.
Well, at least he's consistent.
...or study, or some other comfortable nook where you do your reading, dear reader. The reason? The Pentagon has recently released all the documents that it was forced to give to the New York Times in connection with the rent-a-general/pre-war propagnda story. There's a lot of documents, but there's bound to be some absolutely juicy nuggets nestled in those hills of pulp.
If anyone finds anything, feel free to leave a comment or shoot me an email. I can offer you fame and glory, or the utmost anonymity. Bonus points for anyone that tracks down O'Hanlon related payola.
Kevin Drum is an eminently reasonable man, and a blogger who, unlike me, doesn't wander into the reeds donning tin foil armor on too many occasions. Still, in this post, K-Drum is being overly circumspect even by our respective standards:
So why the sudden spate of stories sugesting that Iran supports only the Mahdi Army, and implying that its support is increasing? There are two options, I guess: (a) because it's true or (b) because it's in somebody's interest to feed this storyline. It's pretty much impossible to say which is more likely, though.
It's that last sentence that stands out like a sore, but even, hand. Impossible to say if the Mahdi Army is the only group in Iraq receiving Iranian support? Really? Despite ISCI's historic and long lasting ties, and the fact that some members of its militia, the Badr Corp., are still receiving pensions from the IRGC? Regardless of the fact that Iranian operatives detained by US forces in Iraq were nabbed at ISCI's headquarters, and were in Iraq on the invitation of ISCI's leadership?
Even worse, Kevin seemingly performs the impossible in the preceding sentence:
Of course, Iran probably is supplying arms to the Mahdi Army. But they've been doing that for a long time, and they also provide support to the Badr Organization, which is allied with the Iraqi government. [emphasis added throughout]
Perhaps it was just sloppy syntax, and Drum meant that the hard to determine part is whether aid to the Mahdi Army is increasing? He has certainly earned my benefit of the doubt. His post from yesterday is far more incicive in terms of exposing holes and dubious reporting associated with the above described Sadr/Iran narrative.
So I'm open to the more innocuous explanation, and the possibility that I'm overreacting. The more interesting, and indeed murky, line of inquiry leads to just whose interests are served by pushing this transparently doctored storyline. But that the storyline is false is a given.
Over the past few days, Israel has suddenly become awash with rumors that the end may be near for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. At issue are allegations that he accepted bribe's from American businessman Morris Talansky during his days as Jerusalem mayor. Israel is under a tight gag order that even Reuters is forced to follow, so we rely on the New York Post to explain this development that could end what remains of the Annapolis peace process. Of course, it's not actually clear to me why this might force Olmert out when nothing else has.
Olmert's coalition is actually at least temporarily down to 64 after three MK's left the Pensioners to form a new Social Justice party linked to Russian billionaire Arcadi Gaydamak. However, they are interested in joining the coalition. Gaydamak has previously been rumored to have his sights on becoming Jerusalem's mayor himself, and even toyed with making a supermarket chain he acquired kosher to appeal to the city's religious voters.
(Crossposted to my blog.)
You know, back when Paul Bremer was running things in Iraq - in his unique fashion - I was amazed by the stories of Republican advocates in his staff trying to push their style of democracy onto the nation. They were trying gun rights, flat taxes, all kinds of silly things. Now it sounds like the proponents of "let capitalism have a chance" are back and bigger than ever.
Forget the rocket attacks, concrete blast walls and lack of a sewer system. Now try to imagine luxury hotels, a shopping center and even condos in the heart of Baghdad.
That's all part of a five-year development "dream list" - or what some dub an improbable fantasy - to transform the U.S.-protected Green Zone from a walled fortress into a centerpiece for Baghdad's future.
But the $5 billion plan has the backing of the Pentagon and apparently the interest of some deep pockets in the world of international hotels and development, the lead military liaison for the project told The Associated Press.
For Washington, the driving motivation is to create a "zone of influence" around the new $700 million U.S. Embassy to serve as a kind of high-end buffer for the compound, whose total price tag will reach about $1 billion after all the workers and offices are relocated over the next year.
"When you have $1 billion hanging out there and 1,000 employees lying around, you kind of want to know who your neighbors are. You want to influence what happens in your neighborhood over time," said Navy Capt. Thomas Karnowski, who led the team that created the development plan.
Yes, this is a Grand Idea! Because there is nothing like having the vast and unforgiving chasm between the "haves" and the "have nots" being shown to the dirt-poor Sadr City occupants on a daily basis to make them happier and obedient servants of the United States government. Can you just imagine the propaganda that will flow if this "Wizard of Oz" city is allowed to flourish? Exactly what kind of social science idiots are being employed here?
UPDATE: More opinions here.If you only read one thing today (not written by me that is, I mean, let's not get carried away people), you should read this piece from Nir Rosen. I don't necessarily agree with everything he says, but it's a long post and he covers a lot of ground. There is, however, a refreshing display of actual knowledge. Fancy that.
Memo to media outlets large and small: More Nir Rosen, less Michael O'Hanlon. Actually, I'd settle for just more Nir Rosen. I'm not greedy.
In Part I of this series, I discussed the primary objective behind the stepped-up assault on the Sadrist movement in Iraq; an assault that has already resulted in a predicted spike of US casualties (51 in April) and an unthinkable level of suffering for the Iraqi people (liberation never felt so good!). Not to mention the implementation of a corrolary policy of walling off, separating and collectively punishing densely populated neighborhoods of Baghdad. Brandon Friedman has a good summary of the uptick in violence (as well as a collection of experts tut-tutting the anti-war crowd for refusing to concede that the Surge had resulted in victory, the end):
On the Iraqi side, 925 people were killed in Sadr City in April alone. Most of these were civilians. As Sadr City is six square miles in size, that represents roughly 150 deaths per square mile in that section of Baghdad during the month.
As argued in Part I, this is what we hope to gain in exchange for all this death and destruction:
So what, then, would count as victory? The answer drains most meaning out of the word: disrupt the political and military wings of the Sadrist movement...enough that Iran's main ally in Iraq, ISCI...can prevail in upcoming elections (only). In other words, the US will be aiding and assisting in the undermining of the democratic process that it supposedly invaded Iraq to promote as an example throughout the region...
The Sadrist current represents too large a social phenomenon to actually defeat or eradicate, but short term disruption is feasible. Why, then, is the goal of weakening the Sadrists in the short term, and helping ISCI ahead of the upcoming elections, so important to the Bush administration? There are at least three reasons:
1. Sadr opposes a prolonged US occupation/permanent bases. The Bush administration obviously values those objectives highly and is in a scramble to come to an agreement on a long-term security/status of forces agreement with the Iraqi government. In pursuit of this, the Bush team wants as much ostensible legal and popular legitimacy buttressing this agreement as possible (even if in appearances only). Keeping Sadr down now, and increasing Maliki's mandate (at least de jure if not de facto), is vital.
2. Sadr opposes heavy foreign involvement in the oil sector. What, did you really think this had nothing to do with oil?
The third prong is more controversial:
3. Sadr opposes the fragmenting of the Iraqi state into semi-autonomous sub-regions.
I say "controversial," because I'm not convinced yet that this is important for the Bush administration. At the very least, though, the Bush administration would be willing to endorse such a plan in return for cooperation from ISCI and Iran (who both favor such a break-up of the state - actually ISCI is the only non-Kurdish group pushing for fragmentation). Which reminds me, the pivot here is that ISCI is more amenable on all three fronts, and so ISCI is the horse we're backing with all the firepower in our arsenal. Despite ISCI's obvious ties to Iran.
Speaking of Iran, their relationships with ISCI and the Sadrists, respectively, are germane to recent developments. ISCI (whose political wing and militia were formed, funded, trained and indoctrinated in Iran by the Iranian regime) is Iran's main proxy in Iraq. Yet the Iranians have also been willing, at times, to fund and arm the Sadrists for at least a couple of reasons: First, the Iranians recognized early on that the Sadrists were too powerful to simply ignore, dismiss or quash, so the better to cultivate influence and goodwill. Second, the Sadrist foot soldiers could provide a useful lever against the US presence in Iraq when necessary.
That being said, Iran does have a strong interest in ensuring the same outcome in upcoming elections as that sought by the Bush administration: namely, a big ISCI/Dawa victory and a poor showing by the Sadrists. That's because the Sadrist movement's political agenda/rhetoric (nationalistic, at times anti-Persian and staunchly opposed to the creation of a Shiite super region) is more hindrance than benefit to the Iranians - as opposed to the Sadrists' capacity to field an anti-American militia which can still come in handy.
Thus, Iran would be reluctant to sever ties with the Sadrists completely or cooperate in their annihilation (that's a pretty big chip to simply discard). And, again, Iran likely realizes that vanquishing such a large movement is very difficult to pull off. Further, participation in such a massive purge/massacre might spark a severe Shiite nationalist backlash (endangering Iran's position in the Shiite south). But short term disruption is feasible and, at the moment, very desirable. [more after the jump]
I'm normally a big fan of the Abu Muquwama site and its authors, but this recent post from Dr. iRak left me scratching my head. The good Dr. seems unduly impressed with some recent statements made by the Government of Iraq (or "GoI" as he terms it) scolding Iran for supplying aid and armaments to Shiite militias. The supposed smoking gun evidence in the present case is a cache of Iranian made weapons (allegedly set aside for the Sadrists) found in the Basra area.
However, given the nature of Iran's longstanding involvement with certain Shiite Iraqi factions, these "official" statements are more like Claude Raines-styled shock than revelation. From the article cited by Dr. iRak:
The U.S. military official suggested that the "thousands" of munitions uncovered in Basra, and the idea that they were being used by extremists allegedly trained by Iran, had been an eye-opener for Iraq's leaders. "Our discussion is now matched by their understanding," he said. "This is the beginning of a change of public discussion among senior Iraqis." [emphasis added]
Uh huh: Iraq's leaders stunned by the discovery that Iran is funding and training Iraqi Shiite groups. Funny that, considering one of the main factions in the GoI, ISCI, is just about a wholly owned subsidiary of the Iranian government. You think that assessment is hyperbolic? Some background: ISCI is comprised of Iraqis that fled mostly to Iran during the 1980s and 1990s. While in Iran, the party (then called SCIRI) and its Badr Corp. militia were formed, funded, armed and indoctrinated by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. and other regime elements. In fact, some ISCI members fought on Iran's side in the Iran/Iraq war, and many still draw pensions from the IRGC, despite the fact that those members returned to Iraq en masse after the Baath regime was toppled.
So is one to assume that ISCI is surprised to find the Iranians arming and training Iraqi Shiites? And that they're now demanding that Iran stop funding and arming...groups like ISCI? Not exactly. Once again, the discussion of Iranian involvement is fixed like a laser on the Sadrist current while the far more extensive ties to our putative allies like ISCI are ignored.
Given this reality, it is more likely that the GoI is pursuing two primary goals by making these statements: First and foremost, placating Bush administration officials concerned about the GoI's ties to Iran (or at least providing the Bush administration with useful PR fodder to counter critics that point out that state of affairs). Second, though to a lesser degree, trying to corner the market on Iranian money and weapons (not cut the supply off completely).
Nevertheless, Dr. iRak sees significance behind the facade of Kabuki make-up:
This stance by the GoI serves several purposes simultaneously. First, it can be understood in classic "good cop, bad cop" terms. The United Stats [sic] is playing the saber-rattling bad cop, appearing to threaten war with Iran over new evidence of lethal assistance to JAM "special groups." The then steps in and says "we agree," but we think that things should be resolved diplomatically, thus playing the good cop holding the Americans back. Good coercive diplomacy . . . if it works.
I suppose, but only in a limited sense. The GoI (meaning ISCI/Dawa) might be playing a little hardball with the Iranian government over its providing support to the Sadrists, but their bluff and bluster can only go so far. Their ties to Iran are too deep to sever over this issue, and such isolation would leave them at the mercy of the Americans alone. That's a heck of a leap to take. More from Dr. iRak:
Second, increasing anti-Iranian rhetoric may help the Maliki government appeal to Sunni leaders and thereby forge cross-sectarian cooperation on other sticky issues.
Not likely. Again, making a public display of opposition to the fact that Iran is supporting the Sadrists isn't goint to fool Iraqi Sunnis. Most have a well developed, if not exaggerated, knowledge about the endurance of ties between Iran and ISCI, as well as Iran and Maliki's Dawa party. The GoI statements are mostly for American audiences, with the locals not being as susceptible to such propaganda.
There are elements in this last bit from Dr. iRak that I agree with, though there are also some dubious presumptions:
Finally, emphasizing Iranian involvement provides a useful public "explanation" for the difficulty U.S. and Iraqi forces have had, thus far, in quelling violence in Sadr City. Blame it on Iran, not Sadr/JAM. Why go this route? Because it allows the United States to maintain the fiction that it is only the "special groups" that are fighting the coalition instead of rank-and-file JAM, thus preserving the illusion that the Sadr "freeze" declared last August--a major (perhaps the major) reason for declining violence during the later part of the "surge" period in 2007--has not collapsed. [...]
At the same time, Iranian involvement allows U.S. officials to deflect blame for the fighting from radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, whom they are counting on to sustain a frayed but officially intact truce he called in August for his Mahdi Army militia. Though privately many soldiers here say the Mahdi militia is involved in the current fighting, publicly, the allegation is that "special groups" who have broken away from Sadr and receive training and aid from Iran are causing the troubles.
As discussed previously on this Site, I concur that the "special groups" fiction can be useful. I'm just not so sure the current strategy looks to take advantage of the "special groups" formulation. Presently, US and Iraqi forces are not seeking to "quell violence" in Sadr City and Basra - they're initiating it. That's an enormous difference. Further, the main purpose of the anti-Sadrist operations is to weaken that movement ahead of regional elections this fall (which only makes the enormous loss of innocent civilian life in Sadr City that much more horrific).
Thus, keeping this fiction in play is less important than previously, when the Bush administration was contemplating more normalized relations with the Sadrists. After all, do we really expect Sadr to sustain a cease fire while missles, bombs and tank shells rain down upon his constituents? The "special groups" fiction wouldn't help him to save face amidst such carnage. Nor would a cease fire halt the onslaught.
What a difference 7+ years makes. Brandon Friedman reminds us of Cheney's comical, in retrospect, denunciation of the degradation of the military under the Clinton administration. From a Cheney speech on the campaign trail back in 2000:
For eight years, Clinton and Gore have extended our military commitments while depleting our military power. Rarely has so much been demanded of our armed forces, and so little given to them in return. George W. Bush and I are going to change that, too. I have seen our military at its finest, with the best equipment, the best training, and the best leadership. I'm proud of them. I have had the responsibility for their well-being. And I can promise them now, help is on the way. Soon, our men and women in uniform will once again have a commander in chief they can respect, one who understands their mission and restores their morale. [emph. added]
And what's not to respect about Dick Deferment and George "Defender of the Texas Skies" Bush. Friedman proceeds to dispatch the fish lingering in this fetid barrel. Well worth the read.
Also providing laughs courtesy of the way-back machine, look what John McCain has to say about a permanent presence in Iraq when we set the dial for 2005:
Three years before the Arizona Republican argued on the campaign trail that U.S. forces could be in Iraq for 100 years in the absence of violence, he decried the very concept of a long-term troop presence.
In fact, when asked specifically if he thought the U.S. military should set up shop in Iraq along the lines of what has been established in post-WWII Germany or Japan — something McCain has repeatedly advocated during the campaign — the senator offered nothing short of a categorical “no.”
“I would hope that we could bring them all home,” he said on MSNBC. “I would hope that we would probably leave some military advisers, as we have in other countries, to help them with their training and equipment and that kind of stuff.”
Host Chris Matthews pressed McCain on the issue. “You’ve heard the ideological argument to keep U.S. forces in the Middle East. I’ve heard it from the hawks. They say, keep United States military presence in the Middle East, like we have with the 7th Fleet in Asia. We have the German…the South Korean component. Do you think we could get along without it?”
McCain held fast, rejecting the very policy he urges today. “I not only think we could get along without it, but I think one of our big problems has been the fact that many Iraqis resent American military presence,” he responded. “And I don’t pretend to know exactly Iraqi public opinion. But as soon as we can reduce our visibility as much as possible, the better I think it is going to be.”
Ah, to be serious and mavirecky. Actually, it gets worse. As Steve Benen documents, McCain goes back and forth on this issue so often he's got enough frequent flier miles racked up that he can finally abandon Cindy's private jet.
Which would only bolster his non-elitists bona fides. I mean, has Obama given up his private jet? Didn't think so.
Abu Aardvark has an interesting post that outlines a challenge I had not previously seen - the fact that there are no Arab embassies in Baghdad to keep the monstrosity known as the Taj Mahal US Embassy company.
Finally, the Saudi position, from which other GCC states will likely take their lead, can be seen in Saud al-Faisal's announcement that security concerns prevent opening an embassy in Baghdad, and in today's column by the well-connected al-Arabiya director Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed dismissing the American and Iraqi demands on debt and embassies as a side issue: security is the "first, second, and third Arab issue", he writes, and when that is solved the rest will fall into place. None of this is surprising. The real reasons, I suspect, lie in their continuing perception of Maliki as a pro-Iranian, sectarian leader and Iraqi state institutions as deeply penetrated by Iranian influence - as well as their lack of interest in doing the US any favors right now. As Ambassador Edward Gnehm, one of America's most experienced diplomats in the Arab world, told me:
Gulf Arab states reacted predictably to Secretary Rice’s blandishments urging those states to open embassies in Baghdad and to forgive Iraqi debts. Those states remain wary and concerned over Shia dominance of the Iraqi political scene, Iranian influence that they perceive follows, and doubts that the U.S. really has an end game plan for Iraq that protects their interests. Both actions are seen as means to pressure the Shia political figures to give Sunni Iraqis their “rightful” place in the power structure as well as to nudge Iraq back toward the “Arab” camp. Until they conclude that Shia political figures are ready to move on these fronts, they will not act --- and they certainly will not make the concessions to the U.S.
In that regard, perhaps the most interesting thing I've seen in the wake of the conference is what seems to be an unusually direct outreach to Saudi concerns over the last two days, with an abrupt about-face on the part of senior Iraqi officials. In Kuwait Maliki called "on all our brothers and friends and all neighbouring countries to make more effort and to strengthen security measures to prevent terrorists from infiltrating our territory through joint borders." Arabs seem to have taken this as directed at them, rather than Iran, particularly when Maliki specifically expressed his dismay with the level of Arab support for Iraq.
So if we can't get the Arab community to reach out and start state-to-state negotiations with its troubled neighbor, how exactly will this Iraqi adventure suceed in becoming a stabilizing force for the region?
...With Some Help From the TPUM
I'm not about to say that stories about the Tibet People's Uprising Movement (TPUM) are getting spiked in some kind of journalistic omerta dedicated to keeping the existence of this awkward group out of reporting on the Tibetan disturbances...
...but I was interested enough in the issue to send a query about the absence of TPUM from news reports to a distinguished Asian correspondent.
He responded! and advised that he considered that TPUM was not important enough to merit mention in dispatches.
Not important! I sputtered to myself.
I think TPUM's plenty important.
So do the Chinese, for that matter.
In Still Broken, A.J. Rossmiller, recounts his tenure as an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA" - which is the Department of Defense's intelligence shop), which traces his personal eveolution ranging from his initial can-do enthusiasm to eventual dissilusionment and frustration. The narrative arc of Still Broken spans Rossmiller's time spent in intelligence gathering and analysis both in Baghdad and later in the labyrinthine halls of the Pentagon (an ample metaphor for the bureaucratic tangle that serves as the book's primary antagonist).
The recurring vignettes depicting the intrusive politicization of the intelligence gathering/analysis process, the inefficiency, lack of connectedness and bureacratic turf wars are as prevalent in each half of the book as they are inextricable parts of the overall story of the invasion of Iraq itself - from the selling of the war, to the mismanagement in the aftermath. While the generalities surrounding this tale are familiar to many in abstraction and slogan, Rossmiller provides a clearly written, unbiased, first person perspective of how this dysfunction actually plays out on a day to day basis. In that sense, it is an invaluable contribution to the public record.
Nevertheless, despite Rossmiller's well-supported diagnosis of an intelligence apparatus that was and is "Still Broken," the next step in the treatment regimen is less convincing. Though they can be detected plaintively in the background throughout, the essential questions raised by Still Broken are never really fully reckoned with by the author: Are we capable of forging a long-term, structural fix for what ails our intelligence community? Relatedly, is the cure likely to kill the patient? [more after the jump]
The big news coming out of Iraq, or at least the news getting the most play, is that the Sunni political bloc that had withdrawn from its ministerial positions in the Maliki government back in August 2007 is coming back. Maybe. That is, the details still have to be worked out, but there don't appear to be too many insurmountable obstacles that would make such a rapprochement impossible.
However, should this political detente unfold, its impact on larger issues of reconciliation should not be overestimated (which it undoubtedly will by all the usual suspects). First of all, the Sunni bloc that is pondering its return to the Maliki government (the Accordance Front) is not exactly representative of a wide swathe of Iraqi Sunnis.
Like the Sadrist current, many Iraqi Sunni groups boycotted the regional elections in 2005, so the Accordance Front is overrepresented due to lack of prior competition. In recent months, other Sunni groups have begun to enter the political fray. In particular, the Awakenings groups (especially the Anbar Salvation Council tribal elements) have been demanding a share of the local and national pie from the Accordance Front (which is viewed with some level of animosity and mistrust by outsider Sunni groups due to the Front's collaborative efforts with Maliki and the occupation forces).
In pursuit of this, the Awakenings groups have been busy forming political parties to compete in the next round of elections tentatively slated for October. In fact, some of the Awakenings constituents have threatened violence if they are not given a share of political power via elections or some other means. That's one of the reasons that the Bush administration has been pushing for regional elections (despite the fact that the Sadrists will make a dent in ISCI/Dawa's mandate through those same elections - unless they are weakened. Hmmm.).
So in a sense, the Accordance Front is facing a similar challenge from previously uninvolved parties that ISCI/Dawa is facing from the Sadrist current. With that in mind, the Accordance Front has at least a few incentives to rejoin Maliki's government. For one, its members will be able to take advantage of their insider positions, and access to government machinery, in order to improve performance at the polls come this fall (in both legitimate and less than legitimate ways ).
The stated reasons for re-entry into the government also offer insight into some of the potential motives:
“Our conditions were very clear, and the government achieved some of them,” said Adnan al-Duleimi, the head of Tawafiq, the largest Sunni bloc in the government. Mr. Duleimi said the achievements included “the general amnesty, chasing down the militias and disbanding them and curbing the outlaws.”
The recently passed amnesty law has already led to the release of many Sunni prisoners, encouraging Sunni parties that the government is serious about enforcing it. And the attacks on Shiite militias have apparently begun to assuage longstanding complaints that only Sunni groups blamed for the insurgency have been the targets of American and Iraqi security forces.
There is at least some truth to this. While possibly exaggerated, the amnesty law has produced positive results. In addition, many Sunnis - having faced the brunt of sectarian cleansing at the hands of the Mahdi Army - likely applaud the recent anti-Sadrist operations. By touting these achievements, the Accordance Front can make the case that they have delivered tangible gains to their constituents. Not a bad thing in an election season, though the incentive to hype these developments is something to consider.
In addition, there could be some behind the scenes quid-pro-quo with Bush administration officials whereby the Accordance Front is given preferential treatment with respect to the elections, or otherwise, in exchange for this PR gift that the Bush team will be touting as a sign of political progress on the reconciliation front. That's purely speculative, but not exaclty outlandish or beyond the pale.
With respect to reconciliation, though, it's important to remember that the return of the Accordance Front is not a new development, just a reset of the status quo ante in place before their withdrawal. So, just as the Surge might have succeeded in returning violence to the already horrific 2005 levels, so this move might restore the Green Zone political apparatus to the dysfunctional dynamic in place prior to August 2007.
Large scale reconciliation will only be possible (eventually) after truly representative elections that produce leaders that speak for, and address the concerns of, large majorities in the various segments Iraqi society. Ironically, the return of the Accordance Front could portend the opposite in terms of the Sunni electorate, just as Maliki's crackdown of the Sadrist current threatens to mute the electoral voice of large chunks of the Shiite population.
One step forward, two steps back. The Iraq shuffle.
(hat tip to Cernig for the link above, and some of the ideas expressed herein)
SHORTER Bush administration: "It's okay to bomb nuclear plants that aren't yet active, as long as you photograph them first. For instance, consider those in Iran..."
Cheryl Rofer is growing frustrated with the kabuki theater surrounding Israel's nuclear arsenal - a topic germane to at least three news stories currently in circulation. Rofer is always worth the read in connection with anything nuclear-related. And not.
Ilan Goldenberg takes note of some more "Special Groups" semantic chicanery. This site has been taking note of such word play in recent days. Cernig follows up with a post on the significance of 73% - and the recurrence of that very percentage. We need better propagandists.
I wish I had more time to blog, but you see, 73% of my day is currently being absorbed battling Special Projects from my bosses - at least, those of my bosses working direclty with the regime in Tehran in an elaborate effort to distract me from the unfolding plot to nuke defenseless Israel.
Vote McCain!
On April 22 (Earth Day!), the Los Angeles Times reported on the”secret retirement send-off” of the last of the F117A Stealth fighters, “those mysterious aircraft that revolutionized aerial warfare”.
The Times article is a competent piece of triumphalist milspeak including the inevitable handwringing over southern California's shrinking aerospace industry.
But there's a lot more to the story of the F117A.
The F117A was stealthy, but it wasn't all that stealthy. A Serbian anti-aircraft battery shot one down, apparently using obsolete Russian radar.
And it wasn't that secret.
Russia (which had originally developed the mathematics for stealth geometry) got pieces of the downed F117A to study.
The Chinese probably did too.
As a result, it's been speculated the F117A's stealth technology was sufficiently compromised that its deployment in South Korea was cancelled and it had to be retired prematurely in favor of the F22A Raptor.
And Chinese possession of Stealth wreckage is still the most likely explanation for one of the formative events in the creation of China's current geopolitical and military mindset: the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
A more complete story of the F117A would probably go like this:
It's time once again to update the list of COCOM commanders. The AP says that General David Petraeus has been nominated to be the next CENTCOM commander. This ought not to surprise anyone. Lieutenant General Ray Odierno will replace General Petraeus in Baghdad as the commander, Multinational Forces - Iraq, instead of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, as previously announced. Lieutenant General Pete Chiarelli will be nominated for that position.
Here's the new score:
- CENTCOM - Army General David Petraeus
- PACOM - Admiral Tim Keating
- EUCOM - Army General Bantz Craddock
- NORTHCOM - Air Force General Victor Renuart
- SOUTHCOM - Admiral James Stavridis
- AFRICOM - Army General William Ward
- JFCOM - Marine General James Mattis
- STRATCOM - Air Force General Kevin Chilton
- SOCOM - Admiral Eric Olsen
- TRANSCOM - Air Force General Norton Schwartz
Army - 3, Air Force - 3, Navy - 3, Marines - 1. Wow, look at that balance. It's almost like a sense of reality has returned to the Pentagon.
[UPDATE BY ERIC: At the risk of stepping on the AG's toes, just wanted to point out that (as noted in the comments) Spencer Ackerman has a good round up of commentary about the Petraeus promotion - including a link to a post at Newshoggers by Cernig with an update from yours truly.]
Anthony Cordesman surveys the lay of the land (pdf) in the era of all-out war with the Sadrists in Iraq and games out the possibilities. Of the three, none is overly promising, even if certain outcomes are preferable to others. They are, according to Cordesman:
First, Maliki can win, defeat Sadr’s militia—the Mahdi Army, or Jaish al Mahdi (JAM)—and marginalize the Sadr movement. Second, Maliki can provoke Sadr into open violence and a new form of insurgency. Or, both sides become locked in a lingering intra-Shi’ite power struggle that mixes violence with political power plays.
Cordesman is using strained definitions of "win" and "defeat" when contemplating the first scenario. A recent Reuters piece clarifies the matter somewhat, echoing points that this site has been making for some time:
Ultimately, say experts, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki may never be able to defeat the popular cleric by force, and his attempt to do so could make Iraq far more unstable at a time when U.S. troops are reducing in numbers.
"I think the threat should be taken very seriously indeed," said Reidar Visser, editor of the Iraq-focused website historiae.org and an expert on southern Shi'ite Iraq.
"The Sadrists represent a strong popular movement with deep roots in Iraqi society, and it is entirely unrealistic to deal with them through military solutions alone."
Even Cordesman hedges and pares back his notions of winning and defeating:
The practical problem is that it is much easier to provoke an ideological and political movement with even the most successful tactical attacks than it is to defeat it as a religious and political force. Iraq’s poorer and more religious Shi’ites will not disappear no matter how good the military gains are against the JAM. They will be a major political force in any future elections regardless of whether Sadr survives, Sadrists are allowed to run, or the elections are fair or partly rigged. No one in Iraq goes quietly into that great night.
So what, then, would count as victory? The answer drains most meaning out of the word: disrupt the political and military wings of the Sadrist movement sufficient enough that Iran's main ally in Iraq, ISCI (aka SIIC), can prevail in upcoming elections (only). In other words, the US will be aiding and assisting in the undermining of the democratic process that it supposedly invaded Iraq to promote as an example throughout the region:
One can question the impact of a Maliki victory from the perspective of democratic theory. Virtually all experts agree that the Sadrist movement probably has more mass support among Shi’ites than the combination of Dawa and SIIC. In some mix of local and provincial elections that was held on the basis of ideal democracy, Sadr would win significant strength in Baghdad and the south, and do so with as much legitimacy as any other populist demagogue.
More practically, it is hard to dismiss the possibility that the fighting that began on March 25 has been directed largely against Sadr precisely because he was becoming an increasingly better organized political force and more of a threat to Dawa and SIIC leaders who gained power more because they rode the US-led invasion into power than because of real popular support.
Would making a mockery of the democratic process in such a transparently hypocritical fashion be worth it for the US? All things being equal, there are some legitimate reasons to prefer ISCI/Dawa over the Sadrists (a topic I will examine in greater length in Part II). But all things aren't equal (nor is the basis for the preference overwhelmingly compelling).
For one, as mentioned above, any realistic conception of "victory" is inherently fleeting: the Sadrists might be shut out of the next round of elections, but they cannot be marginalized indefinitely. Reuters notes:
"The provincial elections are ahead and if the Sadrists were banned from participating, wide-scale confrontation is looming," said Iraqi university professor Saad al-Hadithi.
In addition, continuing to publicly promote democracy and claim it as the driving force of our foreign policy while working tirelessly to unravel democratic results when they don't meet our preferences greatly tarnishes our image and undermines our ability to encourage democratic growth (see, ie, Gaza, Pakistan, etc.).
Most importantly, though, continuing the massive assault on the Sadrist movement (besieging neighborhoods that house over 2 million Iraqis) will result in higher casualties for Coalition forces and, to a much larger extent, Iraqis - both militants and civilian bystanders alike.
All of those considerable and hefty costs will be incurred for the short term electoral gain of some tentative allies in Iraq that will, under ideal circumstances, result in the following net gain - according to Cordesman:
If this "best case" scenario occurs, it would almost certainly increase the prospects of the US staying in Iraq and have some impact on the November elections in the US. It would, however, be as much the "fog ahead" as the "way ahead."
And that's the best case scenario.
Back in July 2003, President Bush issued a now infamous taunt to the then-nascent Iraqi insurgency, urging militants intent on attacking Coalition forces to, "Bring 'em on." The Coalition had suffered three hundred or so fatalities at the time Bush made that ill-fated challenge. Since then, the number has grown to roughly 4,350. Careful what you wish for.
Even Bush, not one to contemplate past errors, has admitted that this bluster was a "big mistake." So when I saw the news over the weekend that Moqtada al-Sadr had issued a final ultimatum to the Iraqi government/US forces (halt the attacks on his movement, or he would fully lift the cease fire and declare all out war), I held out hope that the Bush administration might, at last, take this warning seriously and not make the same mistake again. For the Bush administration, however, it is one thing to begrudgingly admit culpability for previous lapses, and another to learn the implicit lesson therein:
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice mocked anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr as a coward on Sunday, hours after the radical leader threatened to declare war unless U.S. and Iraqi forces end a military crackdown on his followers.
Rice, in the Iraqi capital to tout security gains and what she calls an emerging political consensus, said al-Sadr is content to issue threats and edicts from the safety of Iran, where he is studying...
"I know he's sitting in Iran," Rice said dismissively, when asked about al-Sadr's latest threat to lift a self-imposed cease-fire with government and U.S. forces. "I guess it's all-out war for anybody but him," Rice said. "I guess that's the message; his followers can go too their deaths and he's in Iran."
So Condi, soon to return to that precarious forward operating base at Foggy Bottom, is calling out Sadr for urging others into battle from afar - reminiscent of Bush's prior bravado from a safe distance. Regardless of the transparent hypocrisy in the charge, this is an extremely disturbing development. As I have been cautioning of late, the Bush administration seems intent on provoking a full-on confrontation with the Sadrist movement. Again, careful what you wish for.
Tragically, the Bush administration is underestimating the capacity of the Sadrist movement today in much the same way it did the Sunni insurgency back in 2003. But then, it's easy to bluff big with other peoples' chips lives. She might even admit it was a "big mistake" in a few years. If we're lucky.
(hat tip Cernig)
This isn't the biggest deal in the world, and with everyone anticipating the Pennsylvania vote tomorrow, I doubt anyone's paying attention to it. But Obama, in response to a question about Jimmy Carter meeting with Hamas, said the following yesterday:
"I actually disagree with him on his meeting with Hamas," Obama said... "On the other hand, what I also disagree with is a habit of American presidents which is every president in their last year, they finally decide, we're going to try to broker a peace deal," Obama added. "Bill Clinton did it in his last year and he ran out of time. George Bush tried to do it."
This is a pretty dishonest equivalence he's drawing. The most salient point is that Clinton's presidency began just before Israel and the Palestinians agreed to direct negotiations with each other for the first time in the entire history of the conflict. The Oslo accords specified a five-year "transitional period" starting from the first negotiated withdrawal of Israeli forces, which ended up happening in May of '94 (this was the "Gaza-Jericho" interim agreement). Permanent status negotiations were supposed to begin no later than the beginning of the third year of the five year interim period, i.e. May of '96, with a final deadline of May '99. So how, exactly, was Bill Clinton supposed to "broker a peace deal" during his first year in office?
Let me get more specific about what happened before moving on to Bush. Israel and the Palestinians signed another overall interim agreement ("Oslo II") in September of '95, which re-affirmed the negotiating deadlines I mentioned above. After Rabin was assassinated in November of '95, Peres went into May of '96 (deadline for the start of permanent status talks) seeking a mandate in the election which was held that month. He lost to Netanyahu, who immediately moved to put any permanent status talks on ice. After some fits and starts in more interim talks, the "Wye River Memorandum" agreement of November '98 again re-affirmed the May '99 deadline for reaching a final agreement. When that date came around, there was, once again, an Israeli election, with Barak defeating Netanyahu that very month. It was only at that point that final status talks began in earnest, which eventually led to the Camp David summit and everything that followed.
So how, exactly, was Bill Clinton supposed to have "brokered a peace deal" before the parties themselves had reached the specific timetable that they had agreed upon between themselves? This isn't to exonerate Clinton of any and all criticism; one could argue that on a tactical level, they could have tried harder to keep the negotiations on track during the interim periods (Dennis Ross himself has essentially admitted as much), or maybe that they should have pushed harder for progress under the recalcitrant Netanyahu (on the other hand, such pressure might only have strengthened his position with a terror-weary Israeli electorate). In any event, I simply don't think it's reasonable at all to blame Bill Clinton for having "finally decide[d]" in his last year to try to broker a deal, as Obama said.
Regarding Bush, the record is quite different. It's true that he entered office with the peace process having collapsed into violence, and with a hard-line Israeli prime minister having just been elected in a historically massive landslide (Sharon defeated Barak by 25 points only two weeks after Bush's inauguration). So the atmosphere was hardly conducive to successful peace-making. However, as I noted here, Bush simply did not think that active U.S. involvement in negotiations was the right policy when he took office. Of course, anyone with even a passing familiarity in the conflict (and an honest desire to see it resolved) knew that the outbreak of the intifada and the apparent collapse of the entire Oslo framework had opened up a dangerous vacuum, and this was only going to lead to much worse violence unless something replaced it, which could only happen with assertive U.S. leadership. But that wasn't how Bush saw it, and Powell didn't try very hard to convince him otherwise, so things just kept getting worse.
So the overall point here is that it simply isn't fair at all to draw an equivalence between the fact that both Bush and Clinton have attemped to broker a final peace deal only in the last year of their two-term presidencies. Obama probably knows that and was just trying to score some more points by linking the Clintons to Bush and "old-style politics" or whatever. Obama has faced plenty of unfair or tendentious attacks directly from the Clintons, but his more enthusiastic defenders should probably realize that stuff like this is bound to annoy the Clintons in a big way, and that they're perfectly justified in taking umbrage at Bill's record being characterized unfairly by a fellow Democrat.
| Quick Links |
| About |
|
American Footprints is a group of regular Americans offering commentary on American foreign policy with a multiplicity of views from a liberal perspective.
|
| Where's praktike? |
|
Blake Hounshell (aka praktike), our co-founder and main man, is now web editor of Foreign Policy. 
blakehounshell [at] gmail Blake's personal blog |
| The TBR Pile |
| Visitors since Dec 2004 |
|
|
